Mallory Stout v. Tanner Knotts

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 26, 2023
• Docket: 22A-PL-01216
• Status: Published

Opinion

FILED Jul 26 2023, 8:39 am

CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Robert N. Reimondo Denise F. Hayden Capper Tulley & Reimondo Lacy Law Office, LLC Crawfordsville, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Mallory Stout, July 26, 2023 Appellant-Plaintiff Court of Appeals Case No. 22A-PL-1216 v. Appeal from the Putnam Circuit Court Tanner Knotts, The Honorable Charles D. Bridges, Appellee-Defendant. Special Judge Trial Court Cause No. 67C01-2111-PL-584

Opinion by Judge Pyle

Judges Bradford and Kenworthy concur.

Pyle, Judge.

Statement of the Case [1] Mallory Stout (“Stout”) appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to correct

error. Through a convoluted series of procedural motions, the trial court

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1216| July 26, 2023 Page 1 of 11 effectively granted Tanner Knotts’ (“Knotts”) motion to dismiss pursuant to

Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6). In addition, Stout claims that the trial court

expressed actual bias against her case and erred by not recusing from this case.

Concluding that the trial court erroneously denied Stout’s motion to correct

error and failed to recuse, we reverse the trial court’s judgment, remand this

case for further proceedings, and order the assignment of a new judge.

[2] We reverse and remand.

Issues While Stout raised three issues, we address two that are dispositive:

1. Whether the trial court erroneously denied Stout’s May 2, 2022 motion to correct error.

2. Whether the trial court improperly failed to grant Stout’s motion to recuse.

Facts [3] As alleged in Stout’s complaint, the parties are unmarried, but chose to

cohabitate. Stout selected a home in Roachdale, Indiana. The home was then

purchased by Knotts for $69,900 and was titled in his name. In July 2019, the

parties began to live together. During this time, the parties entered into a “joint

venture” wherein they “used their own assets to make improvements and buy

supplies and materials, increasing the value” of the home. (App. Vol. 2 at 9).

In addition, Stout paid for the utilities, a “large portion of the renovations[,]”

and assisted in completing the renovations. (App. Vol. 2, at 9). At some point

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1216| July 26, 2023 Page 2 of 11 in July 2021, Knotts forced Stout to leave the residence, leaving behind

personal property that was jointly purchased. Knotts subsequently sold the

house for $149,000, and Stout had “no expected reimbursement from the sale of

the house[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 9).

[4] On November 11, 2021, Stout filed a complaint alleging that she and Knotts

had an implied contract to cohabitate wherein she would contribute to the

rehabilitation and maintenance of the home. Stout alleged that her removal

from the house and Knotts’ subsequent sale of the home without her being

compensated for her contributions resulted in Knotts’ unjust enrichment. In

addition, Stout filed a temporary restraining order seeking to prevent Knotts

from spending the money received from the sale of the home before this matter

was resolved. The temporary restraining order was granted on November 12,

2021.

[5] On November 30, 2021, Knotts filed a request for an extension of time to

respond and also filed a motion for change of judge. The motion for change of

judge was granted and the Honorable Charles D. Bridges (“Judge Bridges”) was

selected and qualified to sit as special judge in this case.

[6] On December 10, 2021, Stout filed a motion requesting the trial court to order

that the proceeds from the sale of the home be held by the Putnam County

Clerk while this matter was pending. On December 12, 2021, Knotts filed a

motion to dismiss pursuant to Trial Rule 12(B)(6). In his motion, Knotts

asserted that Indiana did not recognize palimony, and, since the parties were

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1216| July 26, 2023 Page 3 of 11 not married and the home was solely in Knotts’ name, Stout had failed to state

a claim upon which relief could be granted.1 In addition, Knotts objected to the

temporary restraining order and the transfer of the proceeds to the Putnam

County Clerk.

[7] On December 15, 2021, before Stout filed any response, Judge Bridges granted

Knotts’ motion to dismiss. On December 21, 2021, Stout filed a motion to

correct error. In her memorandum accompanying her motion, Stout argued

that she had more than adequately stated a claim recognized under Indiana

law. Citing Bright v. Kuehl, 650 N.E.2d 311, 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), reh’g

denied and Neibert v. Perdomo, 54 N.E.3d 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), Stout

argued that Indiana recognizes a cause of action brought under implied contract

and unjust enrichment where a cohabitant seeks relief based upon contributions

made during the period of cohabitation.

[8] The next day, again before any response could be filed, Judge Bridges granted

Stout’s motion, which vacated the December 15, 2021 order dismissing Stout’s

complaint. On January 4, 2022, Stout filed a second motion requesting an

order directing that the funds from the sale of the home be held by the Putnam

County Clerk; this order was granted that same day.

