Maney v. Secret Service

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Tennessee
DecidedApril 30, 2025
Docket3:24-cv-01131
StatusUnknown

This text of Maney v. Secret Service (Maney v. Secret Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Maney v. Secret Service, (M.D. Tenn. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION

DEBORAH MANEY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) No. 3:24-cv-01131 v. ) ) Judge Trauger SECRET SERVICE, ) Magistrate Judge Newbern ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Pro se Plaintiff Deborah Maney, a resident of Nashville, Tennessee, filed this complaint against the Secret Service, alleging that it has not paid her for work she was hired to do. (Doc. No. 1). I. FILING FEE Plaintiff submitted an Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Application”). (Doc. No. 2). According to Plaintiff’s IFP Application, her monthly income totals $923 from Supplemental Social Security payments, she has no assets of any kind, she has no monthly expenses of any kind, and she does not expect any major changes to her monthly income or expenses in the next 12 months (Id.) Plaintiff did not provide a residential address. It appears that Plaintiff may be unhoused. Because her IFP Application reflects that she lacks sufficient financial resources to pay the full filing fee without undue hardship, the IFP Application (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED. The Clerk therefore is DIRECTED to file the complaint in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). II. INITIAL SCREENING STANDARD Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e), which requires

sua sponte dismissal of an action upon certain determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review her complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999). Under § 1915(e), the Court is required to screen in forma pauperis complaints and dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F. 3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain: (1) a

short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for the relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although allegations in a pro se complaint are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), “liberal construction . . . has limits.” Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985). A pro se complaint must still “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Barnett v. Luttrell, 414 F. App’x 784, 786 (6th Cir. 2011). District courts “have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal” to pro se litigants. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004). Nor are they “required to create” a pro se litigant’s claim for him or her. Payne v. Secretary of Treasury, 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003).And pro se litigants are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011). III. ALLEGED FACTS

As best the Court can discern,1 the complaint alleges that Defendant Secret Service hired her “on a Saturday” and she has “been going ever since.” (Doc. No. 1 at PageID# 4). She has traveled to eight states and “checked in at every Secret Service office” at every city she visited. (Id.) She was never provided with a vehicle and has not been paid. She spent “a lot of money out of [her] SSI income” on flights and buses. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges there are “billions of dollars” in controversy. (Id.) IV. SCREENING OF THE IN FORMA PAUPERIS COMPLAINT After conducting the initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint cannot survive screening under Section 1915(e)(2).

The Secret Service is an agency of the United States. The United States, as a sovereign, cannot be sued without its prior consent, and the terms of its consent define the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. McGinness v. United States, 90 F.3d 143, 145 (6th Cir. 1996). A waiver of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed, unequivocally expressed, and cannot be implied. United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969); Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957). Even liberally construing the pleading, there is not a sufficient indication that the United States waived its sovereign immunity for the claims asserted by Plaintiff against the Secret Service. See Berger v. Pierce, 933 F.2d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that a Bivens claim cannot be

1 Plaintiff’s handwritten complaints are so skeletal and nonsensical that it is difficult to distill her statements into coherent narratives and causes of action. asserted against the United States government, its agencies, or its employees in their official capacities). In any event, Plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal as frivolous or delusional. Plaintiff's bare-bones allegation that she was hired by the Secret Service and performed work for the Secret Service for years without being paid strains credulity. V. CONCLUSION As explained above, Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis complaint is subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e). Accordingly, this action is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

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Related

Soriano v. United States
352 U.S. 270 (Supreme Court, 1957)
United States v. King
395 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1969)
Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Denton v. Hernandez
504 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Pliler v. Ford
542 U.S. 225 (Supreme Court, 2004)
Hill v. Lappin
630 F.3d 468 (Sixth Circuit, 2010)
Roy Brown v. Linda Matauszak
415 F. App'x 608 (Sixth Circuit, 2011)
Sanford J. Berger v. Samuel R. Pierce
933 F.2d 393 (Sixth Circuit, 1991)
Geoffrey Benson v. Greg O'Brian
179 F.3d 1014 (Sixth Circuit, 1999)
Robert Barnett v. Mark Luttrell, Jr.
414 F. App'x 784 (Sixth Circuit, 2011)
Erwin v. Edwards
22 F. App'x 579 (Sixth Circuit, 2001)
Payne v. Secretary of the Treasury
73 F. App'x 836 (Sixth Circuit, 2003)

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Maney v. Secret Service, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/maney-v-secret-service-tnmd-2025.