Malone v. Celt Oil, Inc.

485 So. 2d 145, 90 Oil & Gas Rep. 66, 1986 La. App. LEXIS 6323
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedFebruary 26, 1986
DocketNo. 17571-CA
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 485 So. 2d 145 (Malone v. Celt Oil, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Malone v. Celt Oil, Inc., 485 So. 2d 145, 90 Oil & Gas Rep. 66, 1986 La. App. LEXIS 6323 (La. Ct. App. 1986).

Opinion

SEXTON, Judge.

This appeal presents the narrow issue of whether a mineral lessee’s action in recom-pleting a well at a shallower formation constituted a single operation with the initial drilling so as to be good faith operations sufficient to interrupt the ten year liberative prescription of non-use established for mineral servitudes.

Plaintiffs in this cause are the surviving children and grandchildren of Frankie 0. Lester Malone and William Madison Malone. In the succession of Frankie 0. Lester Malone, plaintiffs were placed in possession of certain immovable property. Subsequently, by deeds dated October 2, 1970, plaintiffs transferred all of their interest in the property to Harold Joseph I. Malone, reserving, however, an undivided one-half interest in the minerals. On January 6,1972, Harold Joseph I. Malone, transferred all of his interests, both surface and mineral, to Mrs. Mary G. Hudson, who is made a defendant in this cause.

Subsequently, plaintiffs leased their mineral interests to Celt Oil, Inc. Certain interests in these leases were assigned to defendants, American Natural Gas Production Company, Sun Oil Company, and Pettit Engineering, Inc. Later, on April 2, 1980, and April 30,1980, Celt Oil, Inc. and Cotton Petroleum Corp., also a defendant, entered into a farm out agreement.

By an operating agreement dated July 8, 1980 between Crystal Oil Company as operator, and Cotton Petroleum Corp. and W.M. Beasley, Jr., as non-operators, Crystal Oil Company began development.

On September 9, 1980, Crystal Oil spud-ded in International Paper Company B No. 1 well (hereinafter IPCO B-l) approximately one month before the accrual of prescription.1 The drill site was located on property unitized for the Haynesville interval with the property sold by plaintiffs with the reservation of a mineral servitude.

According to the drilling report, the well was drilled from September 11, 1980 to October 24, 1980 when the well reached total depth. The well was perforated on November 8, 1980 and was placed into production as a commercial producer from the Smackover interval on November 12, 1980. On March 17, 1981, the tract on which IPCO B-l was situated was unitized in a compulsory unit for the Smackover interval. The production from the well began to dwindle and ceased sometime in March, 1981. Thereafter, the well was plugged back to the Haynesville sand and after the conclusion of recompletion work, produced from that formation beginning on April 24, 1981.

Plaintiffs filed suit for the recognition of their mineral servitude and an accounting and payment of royalties, alleging that the drilling of the IPCO B-l well approximately a month before the accrual of the libera-tive prescription of non-use, was a sufficient good faith operation to interrupt prescription.

In a written opinion following trial, the trial court recognized that Crystal Oil was aware of the paying potential of the Haynesville formation at the time of spud-ding and fully expected to plug back to the Haynesville should the Smackover formation play out or not be productive. However, the trial court held that this factor, including certain, logging tests conducted on the Haynesville sand during the process of putting the well on line as a Smackover producer and the later recompletion at the Haynesville, did not amount to one continuous operation under Article 29 of the Min[147]*147eral Code. The trial court found that the production completed from the Smackover formation ended that particular operation and that the later completion from the Haynesville formation was a separate operation. Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants.

Plaintiffs argue on appeal that there were good faith operations sufficient to interrupt prescription in that at the time IPCO B-l was spudded in, the well site was unitized with the property for the Haynesville formation. According to LSA-R.S. 31:33,2 that operation, if it met with the requisites for interruption of prescription, would interrupt prescription only as to that portion of the tract burdened by the servitude included in the unit provided such operations are for the discovery and production of minerals from the unitized zone.

In opposition, defendants assert that the well was commenced as a Smackover well and that no objective intent can be found to tie the well from the point of spudding to completion at total depth to any type of test of the Haynesville sand. Therefore, defendants assert that the operations did not meet the criteria established in LSA-R.S. 31:29 for interruption of prescription.

LSA-R.S. 31:29 provides:

§ 29. How prescription of nonuse is interrupted
The prescription of nonuse running against a mineral servitude is interrupted by good faith operations for the discovery and production of minerals. By good faith is meant that the operations must be
(1) commenced with reasonable expectation of discovering and producing minerals in paying quantities at a particular point or depth,
(2) continued at the site chosen to that point or depth, and
(3)conducted in such a manner that they constitute a single operation although actual drilling or mining is not conducted at all times.

As the readactor’s comment indicates, this article is simply a broad restatement of the existing jurisprudence. Thus, this court’s definition of “good faith drilling” as a “bona fide attempt to obtain production,” in Matlock Oil Corp. v. Gerard, 263 So.2d 413 (La.App.2d Cir.1972), is noteworthy. Matlock held that the mere act of drilling through a shallower sand, without the manifestation of an intent to obtain production was not sufficient operation to interrupt the running of the liberative prescription of non-use. The facts and holding of Matlock were succinctly stated by this court in Bass Enterprises Production Company v. Kiene, 437 So.2d 940 (La.App.2d Cir.1983) as follows:

In Matlock, this court was faced with the identical issue presented in the instant case. There, a mineral servitude present on land in the SW ¾⅛ of Section 33, Township 22 North, Range 4 West in Claiborne Parish was kept alive by a producing well on the servitude tract until the well was physically plugged and abandoned in May, 1960. The Matlock-Fuller No. 1 Well had been drilled in 1969 within the geographical confines of the Lower Hosston Formation Unit created by a Conservation Order on February 1, 1966. This unit contained the servitude tracts within its confines but the Fuller No. 1 Well was located off the servitude tracts. In January, 1969, the Lower Hosston Formation was penetrated by the well bore of the Fuller No. 1 Well; however, no tests were performed with respect to the Lower Hosston Formation. In Mat-lock, appellants contended that the mere act of drilling the well through the [148]*148Lower Hosston Formation on the drilling and production unit established for that formation interrupted the running of prescription and preserved the mineral servitudes in question which were located within the unit. However, in Mat-lock,

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Related

Malone v. Celt Oil, Inc.
488 So. 2d 692 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1986)

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Bluebook (online)
485 So. 2d 145, 90 Oil & Gas Rep. 66, 1986 La. App. LEXIS 6323, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/malone-v-celt-oil-inc-lactapp-1986.