Malone v. Kate

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedMarch 21, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-01651
StatusUnknown

This text of Malone v. Kate (Malone v. Kate) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Malone v. Kate, (E.D. Wis. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

TRAYVIONTAE MALONE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 24-cv-1651-bhl

NURSE KATE,

Defendant.

SCREENING ORDER

Plaintiff Trayviontae Malone, who is currently serving a state prison sentence at the Milwaukee Secure Detention Facility and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. This matter comes before the Court on Malone’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee and to screen the complaint. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF THE FILING FEE Malone has requested leave to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee (in forma pauperis). A prisoner plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the $350.00 filing fee over time. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). Malone has filed a certified copy of his prison trust account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint, as required under 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2), and has been assessed and paid an initial partial filing fee of $53.17. Accordingly, the Court will grant Malone’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT The Court has a duty to review any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity, and dismiss any complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised any claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,”

that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In screening a complaint, the Court must determine whether the complaint complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and states at least plausible claims for which relief may be granted. To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, a plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It must be at least sufficient to provide notice to each defendant of what he or she is accused of doing, as well as when and where the alleged actions or inactions occurred, and the nature and extent of any damage or injury the actions or inactions caused. “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’

but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556. “[T]he complaint’s allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555 (internal quotations omitted). ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT On November 6, 2024, at around 9:12 p.m., Defendant Nurse Kate scanned Malone’s ID

then gave him the wrong medication. Dkt. No. 1 at 3. Malone states that Nurse Kate “knew” that she made a mistake because “she made a scared face.” Id. Malone states that he had a stomachache and a headache for one week, and he also experienced fear and loss of sleep from taking the wrong medication. Id. For relief, he seeks monetary damages. Id. THE COURT’S ANALYSIS “To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that he or she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that this deprivation occurred at the hands of a person or persons acting under the color of state law.” D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)).

To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, Malone must allege that: (1) he had an objectively serious medical condition; and (2) the defendant was subjectively deliberately indifferent towards it. Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008). A medical condition does not need to be life-threatening to be serious. Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010). However, it must generally be the sort of ailment for which people who are not in prison would seek medical attention. See Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that “minor aches and pains”—“the sorts of ailments for which many people who are not in prison do not seek medical attention”—do not constitute an objectively serious risk of harm.) A defendant is deliberately indifferent when he “actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm.” Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016). Negligence does not meet this standard and “even admitted medical malpractice does not give rise to a constitutional violation.” Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2006). Malone alleges that Nurse Kate gave him the wrong medication one time on November 6,

2024 at 9:12 p.m. This one error is insufficient to state a claim. Courts have long recognized that an isolated, one-time mistake in dispensing the wrong medication amounts to negligence at most, not deliberate indifference. See e.g., Van Leer v. Centurion Health of Indiana, LLC, No. 1:22-CV- 02050-TWP-MG, 2023 WL 2814156, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 6, 2023); Anderson v. Novak, 20-cv- 901-bbc, 2021 WL 39621, at *1-2 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 5, 2021); Robbins v. Pollard, No. 16-CV-1128, 2016 WL 8672956, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 18, 2016). Malone’s claim also fails because he has not alleged that he experienced consequences that could support an Eighth Amendment claim. Although it is possible that administering the wrong medication could pose an objectively serious risk of harm, Malone alleges that he suffered only a stomachache and a headache. These are not objectively serious medical conditions. See Cooper, 97 F.3d at 916 (noting that “minor aches and

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Darnell Cooper and Anthony Davis v. Michael Casey
97 F.3d 914 (Seventh Circuit, 1996)
Armond Norfleet v. Thomas Webster and Alejandro Hadded
439 F.3d 392 (Seventh Circuit, 2006)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Gayton v. McCoy
593 F.3d 610 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Duckworth v. Ahmad
532 F.3d 675 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Tyrone Petties v. Imhotep Carter
836 F.3d 722 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)

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Bluebook (online)
Malone v. Kate, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/malone-v-kate-wied-2025.