Manaster v. Bernfield

2021 IL App (2d) 200161-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: August 17, 2021
• Docket: 2-20-0161
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2021 IL App (2d) 200161-U No. 2-20-0161 Order filed August 17, 2021

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(l). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

JASON MANASTER AND HILLARY ) Appeal from the Circuit Court MANASTER, ) of Lake County. ) Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) ) v. ) No. 14-CH-2484 ) SONDRA BERNFIELD, individually and as ) Trustee of the SONDRA BERNFIELD LIVING) TRUST Dated May 27, 1997, GLEN ) BERNFIELD Individually, and COLDWELL ) BANKER RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE, ) LLC d/b/a COLDWELL BANKER ) RESIDENTIAL BROKERAGE, ) Honorable ) Daniel L. Jasica, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Jorgensen and Schostok concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: At a combined jury and bench trial, the trial court’s evidentiary rulings and choice of jury instructions did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The judgments in favor of the defendant home sellers and the brokerage company were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Also, the trial court correctly determined that the Consumer Fraud Act did not apply to the defendant home sellers. Affirmed. 2021 IL App (2d) 200161-U

¶2 Following an eight-day combined jury and bench trial, the jury and the trial court found

against plaintiff home buyers, Jason and Hillary Manaster, and in favor of defendant home sellers,

Sondra Bernfield, individually and as trustee of the Sondra Bernfield Living Trust, Glen Bernfield,

and their brokers Coldwell Banker, LLC, d/b/a Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage, on all

seven counts. Each of the counts turned on defendants’ alleged failure to disclose two material

defects: sloped floors in the east wing and a water infiltration problem in the basement. The trial

court determined that the sloped floors were not a material defect and, to the extent the water

infiltration problem was a material defect, defendants reasonably believed that it had been

corrected. The Manasters now appeal five of the seven counts, arguing that the judgments in favor

of defendants were against the manifest weight of the evidence. They also challenge several of

the trial court’s discretionary rulings, including its decision to allow Glen Bernfield to testify to

his conversations with a handyman and a plumber, to bar feedback from an unnamed broker, to

refuse two non-Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions (non-IPI), and to issue a Prim instruction (People

v. Prim, 53 Ill. 2d 62 (1972)). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 In October 2013, Bernfield 1 prepared to put his family home of 28 years, 2070 Partridge

Lane in Highland Park, on the market. He knew that the floors in the east wing were sloped by

approximately 1 to 2 inches, but he believed that this was due to normal settling. He also knew

that the basement took in water following heavy rains, and, on October 3, 2013, he hired Pasquesi

Plumbing to address the problem.

1 All references to Bernfield are Glen Bernfield, age 78 in 2013. Sondra Bernfield suffered

from advanced Parkinson’s disease and was excused from testifying at trial.

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¶5 On October 29, 2013, Bernfield, an attorney, completed the property disclosure report. He

checked “no” to the following items: “I am aware of material defects in the walls or floors”; “I am

aware of flooding or recurring leakage problems in the crawlspace or basement”; “I am aware of

material defects in the basement or foundation (including cracks and bulges)”; and “I am aware of

material defects in the plumbing system (including *** [the] sump-pump).” The disclosure report

defined the phrase “am aware” to mean “actual notice or actual knowledge without any specific

investigation or inquiry.” It defined a “material defect” as “a condition that would have a

substantial adverse effect on the value of the residential real property or that would significantly

impair the health or safety of future occupants of the residential real property.” It further clarified:

“These disclosures are intended to reflect the current condition of the premises and do not include

previous problems, if any, that the seller reasonably believes have been corrected.” (Emphasis

added.)

¶6 In October 2013, the Bernfields listed the property for $999,999 and, later, they reduced

the list price to $950,000. In May 2014, the parties closed on the sale of the Partridge house, at a

price of $835,000. The Manasters never moved into the home. Shortly after the purchase, there

was a heavy rain. The Manasters noticed water “gushing” into the basement mechanical room and

running over an electrical box. Ultimately, the Manasters determined that repair of the property

would be too difficult and costly, and they sold the home at a loss for $575,000.

¶7 On September 30, 2016, the Manasters filed the operative complaint in this case, the seven-

count, second amended complaint. The first three counts were against the Bernfields: (1) common

law fraud (count I); (2) violation of the Residential Real Property Disclosure Act (Disclosure Act)

(765 ILCS 77/25 (West 2012)) (count II); and (3) violation of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive

Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2012)) (count III).

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The next four counts were against Coldwell Banker, based on the actions of their agents, the

husband-and-wife partners Ira Rumick and Fran Coulter: (1) common law aiding and abetting a

fraud (count IV); (2) common law negligence (count VII); (3) violation of the Illinois Real Estate

Licensing Act (RELA Act) (225 ILCS 454/15-25 (West 2012)) (count V); and (4) violation of the

Consumer Fraud Act (count VI). The common law claims against Coldwell Banker are not at

issue on appeal (counts IV and VII).

¶8 From October 21 to October 29, 2019, the trial court conducted a combined jury and bench

trial, with the jury deciding the common law claims and the court deciding the statutory claims.

Seven witnesses testified: Jason and Hillary Manaster, Judith Offerle (the Manasters’ realtor), Glen

Bernfield, Ira Rumick (the Bernfields’ realtor), Armando Arguello (one of the Bernfields’

handymen), and David Pasquesi (the Bernfields’ plumber). Fran Coulter, the Bernfields’ other

realtor, did not testify as she had passed away. Numerous documentary, photographic, and video

exhibits were submitted into evidence, but they are not included in the record on appeal. Such

exhibits include certain e-mail exchanges, market analyses, photographs of alleged water damage,

and videos of water infiltration.

¶9 A. Trial: The Manasters’ Testimony

¶ 10 Jason and Hillary Manaster testified consistent with one another as follows. The Manasters

had been living out-of-state and were looking to return home to Illinois. When visiting family

over Thanksgiving in 2013, they viewed the Partridge house with a realtor. Hillary was familiar

with the house, because her grandparents had lived on the same street. Even as a child, she had

taken note of the house. She loved it. She enjoyed the midcentury architecture. Jason was

ambivalent about the house itself, but he liked the area and the lot—a wooded acre on a dead-end

street. From the beginning, he planned to remodel the home.

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¶ 11 The Manasters viewed the home three times before signing a contract. During one

showing, Hillary noticed a bump or a slope to the kitchen floor. She pointed it out to Coulter, who

told her that the bump was due to normal settling. This did not cause Hillary to be concerned.

Hillary could see that the home needed some amount of repair, but she loved the home enough to

live through a repair-and-renovation period. Hillary and Jason had no conversations with Coulter

or Rumick about the sloped floors in the east wing or water problems in the basement.

¶ 12 On March 16, 2014, the Manasters signed a contract for purchase. A March 19, 2014,

inspection revealed numerous items that needed repair and/or further investigation. For example,

there were gaps and cracks in the bathroom tiling and gaps between the wall and the bathroom

sink. As Jason planned to remodel, the bathroom issues were “minor problems in [his] mind.”

More relevant to the instant case, however, the inspection revealed cracks in the front foundation.

The basement walls had stress cracks and the walls had moved. The contractor recommended that

the walls be monitored for future movement. The contractor had difficulty assessing whether the

cracks caused weaknesses in the wall. One reason that the contractor had difficulty making that

assessment was that “storage” had been placed in front of the wall. The contractor recommended

that the walls be evaluated by a structural engineer to discern whether there was a structural

problem and, if so, to obtain a bid for repair. The inspector also recommended that a licensed

waterproofing contractor evaluate the property and that the Manasters hire a landscaper to create

a proper pitch away from the foundation. None of these recommendations suggested to Jason that

the property was subject to flooding. Jason did not follow the inspector’s recommendations,

explaining: “No, the cracks didn’t give me any concern.” Jason testified that, if he had known of

the water infiltration problem on top of these other issues, he would have followed the inspector’s

recommendation and hired a structural engineer prior to closing.