1 Palimony is a “term [having] meaning similar to ‘alimony’ except that award, settlement or agreement arises out of nonmarital relationship of parties.” Putz v. Allie, 785 N.E.2d 577. 579 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1216| July 26, 2023 Page 4 of 11 [9] On January 19, 2022, Knotts filed his motion to correct error. Knotts argued

that the trial court should not have granted Stout’s motion to correct error

before he had an opportunity to respond. Specifically, he asserted that Trial

Rule 59(E) provides that parties opposing a motion to correct error have a

period of fifteen days within which to file a response. In addition, Knotts

argued that Stout did not follow the proper procedures for challenging the grant

of a motion to dismiss. Contemporaneously, Knotts also filed a motion

requesting that the trial court release the funds from the sale of the home to

him.

[10] On January 21, 2022, the trial court, before Stout could file a response, granted

Knotts’ motion to correct error. On January 26, 2022, Stout filed a response to

Knotts’ motion to correct error. Stout requested “that this Court deny [Knotts’]

Motion for Relief of Proceeds, grant [Stout’s] Motion to Correct Error, set aside

the Order Granting [Knotts’] Motion to Dismiss, and for all other relief just and

proper in the premises.” (App. Vol. 2 at 42). In an order dated January 27,

2022, before Knotts filed any response, Judge Bridges issued an order. In his

order, Judge Bridges, acknowledging that he had already granted Knotts’

motion to correct error, gave Knotts “15 days from January 21, 2022 to file his

response to [Stout’s] Motion to Correct Errors.” (App. Vol. 2 at 44). In

addition, Judge Bridges denied Knotts’ request to release the funds from the

sale of the house to him.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1216| July 26, 2023 Page 5 of 11 [11] Despite the procedural posture of this case, Judge Bridges held a telephonic

pretrial conference on March 8, 2022. A trial date of September 22, 2022 was

subsequently scheduled.

[12] On March 17, 2022, Stout filed a motion requesting that Judge Bridges recuse

himself. The contents of the motion read as follows:

1. This matter was set for telephonic attorney conference on March 8, 2022.

2. That during said telephonic conference this Court stated to counsel that its position is, regardless of what everyone else’s position is in Indianapolis, that if [the parties] weren’t married and [Stout] lived there and had the benefit of living there and now wants to claim what everyone calls “sweat equity” . . . bullsh*t. There is no sweat equity in this Court.

3. When undersigned asked whether the Court would uphold the status of the law in Indiana regarding the equitable theory of unjust enrichment or implied contract, this Court stated, I never have . . . it does not sit well with me.

4. That this Court elaborated and stated that it sees women do this all the time and it’s horsesh*t.

5. That an unjust bias and prejudice against [Stout] and/or her circumstances, as pled, exists and on that basis [Stout] is entitled to recusal of the Judge herein.

(App. Vol. 2 at 46). Judge Bridges took no action and failed to make any

ruling on Stout’s motion for recusal.

[13] On March 17, 2022, Knotts filed a motion asking the trial court to vacate the

trial date set in September. Knotts argued that when the trial court granted his

motion to correct error on January 21, 2022, it effectively returned the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1216| July 26, 2023 Page 6 of 11 procedural posture of the case to the point when Stout’s complaint had been

dismissed. Knotts also acknowledged that he had yet to file an answer or

counterclaim in this case. As a result, Knotts asserted that, with Stout’s case

being dismissed, a trial date was unnecessary. Stout subsequently filed an

objection to Knotts’ motion to vacate the trial setting.

[14] On April 8, 2022, the trial court granted Knotts’ motion and vacated the trial

setting. In addition, the trial court found that Stout’s complaint should be

dismissed without prejudice. Knotts subsequently filed a motion for release of

funds, which the trial court granted on April 13, 2022. Stout filed her motion to

correct error on May 2, 2022, which the trial court denied.

[15] Stout now appeals.

Decision

1. Motion to Correct Error

[16] Stout argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to correct error.

Specifically, she argues that her complaint adequately states a claim for relief

under Indiana law. We agree.

[17] We generally review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to correct error for an

abuse of discretion. Berg v. Berg, 170 N.E.3d 224, 227 (Ind. 2021). “But, where

a ruling turns on a question of law, our review is de novo.” Id. A motion to

dismiss for failing to state a claim under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) is reviewed de

novo. Residences at Ivy Quad v. Ivy Quad Development, LLC, 179 N.E.3d 977, 981

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1216| July 26, 2023 Page 7 of 11 (Ind. 2022). When considering the trial court’s action, we take the facts alleged

in the complaint as true, consider all allegations in the light most favorable to

Stout, and draw every reasonable inference in her favor. Id. In essence, we

must determine whether Stout has “stated some factual scenario in which a

legally actionable injury has occurred.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). “If so, dismissal is improper.” Id.

