Malvick v. Debroux

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJune 7, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-00625
StatusUnknown

This text of Malvick v. Debroux (Malvick v. Debroux) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Malvick v. Debroux, (E.D. Wis. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

KEVIN ROBERT MALVICK,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 22-cv-0625-bhl

LANGLADE COUNTY JAIL and DISTRICT ATTORNEY GEBERT,

Defendants.

SCREENING ORDER

Plaintiff Kevin Robert Malvick, who is currently incarcerated at the Langlade County Jail and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. On May 26, 2022, Malvick paid the $402 civil case filing fee. This matter comes before the Court to screen the complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. §1915A. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT The Court has a duty to review any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity and must dismiss any complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised any claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In screening a complaint, the Court must determine whether the complaint complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and states at least plausible claims for which relief may be granted. To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, a plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It must be at least sufficient to provide notice to each defendant of what he or she is accused of doing, as well as when and where the alleged actions or inactions occurred, and the nature and extent of any damage or injury the actions or inactions caused. “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007)). “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556. “[T]he complaint’s allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555 (internal quotations omitted). ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

Malvick asserts that on June 15, 2021, he was injured by a police officer who “put his shoulder into [his] ribs and knocked [him] to the ground . . . .” Malvick alleges that the ribs on his left side were broken and his right shoulder was hurt. According to Malvick, the next day he complained to the nurse at the jail that he was in a lot of pain, but the nurse refused to help him. On June 17, 2021, Malvick was allegedly evaluated by the nurse, at which time Malvick explained that he has diabetes, bad knees, a bad right foot, broken ribs, and a shoulder injury. Malvick asserts that the nurse refused his request for his diabetic shoes and told him that there was nothing he could do to help him. Malvick states that no one contacted his doctor about the severity of his conditions. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. A few months later, on September 3, 2021, Malvick was allegedly segregated because his foot had become badly bruised and infected as a result of wearing plastic sandals every day. He asserts that his requests to go to the hospital were denied, but he was prescribed antibiotics. About a week later, allegedly at his father’s prompting, Malvick was taken to the emergency room.

Malvick explains that by that time his foot was very swollen. At the emergency room, doctors “opened” his foot and “let the puss drain for hours.” Malvick explains that he was given more antibiotics and sent back to the jail. Malvick asserts that the jail refused to take him to his foot surgeon, but he was taken to a local foot and ankle clinic three times “for a simple bandage change that cost [him] hundreds of dollars for absolutely nothing.” Dkt. No. 1 at 3. Next, Malvick explains that, on November 25, 2021, his knee gave out and he fell and broke his right ring finger. Malvick asserts that the jail x-rayed the finger to confirm it was broken and then scheduled him to see a doctor to fix it, but, on December 2, the nurse informed him the appointment had been canceled. Malvick alleges that he now has a limp finger that does not move and will have to be surgically fixed. Dkt. No. 1 at 3-4.

Malvick also asserts that he should have had knee replacement surgery by now. He states that the nurse initially told him he would have to have knee replacement surgery after his release, but a few days later, Defendant District Attorney Gebert allegedly stated that the County would pay for the surgery. Malvick asserts that he has his own knee surgeon and foot surgeon and that he is “not having knee replacement while sitting in a jail cell anyway.” Dkt. No. 1 at 4. Finally, Malvick states that Gebert is corrupt and has lied about how he treated his girlfriend. He states that the judge refused to lower his bond amount because of her lies. He also asserts that he knows his mail from the federal court was opened outside his presence because she knew about the contents of a letter the court sent to him. THE COURT’S ANALYSIS “To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that he or she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that this deprivation occurred at the hands of a person or persons acting under the color of state law.” D.S.

v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). Malvick names the Langlade County Jail as a Defendant, but the jail cannot be sued. Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue a “person” who violates his constitutional rights under color of state law, and a jail is not a “person.” The Supreme Court has held that there are some circumstances in which municipalities or local government units can be considered “persons” and sued under §1983, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), but a jail is not legal entity separate from the county government it serves. See Miranda v. Milwaukee County Jail Facility, No. 19-C-582, 2019 WL 2359396, at *2 (E.D. Wis. June 4, 2019) (citing Whiting v.

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Bluebook (online)
Malvick v. Debroux, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/malvick-v-debroux-wied-2022.