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¶ 13 A separate, March 21, 2014, inspection of the indoor pool showed that repairing the pool

would come at a cost. The Manasters do not point us to this separate inspection report in the record

on appeal. However, Jason testified to the report as follows:

“A. There was a bunch of different [repair] costs in there, anywhere from $8,000 to

$230,000.

Q. Is that what this case is about today?

A. No.

***

Q. Are you complaining today about the cost to repair the pool?

A. No, I could be careless.

Q. This was a cost you expected getting a house *** up and running?

A. Yes.”

¶ 14 After the inspection(s), the Manasters decided to move forward with the purchase of the

home. They negotiated for a $5000 reduction in light of the inspection report(s).

¶ 15 In May 2014, the Manasters closed on the sale of the home. Shortly thereafter, on June 11,

2014, Jason noticed a water infiltration problem in the basement. That day, upon entering the

property from the garage, he immediately heard a very loud noise. He followed the sound to the

basement, where he saw a puddle on the floor of the basement’s main section. He then entered the

mechanical room and saw a “gusher” or “waterfall” coming out of the wall in approximately two

places. The water ran down the wall next to an electrical box. It ran for hours. Jason filmed the

event. The video was entered into evidence and shown to the jury. Jason filmed a similar event

on July 23, 2016. Jason filmed just two gushers in two years, but he believed that five or six

gushers had occurred during that time.

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¶ 16 In the winter of 2014-2015, Jason forgot to turn off the waterflow to the outdoor spigot.

This caused a pipe to burst and led to dry wall damage and “a lot” of water on the floor of one of

the mechanical rooms. (Offerle, the Manaster’s realtor, would later testify that Jason’s failure to

turn off the spigot damaged the ceiling in the pool storage room, as well.) Jason received a bid to

repair the pipe and drywall. The bid was $1000. Jason did not repair the damage. He explained:

“I didn’t feel like spending $1000, just putting more money into a sinking ship.”

¶ 17 Jason testified both to remodeling plans and to repair plans. As to remodeling plans, the

plans evolved from 2014 to 2016. In total, the Manasters paid the Marvin Herman architectural

firm $45,715 for the plans. A 2014 plan, which included extensive work in the bathrooms, received

bids from contractors in the $400,000 to $445,000 range. A 2016 plan, which by then included

bedrooms, a staircase renovation, getting rid of the pool, as well as repair measures, received bids

in the $600,000 to $740,000 range. The Manasters do not point us to the 2016 plans in the record

on appeal, and it is not clear what percentage of the $740,000 bid pertained to remodeling, as

opposed to repairing, the property.

¶ 18 Jason acknowledged that he did not timely disclose the Marvin Herman plans in

conjunction with the instant lawsuit. In May 2017, the Manasters submitted an affidavit of

completeness. However, they had not disclosed the Marvin Herman plans. In the summer of 2018,

the Bernfields obtained a court order requiring the Manasters to produce all documents by July 5,

2018. At a July 10, 2018, deposition, the Manasters again failed to disclose the plans. At some

point after July 10, 2018, the Manasters disclosed the plans, which led to a subsequent deposition.

¶ 19 As to repair plans, sometime after closing, the Manasters hired two structural engineers to

assess foundational problems and propose repair measures. The Manasters do not point us to the

reports and/or bids in the record on appeal. The Manasters also hired Pasquesi Plumbing, Perma

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Seal, and U.S. Waterproofing to assess the water infiltration problem and provide estimates. David

Pasquesi of Pasquesi plumbing rodded the drain and performed exploratory work on the property,

including exploration of the pipes in the courtyard. Pasquesi told Jason that he had performed

work on the property in the past (for Bernfield). Ultimately, Pasquesi thought that the drain-tile

system had failed. He charged $6765 for his work to that point, and he bid $20,000 to $30,000 to

put in a new drain tile. Perma Seal and U.S. Waterproofing agreed that a new drain tile was

necessary. Their bids were in the $30,000 to $40,000 range. The Manasters did not hire Pasquesi,

Perma Seal, or U.S. Waterproofing. They did not have the drain tile replaced.

¶ 20 Around the time that Pasquesi performed exploratory work in the courtyard, the Manasters

removed trees in the courtyard on the advice of a landscape architect. However, the tree removal

did not alleviate the water infiltration problem. The Manasters never filled in the holes left from

digging up trees and exploring the courtyard area. During their two-year ownership of the

property, they did not perform any repairs (except, of course, that they allowed Pasquesi to rod the

drain).

¶ 21 In 2016, the Manasters decided that it would be too costly to repair the property, and they

decided to list the property for sale. At the time they decided to list the property for sale, they had

already initiated the instant lawsuit. The Manasters completed a disclosure report in conjunction

with the 2016 sale. Unlike Bernfield, they checked “yes” to the various items associated with

sloped floors in the east wing and leakage in the basement. They did not disclose any leaks in the

pool storage room. Nevertheless, in conjunction with the instant lawsuit, they alleged leaks in the

pool storage room and submitted photographs of water running along its perimeter channels.

¶ 22 B. Trial: Judith Offerle’s Testimony

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¶ 23 Offerle represented the Manasters in the 2016 sale. She had been contacted by the

Manasters’ counsel during the pendency of the lawsuit. She had been a realtor since 2003. She

also held an engineering degree, though she never practiced as an engineer.

¶ 24 Offerle testified to her professional obligations surrounding the seller’s disclosure report.

She agreed that it was the seller’s, not the realtor’s, responsibility to fill out the report. If a seller

had a question about how to fill out the report, Offerle would direct the seller to speak with an

attorney. If Offerle felt that the seller had been dishonest in filling out the report, she would

withdraw as the listing agent.

¶ 25 Offerle performed a market analysis report of the property. The report was submitted into

evidence as an exhibit, but the Manasters do not point us to the exhibit in the record on appeal.

Offerle testified that she valued the land at between $500,000 and $600,000. She described the

trajectory of the real estate market between 2014 and 2016 as “reasonably stable, maybe a little

reduction.”

¶ 26 Offerle knew that the property needed repairs. Some of the property’s flaws were readily

apparent. Offerle could see the slope in the floor of the east wing. She could see signs of water

damage in the basement, and she had been showed a video of the gusher. Also, a pipe had burst

in the ceiling of the pool storage room. She understood that had occurred when Jason forgot to

turn off the spigot one winter. She could see that the yard had been dug up and, as a result, the

property needed “serious landscaping.”

¶ 27 As to the slope in the floor, specifically, she was aware that an addendum to the Manasters’

disclosure form stated: “[T]he east side mechanical room has recurring leakage because east

bedroom wing, which is slab on grade, has settled.” Still, she agreed that older homes “often”

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have sloped floors. She further agreed that the most common cause of sloped floors was normal

settling.

¶ 28 Finally, Offerle testified to various e-mails that she had written. First, Offerle testified to

e-mails that she sent to prospective buyers’ agents concerning the cost of repairs. Offerle wanted

to provide prospective buyers with a “ball park” figure so as to secure a buyer who could afford to

repair the property. She also advised prospective buyers to hire a contractor to better discern the

cost of repairs. One e-mail read: “My client is on the advice of their attorney [and] will not disclose

the quotes, however, I would estimate $150,000 to $200,000.” Another e-mail read: “[W]hile the

work [is] not [cost] prohibitive, my clients have been disheartened by the legal process and

probably their contentious litigator egging them on and wan[t] to move on.” Next, Offerle testified

to an e-mail conversation with Jason. At the time, the property was temporarily delisted but they

had a lead from a prospective buyer. Offerle encouraged Jason to allow the prospective buyer to

view the property. She explained to him that it “would be a good idea if we can get one written

offer. It goes a long way *** in convincing a court of damages.”

