COURT OF CHANCERY
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
417 S. State Street
JOSEPH R. SLIGHTS III Dover, Delaware 19901 VICE CHANCELLOR Telephone: (302) 739-4397 Facsimile: (302) 739-6179
Date Submitted: October 19, 2020 Date Decided: November 19, 2020
Steven L. Caponi, Esquire R. Judson Scaggs, Jr., Esquire Matthew B. Goeller, Esquire Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP K&L Gates LLP 1201 North Market Street 600 King Street, Suite 901 Wilmington, DE 19801 Wilmington, DE 19801 David E. Ross, Esquire R. Garrett Rice, Esquire Ross Aronstam & Moritz LLP 100 S. West Street, Suite 400 Wilmington, DE 19801
Re: Manhattan Telecommunications Corp., d/b/a Metropolitan Telecommunications, a/k/a MetTel v. Granite Telecommunications, LLC C.A. No. 2020-0468-JRS
Dear Counsel:
The plaintiff in this trade libel case, Manhattan Telecommunications Corp.
(“MetTel”), has brought a Motion for Continued Confidential Treatment in which it
seeks a court order sealing all references in the pleadings to the allegedly defamatory
statements. For the reasons explained below, MetTel’s motion must be denied and
the redacted portions of the pleadings must be made public.
Granite Telecommunications, LLC C.A. No. 2020-0468-JRS November 19, 2020 Page 2
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
MetTel and Granite Telecommunications, LLC (“Granite”) provide a variety
of communications solutions to Delaware entities.1 Both companies apparently
provide services to an overlapping customer base, including those uniquely affected
by the COVID-19 pandemic, such as healthcare providers.2 In its Complaint,
MetTel alleges that shortly after the pandemic set in, Granite began contacting some
of these overlapping customers to sow doubts about MetTel’s financial condition
and ability to weather the pandemic-related economic uncertainty. 3
These contacts first came to light after MetTel was approached by confused
customers who recounted Granite’s statements.4 As time passed, MetTel came to
learn that Granite’s allegedly false and defamatory statements were not isolated, but
1 Verified Compl. Under Seal (“Compl.”) (D.I. 1) ¶¶ 6–7, 10–11.
2 Compl. ¶¶ 4, 20.
3 Compl. ¶¶ 16–17.
4 Compl. ¶ 19.
Granite Telecommunications, LLC C.A. No. 2020-0468-JRS November 19, 2020 Page 3
widespread, and were coming from all levels within Granite’s organization. 5 As a
result of these contacts, MetTel alleges substantial harm to its reputation and a
decline in both current and future business. 6
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
MetTel originally brought suit against Granite on May 19, 2020. 7 On June 9,
2020, Granite removed the action to the United States District Court for the District
of Delaware. MetTel then voluntarily dismissed that action. 8 MetTel initiated this
action on June 15, 2020.9 The operative Complaint asserts claims for defamation,
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, tortious interference
5 Compl. ¶¶ 19–20, 29.
6 Compl. ¶ 36.
7 Verified Compl., Manhattan Telecomms. Corp. v. Granite Telecomms., LLC, C.A. No. 2020-0380-JRS (D.I. 1). 8 Notice of Filing of Notice of Removal, Manhattan Telecomms. Corp. v. Granite Telecomms., LLC, C.A. No. 2020-0380-JRS (D.I. 41); Mot. for Continued Confidential Treatment (“Mot.”) (D.I. 14) ¶ 3. 9 (D.I. 1).
Granite Telecommunications, LLC C.A. No. 2020-0468-JRS November 19, 2020 Page 4
with contractual relations, trade libel and deceptive trade practices. 10 As factual
predicates for these claims, the Complaint lays out both general descriptions and
specific examples of statements made by Granite employees that MetTel claims are
defamatory, as well as the reasons MetTel believes the statements will or have
caused harm. 11 The Complaint was filed under seal as permitted by Court of
Chancery Rule 5.1.