[18] In Indiana, we have determined “that a party who cohabitates with another

without subsequent marriage is entitled to relief upon a showing of an express

contract or a viable equitable theory such as implied contract or unjust

enrichment.” Bright, 650 N.E.2d at 315.

To recover for unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must show that (1) [she] rendered a measurable benefit to the defendant at the defendant’s express or implied request; (2) [she] expected payment from the defendant; and (3) allowing the defendant to retain the benefit without restitution would be unjust. . . .

Similarly, to recover under implied contract, the plaintiff generally must establish that the defendant impliedly or expressly requested the benefits conferred. Any benefit, commonly the subject of pecuniary compensation, which one, not intending it as a gift, confers upon another who accepts it, is an adequate foundation for a legally implied or created promise to render back its value.

Neibert, 54 N.E.3d at 1051 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

[19] In this case, the allegations in Stout’s complaint sound in implied contract and

unjust enrichment. Stout has alleged in her complaint that she and Knotts

decided to live together. She picked out the house. Knotts purchased the

property and placed it in his name. Stout alleged that, between July 2019 and

July 2021, she and Knotts entered into a “joint venture” wherein the parties

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1216| July 26, 2023 Page 8 of 11 would contribute to the rehabilitation and renovation of the house. (App. Vol.

2 at 9). Stout stated that she paid for the utilities and contributed money and

labor to the maintenance of the home and claimed that she was eventually

forced to move out of the house. She alleged that she left behind personal

property that was jointly purchased and that Knotts sold the house for a profit

without compensating her for her contributions.

[20] Based upon these allegations, we hold that Stout has stated a claim upon which

relief can be granted. We make no comment on whether Stout will produce

sufficient evidence to be successful, but the allegations in her complaint are

sufficient to warrant remand of this case for further proceedings.

2. Motion for Recusal

[21] Stout argues that the trial court also erred by failing to rule on her motion for

recusal. Stout’s motion is based on the statements Judge Bridges made during

the telephonic pretrial conference that we have outlined above. Stout argues

that recusal is required because Judge Bridges demonstrated his inability to be

impartial. Knotts does not dispute the accuracy of the statements outlined in

Stout’s motion nor does he address the trial court’s failure to rule on the

motion. Instead, the crux of Knotts’ argument is that a trial court’s adverse

ruling is not a basis for recusal.

[22] It is well settled that an impartial judge is an essential element of Due Process.

Chappey v. Storey, 204 N.E.3d 932, 939 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1216| July 26, 2023 Page 9 of 11 While we presume judicial officers to be unbiased, our supreme court has

outlined the conduct expected of Indiana’s judicial officers as follows:

Indiana Judicial Conduct Canon 2 requires a judge to perform the duties of judicial office impartially, competently, and diligently. Judges must be objective and open-minded. A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office . . . without bias or prejudice. A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants. A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned including in circumstances when the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.

Hollinsworth v. State, 928 N.E.2d 201, 202 (Ind. 2010) (quotation marks and

citations omitted) (emphasis added). Recusal is required if an objective person,

knowledgeable of all the circumstances, would have a rational basis for

doubting the judge’s impartiality. L.G. v. S.L., 88 N.E.3d 1069, 1071 (Ind.

2018).

[23] Here, Judge Bridges’ statements, as outlined in Stout’s recusal motion, fall

woefully short of this standard. His statements go beyond merely expressing

skepticism about Stout’s claims in her complaint. Judge Bridges clearly

expressed disdain, not only for the type of relief Stout was seeking, but for the

gender he believed most often sought this type of relief. In addition, he

indicated that he would not provide the relief being requested by Stout,

regardless of whether the law allowed it or there was sufficient evidence to

support the requested relief. See Chappey, 204 N.E.3d at 939 (holding that clear

bias or prejudice exists where there is an undisputed claim or the judge has

expressed an opinion on the merits of the controversy). As a result, we hold

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1216| July 26, 2023 Page 10 of 11 that an objective person would have a rational basis for doubting Judge Bridges’

impartiality.

[24] Because the record reveals that the trial court erred in dismissing Stout’s

complaint for failing to state a claim, the order denying Stout’s motion to

correct error is reversed and this case is remanded for further proceedings.

Because the trial court’s order releasing the funds from the sale of the home is

inextricably linked to the erroneous dismissal of Stout’s complaint, that order is

also reversed. In addition, on remand, Stout is entitled to a new judge.

[25] Reversed and remanded with instructions.

Bradford, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.

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