¶ 29 C. Trial: Glen Bernfield’s Testimony

¶ 30 Just prior to Bernfield’s testimony, defendants entered the following stipulation concerning

the sloped floors in the east wing: “We stipulate to the following facts: prior to offering 2070

Partridge Lane for sale the Bernfields and Coldwell Banker knew about the floors in the hallway

and the fourth bedroom, that they were slanted.” The parties agree that this stipulation was a

consequence of several off-the-record conversations surrounding the trial court’s ruling on

Coldwell Banker’s motion in limine to exclude written comments gathered at a broker tour of the

property. As is relevant to the instant appeal, one of those comments had read: “Get

civil/foundation engineer to assess foundational problem and cost of resolution.”

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¶ 31 Bernfield testified to his ownership history of the property and to the marketing and sales

history of the property. Bernfield owned the home for 28 years. He had many treasured memories

of events in the home, including his daughter’s engagement party. He reflected: “It was just a

wonderful family home for us to both live in and to entertain in.” In 2005, however, Sondra

became ill, and she and Bernfield decided that it was time to downsize. They listed the property

first with realtor Gerry Emefar and, soon after, with Rumick and Coulter. In 2006, Rumick and

Coulter listed the property for $1.3 million. The Bernfields received an offer for $1.15 million.

They rejected the offer, thinking that it was too low. Bernfield stated: “[It was] [o]ne of the biggest

mistakes of my life.” After that offer, the market changed, and they removed the listing. In late

October 2013, they put the property back on the market. To price the property, they began with

the value of the land. Rumick and Coulter had assessed the value of the land at $700,000 to

$750,000. They decided to list the property at $999,999, and they later reduced the price to

$950,000. In May 2014, they closed on the property with the Manasters for $835,000. During the

2013-2014 marketing of the property, the Bernfields spent the winter in their Arizona home. Also

during that time, the Bernfields bought a new, smaller home in Highland Park.

¶ 32 Next, Bernfield testified to his knowledge of the sloped floors in the east wing and the

water infiltration problem in the basement. As to the sloped floors, Bernfield first noticed them in

2006, when Rumick and Coulter pointed them out to him. In 2011, Bernfield asked one of his

handymen, Richard Plaza, about them. The Manasters objected on hearsay grounds to Bernfield’s

conversation with Plaza. The court overruled the objection. It provided the jury with a limiting

instruction, informing the jury that it was not to consider the conversation for the truth of the words

but only for the purpose of showing Bernfield’s subsequent conduct. Bernfield continued

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testifying to the conversation, relaying that Plaza told him that the sloped floors were the result of

ordinary settling.

¶ 33 Bernfield addressed an e-mail exchange between himself and Rumick regarding the sloped

floors and prospective buyers named John and Demi (the John and Demi e-mail). The e-mail

exchange was put up on a screen for the jury and portions of it were read aloud. In the e-mail,

Rumick informed Bernfield that John and Demi expressed serious interest in the property, though

they were concerned about the sloped floors. Bernfield had already received an offer from the

Manasters at that time, and Rumick advised Bernfield to stick with the Manasters’ offer. Rumick

cautioned: “I am concerned about two things. One, by asking for John and Demi’s contract so

often I feel like we are giving the impression that we are desperate for another offer as soon as the

one we have is falling apart. *** Number two, which of is of more concern to me and of more

importance, what if John and Demi have an inspection report that comes up with the structural

problems on the slate floor? This could be quite expensive to take care of properly. *** We have

seen many inspectors find things that others miss and miss things that others find about a house.”

Bernfield replied to Rumick that the sloped floors were the result of ordinary settling and that the

slope had not gotten worse since they first noticed it in 2006.

¶ 34 Bernfield did not disclose the sloped floors on the disclosure report, because he did not

believe them to be a material defect. Bernfield “took into account” his conversation with Plaza in

forming his opinion that the slope was not a material defect. He also explained: “From our point

of view, it wasn’t material. There was a slope but it was slight and it had been the same since we

first put the house on the market [in 2006] ***. In the hallway, it was slightly visible and in my

office it was slightly visible ***.” The sloped floors did not interfere with Bernfield’s enjoyment

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of the home or cause Bernfield any difficulty in navigating the home. Bernfield did not arrange

the furniture so as to hide the slope.

¶ 35 As to the water infiltration problem in the basement, Bernfield addressed a 2011 to-do list

that he had provided to Plaza. Three items on the list concerned water infiltration in the basement:

(1) water near the yarn room; (2) a pooling of water in the main section of the basement’s floor;

and (3) the “gusher” in the mechanical room that is at the center of this case. As to the water in

the yarn room, Bernfield had “no recollection of it,” and “[w]hatever it was, it did not persist.” As

to the pooling of water in the main section of the basement, Bernfield noticed this occasionally

after heavy rains. It could be cleaned with five to seven towels. In approximately 2009 or 2010,

his prior handyman, Slavic Gos, addressed the problem. Gos removed paneling on the wall and

sealed portions of the wall. This solved the problem for some time. As to the gusher, Bernfield

did not consider it urgent, because it happened only following heavy rains, two to four times per

year. The water then flowed directly into the sump pump. Any remaining water could be mopped

up with “less than” one towel. Also, cardboard files stored next to the sump pump were never

made wet and unusable. When showed the Manasters’ videos of the 2014 and 2016 gushers,

Bernfield agreed that they appeared similar in character to the gushers he had experienced.

Bernfield did, nevertheless, believe he had repaired the gusher.

¶ 36 In 2013, when Bernfield prepared to put the house on the market, the pooling of water in

the main section of the basement had returned to some extent. Additionally, although Bernfield

did not consider the gusher to be urgent, “[he] d[id]n’t want there to be any leaks for the person

who bought [his] house.” Thus, Bernfield contacted his plumber of 45 years, David Pasquesi of

Pasquesi Plumbing to repair the gusher and the pooling of water in the main section of the

basement.

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¶ 37 Bernfield began to testify to what Pasquesi told him. The Manasters objected on hearsay

grounds to Bernfield’s 2013 conversation with Pasquesi. The trial court overruled the objection.

It provided the jury with a limiting instruction, informing the jury that it was not to consider the

conversation for the truth of the words but only for the purpose of showing the effect of the words

on Bernfield.

¶ 38 Bernfield continued that Pasquesi recommended solving the water infiltration problem as

follows. Pasquesi would seal cracks in the foundation of an outdoor courtyard referred to as the

Japanese garden. Also, Pasquesi would rod out the drain tile to the sump pump in the mechanical

storage room. Bernfield personally observed Pasquesi sealing cracks in the courtyard and digging

a big hole going down 12 feet to rod out the drain tile. The work was done on two separate days

in October 2013. The repairs cost approximately $3000.

¶ 39 Bernfield addressed his discussions with Coulter and/or Rumick about the “gusher” in the

mechanical room. Bernfield could not remember whether he told Coulter or Rumick or both about

the gusher, but he knew that he told at least one of them. He primarily dealt with Coulter. He told

Coulter or Rumick about the gusher after he had repaired it, sometime between October 9 and

October 29, 2013. He told them that it had been repaired. He did not discuss it again after that

point.

