Maloy v. Pead

CourtDistrict Court, D. Utah
DecidedApril 18, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-00129
StatusUnknown

This text of Maloy v. Pead (Maloy v. Pead) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Maloy v. Pead, (D. Utah 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH CENTRAL DIVISION

NATHANIEL MALOY, MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER TO AMEND COMPLAINT Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:22-cv-00129 DUSTIN PEAD, Magistrate Judge Daphne A. Oberg Defendant.

Pro se plaintiff Nathaniel Maloy, proceeding in forma pauperis, filed this action against Dustin Pead, a magistrate judge in this district. (Doc. No. 8.) For the reasons explained below, the court ORDERS Mr. Maloy to file an amended complaint by May 9, 2022. LEGAL STANDARDS Whenever the court authorizes a party to proceed in forma pauperis, the court must dismiss the case if the court determines the complaint “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim for relief under section 1915, the court employs the standard for analyzing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Hogan v. Winder, 762 F.3d 1096, 1104 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)). The court accepts as true well-pleaded factual allegations and views the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Wilson v. Montano, 715 F.3d 847, 852 (10th Cir. 2013). But the court need not accept the plaintiff’s conclusory allegations as true. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff must offer specific factual allegations to support each claim.” Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011). A complaint is frivolous where “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Tucker v. U.S. Ct. of App. for the Tenth Cir., 815 F. App’x 292, 293 (10th Cir. May 19, 2020) (unpublished) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). Because Mr. Maloy proceeds pro se, his filings are liberally construed and held “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. Still, a pro

se plaintiff must “follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” Garrett v. Selby, Connor, Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). For instance, a pro se plaintiff “still has the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Jenkins v. Currier, 514 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). While the court must make some allowances for a pro se plaintiff’s “failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements,” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110, the court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf,” Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1096 (10th Cir. 2009)

(internal quotation marks omitted). ANALYSIS In his complaint, Mr. Maloy expresses dissatisfaction with Judge Pead’s handling of a prior case filed by Mr. Maloy in this district: Case No. 1:21-cv-00120-DBB-DBP (D. Utah, filed Aug. 31, 2021). (See Compl., Doc. No. 8 at 12–13.) Mr. Maloy alleges Judge Pead “tri[ed] to force [him] to amend [his] claim even though the evidence shows [him] innocent,” denied his case, did not review evidence properly, and ruined his life. (Id. at 9.) He states Judge Pead “refused to acknowledge all the letters that state [he is] free of all this debt.” (Id. at 10.) Mr. Maloy checked a box indicating he is asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 8.) He seeks damages of $30,000 and requests that Judge Pead be imprisoned for five years. (Id. at 13.) Mr. Maloy’s complaint is subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because it

asserts a claim for monetary damages against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Judges are generally immune from suits for monetary damages. Stein v. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court of N.M., 520 F.3d 1183, 1195 (10th Cir. 2008). The only exceptions to this rule are “(1) when the act is not taken in [the judge’s] judicial capacity, and (2) when the act, though judicial in nature, [is] taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Mr. Maloy challenges Judge Pead’s actions taken in his judicial capacity in a prior case, and he does not allege any act taken outside Judge Pead’s judicial capacity or in the absence of all jurisdiction. Mr. Maloy also fails to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or any other

plausible cause of action. To state a section 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must allege (1) deprivation of a federal right by (2) a person acting under color of state law.” Watson v. Kan. City, 857 F.2d 690, 694 (10th Cir. 1988). Mr. Maloy does not allege any deprivation of a federal right, nor does he allege facts sufficient to show that Judge Pead, a federal judge, was acting under color of state law. If Mr. Maloy is dissatisfied with the outcome of the prior case, his remedy is to file an appeal. But his general disagreement with a judge’s rulings is not a basis for any recognized legal claim against the judge. Indeed, his claims for monetary damages and imprisonment lack any arguable basis in law or fact and, therefore, are frivolous. In sum, Mr. Maloy’s complaint is subject to dismissal because it seeks monetary damages against a defendant who is immune from such relief, fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, and is frivolous. Nevertheless, “[d]ismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity to amend.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1217

(internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the court gives Mr. Maloy an opportunity to amend his complaint. CONCLUSION The court ORDERS as follows: 1. Mr. Maloy is ordered to file an amended complaint by May 9, 2022. The words “Amended Complaint” should appear in the caption of the document. 2. Once filed, the court will screen the amended complaint under 28 U.S.C.

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Related

Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer
425 F.3d 836 (Tenth Circuit, 2005)
Kay v. Bemis
500 F.3d 1214 (Tenth Circuit, 2007)
Jenkins v. Currier
514 F.3d 1030 (Tenth Circuit, 2008)
Stein v. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court of NM
520 F.3d 1183 (Tenth Circuit, 2008)
Smith v. United States
561 F.3d 1090 (Tenth Circuit, 2009)
Kansas Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins
656 F.3d 1210 (Tenth Circuit, 2011)
Wilson v. Montano
715 F.3d 847 (Tenth Circuit, 2013)
Hogan v. Winder
762 F.3d 1096 (Tenth Circuit, 2014)
Hall v. Bellmon
935 F.2d 1106 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
Maloy v. Pead, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/maloy-v-pead-utd-2022.