When MetTel filed the public version of the Complaint, the content related to
the alleged defamatory statements was redacted. 12 MetTel filed its initial Motion for
Confidential Treatment on June 23, 2020.13 This motion sought an order allowing
MetTel to file its Motion to Expedite confidentially under Court of Chancery
Rule 5.1. 14 This unopposed motion was granted on June 24, 2020.15 MetTel’s
10 Compl. ¶¶ 38–71.
11 Compl. ¶¶ 17–37.
12 Verified Compl. Redacted Public Version (D.I. 2).
13 Pl.’s Mot. for Confidential Treatment (D.I. 4).
14 Id. ¶ 7.
15 Order Granting Mot. for Confidential Treatment (D.I. 5).
Granite Telecommunications, LLC C.A. No. 2020-0468-JRS November 19, 2020 Page 5
Motion to Expedite was filed on June 25, 16 with the redacted public version being
filed on July 2, 2020.17
Prior to the filing of the public version of the Motion to Expedite, on June 29,
2020, Interested Party Professor Eugene Volokh submitted notice under Rule 5.1(f)
challenging the confidential treatment of the Complaint, its exhibits and the Motion
to Expedite.18 In response, MetTel filed the present Motion for Continued
Confidential Treatment on July 10, 2020 (the “Motion”).19 In his opposition to the
Motion, Professor Volokh states that he wishes to use the currently redacted
information, inter alia, to “publicly discuss, on his Reason Magazine-hosted blog
and potentially in a law review article, how libel litigants are trying to use the legal
system to restrict speech.”20
16 Pl.’s Mot. to Expedite Under Seal (D.I. 6).
17 Pl.’s Mot. to Expedite (D.I. 11).
18 Notice of Challenge to Confidential Treatment (D.I. 10).
19 (D.I. 14).
20 Opp’n to Mot. for Continued Confidential Treatment (“Opp’n”) (D.I. 16) ¶ 15.
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MetTel makes three primary arguments for continued confidential treatment.
First, it argues that the presumption of public access is overcome because public
access to the allegedly defamatory statements would cause irreparable harm, as
recognized by this court in CapStack Nashville 3 LLC v. MACC Venture Partners
(“CapStack”). 21 Second, it argues that Professor Volokh’s interest in this
information is not “compelling enough” to outweigh the potential harm. 22 Third, it
argues that the previous findings of good cause for confidentiality in this case dictate
the same finding here. 23
Professor Volokh counters that MetTel has failed to rebut the presumption of
public access for a multitude of reasons. He principally argues that he possesses a
legitimate interest in the redacted information, while MetTel lacks any justifiable
21 Mot. ¶¶ 11–17 (citing CapStack Nashville 3 LLC v. MACC Venture Partners, 2018 WL 3949274 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2018)). 22 Mot. ¶¶ 18–23; Reply in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Continued Confidential Treatment (“RB”) (D.I. 21) ¶¶ 8–14. 23 Mot. ¶¶ 24–25; RB ¶¶ 15–16.
Granite Telecommunications, LLC C.A. No. 2020-0468-JRS November 19, 2020 Page 7
interest in confidentiality. 24 He further argues MetTel’s filing of an unredacted
Motion to Remand in Federal Court undermines its arguments in this Action, 25 and
the public interest here is heightened because MetTel should be deemed to be a
public person.26
I am persuaded that the public interest in the redacted information at issue
outweighs the potential for harm to MetTel flowing from disclosure. The Motion,
therefore, is denied.
III. ANALYSIS
Court of Chancery Rule 5.1 governs this Motion for Continued Confidential
Treatment. That rule, in essence, codifies the “powerful presumption of public
24 Opp’n ¶¶ 15–17, 18–22.
25 Opp’n ¶¶ 23–24. According to MetTel, this disclosure was inadvertent and “[t]he District Court has since placed the Opening Brief in Support of Motion to Remand under seal.” RB ¶ 12. 26 Opp’n ¶ 25. Given a sufficient showing that the public’s interest in understanding the proceedings outweighs MetTel’s interest in confidentiality, I need not decide whether MetTel is a “public person.”
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access” to court proceedings and records.27 The rule also recognizes, however, that
the presumption of public access is not absolute, and that, in certain circumstances,
litigants are entitled to confidentiality. The touchstone for the exception to access is
“good cause.”28 Good cause exists if the party seeking confidential treatment can
demonstrate that “the public interest in access to Court proceedings is outweighed
by the harm that public disclosure of sensitive, non-public information would
cause.”29
By design, the burden of demonstrating good cause is exacting, recognizing
that “[t]hose who decide to litigate in a public forum . . . must do so in a manner
consistent with the right of the public to follow and monitor the proceedings and the
result of [the] dispute.” 30 In this regard, our courts appreciate that public access to