¶ 40 Bernfield also addressed the alleged water incursion in the pool storage room. Although a

previous owner had installed drainage channels around the perimeter of the room, Bernfield never

experienced any water in that room. “There was never any water there.” Bernfield did, however,

admit to an occasional leak on the flat portion of the roof. He explained that flat roofs notoriously

leak. Bernfield hired a professional to fix each leak as it arose, and it was not an issue at the time

of the sale of the house.

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¶ 41 Bernfield did not disclose the gusher or any prior leaks on the disclosure report, because

he believed they had been repaired. He believed they had been repaired, because he personally

observed the repairs. Also, in the seven months between the completion of the disclosure report

and the sale of the home, there had been no significant water incursion. Although Bernfield was

in Arizona much of that time, one of his handymen, Armando Arguello, checked in on the house

two to three times per week. To Bernfield’s knowledge, the only post-repair water infiltration of

any kind occurred two days before closing. That is, following the heaviest rain in the seven-month

period between the October repairs and the May closing, a “trickle” of water could be seen on the

chimney. Rumick happened to be at the property that day, and Bernfield “thought” he pointed out

the trickle to him. Despite the heavy rain, there was no water flow of any kind, let alone a gusher,

in the mechanical storage room.

¶ 42 D. Trial: Ira Rumick’s Testimony

¶ 43 Rumick testified that he, along with Coulter, listed the Partridge house. Rumick has been

a realtor since 1979. He has been a member of the Chicago Association of Realtors and of its

Professional Standards Committee. He served as a chairman of that committee for two years. He

is currently an independent contractor for Coldwell Banker. Although Rumick and Coulter co-

listed the property, Coulter did 95% of the work and handled 95% of the communications with

clients. Coulter passed away shortly after the closing, in June 2014.

¶ 44 Rumick and Coulter first listed the property in 2006. At that time, Rumick noticed the

sloped floors in the east wing. He pointed them out to Bernfield. However, Rumick did not believe

they presented a significant problem. Sloped floors were very common in older homes. In fact,

he “expected” to see sloped floors in an older home. Sloped floors were usually the result of

normal settling, and he had sold many homes with sloped floors. Rumick did not advise Bernfield

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to place furniture so as to obscure the slope the floor. The jury was shown pictures from the real

estate listing, which showed the placement of the furniture, but the Manasters do not point us to

the exhibit containing those pictures.

¶ 45 Rumick, like Offerle, testified that it was the seller’s, not the realtor’s, responsibility to

complete the disclosure report. Rumick was “not allowed” to help the seller complete the report.

If Rumick knew that the water problems that had been described at trial existed at the time of the

2014 sale, he would have refused the listing.

¶ 46 Rumick had no recollection of ever being told of any water problem in the basement. He

heard Bernfield testify that Bernfield told his realtors of the problem and that the problem had been

fixed. However, Rumick did not believe that Bernfield ever told him that. If Bernfield told

Coulter, Coulter did not pass along the information.

¶ 47 In the seven months that Rumick showed the property, the Bernfields never told Rumick

to steer buyers away from certain areas of the house. They never told Rumick that he should not

show the house after a heavy rain. Nevertheless, it was true that the Bernfields did not want to

allow prospective buyers to perform a formal inspection or appraisal prior to signing a contract.

(The contract, in turn, would provide a clause allowing the prospective buyer to walk away pending

the results of the inspection.)

¶ 48 The only water Rumick had ever seen in the home was a small leak by the sand filter in the

pool room and a small leak resulting in a “few drops” from the flat roof coming in over an interior

closet door. Rumick knew that Bernfield had those small leaks repaired. He himself saw men

shoveling icy snow off the flat roof in an effort to repair the latter leak.

¶ 49 Finally, Rumick addressed the John and Demi e-mail. He explained: “What I meant [by

that e-mail] was you already have one offer on the table, you ought to consider working with that

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instead of another one, you never know what is going to happen with another offer.” When

Rumick wrote the John and Demi e-mail, he did not believe that the sloped floors presented a

structural problem.

¶ 50 E. Trial: Armando Arguello’s Testimony

¶ 51 Arguello testified that the Bernfields hired him to check on the Partridge house during the

winter when they were in Arizona. Arguello checked on the house two to three times per week,

and his duties included walking the entire interior and exterior of the property. He checked the

main rooms including the kitchen, bathrooms, and basement. He monitored the temperature and

the furnace. He went into the mechanical room on every visit. He never saw any water flowing,

or even any wetness on the floor, in the mechanical room. Bernfield never asked him to pay special

attention to water problems or to watch out for water flow in the mechanical room. Nevertheless,

Arguello did generally look for water. He remembered reporting only one small leak to Bernfield.

It came from the ceiling over the entryway. The leak was due to snow and ice on the flat roof.

Arguello met with a roofer who repaired the leak.

¶ 52 F. Trial: David Pasquesi’s Testimony

¶ 53 Pasquesi testified that he did not recall any specific conversation or job performed for

Bernfield: “I remember speaking to Mr. Bernfield in the past but I don’t recall what the purpose

of our conversation was, and I don’t remember the work.” In the course of a single year, his

company services “thousands” of customers. He relies on his invoices to “sor[t] out exactly what

happened.”

¶ 54 When given the invoice for the Bernfield project, he explained the work performed. He

cleaned out and rodded a drain tile, he replaced a sump pump and two check valves, and he sealed

cracks in the courtyard known as the Japanese garden. The drain-tile system includes the piping

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underground that collects rainwater. It runs all around the foundation. The purpose of the drain-

tile system is to take the drain water that accumulates around the foundation and drain it into the

sump pump. The sump pump then pumps the water out. It is very common that a drain tile will

crack or get plugged “as time goes on.” Most often, it is only necessary to find the “bad spot” and

repair that section. Less frequently, the entire drain-tile system must be replaced.

¶ 55 Pasquesi acknowledged that he returned to the Partridge house to perform work for

Manaster. However, he did not testify substantively about that work.

¶ 56 G. Jury Instructions

¶ 57 At the jury instruction conference, the parties discussed three instructions now at issue on

appeal. Those instructions were the Manasters’ proposed jury instruction nos. 20, 21, and 13. We

first discuss instruction nos. 20 and 21, which were tandem instructions. Instruction no. 20

provided:

“[20.] When I use the word ‘material fact’ I mean the statements on the Disclosure Report

must have been an essential element to the transaction, and had the Manasters been aware

of the truth, they would have acted differently.” (Based on IPI Civil No. 800.04. (“Fraud

and Deceit—Material Fact—Definition”) (approved December 8, 2011).

Instruction no. 21 provided:

“[21.] A ‘material defect’ in the context of the Residential Real Property Disclosure Report

means that a condition that would have a substantial adverse effect on the value of the

residential real property or that would significantly impair the health or safety of future

occupants of the residential real property unless the seller reasonably believes that the

condition has been corrected.” (Non-IPI).

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¶ 58 The Manasters explained their position on instruction nos. 20 and 21 as follows. The first

element of common law fraud is that the defendant made a false statement of “material fact.”

However, the corresponding IPI instruction defines only the word “material”:

“When I use the word ‘material’ I mean the [misrepresented] [concealed]

[withheld] fact[s] must have been an essential element to the transaction, and had the

plaintiff been aware of the truth, he would have acted differently.” IPI Civil No. 800.04.

¶ 59 The Manasters’ concern was that, if the instructions defined only “material,” then the jury

would get confused by the terms “material fact” versus “material defect,” the latter of which was

a term used in the disclosure report. Thus, as to instruction no. 20, they sought to modify IPI

800.04 to define the term “material fact” instead of just the term “material.” They also sought to

specifically reference the disclosure report (“When I use the word ‘material fact’ I mean the

statements on the Disclosure Report must have been an essential element to the transaction.”)

