Manix v. Harris
This text of 2014 MT 30N (Manix v. Harris) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Montana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
February 4 2014
DA 13-0266
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2014 MT 30N
DAVE MANIX,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
SAM HARRIS, Attorney at Law,
Defendant and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. CDV-12-0633(b) Honorable Julie Macek, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Patrick F. Flaherty, Attorney at Law; Great Falls, Montana
For Appellee:
Michael F. McMahon, Bernard F. Hubley, McMahon, Wall & Hubley, PLLC; Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 2, 2014 Decided: February 4, 2014
Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 The State charged Dave Manix with felony elder abuse after an investigation by
Adult Protective Services of the Montana Department of Health and Human Services
showed that an elderly neighbor had given him over $160,000 in 2008 and 2009. The
State sought and obtained an order of protection that limited Manix’s contact with the
neighbor. Manix hired attorney Sam Harris to represent him and paid a retainer. Harris
represented Manix for over a year, and negotiated a plea agreement with the State under
which Manix would plead guilty to the charge and make restitution of $60,000. The
State agreed to a ten-year deferred imposition of sentence. Manix signed the plea
agreement but subsequently changed his mind.
¶3 Harris withdrew as Manix’s attorney with Manix’s consent. Manix obtained a
new attorney who negotiated a deferred prosecution agreement with the State. The
agreement provided for restitution of about $2700 and the State subsequently dismissed
the charge, without prejudice.
¶4 Manix, through his new attorney, filed this action against his former attorney
Harris, asserting claims for negligence/malpractice; breach of fiduciary duty; breach of
2 the covenant of good faith; and negligent misrepresentation. Harris filed motions for
summary judgment, and Manix responded, seeking leave to file an amended complaint to
plead an additional claim for deceit. The District Court held a hearing and granted
summary judgment to Harris. Manix appeals and we affirm.
¶5 The District Court heard argument on each of Harris’s grounds for summary
judgment and then announced its decision from the bench. The District Court concluded
that Manix failed to properly plead a claim for deceit and that the statute he relied upon,
§ 37-61-406, MCA, does not apply to claims of deceit as between an attorney and client.
The District Court concluded that Manix’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty failed
because he did not plead sufficient facts to support the claim. The District Court
concluded that Manix could not maintain a claim for negligent misrepresentation because
Harris had provided only a legal opinion that Manix would likely be convicted if the case
went to trial and that he should accept the plea agreement. This legal opinion was not a
representation of fact and Manix ultimately chose not to follow Harris’s legal advice.
¶6 The District Court granted summary judgment on the claim of legal negligence or
malpractice because it was based upon the contention that Harris was negligent for
advising Manix that he would likely be convicted if tried and should therefore plead
guilty. Because Manix ultimately declined to follow that advice, Manix had no basis to
claim that Harris’s advice caused him injury as required to support a claim of damages
for negligence. Further, Manix’s claimed damages arising from the deterioration of his
relationship with his elderly neighbor, who he refers to as his mother, were caused by the
felony charge and the order of protection, and not by Harris’s advice. The District Court
3 also concluded that Manix’s proposal to salvage his claims by filing an amended
complaint were not effective because the proposed amendments would be futile as a
matter of fact or law.
¶7 The District Court properly considered and disposed of Manix’s claims and
properly granted summary judgment to Harris. The fact that Manix is dissatisfied with
Harris’s representation does not, without more, support a cause of action for damages.
Harris was not required to produce a particular result for Manix, did not engage in any
demonstrated misrepresentation of fact, and is not liable because Manix obtained a
different result with a different lawyer. Manix did not take Harris’s advice, did not enter
a guilty plea and was not held liable under the plea agreement that Harris obtained. The
District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Manix leave to file an amended
complaint.
¶8 Manix did not appeal the District Court’s award of costs to Harris and we
therefore do not consider that award in this proceeding. We decline Harris’s request that
he be awarded costs and attorney fees on appeal.
¶9 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d) of
our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. The District
Court properly applied the facts to the law in resolving this case and did not err in
granting summary judgment.
¶10 Affirmed.
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
4 We Concur:
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT /S/ PATRICIA COTTER /S/ JIM RICE
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