27 Horres v. Chick-fil-A, Inc., 2013 WL 1223605, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2013).
28 Ct. Ch. R. 5.1.
29 Id.
30 Al Jazeera America, LLC v. AT&T Servs., Inc., 2013 WL 5614284, at *7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2013). Notably, the previous rule, Rule 5(g), was revised “in part because too much information was being deemed confidential, including information which ‘did not
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the courts and their business is “fundamental to a democratic state and necessary in
the long run so that the public can judge the product of the courts in a given case.”31
And the public cannot “judge the product of the courts in a given case” if the
information being withheld is necessary for understanding “the nature of the
dispute” or the court’s bases for a decision. 32
The burden for overcoming the presumption of public access always falls on
the party seeking to “obtain or maintain Confidential Treatment.” 33 And that party
must show more than mere “potential for collateral economic consequences.”34
fall within any recognized exception to the public’s right of access and was not truly sensitive or confidential in nature.’” Id. at *3 (internal citation omitted). 31 Sequoia Presidential Yacht Gp. LLC v. FE P’rs LLC, 2013 WL 3724946, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 15, 2013) (footnote and internal quotations omitted). 32 Al Jazeera America, LLC, 2013 WL 5614284, at *1 (observing that “[t]he public interest in the judicial process cannot be vindicated if the nature of the litigation remains masked in a fundamental way”). 33 Ct. Ch. R. 5.1(b)(3) (emphasis added).
34 Al Jazeera, 2013 WL 5614284, at *5.
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“Instead, the harm must be ‘particularized.’” 35 In other words, “[t]he conclusory
assertion that a company faces an unsubstantiated risk of ‘economic disadvantage’”
is not enough.36 Nor is potential embarrassment or the fact that the information has
not previously been disclosed.37
Applying this balancing framework here, MetTel has failed to prove a
particularized harm sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in the redacted
information. First, the harm MetTel asserts will occur if the redacted information is
made public is not sufficiently particularized. Second, without the currently
redacted portions of the Complaint, the public’s ability to understand the
proceedings is seriously diminished. Finally, MetTel’s argument that CapStack is
dispositive is unconvincing.
35 In re Columbia Pipeline Gp., Inc., 2018 WL 4182207, at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 30, 2018) (quoting Sequoia, 2013 WL 3724946, at *2). 36 ADT Hldgs., Inc. v. Harris, 2017 WL 4317245, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 28, 2017) (quoting Al Jazeera, 2013 WL 5614284, at *3). 37 Sequoia, 2013 WL 3724946, at *2. Because MetTel bears the burden to prove good cause, and the fact that information is currently undisclosed is not sufficient, MetTel’s arguments that past findings of good cause on uncontested motions must lead to the same conclusion here fall short. Mot. ¶ 25.
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A. MetTel’s Interest in Confidentiality
The harm MetTel alleges will be inflicted upon it in the absence of
confidentiality protections is too broad to meet the requirements of Rule 5.1. As
explained above, to show an interest in confidentiality that outweighs the public’s
right of access, MetTel must do more than make “[g]eneric statements of harm.” 38
The showing must be particularized; in other words, MetTel “must point to specific
information like ‘trade secrets or competitively sensitive pricing information’” that
is not in the public mix and, if disclosed, will cause clearly identified harm. 39
MetTel claims to meet this burden by alleging “harm beyond its reputation,
including but not limited to direct harm to its business relationships with current and
potential customers.” 40 But MetTel’s Complaint and Motion rest on unsubstantiated
38 In re Oxbow Carbon LLC, 2016 WL 7323443, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 15, 2016) (Order).
39 Id. (quoting Kronenberg v. Katz, 872 A.2d 568, 608–09 (Del. Ch. 2004)).
40 Mot. ¶ 17.
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claims of generic harm. 41 For example, MetTel’s Complaint alleges: “[o]nce that
seed [of the defamatory statement] has been planted, the client will undertake a
critical look at a provider with which it had been perfectly happy” and “may
terminate the contract based on a pretext” 42; “there is a real risk that MetTel will be
asked to bid on fewer and fewer contracts going forward”43; and “[o]nce confidence
[in] a provider’s financial stability is called into question, customers . . . can simply
choose the non-confrontational option of selecting a different vendor.”44
The examples of potential harm MetTel offers in support of the Motion are
even less concrete. MetTel asserts that “[i]f this Court were to discontinue the
confidential treatment of the pleadings that contain Granite’s defamatory statements,
it would effectively thwart MetTel’s efforts to prevent further irreparable harm.” 45
41 It is important to emphasize here that the extent to which MetTel is required to plead harm to meet its minimal notice pleading burden under Court of Chancery Rule 8 differs from the more rigorous burden to demonstrate harm under Rule 5.1. 42 Compl. ¶ 31.