(Emphasis added.) As to instruction no. 21, they sought to provide the jury with a definition of

“material defect” as it was already defined in the disclosure report. However, they wanted the jury

to be able to compare the terms “material fact” and “material defect” side by side.

¶ 60 The court granted Manasters’ request in part. As to instruction no. 20, it agreed to modify

IPI Civil No. 800.04 to define the term “material fact” instead of just the term “material.”

However, it declined to further modify the IPI to specifically reference the disclosure report. It

also summarily refused non-IPI instruction no. 21, which defined “material defect.”

¶ 61 Also at issue was the Manasters’ proposed instruction no. 13. Instruction no. 13 read:

“The phrases ‘reasonable belief’ or ‘reasonably believes’ mean that the person

concerned, acting as a reasonable person, believes that the described facts exist.” (Non-

IPI).

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¶ 62 The trial court refused instruction no. 13. It explained that, while the criminal IPI provided

a definition for “reasonable belief,” the civil IPI did not. See, e.g., IPI Criminal 4.13 (“Definition

of Reasonable Belief”) (approved December 8, 2011). The court agreed with defendants that the

term “reasonable belief” was “self-defining” and, therefore, further instruction was not necessary.

¶ 63 H. Jury Deliberation, Verdict, and Findings

¶ 64 During deliberation, the jury asked five questions, the last four of which are at issue here.

First, the jury asked for a demonstrative exhibit prepared by the Manasters setting forth the

damages they claimed to have suffered. The trial court sent back the demonstrative exhibit.

¶ 65 Second, at 12:50 p.m., the jury asked:

“We have a juror that has a question that is critical (for them) to moving on. Is the

seller responsible to disclose previous problems on the disclosure form which were fixed

or not fixed?” (Emphasis in original).

¶ 66 Third, also at 12:50 p.m., the jury asked:

“We have a juror that has a question that is critical (for them) to moving on. At the

time of filling out the disclosure form, is it legally required by the seller for him to disclose

a recent repair that he has not guaranteed that the issue is 100% fixed.” (Emphasis in

original).

¶ 67 In response to questions two and three, at 1:41 p.m., the trial court sent back the relevant

language of the disclosure report itself. That language provided:

“A material defect means a condition that would have a substantial adverse effect

on the value of the residential real property or that would significantly impair the health or

safety of future occupants of the residential real property unless the seller reasonably

believes that the condition has been corrected.

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The disclosures are intended to reflect the current conditions of the premises and

do not include previous problems, if any, that the seller reasonably believes have been

corrected.”

All parties agreed to this answer.

¶ 68 Fourth, at 2:43 p.m., the jury asked: “May I, the foreperson, speak to the judge?” In

response to question four, at 3:05 p.m., the trial court answered: “No, the judge cannot speak

individually with jurors.”

¶ 69 In discussing question four, counsel for Coldwell Banker had suggested giving the Prim

instruction for deadlocked juries. Counsel for the Manasters and the Bernfields suggested holding

off, noting that the jury had not officially declared deadlock. The trial court noted that the jury

had been deliberating for over ten hours across two days. Still, it agreed that “at this point I do

believe [a Prim instruction is] a bit premature.”

¶ 70 Fifth, at 3:14 p.m., the jury asked:

“We are having an issue in the deliberation room. We are currently 11-1 (not

indicating one way or another). The 12th juror is firm in his/her belief and will not entertain

further discussion. He/she wants to dismiss the case. We as a jury do not want a hung jury.”

Upon receiving question five, the trial court asked counsel:

“[THE COURT]: Have counsel had an opportunity to consider what response, if

any, would be appropriate from the court at this time?

[MANASTERS’ COUNSEL]: Yes. This appears to be the predicate for the Prim

charge.”

Counsel for defendants agreed.

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¶ 71 Thus, at 3:24 p.m., court called the jury into the courtroom and read it the Prim instruction,

reminding them that “[it was their] duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate

with a view to reaching an agreement, if [they] c[ould] do so without violence to individual

judgment.” Although the exact timing is not clear from the record, “shortly thereafter” and “within

minutes” of receiving the Prim instruction, the jury returned a verdict for defendants on each of

the common law claims before it. Later, the trial court also found for defendants on each of the

statutory claims before it. The trial court denied the Manasters’ posttrial motion. This appeal

followed.

¶ 72 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 73 As a threshold matter, the Manasters challenge two of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings

as well as its choice of jury instructions. The Manasters next argue that the following judgments

in favor of defendants were against the manifest weight of the evidence: (1) common law fraud as

to the Bernfields (count I); (2) an alleged violation of the Disclosure Act as to the Bernfields (count

II); (3) an alleged violation of the RELA Act as to Coldwell Banker (count V); and (4) an alleged

violation of the Consumer Fraud Act as to Coldwell Banker (count VI). They also argue that the

trial court erred in determining that the Consumer Fraud Act did not apply to the Bernfields (count

III). 2 We reject these arguments.

¶ 74 A. Evidentiary Rulings and Choice of Jury Instructions

2 The Manasters initially appealed the jury and bench trial judgments as to all seven claims.

However, in their reply brief, the Manasters withdrew their challenge as to the two common law

claims against Coldwell Banker, aiding and abetting common law fraud (count IV) and negligence

(count VII).

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¶ 75 The Manasters argue that the trial court erred by: (1) granting Coldwell Banker’s motion

in limine to exclude a comment from an unnamed broker at the broker tour pertaining to the sloped

floors in the east wing (“Get civil/foundation engineer to assess foundational problem and cost of

resolution”); and (2) allowing Bernfield to testify to hearsay statements by handyman Plaza and

plumber Pasquesi. They also argue that the trial court erred in refusing their proposed non-IPI jury

instruction nos. 21 and 13, which defined “material defect” and “reasonable belief” and, separately,

by issuing the Prim instruction. They contend that, had the trial court decided differently in these

instances, the outcome of the trial would have been different.

¶ 76 We review these matters for an abuse of discretion. See Swick v. Liautaud, 169 Ill. 2d 504,

521 (1996) (motion in limine); Gill v. Foster, 157 Ill. 2d 304, 312-13 (1993) (admitting evidence

in general); and Schultz v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corp., 201 Ill. 2d 260,

273 (2002) (jury instructions); People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 222 (2000) (Prim instruction).

A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when

no reasonable person would adopt the court’s view. Enbridge Pipelines (Illinois), LLC v. Troyer,

2015 IL App (4th) 150334, ¶ 14. For the reasons that follow, the Manasters cannot show that the

trial court abused its discretion in any of the challenged evidentiary and jury-instruction matters.

¶ 77 1. Motion in Limine

¶ 78 The Manasters’ argument ignores the history and context for the trial court’s ruling on the

motion in limine which we now recount in more detail. That is, the court initially denied the

motion, writing: “Coldwell Banker’s Motion in limine to Bar Hearsay Evidence is denied, but such

documents may be admitted only to show notice, not for the truth of the matter asserted.”

(Emphasis added.)

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¶ 79 Subsequently, at trial, defendants stipulated to notice: “We stipulate to the following facts:

prior to offering 2070 Partridge Lane for sale the Bernfields and Coldwell Banker knew about the

floors in the hallway and the fourth bedroom, that they were slanted.” As a result, the trial court

reversed its ruling on the motion in limine. The reversal was made off the record. However,

counsel for the Manasters later recounted the ruling on the record as follows:

“Judge, in looking everything over I noticed *** the written order that *** denied

Coldwell Banker’s motion in limine *** relative to the hearsay evidence. There [were]

then several discussions, which I believe were off the record, and the result of that was an

agreed stipulation which has been accepted. But I’m not sure that there is a formal record

that the court had reconsidered over the course of the trial its denial of Coldwell Banker’s

motion in limine to bar hearsay evidence. What the court—what I think the result of an off

the record discussion was [that] the court had revisited that motion in limine, had granted

it subject to the stipulation and without the plaintiff’s waiver of its objection. I just want

to [put] that [on] the record.” (Emphasis added.)

