Malver v. Sheffield Industries, Inc.

462 So. 2d 567, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 193, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 11952
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedJanuary 15, 1985
Docket84-1182
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 462 So. 2d 567 (Malver v. Sheffield Industries, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Malver v. Sheffield Industries, Inc., 462 So. 2d 567, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 193, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 11952 (Fla. Ct. App. 1985).

Opinion

462 So.2d 567 (1985)

Benny MALVER, Appellant,
v.
SHEFFIELD INDUSTRIES, INC., Appellee.

No. 84-1182.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

January 15, 1985.

*568 Edward J. Schack, Oakland Park, for appellant.

Arnold Nevins, Miami Beach, for appellee.

Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HUBBART and NESBITT, JJ.

NESBITT, Judge.

Malver, having elected to stand on his second amended complaint, appeals its ultimate dismissal. We affirm the dismissal, but remand with directions to allow an amendment of Count I of the complaint.

In Count I, a breach of contract count, Malver sought recovery of medical insurance and disability payments which were lost when his employment was terminated by Sheffield Industries, Inc. (Sheffield). Because the contract of employment was of indefinite duration, it was terminable at will. Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Administrators, 427 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1983). However, Sheffield, the employer, was required under the law to give Malver reasonable notice of termination. Perri v. Byrd, 436 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). If Malver pleads and proves that there was no reasonable notice given, he can recover those damages which were caused by the failure to give such notice. Byrd. Since it appears from the complaint that such an allegation can be made, Malver should be permitted to amend Count I.

In Count II, Malver attempted to allege a tortious interference with a contract or expectancy. The gist of the count appears to be that Sheffield's termination of Malver's employment tortiously interfered with his expected insurance benefits. Since the expectancy which was allegedly interfered with flowed directly from Sheffield's employment relationship with Malver, it is not possible for the plaintiff to state a cause of action for interference. A.R.E.E.A., Inc. v. Goldstein, 411 So.2d 310 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Ethyl Corp. v. Balter, 386 So.2d 1220, 1223-24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).

Accordingly, the order dismissing the complaint is affirmed with directions that the plaintiff be allowed to amend Count I. Affirmed with directions.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Mousa v. Lauda Air Luftfahrt, A.G.
258 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (S.D. Florida, 2003)
Knight v. Palm City Millwork and Supply Co.
78 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Florida, 1999)
Malver v. Sheffield Industries, Inc.
502 So. 2d 75 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1987)
Crawford v. DAVID SHAPIRO & CO., PA
490 So. 2d 993 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1986)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
462 So. 2d 567, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 193, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 11952, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/malver-v-sheffield-industries-inc-fladistctapp-1985.