Mallik v. Youngblood

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Mallik v. Youngblood

274 A.D.2d 456, 710 N.Y.S.2d 395, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7855

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJuly 17, 2000

StatusPublished

This text of 274 A.D.2d 456 (Mallik v. Youngblood) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Mallik v. Youngblood, 274 A.D.2d 456, 710 N.Y.S.2d 395, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7855 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2000).

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Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (McCarty, J.), dated April 23, 1999, which granted the separate motions of the defendants Independent Coach Corporation and Lawrence Union Free School District #15 which were, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

[457]*457Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motions are denied.

The plaintiffs alleged that the bus stop designated by the school district is unsafe, and that therefore it is liable for injuries sustained by the infant plaintiff Zeshan Mallik as he attempted to cross the street after leaving the school bus. Generally, a school district may not be held vicariously liable for the purported negligence of a bus company that is an independent contractor (see, Kleeman v Rheingold, 81 NY2d 270). Here, however, the affidavit of the plaintiffs’ expert raised a triable issue of fact as to the safety of the bus stop in question, and therefore, the motion of the school district should have been denied (see generally, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557).

The Supreme Court also erred in granting summary judgment to the defendant bus company. While the intersection where the infant plaintiff was discharged was designated by the school district, the record indicates that it was left to the discretion of the bus company to decide where at the intersection to drop off the students. The plaintiffs have raised a triable issue as to whether the bus company failed to exercise reasonable care in not stopping on the busier street of the intersection, which the infant plaintiff was required to cross (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1174 [b]; Bruce v Hasbrouk, 207 AD2d 10, affd 87 NY2d 370). Joy, J. P., Florio, H. Miller and Smith, JJ., concur.

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—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (McCarty, J.), dated April 23, 1999, which granted the separate motions of the defendants Independent Coach Corporation and Lawrence Union Free School District #15 which were, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

[457]*457Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motions are denied.

The plaintiffs alleged that the bus stop designated by the school district is unsafe, and that therefore it is liable for injuries sustained by the infant plaintiff Zeshan Mallik as he attempted to cross the street after leaving the school bus. Generally, a school district may not be held vicariously liable for the purported negligence of a bus company that is an independent contractor (see, Kleeman v Rheingold, 81 NY2d 270). Here, however, the affidavit of the plaintiffs’ expert raised a triable issue of fact as to the safety of the bus stop in question, and therefore, the motion of the school district should have been denied (see generally, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557).

The Supreme Court also erred in granting summary judgment to the defendant bus company. While the intersection where the infant plaintiff was discharged was designated by the school district, the record indicates that it was left to the discretion of the bus company to decide where at the intersection to drop off the students. The plaintiffs have raised a triable issue as to whether the bus company failed to exercise reasonable care in not stopping on the busier street of the intersection, which the infant plaintiff was required to cross (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1174 [b]; Bruce v Hasbrouk, 207 AD2d 10, affd 87 NY2d 370). Joy, J. P., Florio, H. Miller and Smith, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

274 A.D.2d 456, 710 N.Y.S.2d 395, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7855, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mallik-v-youngblood-nyappdiv-2000.

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