¶ 80 At trial, the Manasters made an oral motion to reconsider the trial court’s ruling. The court

denied the motion: “We’ve already stipulated they were aware of the floor issue. That’s why we

resolved the motion in limine in that fashion. We’ve already got a stipulation that both Coldwell

Banker and the Bernfields knew of the slanted floor prior to the time of—or at the time of the

listing and sale. What more do you want?”

¶ 81 Here, the court appears to have acted within its discretion to manage the admission of

evidence, balance competing interests, and weigh probative value versus prejudicial effect. See,

e.g., Evid. Rule 403 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). The stipulation informed the jury that defendants had

notice of the sloped floors. As notice had been the only purpose for which the court had initially

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allowed the broker’s statement, the broker’s statement was no longer necessary. Moreover, by

excluding the feedback from the unnamed broker, the court ensured that the jury would not accept

the broker’s words as true, i.e., that the floors in fact represented a structural problem. “Any doubts

which may arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant.”

Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 392 (1984). As such, on this record, we see no legitimate basis

for the Manasters’ challenge to the trial court’s ruling.

¶ 82 2. Alleged Hearsay Statements of Plaza and Pasquesi

¶ 83 As to Bernfield’s testimony concerning his conversations with Plaza and Pasquesi, it was

not hearsay. “Hearsay evidence, an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter

asserted, is generally inadmissible unless an exception applies.” Piser v. State Farm Mutual Auto

Insurance Co., 405 Ill. App. 3d 341, 351 (2010); see also Ill. R. Evid. 801(c) (eff. Oct. 15, 2015).

However, testimony about an out-of-court statement that is used for a purpose other than to prove

the truth of the matter asserted is not hearsay. In re Zariyah A., 2017 IL App (1st) 170971, ¶ 88.

For example, testimony about an out-of-court statement that is offered to show the effect on the

listener or explain the listener’s course of conduct is not hearsay. Id. That was precisely the reason

given here.

¶ 84 The court allowed Bernfield to testify to his conversation with Plaza to show why he told

Rumick in the John and Demi e-mail that the sloped floors were due to normal settling and why

he completed the disclosure report as he did. Similarly, the court allowed Bernfield to testify to

his conversation with Pasquesi to show why he believed that Pasquesi’s work corrected the water

infiltration problem and, again, why he completed the disclosure report as he did. The court

provided the jury with a limiting instruction, informing it that it was not to consider Bernfield’s

testimony for the truth of the matter asserted but rather for its effect on the listener. The trial court

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did not abuse its discretion in allowing Bernfield to testify to his conversations with Plaza and

Pasquesi.

¶ 85 3. Jury Instructions

¶ 86 The Manasters argue that the trial court should have issued its proposed non-IPI instruction

nos. 21 and 13 defining “material defect” and “reasonable belief.” The applicable civil IPI

instructions shall be given unless the trial court determines that they do not accurately state the

law. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 239(a) (eff. Apr. 8, 2013); Parikh v. Gilchrist, 2017 IL App (1st)

160532, ¶ 33. Non-IPI instructions may be given if the IPI instruction does not accurately state

the law or does not cover a subject on which the jury should be instructed. Id. The trial court’s

decision to give or refuse a proposed non-IPI instruction will not be reversed absent an abuse of

discretion. Parikh, 2017 IL App (1st) 160532, ¶33.

¶ 87 We first address instruction No. 21, which defined the term “material defect.” The trial

court’s evaluation of instruction No. 21 was linked to its evaluation of instruction No. 20, which

defined “material.” Although the court refused instruction No. 21, it nevertheless accounted for

the Manasters’ concern that the jury would confuse the concepts of “material fact” and “material

defect” by adding the term “material fact” to instruction No. 20. This approach allowed the trial

court to closely track the standard IPI language in instruction No. 20. See Parikh, 2017 IL App

(1st) 160532, ¶33. Moreover, the jury was ultimately provided with the definition of “material

defect.” In answer to jury questions two and three, the court instructed in pertinent part: “A

material defect means a condition that would have a substantial adverse effect on the value of the

residential real property or that would significantly impair the health or safety of future occupants

of the residential real property unless the seller reasonably believes that the condition has been

corrected.” This language came from the disclosure report and was nearly identical to the

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Manasters’ proposed instruction no. 21. The Manasters agreed to the instruction. The court did

not abuse its discretion in first addressing the Manasters’ concern in a manner that allowed it to

closely track the IPI language and then, upon receiving a question from the jury, in issuing an

instruction agreed to by all parties.

¶ 88 We next address instruction no. 13, which defined “reasonable belief.” The trial court may

refuse to define a term in a jury instruction that is self-defining or commonly understood. Parikh,

2017 IL App (1st) 160532, ¶ 34. Here, although the IPI Criminal defines reasonable belief, the

IPI Civil does not. In our view, the term “reasonable belief” is self-defining and commonly

understood. Thus, we cannot say that the court’s refusal to define it was an abuse of discretion.

¶ 89 4. Prim

¶ 90 The Manasters have forfeited their challenge to the trial court’s issuance of the Prim

instruction. “A [litigant] forfeits review of a jury-instruction error if he did not object to the

instruction or offer an alternative instruction.” In re James W., 2014 IL App (5th) 110495, ¶ 23.

Here, after jury question four, Coldwell Banker suggested that the court give the jury the Prim

instruction. The Manasters objected. However, after jury question five, the Manasters agreed with

the trial court that the time was right—after more than 10 hours of deliberation over two days and

a declaration of deadlock—to give the Prim instruction. When prompted by the court, the

Manasters’ counsel answered: “This appears to be the predicate for the Prim charge.” Because the

Manasters’ counsel withdrew the objection to the Prim instruction, even agreeing with the court

that the time was right to give it, this argument is forfeited.

¶ 91 Forfeiture aside, there was no error. The purpose of a Prim instruction is to give guidance

to a jury that is not hopelessly deadlocked. People v. Gregory, 184 Ill. App. 3d 676, 681 (1989).

In deciding to give a Prim instruction, the trial court may consider the length of time already spent

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deliberating and the complexity of the issues before the jury. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 222. Here,

as stated, the Manasters agreed to give the Prim instruction after a lengthy deliberation. They now

complain, however, that the return of the jury verdict shortly after the issuance of the Prim

instructions shows that the jury was coerced. However, the length of time a jury spends

deliberating is not, on its own, determinative of whether a trial court exerted pressure on the jury

to reach a verdict. Gregory, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 682. In point of fact, in Prim itself, the court was

found not to have hastened the verdict, even though the jury deliberated for just 15 minutes after

receiving the instruction. Prim, 53 Ill. 2d at 71-72. We reject the Manasters’ argument.

¶ 92 B. The Judgments Were Not Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence

¶ 93 The Manasters argue that the following judgments in favor of defendants were against the

manifest weight of the evidence: (1) common law fraud as to the Bernfields (count I); (2) an alleged

violation of the Disclosure Act as the Bernfields (count II); (3) an alleged violation of the RELA

Act as to Coldwell Banker (count V); and (4) an alleged violation of the Consumer Fraud Act as

to Coldwell Banker (count VI). The four claims at issue share common questions of fact. On this

point, it is important to remember that it is the trier of fact’s role to resolve the conflicts in the

evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses, and to decide what weight is to be given to the

witnesses’ testimony. Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 452 (1992). A litigant is entitled to a

new trial when the verdict or finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. at 454. A

verdict or finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion is

clearly apparent or where the findings of the jury are unreasonable, arbitrary, and not based on the

evidence. Id. In this case, we are also mindful that the record on appeal does not include the many

of the exhibits that were shown to the jury. Again, we will resolve any doubts due to the

incompleteness of the record against the appellant. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392.

