F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 20 1999 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
TED E. MANGOLD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-3090 (D.C. No. 97-CV-1091-JTM) KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner, (D. Kan.) Social Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON , BARRETT , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Plaintiff Ted E. Mangold appeals the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner’s denial of social security disability benefits at step five of the
sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1520; Williams v. Bowen ,
844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988) (describing five-step evaluation process
in detail). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and affirm.
We review the Commissioner’s decision for substantial evidence in the
record and to ascertain whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal
standards. See Hawkins v. Chater , 113 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir. 1997). “[W]e
neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the agency.”
Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir.
1991). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Soliz v. Chater , 82 F.3d 373,
375 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)
(further quotation omitted)).
Plaintiff was born in 1956, is a high school graduate, has two years of
vocational training, and, on the day of the administrative law judge’s (ALJ)
decision on review here, was forty years old. In 1991, plaintiff applied for social
security disability benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act.
He claimed disability based on carpal tunnel syndrome (connected to a 1988
-2- work-place accident), depression, seizure disorder, and reflex sympathetic
dystrophy.
The Commissioner denied plaintiff’s application at the administrative level
and again on reconsideration. After a de novo hearing, the ALJ issued a partially
favorable decision, finding plaintiff disabled by the combination of his
impairments from April 26, 1988 through November 11, 1991, but not thereafter.
The ALJ concluded that, after November 11, 1991, while plaintiff was not able to
return to his past work as a flight line mechanic and hydraulic plumber, he
retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to undertake limited sedentary and
light exertional work. Based on the testimony of a vocational expert (VE), the
ALJ found that, even with only limited use of his right arm, plaintiff could work
as a ticket seller, order clerk, security monitor, photo finisher, or doorkeeper, jobs
that exist in significant numbers in Kansas and the national economy.
On review, the district court reversed and remanded for further
consideration of the side effects of plaintiff’s medication, which allegedly make
him drowsy and require him to sleep during the day. On remand, the ALJ held
a supplemental hearing limited to the medication issue, at which plaintiff and
a medical expert testified. Plaintiff, a self-described “night person,” testified that
he goes to sleep around 1:00 a.m. and rises at 9:00 a.m. He further testified that
-3- he rests and/or sleeps approximately four hours during the day in two hour
increments after taking his medication.
The medical expert, a neurologist, testified that plaintiff’s medication
would not cause drowsiness when taken in normal dosages. 1 Although the
medical expert testified that a combination of drugs can exaggerate mild side
effects, he opined that the combination of drugs--at the levels plaintiff was
taking--would not cause his described drowsiness. The medical expert questioned
why plaintiff was continuing to take anti-seizure and muscle relaxant medication.
Thereafter, the ALJ confirmed the Commissioner’s initial determination,
concluding that plaintiff “has no medically determinable impairment regarding
significant sleepiness/lethargy.” Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 512. The ALJ
reviewed plaintiff’s medical history in detail and found that his testimony
concerning pain and limitations was disproportionate to the medical evidence in
the record and not credible. In doing so, the ALJ set forth and considered the
relevant factors as required under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. In addition, the ALJ did
not credit plaintiff’s testimony that his increased fatigue precluded work. The
ALJ acknowledged but explicitly rejected plaintiff’s treating physician’s opinion
that he was completely disabled.
1 At the time of the hearing, plaintiff was taking Dilantin for seizures, Esgic Plus for pain, and Soma and Ultram (muscle relaxants). At earlier relevant times, he was also taking Flexeril and Procardia.
-4- Plaintiff alleges on appeal that the ALJ’s decision, which became the
Commissioner’s final determination of nondisability, is erroneous because: (1) the
ALJ failed to follow the treating physician rule; (2) the ALJ arbitrarily rejected
his subjective complaints of pain; and (3) the ALJ’s denial of benefits is not
supported by substantial evidence.
A treating physician may proffer an opinion about the claimant’s
impairments and the Commissioner will accord “controlling weight to that type
of opinion if it is well supported by clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques
and if it is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record.”
Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 26 F.3d 1027, 1029 (10th Cir.
1994). A treating physician may also opine that a claimant is totally disabled,
however, “[t]hat opinion is not dispositive because final responsibility for
determining the ultimate issue of disability is reserved to the Secretary.” Id. ;
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 20 1999 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
TED E. MANGOLD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-3090 (D.C. No. 97-CV-1091-JTM) KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner, (D. Kan.) Social Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON , BARRETT , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Plaintiff Ted E. Mangold appeals the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner’s denial of social security disability benefits at step five of the
sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1520; Williams v. Bowen ,
844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988) (describing five-step evaluation process
in detail). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and affirm.
We review the Commissioner’s decision for substantial evidence in the
record and to ascertain whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal
standards. See Hawkins v. Chater , 113 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir. 1997). “[W]e
neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the agency.”
Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir.
1991). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Soliz v. Chater , 82 F.3d 373,
375 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)
(further quotation omitted)).
Plaintiff was born in 1956, is a high school graduate, has two years of
vocational training, and, on the day of the administrative law judge’s (ALJ)
decision on review here, was forty years old. In 1991, plaintiff applied for social
security disability benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act.
He claimed disability based on carpal tunnel syndrome (connected to a 1988
-2- work-place accident), depression, seizure disorder, and reflex sympathetic
dystrophy.
