Malka v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: July 30, 2025
• Docket: 2:23-cv-01877
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 OMER MALKA, et al., Case No. 2:23-cv-01877-CSK 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 14 MERCEDES-BENZ, LLC, (ECF No. 47) 15 Defendant. 16 17 Pending before the Court is Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC’s (“Mercedes- 18 Benz USA”) motion for summary judgment.1 (ECF No. 47.) Plaintiffs Omer Malka and 19 Karin Ohayon bring two state law claims for breach of express warranty and breach of 20 implied warranty pursuant to California’s Song-Beverly Act. First Amended Complaint 21 (“FAC”) (ECF No. 43). Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is fully briefed. (ECF 22 Nos. 47, 51, 53, 54.) On July 22, 2025, the Court held an in-person hearing where 23 attorney Meghan Gallagher appeared on behalf of Defendant and Attorney Lior Katz 24 appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs. (ECF No. 22.) For the reasons that follow, the Court 25 GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 26

27 1 This case proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) for all purposes, including the entry of judgment, pursuant to the consent of all parties. (ECF 28 Nos. 7, 8, 9.) 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 A. Factual Background 3 On or about April 3, 2022, Plaintiffs leased a 2022 Mercedes-Benz GT53C4 4 bearing the vehicle identification number W1K7X6BB0NA046172 (“Subject Vehicle”), 5 which was manufactured and/or distributed by Defendant. FAC ¶ 10. The Subject 6 Vehicle was leased to Plaintiffs by non-party Mercedes-Benz of Sacramento. Id. At the 7 time of leasing the Subject Vehicle to Plaintiffs, the Subject Vehicle had no prior owners. 8 Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiffs were informed that the Subject Vehicle was “dealer-owned” and was 9 used by Mercedez-Benz of Sacramento as a “demonstrator vehicle.” Id. ¶¶ 13- 15. 10 Plaintiffs allege the Subject Vehicle came with a 48-month, or 50,000 miles, express 11 warranty that was issued by Defendant. Id. ¶¶ 10-12. Throughout a two-year period, 12 Plaintiffs allege they began experiencing issues with the Subject Vehicle that resulted in 13 multiple repairs. Id. ¶¶ 23-27. Plaintiffs allege the Subject Vehicle continues to have 14 defects that may result in it needing additional repairs and that none of the repair 15 attempts have thus far successfully repaired the Subject Vehicle. Id. ¶¶ 28-29. Plaintiffs 16 therefore allege Defendant is required under state law to promptly offer to repurchase or 17 replace the Subject Vehicle after a reasonable number of repair attempts, which 18 Defendant has failed to do. Id. ¶ 31. 19 B. Procedural Background 20 Plaintiffs originally filed this action in Sacramento County Superior Court on July 21 14, 2023 asserting the following six causes of action: (1) violation of California Civil Code 22 § 1793.2(d); (2) violation of California Civil Code § 1793.2(b); (3) violation of California 23 Civil Code § 1793.2(a)(3); (4) breach of express written warranty pursuant to California 24 Civil Code §§ 1791.2(a) and 1794; (5) breach of implied warranty of merchantability 25 pursuant to California Civil Code §§ 1791.1 and 1794; and (6) violation of the Tanner 26 Consumer Protection Act pursuant to California Civil Code § 1793.22, et seq. (ECF No. 1 27 ¶¶ 13-54.) On August 31, 2023, Defendant filed an Answer in state court (ECF No. 1-2), 28 and subsequently removed this action to federal court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction 1 (ECF No. 1). On August 5, 2024, Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings 2 (ECF No. 23), which the Court granted on November 14, 2024, dismissing the Complaint 3 with leave to amend (ECF No. 39). On November 27, 2024, the Court granted the 4 parties’ joint stipulation to modify the Court’s scheduling order to allow the parties to 5 engage in mediation on February 24, 2025. (ECF Nos. 40, 42.) On December 2, 2024, 6 Plaintiffs filed their FAC alleging two causes of action for breach of express warranty and 7 breach of implied warranty under California’s Song-Beverly Act (“SBA”) pursuant to 8 California Civil Code §§ 1790, et seq. FAC (ECF No. 43). Plaintiffs did not amend to 9 include additional defendants such as Mercedez-Benz of Sacramento. Id. Plaintiffs’ FAC 10 is the operative complaint in this action and on December 16, 2024, Defendant filed its 11 Answer. (ECF Nos. 43, 44.) On February 24, 2025, the parties engaged in mediation 12 efforts, which were unsuccessful. (ECF No. 46.) On June 2, 2025, Defendant filed this 13 pending motion for summary judgment. Def. MSJ (ECF No. 47). 14 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 15 Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any 16 material fact and the mov[ing party] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 17 Civ. P. 56(c). The principal purpose of summary judgment is to dispose of factually 18 unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). 19 Therefore, the “threshold inquiry” is whether there are any factual issues that could 20 reasonably be resolved in favor of either party, or conversely, whether the facts are so 21 one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 22 477 U.S. 242, 250-52 (1986). Summary judgment should be entered, after adequate 23 time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing 24 sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on 25 which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. “[A] 26 complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case 27 necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. 