43 Compl. ¶ 32.
44 Compl. ¶ 33.
45 Mot. ¶ 15.
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These potential harms fail to meet the stringent particularization standard. In
fact, it is difficult to imagine a defamation case, at least in a commercial setting,
where these same concerns would not always be present. MetTel tries to avoid this
reality by claiming its harm is unique because disclosure “would effectively nullify
MetTel’s efforts to prove it was and is being harmed.” 46 Not so. If Granite had
made these statements in a public setting, MetTel would still be able to sue for
defamation just the same. 47 While the nature of the harm may differ depending on
if a defamatory statement is made in private or public, a defamation or libel suit
would still be viable in either context.48
Stepping back from MetTel’s arguments, it is evident from a comparison to
the examples in Rule 5.1 that potentially defamatory statements, per se, are not the
kind of information the drafters of Rule 5.1 intended to protect. The five examples
in Rule 5.1 include: “trade secrets; sensitive proprietary information; sensitive
46 RB ¶ 6.
47 See, e.g., Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967, 972–73 (Del. 1978) (finding a quote in a publicly available magazine article was libelous). 48 Id.
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financial, business, or personnel information; sensitive personal information such as
medical records; and personally identifying information such as social security
numbers, financial account numbers, and the names of minor children.” 49 Each of
these enumerated categories is discrete and reflects information that is not, or at least
should not be, of interest to the general public in the quest to understand the dispute
before the court or the bases for the court’s decisions.50 While I do not dispute there
is some risk of economic harm to MetTel if the redacted information is made public,
allowing such information to remain redacted “merely because its disclosure could
cause the parties economic harm” would turn the presumption of public access on
its head and frustrate the purpose of Rule 5.1. 51
49 Ct. Ch. R. 5.1(b)(2).
50 See Al Jazeera, 2013 WL 5614284, at *1 (“They note that this Court traditionally has allowed redaction of discrete sensitive information, such as a price term . . . . That is because, on balance, the detriment to the parties of disclosure outweighs the public interest in such a discrete piece of information.”). 51 Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
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B. The Public’s Interest in Understanding the Bases of the Dispute
The public maintains a strong interest in access to the content of the alleged
defamatory statements. If the information currently redacted remains so, the public
will have no means to understand the dispute MetTel has asked the Court to
adjudicate. This conflicts with the public’s right to “monitor the proceedings and
result[s]” 52—a right, again, that “has been characterized as fundamental to a
democratic state.” 53 In other words, when “the supposedly-confidential information
represents the nature of the dispute itself—the interest of the public in accessing this
information outweighs the economic harm to the parties that disclosure may
cause.”54 That is the case here.
While MetTel and Professor Volokh debate the legitimacy of Professor
Volokh’s planned use for this information,55 nothing in our law obligates Professor
52 Id. at *7.
53 Horres, 2013 WL 1223605, at *1 (quoting Matter of Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984)). 54 Al Jazeera, 2013 WL 5614284, at *5.
55 Mot. ¶¶ 18–23; Opp’n ¶¶ 15–17.
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Volokh to prove why he seeks access to information filed in a Delaware court, much
less that his purpose is somehow “proper.” Instead, MetTel is obligated to prove that
good cause exists to deny Professor Volokh access to the information he seeks as a
member of the public. 56 That information—the gravamen of the case—cannot be
discerned from the redacted Complaint, which, at best, notifies the public that
Granite made some unknown defamatory statements that MetTel now asserts are
defamatory for some unknown reason(s).57 This is hardly adequate to enable the
public “to follow and monitor the proceedings and the result of [the] dispute.”58
56 Ct. Ch. R. 5.1(b)(3) (“The party or person seeking to obtain or maintain Confidential Treatment always bears the burden of establishing good cause for Confidential Treatment.”). 57 For example, the interested reader of Paragraph 17 of the Complaint would read: “Granite has begun telling MetTel’s current and potential clients—falsely—that MetTel is in bad financial shape and probably will not survive the COVID-19 crisis. The purpose of these lies is to convince MetTel’s clients and potential clients that MetTel is an unreliable telecom provider that will likely leave them without essential services when they are needed most.” Compl. ¶ 17. 58 Al Jazeera America, LLC, 2013 WL 5614284, at *7. See also Okla. Firefighters Pension Ret. Sys. v. Corbat, 2017 WL 5484125, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 15, 2017) (holding that, although the complaint revealed that the case “involve[d] communications between Citigroup’s management and its Board of Directors concerning its compliance with law and with regulatory consent orders,” redactions regarding the specific communications
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Not only would it be impossible for a member of the public to understand
what is going on in this case based on the pleadings, “it is difficult to envision a
judicial opinion in this matter that could maintain the confidentiality of all the
designated material and yet be comprehensible to the reading public.” 59 In its
Complaint, MetTel asks this Court to determine whether Granite committed
defamation, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, tortious
interference with contractual relations, trade libel and deceptive trade practices.60
When this Court is called upon to determine the merits of these claims in trial or
motion practice, the Court will not be able to render and deliver a comprehensible
decision without reference to the currently redacted information.