The Commissioner denied plaintiff’s application at the administrative level
and again on reconsideration. After a de novo hearing, the ALJ issued a partially
favorable decision, finding plaintiff disabled by the combination of his
impairments from April 26, 1988 through November 11, 1991, but not thereafter.
The ALJ concluded that, after November 11, 1991, while plaintiff was not able to
return to his past work as a flight line mechanic and hydraulic plumber, he
retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to undertake limited sedentary and
light exertional work. Based on the testimony of a vocational expert (VE), the
ALJ found that, even with only limited use of his right arm, plaintiff could work
as a ticket seller, order clerk, security monitor, photo finisher, or doorkeeper, jobs
that exist in significant numbers in Kansas and the national economy.
On review, the district court reversed and remanded for further
consideration of the side effects of plaintiff’s medication, which allegedly make
him drowsy and require him to sleep during the day. On remand, the ALJ held
a supplemental hearing limited to the medication issue, at which plaintiff and
a medical expert testified. Plaintiff, a self-described “night person,” testified that
he goes to sleep around 1:00 a.m. and rises at 9:00 a.m. He further testified that
-3- he rests and/or sleeps approximately four hours during the day in two hour
increments after taking his medication.
The medical expert, a neurologist, testified that plaintiff’s medication
would not cause drowsiness when taken in normal dosages. 1 Although the
medical expert testified that a combination of drugs can exaggerate mild side
effects, he opined that the combination of drugs--at the levels plaintiff was
taking--would not cause his described drowsiness. The medical expert questioned
why plaintiff was continuing to take anti-seizure and muscle relaxant medication.
Thereafter, the ALJ confirmed the Commissioner’s initial determination,
concluding that plaintiff “has no medically determinable impairment regarding
significant sleepiness/lethargy.” Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 512. The ALJ
reviewed plaintiff’s medical history in detail and found that his testimony
concerning pain and limitations was disproportionate to the medical evidence in
the record and not credible. In doing so, the ALJ set forth and considered the
relevant factors as required under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. In addition, the ALJ did
not credit plaintiff’s testimony that his increased fatigue precluded work. The
ALJ acknowledged but explicitly rejected plaintiff’s treating physician’s opinion
that he was completely disabled.
1 At the time of the hearing, plaintiff was taking Dilantin for seizures, Esgic Plus for pain, and Soma and Ultram (muscle relaxants). At earlier relevant times, he was also taking Flexeril and Procardia.
-4- Plaintiff alleges on appeal that the ALJ’s decision, which became the
Commissioner’s final determination of nondisability, is erroneous because: (1) the
ALJ failed to follow the treating physician rule; (2) the ALJ arbitrarily rejected
his subjective complaints of pain; and (3) the ALJ’s denial of benefits is not
supported by substantial evidence.
A treating physician may proffer an opinion about the claimant’s
impairments and the Commissioner will accord “controlling weight to that type
of opinion if it is well supported by clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques
and if it is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record.”
Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 26 F.3d 1027, 1029 (10th Cir.
1994). A treating physician may also opine that a claimant is totally disabled,
however, “[t]hat opinion is not dispositive because final responsibility for
determining the ultimate issue of disability is reserved to the Secretary.” Id. ;
see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2). “The ALJ must give specific, legitimate
reasons for disregarding the treating physician’s opinion that a claimant is
disabled.” Goatcher v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. , 52 F.3d
288, 290 (10th Cir. 1995).
Dr. Charles Marable, a neurologist, has been treating plaintiff since 1989
and has consistently maintained that plaintiff is completely disabled. In August
-5- 1996, shortly before the supplemental hearing, Dr. Marable stated in a letter to
plaintiff’s attorney as follows:
With [the prescribed] medications and his above medical problem, he is 100% disabled due to the fact that he is not able to use his right hand and has significant pain and problems with it, requiring all these above medications. With the use of these medications it would render him quite sedated and [he] would have difficulty working and obtaining a good, cognitive view of his situation in the work force.
Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 620.
Substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s rejection of the
treating physician’s opinion. The ALJ accorded Dr. Marable’s opinion
appropriate weight in light of the medical record. Throughout the course of his
treatment, plaintiff has been examined by a number of physicians. The ALJ’s
conclusion that plaintiff has not been disabled since November 11, 1991, is
supported by the examining physicians’ contrary conclusions which outweigh
Dr. Marable’s opinion. See Goatcher , 52 F.3d at 290 (reiterating principle that
when inconsistent with treating physician’s opinion, it is the ALJ’s task to
examine other physicians’ reports and adduce if they outweigh that of the treating
physician, not vice versa); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(4) (“Generally, the
more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight [the
Commissioner] will give to that opinion.”).
In addition, the ALJ’s decision not to credit plaintiff’s testimony as to his
pain and limitations, as well as his testimony that medication-induced fatigue
-6- prevents him from working, is likewise supported. In particular, the ALJ
articulated the reasons for doubting plaintiff’s testimony and linked his credibility
determination to the evidence. See Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir.
1995) (requiring link between evidence and credibility determination). Hence,
we will not disturb these findings on appeal. See Diaz v. Secretary of Health &
Human Servs. , 898 F.2d 774, 777 (10th Cir. 1990) (“Credibility determinations
are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such
determinations when supported by substantial evidence.”). Accordingly, the
Commissioner’s determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
James E. Barrett Senior Circuit Judge
-7-