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¶ 94 1. Common Law Fraud Against the Bernfields (Count I)

¶ 95 The elements of common-law fraud are: (1) a false statement of material fact; (2)

knowledge or belief by the defendant that the statement was false; (3) an intention to induce the

plaintiff to act; (4) reasonable reliance upon the truth of the statement by the plaintiff; and (5)

damage to the plaintiff resulting from this reliance. Avon Hardware, Co. v. Ace Hardware Corp.,

2013 IL App (1st) 130750, ¶ 15. Here, as to the sloped floors in the east wing, the Manasters’

argument on appeal cannot survive the first element. As to the water infiltration problem, the

Manasters’ argument cannot survive the second.

¶ 96 We first address the sloped floors. The Manasters contend that Bernfield made a false

statement of material fact when he checked “no” to the following statements on the disclosure

report: “I am aware of material defects in the walls or floors”; and “I am aware of material defects

in the basement or foundation (including cracks and bulges).” Again, the disclosure report defined

a material defect as “a condition that would have a substantial adverse effect on the value of the

residential real property or that would significantly impair the health or safety of future occupants

of the residential real property unless the seller reasonably believes that the condition has been

corrected.” The Manasters reason that, because Bernfield admitted to being aware of the sloped

floors, he should have known that there were material defects in the floors and foundation.

¶ 97 However, the jury was not required to find that the sloped floors constituted a material

defect or that they were a sign of a material structural problem. Most critically, the evidence

showed that, after the closing, the Manasters hired two structural engineers to assess the

foundation. Yet, the Manasters submitted no testimony by the structural engineers to establish that

they actually found structural defects or that the sloped floors were related to a structural defect.

Even on appeal, the Manasters point to no evidence at trial to support their claim that the sloped

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floors represented a structural defect and merely state in conclusory fashion: “[T]he only inference

that can be drawn from the evidence is that the sloping floors and the gushers *** in the area just

below the sloping floors were *** related problems.”

¶ 98 Contrary to the Manasters’ position, the evidence at trial showed that sloping floors are a

common feature in older homes. Rumick and Offerle both agreed to that. Bernfield had been

aware of the slope in the floors since 2006, and, in his view, the slope had not gotten worse since

then. It was undisputed that the slope did not interfere with Bernfield’s enjoyment of the home or

give him difficulty in navigating the home. The Manasters did not present any contrary evidence.

Thus, it cannot be said that the slope would “significantly impair the health or safety of future

occupants of the residential real property.”

¶ 99 We next address the water infiltration problem and, more specifically, the gusher in the

mechanical room. The Manasters contend that Bernfield made a false statement of material fact

and believed the statement to be false when he checked “no” to the following statements on the

disclosure form: “I am aware of flooding or recurring leakage problems in the crawlspace or

basement”; “I am aware of material defects in the basement or foundation (including cracks and

bulges)”; and “I am aware of material defects in the plumbing system (including *** [the] sump-

pump).” The Manasters acknowledge that, per the disclosure report’s own terms, “Th[e]

disclosures are intended to reflect the current condition of the premises and do not include previous

problems, if any, that the seller reasonably believes have been corrected.” (Emphasis added.) The

Manasters urge, however, that Bernfield cannot have reasonably believed that he corrected the

flooding and recurring leakage problems in the basement. They assert that the nature of the

problem was extensive and note that, in comparison, the repair cost was low. They further contend

that the Bernfields attempted to camouflage the problem by putting storage units in the basement.

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¶ 100 We disagree. Whether Bernfield reasonably believed that the water infiltration problem

had been fixed was largely a question of credibility. Credibility determinations are within the

province of the jury. See Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 452. Here, the jury could have reasonably found

that Bernfield testified credibly that he believed the problem to be fixed. Bernfield hired Pasquesi,

his plumber of 45 years, to solve the problem. He personally observed Pasquesi sealing cracks in

the outdoor courtyard and rodding the drain tile. In the seven months between the repairs and the

closing, during which one heavy rain occurred, the gusher did not return. While Bernfield agreed

that the gushers that he had experienced were similar in character to the two that Jason filmed,

Bernfield did not characterize the gusher as a serious problem. According to Bernfield, the gusher

occurred only two to four times per year, flowed immediately into the sump pump, and any

remaining water could be wiped up with a single towel. The cardboard files that were stored near

the gusher never were damaged.

¶ 101 Bernfield’s testimony was directly corroborated by Pasquesi and Arguello and indirectly

corroborated by Rumick. After looking at the invoice, Pasquesi confirmed that the work was

performed. Pasquesi testified that, most often, it is only necessary to repair the “bad spot” in a

drain-tile system. Eventually, however, the entire drain-tile system will need to be replaced,

leading to a more costly repair. That the need for this more costly repair occurred during the

Manasters’ ownership does not mean that Bernfield did not reasonably believe he had corrected

the problem as recommended by his plumber. Arguello, who visited the home two to three times

per week over the seven months at issue, confirmed that there were no signs of significant water

incursion. Also, Rumick testified that Bernfield never instructed him to steer buyers away from

certain areas of the home or avoid showing the home after heavy rains.

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¶ 102 The Manasters’ testimony, in turn, contained multiple inconsistencies. The jury was not

required to believe that the water infiltration problems were as widespread as the Manasters

claimed. For example, Bernfield insisted that he never had any water in the pool storage room and

the Manasters themselves did not disclose water in the pool storage room in their own 2016

disclosure report. Further, to the extent that there was water damage in the pool storage room, the

jury could have found that the Manasters themselves caused the damage. Jason caused a pipe to

burst and declined to repair the pipe or the drywall damage and Offerle testified that the ceiling of

the pool storage room had been damaged in the event. Further, Jason’s testimony concerning

repair costs likely puzzled the jury. On the one hand, in 2014 heading into the purchase, Jason

was not concerned with whether the repair costs for pool would be $8000 or $230,000 (“I could

be careless”) and, in 2015-2016, Jason continued to commission his architect to draw plans for a

remodel (with the plans alone costing $45,000 and bids for the earliest, simplest plans coming in

at over $400,000). Yet, on the other hand, during the winter of 2014-2015, Jason did not want to

spend even $1000 to repair a pipe that he caused to burst (“I did not want to throw money into a

sinking ship”). The jury may have reasonably discounted the Manasters’ testimony.

¶ 103 Considering the above testimony in favor of the Bernfields, the jury’s finding as to the

common law fraud claim was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We note that, as to

this common law fraud claim only, the Manasters also argue that they were entitled to a judgment

notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). However, the standard required to obtain a JNOV is higher

than that required to obtain a new trial. See, e.g., Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 453 (the standard for a

JNOV is more “conclusive” than the standard for a new trial). As we have determined that the

Manasters are not entitled to a new trial, we also determine that they are not entitled to a JNOV.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment as to count I.

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¶ 104 2. An Alleged Violation of the Disclosure Act Against the Bernfields (Count II)

¶ 105 The Disclosure Act requires a seller to disclose a material defect of which he had actual

knowledge. 765 ILCS 77/25(b) (West 2012). However, the seller has no obligation to conduct an

investigation to complete the disclosure report. 765 ILCS 77/25(c) (West 2012). Moreover, the

seller is not liable for any error, inaccuracy, or omission if the seller reasonably believed the

material defect to have been corrected. 725 ILCS 77/25(a) (West 2012).

