Mallery v. Managers' Securities Co.

1 F. Supp. 942, 1932 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1890
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedDecember 7, 1932
Docket850
StatusPublished

This text of 1 F. Supp. 942 (Mallery v. Managers' Securities Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mallery v. Managers' Securities Co., 1 F. Supp. 942, 1932 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1890 (D. Del. 1932).

Opinion

NIELDS, District Judge.

Harvey J. Mailery, a holder of elass B stock in Managers’ Securities Company, a Delaware corporation, filed his bill against that corporation for an accounting involving a multiplicity of transactions and complicated accounts. The controversy relates to the determination of the proper amount of assets of defendant apportionable upon dissolution to elass B stockholders and to the rights of plaintiff in those assets.

In 1923 a vice president of General Motors Corporation conceived a plan for arousing and sustaining the zeal, enthusiam, fidelity, and loyalty of managing executives of that company. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., holding 7,500,000 shares of General Motors stock through its subsidiary, General Motors Securities Company, was deeply interested in the plan and was ready to co-operate by selling to defendant stock of its subsidiary being the equivalent of 2,250,000 shares of General Motors stock at $15 a share. To carry out this plan Managers’ Securities Company, the defendant, was incorporated November 26, 1923. The charter authorized the issuance of $28,800,000 in 7 per cent, cumulative preferred stock and $4,000,000 in elass A stock, divided into 40,000 shares, par value $100, and $1,000,000 in class B- stock divided into 40,000 shares, par value $25.-These three classes of stock were issued. Upon the organization of defendant on November 26, 1923, and continuously thereafter, its officers were a few of the officers of General Motors Corporation. Its directors were likewise a few of the officers or chief executives of General Motors. Approximately seventy of the managing executives of General Motors or of its subsidiaries became the stockholders of defendant.

November 27, 1923, the day after its organization, defendant entered into a contract with General Motors Corporation, commonly referred to as the “5 after 7 contract.” It provided: “General Motors hereby agrees on or before April 1st in each year, commencing with April 1st, 1924 and ending April 1st, 1931, to pay to the Managers Company 5% of the net earnings of General Motors for the preceding calendar year after deducting from said net earnings 7% on the capital employed during said year.” On the same day, November 27, 1923, the du Pont Company agreed to sell to the defendant 148,509 shares of the stock of its subsidiary, General Motors Securities Company, being the equivalent of 2,250,000 shares of General Motors stock.

*943 All of class A and class B stock of the defendant was sold to General Motors Corporation for $5,000,000 in cash. This sum, so acquired by the defendant (less $50,000) was paid by the defendant to the du Pont Company, and the $28,800,000 of preferred stock of defendant was delivered to the du Pont Company for stock of General Motors Securities Company, .representing 2,250,000 shares of General Motors stock. This preferred stock was later retired. To accomplish the ultimate purpose of the plan, General Motors resold in large part the class A and class B stock of defendant to some seventy or more selected executives of General Motors or of its subsidiary companies. They uniformly acquired the same number of class A and class B shares. The plaintiff, one of such executives, purchased 200 shares of class A and 200 shares of class B. General Motors required each purchaser of class A and class B stock at the time of purchase to give to it an irrevocable option enabling it to reacquire such stock. Plaintiff executed and delivered such an option. The option on the class A stock provided that if the plaintiff should leave the employ of General Motors or its subsidiary, through no fault of his own, the General Motors Corporation could buy the class A stock at a price equivalent to its par value plus its proportion of the class A surplus “as shown on the books of the company as of April 30th” in the year in which the repurchase was made. In 1929 this option was exercised upon plaintiff leaving defendant’s employ and plaintiff continued the holder of class B stock only.

The business of the defendant was to administer for the benefit of its stockholders two sources of income: (1) The shares of General Motors Securities Company, the equivalent of 2,250,000 shares of General Motors stock acquired from the du Pont Company; and (2) the “5 after 7 contract” yielding bonus payments to be distributed among defendant’s class A stockholders while they remained in the service of General Motors Corporation and no longer.

Nothing more need be said as to the purchase of the block of General Motors stock from the du P'ont Company. We are more concerned in this ease with the other asset of defendant, the “5 after 7 contract” and the earnings of General Motors Corporation received by defendant under that contract. We are concerned with the agreement between the stockholders of defendant contained in its charter relative to its earnings. The charter provided: “There shall be credited to a Class A surplus account, for the benefit of the Class A stock, on the books of the Company, when and as received, the net amount, after providing for taxes, earned by the Company under said contract with the General Motors Corporation wherein General Motors Corporation agrees, under the terms and conditions therein set forth, to pay this Company, for the term therein specified, five percent (5%) of its net earnings after certain deductions. Said Class A surplus may be used for the payment of special dividends on Class A stock, or for the purpose of retiring such Class A stock pro rata either in whole or in part at any time at a price equal to the par value thereof plus its pro rata share of said Class A surplus account. All the remaining net income of the Company shall be credited to a general surplus account.”

From the start a “Class A Surplus Account” was set up on defendant’s books. Its income under the “5 after 7 contract” was credited on the books to that account as required by its charter. Its remaining income was credited to a general surplus account. Dividends on class B stock were paid from and charged against the general surplus account. Dividends paid on class A stock were paid from and charged against class A surplus account. Defendant’s income was very large. By the summer of 1926 its preferred stock had all been retired. By 1928, 30,000 shares of class A stock were retired from income received under the “5 after 7 contract.” The charter of defendant was amended reducing defendant’s authorized capital to $2,000,000 consisting of 10,000 shares of class A stock and 40,000 shares of class B stock.

Starting with 1925, a meeting of stockholders was held in Detroit in January or February of each year. At these meetings a statement of earnings with balance sheets were presented together with charts dealing with probable earning’s, dividends, etc. Voluminous exhibits were produced comparing the assets, earnings, and dividends of defendant, General Motors, and other corporations. Reports were made to the stockholders by the officers and the business of the company was fully discussed. These were the only meetings where the operations of the company and its financial condition were preseated personally to the stockholders. At the stated annual meetings in Wilmington only a sufficient number of stockholders attended to hold the meetings, the vast majority of the stockholders being represented by their proxies.

*944 January 24,1928, Mr.

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Bluebook (online)
1 F. Supp. 942, 1932 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1890, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mallery-v-managers-securities-co-ded-1932.