Mallory v. McDermott

274 A.D. 254, 80 N.Y.S.2d 486
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedJuly 8, 1948
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 274 A.D. 254 (Mallory v. McDermott) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mallory v. McDermott, 274 A.D. 254, 80 N.Y.S.2d 486 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1948).

Opinion

Larkin, J.

Plaintiff is the owner of the oil and gas right of, and engaged in producing oil from, approximately sixteen acres of land in Allegany County, New York, close to the village of Bolivar. Defendant’s incompetent, hereinafter referred to as defendant, is the owner of the surface of these sixteen acres, and also of the surface and oil and gas right of approximately twelve acres hereinafter mentioned as the restricted area, immediately adjoining on the south the above sixteen acres.

The complaint seeks an injunction to restrain defendant from producing oil from a well which he drilled in 1946, and from which he is now producing oil, in the restricted area, and asks an accounting for the oil produced from that well. The basis of the complaint is a claimed violation of a restriction contained in prior deeds forbidding defendant to drill any oil wells on the restricted area. The answer puts in issue the restriction, and it also pleads a counterclaim based on allegations that plaintiff, without right, has drilled an oil well in the restricted area, from which he has been and is producing oil. Defendant demands an accounting of the oil produced therefrom. After a trial at Special Term the court made a judgment dismissing the complaint, finding that there was no restriction operative against defendant. The same judgment also dismissed the counterclaim on a finding, in effect, that the well which plaintiff had drilled was on the north sixteen acres, and not on the restricted area. Bach party appeals from the adverse part of the judgment.

To determine the issues raised by the complaint requires the construction of two deeds made by one Hunt to defendant, the first dated July 26, 1898, and the second, January 16, 1900, and another deed made by defendant April 23, 1907, to Price, Corbin and Boot. The issues raised by the counterclaim present a purely factual question, whether the well therein mentioned is located on the restricted area.

Prior to the 1898 deed, Hunt was the owner of approximately sixty-five acres of land. By the 1898 deed, Hunt conveyed to •defendant the surface, only, of this acreage, retaining the right to produce oil from six wells then on the premises, but stating in such deed that as fast as .a well was abandoned Hunt would pull and remove the well, with all of its appurtenances, from the property. By this deed defendant became the owner of the entire surface right of the sixty-five acres, but Hunt remained the owner of the oil and gas right, subject to the limitation noted.

[257]*257By the 1900 deed, Hunt conveyed to defendant the oil and gas right of the north sixteen acres, approximately, of the sixty-five acres, in consideration of $60. By this deed defendant, already the owner of the surface, became, to all intents and purposes, the owner of the fee of the sixteen acres, but Hunt remained the owner of the oil and gas right of the balance of the acreage, approximately forty-nine acres. The language of this 1900 deed is important. The description of the oil and gas right so conveyed fixes the south fine at a point 600 feet north of Hunt’s then northernmost well on the entire sixty-five acres, and parallel to the north line of the entire sixty-five acres. As a part of the consideration defendant released Hunt from liability to furnish gas for fuel and lights to defendant’s nearby residence in Bolivar, as stipulated in the 1898 deed. This deed of 1900 contains the following provision: “As a further consideration said second party also agrees that the said W. J. Hunt may drill two more wells on the premises described in said deed [meaning the deed of 1898] above mentioned, one of said wells to be north of the stone quarry and one south of same and north of well now on west line but no well to be drilled within 600 feet of the south boundary of above described premises [meaning the north 16 acres].” This provision is important, as, by it, plaintiff insists that the restriction, of which he now claims the benefit, originated.

Defendant, in 1907, by warranty deed, conveyed the foregoing oil and gas right, only, to Price, Corbin and Boot, describing the north sixteen acres by the same description as in the deed from Hunt to him. Apparently defendant had drilled oil wells on the north sixteen acres after the conveyance in 1900, from Hunt to him, and at the time of the conveyance in 1907, had at least six producing wells then on the property. These six wells explain the difference between what defendant paid Hunt, $60, and what Price, Corbin and Boot paid defendant, $5,600. In this deed of 1907, is this recital: ‘‘ It is understood and agreed that no wells shall be drilled within 600 feet of the south boundary of the above described premises.” This clause is likewise important because plaintiff, by tying it into the 1900 deed of Hunt to defendant, insists that the latter, thereby, gave written evidence that the provision in Hunt’s deed of 1900, to defendant was intended to create a restriction on Hunt’s right to drill in the restricted area, and to make this restriction appurtenant to the oil and gas right of the north sixteen acres, and that defendant, by his deed of 1907, to Price, Corbin and Boot, intended to convey and assign to them his right to enforce it, as against Hunt.

[258]*258By various conveyances, all of them using the same description and containing the same provision as to drilling within the restricted area, title of the oil right to the north sixteen acres became, in 1932, completely vested in this plaintiff. In 1915, defendant, by quitclaim deed from Hunt, became the owner of the oil and gas right underlying the entire sixty-five acres, excepting that underlying the north sixteen acres.

Plaintiff’s position in this lawsuit, insofar as he seeks an injunction against defendant, is, that defendant stands in the same position as Hunt would be, if he had remained the owner of the oil and gas right of the restricted- area, since defendant, by his conveyance from Hunt in 1915, took with notice of the two deeds by which the restriction as to drilling on the restricted area came into being, and since plaintiff, as a subsequent grantee, must be deemed to have acquired his title, with notice of the existence of the restriction, he, now, can enforce this restriction against defendant.

Defendant’s position is, that Hunt and defendant, the parties to the 1900 deed, never intended to create either a covenant, or a restriction, in favor of the oil right on the north sixteen acres, but that, on the contrary, it was a mere personal privilege which defendant accorded to his grantor to drill two additional wells, and which, had Hunt died before exercising, would have ended with his death, and that-the provision found in defendant’s deed of 1907, to Price, Corbin and Boot was a mere rephrasing of the same privilege as accorded to Hunt by defendant, and that the only reason it was placed by defendant in his deed of 1907, to Price, Corbin and Boot, was because Hunt had not yet exercised the privilege, and so, defendant merely gave notice that he still recognized Hunt’s right to drill two additional wells.

The question posed is a troublesome one, not free from doubt. Concededly whatever restriction was contained in the deed from Hunt to defendant, of the surface, in 1898, was clearly for the benefit of the surface, only, as defendant then owned no oil right to be benefited. While it is true that by the 1900 deed defendant acquired the oil right of the north sixteen acres, it must be kept in mind that he, by the 1898 deed, then owned the surface of the entire sixty-five acres.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
274 A.D. 254, 80 N.Y.S.2d 486, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mallory-v-mcdermott-nyappdiv-1948.