¶ 106 The Manasters’ claim under the Disclosure Act largely mirrors their claim for common law

fraud. Indeed, the Manasters all but concede in their appellate brief that our resolution of count II

will rise and fall with our resolution of count I. They state: “[T]he jury’s resolution of [c]ount I

(and the trial court’s resolution of [c]ount II ***) turned on whether Glen Bernfield’s purported

‘belief’ that these material defects had been repaired was ‘reasonable’.” (Emphasis added.) We

have already determined a trier of fact could have found that the sloped floors did not constitute a

material defect and that Bernfield reasonably believed the water infiltration problem to have been

corrected. As such, we affirm the trial court’s judgment as to count II.

¶ 107 3. An Alleged Violation of the RELA Act against Coldwell Banker (Count V)

¶ 108 The Real Estate Licensing Act provides:

“Licensees shall treat all customers honestly and shall not negligently or knowingly

give them false information. A licensee engaged by a seller client shall timely disclose to

customers who are prospective buyers all latent material adverse facts pertaining to the

physical condition of the property that are actually known by the licensee and that could

not be discovered by a reasonably diligent inspection of the property by the customer. A

licensee shall not be liable to a customer for providing false information to the customer if

the false information was provided to the licensee by the licensee’s client and the licensee

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did not have actual knowledge that the information was false. No cause of action shall

arise on behalf of any person against a licensee for revealing information in compliance

with this Section.” (Emphases added.) 725 ILCS 454/15-25 (West 2012).

¶ 109 The Manasters’ RELA Act argument on appeal focuses solely on the sloped floors in the

east wing, not the water infiltration problem. The Manasters argue that Rumick violated the RELA

Act in that he was aware of the sloped floors in the east wing and was aware that some inspectors

would discover the defect but others would not. As Rumick wrote in the John and Demi e-mail:

“[W]hat if John and Demi have an inspection report that comes up with the structural problems on

the slate floor? This could be quite expensive to take care of properly. *** We have seen many

inspectors find things that others miss and miss things that others find about a house.”

¶ 110 The Manasters’ argument fails for at least two reasons. First, as we have discussed, the

Manasters never proved that the sloped floors constituted a material defect resulting in damages.

Again, although the Manasters hired two structural engineers to assess the foundation, they

submitted no testimony that the structural engineers actually found material structural defects or

that the sloped floors were related to a structural defect. Stated otherwise, the Manasters never

proved that the sloped floors were the result of anything other than normal settling.

¶ 111 Second, even if the sloped floors did constitute a material defect, the Manasters never

proved that Rumick actually knew that they did. Rumick testified that, at the time he wrote the

John and Demi e-mail, he did not believe that the sloped floors represented a structural defect. He

simply did not want to take the chance another inspector might conclude differently. Rumick’s

explanation for the John and Demi e-mail presents a credibility issue, and we will not upset the

trial court’s credibility determination. See, e.g., Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 452. As such, we affirm the

trial court’s judgment as to count V.

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¶ 112 4. An Alleged Violation of the Consumer Fraud Act against Coldwell Banker (Count VI)

¶ 113 To prove a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act, a plaintiff must show: (1) a deceptive act

or practice by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intent that the plaintiff rely on the deception; (3)

the occurrence of the deception in the course of conduct involving trade and commerce; and (4)

actual damage to the plaintiff (5) proximately caused by the deception. Capiccioni v. Brennan

Naperville, Inc., 339 Ill. App. 3d 927, 933 (2003). The Consumer Fraud Act applies to realtors if

the realtor “knows of the false, misleading or deceptive character of such information.” 815 ILCS

505/10b(4) (West 2012).

¶ 114 The Manasters’ Consumer Fraud Act argument on appeal focuses primarily on the sloped

floors and only cursorily on the water infiltration problem. The Manasters contend that Coulter

and Rumick had actual knowledge that the information contained in Bernfield’s disclosure report

was false. Specifically, they contend:

“Mr. Rumick knew that the condition of the flooring was likely to be detected by

some but not all inspectors, conceding that the disclosure report was deceptive.

Indeed, [the John and Demi] e-mail demonstrates conclusively that [Rumick] knew

that representations regarding the condition of the floor and foundation *** were

misleading and/or deceptive.”

¶ 115 We reject the Manasters’ argument. The Manasters’ argument fails for the same reason it

failed when presented as a RELA Act claim. That is, the Manasters never proved that the sloped

floors were not the result of ordinary settling. Also, the Manasters never proved that Coulter or

Rumick knew the sloped floors were not the result of ordinary settling.

¶ 116 As to the water infiltration problem, the Manasters argue in total: “Glen Bernfield testified

that he told Ms. Coulter and/or Mr. Rumick that he had substantial water leakage in the basement

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which he addressed within two weeks of listing the house for sale.” This argument, however, is

otherwise undeveloped. The Manasters fail to argue that Coulter and Rumick had any reason to

believe that the water problem was not fixed. In any event, the evidence supported the trial court’s

determination that Rumick did not know of any current water problems. Rumick testified that the

only water he had seen in the home was a small leak coming from the roof and a small leak near

the sand filter of the pool. He believed that both of these leaks had been fixed. Rumick’s testimony

was corroborated by Arguello, who testified that the small leak on the roof had been fixed. As we

have stated throughout this order, we will not disrupt the trial court’s credibility determinations.

As such, we affirm the trial court’s judgment as to count VI.

¶ 117 C. Application of the Consumer Fraud Act to the Bernfields (Count III)

¶ 118 Finally, the Manasters argue that the trial court erred in determining that the Bernfields

could not be liable under the Consumer Fraud Act. The Manasters accept that, typically,

homeowners involved in the sale of their personal residence are not engaged in “trade or

commerce” and cannot, therefore, be liable under the Consumer Fraud Act. Provenzale v. Forister,

318 Ill. App. 3d 869, 877 (2001); Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc., 156 Ill. App. 3d 154,

168 (1986). The Manasters note, however, that persons who purchase multiple homes for the

purposes of renovation and resale can be liable under the Act. Pack v. Maslikiewicz, 2019 IL App

(1st) 182447, ¶ 118 (the seller bought the residence for the purpose of renovating and reselling at

a profit, she purchased several other homes for the same purpose, and she never resided in the

homes). The trial court’s determination that the Bernfields were not involved in the purchase of

multiple homes for the purposes of renovation and resale is one of fact. We defer to the court’s

factual determination unless it was against the manifest weight of the evidence. See, e.g., Curtis

Investment Firm Ltd. Partnership v. Schuch, 321 Ill. App. 3d 197, 201 (2001).

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¶ 119 Here, the trial court’s determination was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

To be sure, the Bernfields held three properties at the same time for a number of months—the

Partridge house (their primary residence of 28 years), the new house in Highland Park (their

“downsizing” residence, which they bought while the Partridge house was still on the market), and

the Arizona house (their “snowbird” residence). However, this did not mean that the Bernfields’

sale of the Partridge house was anything more than the sale of their personal residence. As

Bernfield testified, the Partridge house had been a “wonderful family home.” They hosted many

family events there over 28 years, including their daughter’s engagement party. Unlike the

situation in Pack, the Bernfields resided in the Partridge house. Moreover, the evidence

overwhelmingly supports that they did not purchase the Partridge house—in 1986—for the

purpose of renovating and reselling it. The Manasters’ argument as to count III is without merit.

¶ 120 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 121 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the trial court of Lake County.

¶ 122 Affirmed.

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