Mann v. Mann

223 N.W. 186, 57 N.D. 550, 1929 N.D. LEXIS 345
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 19, 1929
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 223 N.W. 186 (Mann v. Mann) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mann v. Mann, 223 N.W. 186, 57 N.D. 550, 1929 N.D. LEXIS 345 (N.D. 1929).

Opinion

*552 Burr, J.

“The Bismarck Tribune Company is a North Dakota corporation with assets approximately $300,000, liabilities negligible, and capitalized stock of $25,000 divided into 250 shares of $100.” This statement from defendant’s brief is a succinct description of the corporation at the time of the commencement of this action. The defendant held 248 shares of this stock, her sister held one share, and the plaintiff held the remaining share.

In a property settlement, incidental to a divorce proceeding, the defendant agreed to purchase her sister’s share' of stock and sell this together with her own holdings to the plaintiff, thus vesting in him the sole ownership of the corporation, and in consideration therefor the plaintiff agreed to deliver to the defendant valid bonds of the corporation in the sum of $165,000 — the bonds to be amortized so as to pay $6,000 principal and interest semi-annually and “secured by first mortgage on all the real and personal property of the company.” The surplus of the corporation at this time amounted to some $200,000, there were no creditors, and no stockholders other than the ones heretofore mentioned. The defendant secured the stock held by her sister *553 -and transferred this together with her stock to the plaintiff. The plaintiff tendered to the defendant, in consideration for this transfer ■of stock, $165,000 in bonds of the corporation in compliance with the t'-rms agreed upon between the parties. At the time of this agreement the life expectancy of the corporation was less than the time allowed for the maturity of the bonds. It is agreed between the parties that the bonds on their face as issued and delivered to the defendant are strictly in accordance with the agreement; but under the contract the “legality of the bond issue on which said bonds . . . are based shall be passed upon by counsel for the defendant.” Counsel for the defendant being doubtful as to the validity of the bonds the defendant declined to receive them. Thus the validity of the bond issue is the matter in dispute for if the bonds be valid plaintiff has complied with his contract and the defendant should accept them.

. The plaintiff, the defendant, and the defendant’s sister were the directors of the corporation. Upon the transfer of the stock to the plaintiff he became the sole owner of the corporation. There being no debts he could handle the property as he saw fit. He was entitled to the surplus, could continue the corporation or he could wind it up. In order to comply with the statute of this state, requiring three directors for the corporation, the plaintiff transferred one share of stock to Archie Johnson, and one share of stock to Frank Ellsworth and thus there were three stockholders. These stockholders met and elected themselves directors and officers of the corporation. They held a meeting for the purpose of issuing the bonds, in order to permit the plaintiff to carry out his agreement with the defendant. Accordingly the bonds were issued and all of the necessary legal requirements followed; but plaintiff still owned the company.

The validity of the bonds is not attacked by the corporation itself, nor by a stockholder, nor by a creditor. The defendant is not a creditor of the corporation. She has no interest in the corporation and claims none other than as the holder of these bonds if they are to be accepted by her.

The bonds were in fact issued, all necessary steps were taken and the corporation was such a one as could borrow money and issue bonds. Hence this act was not ultra vires in the strict sense of the term. The term ultra vires is used in different senses. In the real primary sense *554 it refers first to the state, “meaning an act which transcends the powers conferred by law on the corporation — something which is not within the scope of the powers of a corporation to make under any circumstances, or for any purpose.” Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co. v. Langdon, 44 Minn. 41, 46 N. W. 312. Frequently the term is used also in the case of contracts which in general the corporation could make but which are imperfect or defective because of some irregularity or defect in the actual exercise of its powers insofar as the particular contract is concerned. The issuance of bonds by this corporation is not an ultra vires act in itself. Therefore a bond issue is not absolutely void.

Defendant says the bonds tendered her are invalid because “the proposed bond issue is in excess of the capital stock of the Bismarck Tribune Company” and therefore in violation of § 4543 of the Supplement which says: “The directors of corporations must not . . . create debts beyond the subscribed capital stock.” The statute does not say that such debts are void and therefore would imply they are debts of the corporation when contracted. It is a limitation on the power of the directors and a violation thereof would subject the directors to a suit at the hands of the stockholders, but the debts are not necessarily void. In the case of Underhill v. Santa Barbara Land, Bldg. & Improv. Co. 93 Cal. 300, 28 Pac. 1049, the court construed an identical provision in the California case and held:

“Though the notes and mortgages were given for a debt larger than the subscribed capital stock of the corporation, their execution was not prohibited by Civil Code, No. 309, forbidding directors of corporations from creating debts beyond the subscribed capital stock, and for a violation of this provision making the directors who create such debts jointly and individually liable to the corporation.”

See also Sells v. Rosedale Grocery & Commission Co. 72 Miss. 590, 17 So. 236; Ossipee Hosiery & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Canney, 54 N. H. 295; Hawke v. California Realty & Constr. Co. 28 Cal. App. 377, 152 Pac. 963; 14 C. J. 574. Of course the defendant knew when she agreed to take the bonds that she was contracting for bonds in excess of the capital stock of the company. The defendant not being a stockholder or a creditor of the corporation is not- in position to raise this question and in any event we do not think such violation of the statute inrali *555 dates the bonds. The bonds are valid if the plaintiff or her assignees can enforce them against the corporation, and if the corporation and stockholders be estopped from raising the question of the validity of their own acts then so far as the defendant is concerned the bonds are good.

As a general rule whatever will estop the stockholders will estop the. corporation and whatever will estop the corporation will estop stockholders. See Thomp. Corp. § 5269; Omaha Hotel Co. v. Wade, 97 U. S. 13, 24 L. ed. 917; Union P. R. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 163 U. S. 564, 41 L. ed. 265, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1173. In this later case cited it was held that new stockholders, — that is the stockholders who bought into the corporation after the acts complained of had been committed and were known — had no standing" in the court to test the validity of the act done and therefore the corporation could not recover as for them. Hence subsequent stockholders of this corporation can not attack the validity of this bond issue.

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Bluebook (online)
223 N.W. 186, 57 N.D. 550, 1929 N.D. LEXIS 345, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mann-v-mann-nd-1929.