Manditch v. Manditch

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Manditch v. Manditch

129 A.D.3d 1034, 12 N.Y.S.3d 273

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 24, 2015

Docket2013-10369

StatusPublished

This text of 129 A.D.3d 1034 (Manditch v. Manditch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Manditch v. Manditch, 129 A.D.3d 1034, 12 N.Y.S.3d 273 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2015).

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Opinion

Appeal from stated portions of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (James F. Quinn, J.), dated July 9, 2013. The judgment, upon a decision of the same court dated February 8, 2013, made after a nonjury trial, inter alia, awarded the plaintiff certain items of personalty, awarded the defendant only $52,000 in counsel fees, and denied the defendant’s application for an award of expert fees.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in declining to award her a share of the income generated by stock in a company called BankTel, and to credit her with half of the payments that the plaintiff made in connection with certain stock transactions (see Mahoney-Buntzman v Buntzman, 12 NY3d 415 [2009]). Moreover, the court providently exercised its discretion in directing the defendant to return to the plaintiff two objects of art purchased during the parties’ marriage. The distribution made by the Supreme Court was well within its broad discretion in making an equitable distribution of the parties’ marital property (see Schwartz v Schwartz, 67 AD3d 989 [2009]), and we discern no reason to disturb its determination.

Contrary to the defendant’s further contention, the Supreme Court properly denied her request for an award of additional counsel fees relating to certain services rendered by her former *1035 attorneys (see Schultz v Hughes, 109 AD3d 895 [2013]; Manditch v Manditch, 92 AD3d 645 [2012]). Moreover, under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for an award of expert fees (see Carlin v Carlin, 120 AD3d 734 [2014]; Kim v Schiller, 112 AD3d 671 [2013]; Avello v Avello, 72 AD3d 850 [2010]; Appel v Appel, 54 AD3d 786 [2008]).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are without merit.

Rivera, J.R, Skelos, Roman and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

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Appeal from stated portions of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (James F. Quinn, J.), dated July 9, 2013. The judgment, upon a decision of the same court dated February 8, 2013, made after a nonjury trial, inter alia, awarded the plaintiff certain items of personalty, awarded the defendant only $52,000 in counsel fees, and denied the defendant’s application for an award of expert fees.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in declining to award her a share of the income generated by stock in a company called BankTel, and to credit her with half of the payments that the plaintiff made in connection with certain stock transactions (see Mahoney-Buntzman v Buntzman, 12 NY3d 415 [2009]). Moreover, the court providently exercised its discretion in directing the defendant to return to the plaintiff two objects of art purchased during the parties’ marriage. The distribution made by the Supreme Court was well within its broad discretion in making an equitable distribution of the parties’ marital property (see Schwartz v Schwartz, 67 AD3d 989 [2009]), and we discern no reason to disturb its determination.

Contrary to the defendant’s further contention, the Supreme Court properly denied her request for an award of additional counsel fees relating to certain services rendered by her former *1035 attorneys (see Schultz v Hughes, 109 AD3d 895 [2013]; Manditch v Manditch, 92 AD3d 645 [2012]). Moreover, under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for an award of expert fees (see Carlin v Carlin, 120 AD3d 734 [2014]; Kim v Schiller, 112 AD3d 671 [2013]; Avello v Avello, 72 AD3d 850 [2010]; Appel v Appel, 54 AD3d 786 [2008]).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are without merit.

Rivera, J.R, Skelos, Roman and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

129 A.D.3d 1034, 12 N.Y.S.3d 273, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/manditch-v-manditch-nyappdiv-2015.

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