Mandeville v. Joseph Riddle & Co.

Supreme Court

Mandeville v. Joseph Riddle & Co.

5 U.S. 290, 2 L. Ed. 112, 1 Cranch 290, 1803 U.S. LEXIS 361

CourtSupreme Court of the United States

DecidedFebruary 26, 1803

StatusPublished

Cited by23 cases

This text of 5 U.S. 290 (Mandeville v. Joseph Riddle & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Mandeville v. Joseph Riddle & Co., 5 U.S. 290, 2 L. Ed. 112, 1 Cranch 290, 1803 U.S. LEXIS 361 (1803).

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Opinion

The chief justice

delivered the opinion of the court.

“ The only question in this case is, Whether an action “ of indebitatus assumpsit can be maintained by the assignee “ of a promissory note made in Virginia, against a re- “ mote assignor.

“ The act of the Virginia assembly which makes notes “ assignable, gives the assignee an action of debt in his own “ name against the maker of the note, but is silent with “ respect to the claim of the assignee against the assignor. “ It was therefore long a doubt whether the assignor be- “ came liable on his mere assignment, without any special “ agreement, for the contents of the note, in the event “ of the insolvency of the maker. This doubt has at “ length been settled in Virginia, so far as to declare the “ liability of the assignor on such assignment; but not the “ amount for which he is liable. It seems to be yet a ques- “ tion whether he is answerable for the sum mentioned in “ the note, or for only so much as he received for it, “ provided he shall be able to prove the sum actually re- “ ceived. It is also a question whether the assignee can “ have recourse to any other than his immediate assignor.

“ As the act of assembly gives no right to sue the as- “ signor, such an action can only be maintained on the “ promise which the law implies from the assignment, and “ consequently can only be sustained by and against the “ persons to and from whom the law implies such a pro- “ mise to have been made. As the assignment is made to “ a particular person, the law implies a promise to that “ person; but it raises no promise to any other. There “ is no fact on which to imply such promise.

“ In the language of the books, there is a privity be- “ tween the assignor and his immediate assignee; but no “ privity is perceived between the assignor and his remote “ assignee. The implied promise growing out of the in- “ dorsement, is not considered as having been made as- “ signable by the act of assembly, and therefore the as- “ signee of that promise can not maintain an action of “ indebitatus assumpsit on it.

*299 “ It is therefore the opinion of the court that this ac- “ tion is not maintainable and that the judgment ought “ to be reversed.” *

*

See note (A.) in the appendix to this volume of reports.

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The chief justice

delivered the opinion of the court.

“ The only question in this case is, Whether an action “ of indebitatus assumpsit can be maintained by the assignee “ of a promissory note made in Virginia, against a re- “ mote assignor.

“ The act of the Virginia assembly which makes notes “ assignable, gives the assignee an action of debt in his own “ name against the maker of the note, but is silent with “ respect to the claim of the assignee against the assignor. “ It was therefore long a doubt whether the assignor be- “ came liable on his mere assignment, without any special “ agreement, for the contents of the note, in the event “ of the insolvency of the maker. This doubt has at “ length been settled in Virginia, so far as to declare the “ liability of the assignor on such assignment; but not the “ amount for which he is liable. It seems to be yet a ques- “ tion whether he is answerable for the sum mentioned in “ the note, or for only so much as he received for it, “ provided he shall be able to prove the sum actually re- “ ceived. It is also a question whether the assignee can “ have recourse to any other than his immediate assignor.

“ As the act of assembly gives no right to sue the as- “ signor, such an action can only be maintained on the “ promise which the law implies from the assignment, and “ consequently can only be sustained by and against the “ persons to and from whom the law implies such a pro- “ mise to have been made. As the assignment is made to “ a particular person, the law implies a promise to that “ person; but it raises no promise to any other. There “ is no fact on which to imply such promise.

“ In the language of the books, there is a privity be- “ tween the assignor and his immediate assignee; but no “ privity is perceived between the assignor and his remote “ assignee. The implied promise growing out of the in- “ dorsement, is not considered as having been made as- “ signable by the act of assembly, and therefore the as- “ signee of that promise can not maintain an action of “ indebitatus assumpsit on it.

*299 “ It is therefore the opinion of the court that this ac- “ tion is not maintainable and that the judgment ought “ to be reversed.” *

*

See note (A.) in the appendix to this volume of reports.

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5 U.S. 290, 2 L. Ed. 112, 1 Cranch 290, 1803 U.S. LEXIS 361, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mandeville-v-joseph-riddle-co-scotus-1803.

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