were not proper since “[t]he public . . . has a strong interest in the workings of a Delaware entity and its compliance with substantive law”). 59 Al Jazeera, 2013 WL 5614284, at *1.
60 Compl. ¶¶ 38–71.
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C. MetTel’s Reliance on CapStack is Misplaced
Finally, MetTel claims that this court’s decision in CapStack is dispositive.61
Indeed, according to MetTel, CapStack is the reason it filed its pleadings under seal
in the first place.62 Under MetTel’s reading of CapStack, MetTel “cannot, on the
one hand, argue that the defamatory and tortious statements by Granite are causing
irreparable harm, while, at the same time, repeat those defamatory and tortious
statements in the public record.” 63 As explained below, that reading of CapStack in
the context of this Motion, is neither accurate nor persuasive.
In CapStack, shortly after the parties entered into an arrangement to own and
manage three rental properties, the relationship fell apart.64 Both the plaintiffs and
defendants accused the other of misrepresenting the extent of their previous
61 2018 WL 3949274.
62 Mot. ¶ 2.
63 RB ¶ 6.
64 CapStack Nashville 3 LLC, 2018 WL 3949274, at *2.
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experience in the industry. 65 After the plaintiffs received a letter they read as a threat
to spread the alleged misrepresentations, they filed suit.66 The plaintiffs then moved
for a temporary restraining order, “ask[ing] this Court to temporarily enjoin the
Defendants from making allegedly defamatory statements about the Plaintiffs to the
SEC, investors in CSP, or any other third parties.”67 “In other words, the Plaintiffs
[sought] a prior restraint” on speech, which is prohibited by the Delaware
Constitution.68
While it is true that CapStack held that the plaintiffs had “failed to establish
that irreparable harm will likely result,” relying in part on the fact that the
information was already public through the pleadings, the court reached this
conclusion when answering an entirely different question than the one I answer
65 Id.
66 Id. at *2–3.
67 Id. at *3.
68 Id. at *3–4.
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here.69 The court in CapStack was being asked “to temporarily enjoin future speech
based solely on a finding that the Complaint pleads a colorable claim for defamation
or trade libel.”70 The court analyzed the defamation claims solely in the context of
deciding whether a TRO was justified. 71
Here, I must answer a single question: whether MetTel has demonstrated a
particularized harm that outweighs the public interest in access to court proceedings
and records. I am not considering whether a temporary injunction should issue, but
rather whether redacted information should be made public. And because the
allegedly defamatory statements have already been made and documented, I face no
risk of inadvertently “forbidding [a party] from engaging in constitutionally
protected speech.”72
69 Id. at *3.
70 Id. at *4 (emphasis in original).
71 Id. at *3 (internal citation omitted).
72 Id. at *5. The fact that the statements have already been made likely explains why MetTel has not sought emergency injunctive relief.
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Further, even ignoring these significant differences in procedural posture and
requested relief, MetTel’s CapStack argument fails for another equally salient
reason. Under MetTel’s reading of CapStack, the factual gravamen of a defamation
complaint could never be disclosed to the public in a court document if that
information was not previously disclosed, regardless of whether access to the
particular statements would cause particularized harm, because disclosure would
potentially foreclose a showing of irreparable harm. 73 That reading would eviscerate
the presumption of public access, ignore our Rule 5.1 jurisprudence requiring a
showing of good cause to rebut the presumption, and conflict with the general rule
that the mere fact information is “previously undisclosed” is not enough to justify
confidential treatment. 74 CapStack has no bearing here.
73 RB ¶ 5.
74 Sequoia, 2013 WL 3724946, at *2.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Because MetTel has failed to carry its burden of proving good cause under
Rule 5.1, MetTel’s Motion for Continued Confidential Treatment must be DENIED.
The pleadings at issue will be unsealed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
/s/ Joseph R. Slights III