28 In a summary judgment motion, the moving party must inform the court of the 1 basis for the motion and identify the portion of the record that it believes demonstrates 2 the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving 3 party meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish 4 that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 5 Corp., 475 U.S. 574. 585 (1986). To establish the existence of genuine issue of material 6 fact, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings, but 7 must tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible 8 discovery material. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The 9 opposing party must demonstrate that the fact might affect the outcome of the suit and a 10 reasonable jury could return a verdict for the opposing party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 11 248; T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 12 1987). For the moving party to succeed, the court must conclude that no rational trier of 13 fact could find for the opposing party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 14 All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the 15 court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; 16 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it 17 is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference 18 may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. 19 Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). In addition, while a verified 20 complaint may be considered as evidence at the summary judgment stage “if it is based 21 on personal knowledge and if it sets forth the requisite facts with specificity,” Lopez v. 22 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.14 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), an unverified complaint 23 cannot be considered as evidence. Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 759-60 (9th Cir. 2006) 24 (citing Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995); Lew v. 25 Kona Hospital, 754 F.2d 1420, 1423-24 (9th Cir. 1985)). 26 III. DISCUSSION 27 Plaintiffs asserts two claims for relief for breach of express and implied warranty 28 pursuant to the SBA against Defendant. FAC ¶¶ 32-60. Defendant moves for summary 1 judgment on both claims on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their 2 SBA claims; and (2) Plaintiffs have failed to prove the essential elements of their claims. 3 Def. MSJ. Before turning to the merits, the Court first addresses preliminary issues 4 discussed at the Court’s July 22, 2025 hearing and evidentiary objections raised by both 5 Defendant and Plaintiffs. 6 A. Preliminary Issues 7 First, Plaintiffs argue Defendant’s motion is untimely as it was filed “on the eve of 8 the deadline to file” dispositive motions and was filed less than 35 days after service and 9 filing of the motion consistent with Local Rule 230. Pls. Opp’n at 1, 13-14 (ECF No. 51). 10 On November 22, 2024, the parties filed a joint stipulation requesting continuation of 11 certain case deadlines to allow the parties to engage in mediation, including continuing 12 the deadline to file dispositive motions and have dispositive motions heard. (ECF Nos. 13 40, 41.) The Court granted the parties’ request on November 27, 2024 to extend the 14 dispositive motion filing deadline to June 2, 2025, and the dispositive motion hearing 15 deadline to July 1, 2025. (ECF Nos. 40, 42.) Defendant timely filed its motion for 16 summary judgment on June 2, 2025, and set it for hearing on July 1, 2025. Def. MSJ. 17 While Plaintiffs are correct that this motion was not noticed under the 35-day timeline of 18 Local Rule 230, this error appears to have been inadvertent and also one that Plaintiffs 19 bear some responsibility for as the parties’ joint stipulation set July 1, 2025 as the 20 hearing deadline for a June 2, 2025 motion filing deadline. (See ECF No. 40.) 21 Regardless, the error was corrected as the Court reset the hearing for July 8, 2025. 22 (ECF No. 48.) On June 6, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an ex parte request to continue the July 8, 23 2025 hearing to a later date due to unavailability, which the Court granted and reset the 24 hearing date to July 22, 2025. (ECF No. 50.) Defendant’s motion is timely. Plaintiffs had 25 an opportunity to respond and did respond to the motion, and any error appears to have 26 been an inadvertent error by both Defendant and Plaintiffs. 27 Second, Plaintiffs argue Defendant violated the Court’s Civil Standing Order by 28 failing to meet and confer 28 days prior to the dispositive motion filing deadline to 1 determine whether the parties intended to file cross motions for summary judgment, 2 therefore depriving Plaintiffs of “being able to timely file a cross motion for summary 3 judgment.” Pls. Opp’n at 9. Defendant disagrees, noting that defense counsel raised the 4 issues with Plaintiffs’ counsel before filing the motion. Def. Reply at 1 (ECF No. 53.) The 5 requirement to meet and confer before the dispositive motion filing deadline is applicable 6 to both parties. The Court rejects Plaintiffs’ argument as it appears that Plaintiffs 7 themselves did not make efforts to meet and confer with Defendant to discuss cross 8 motions for summary judgment, a point Plaintiffs did not contest at the hearing. 9 B. Evidentiary Objections 10 Both parties make several evidentiary objections to various exhibits attached to 11 Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and Plaintiffs’ opposition, including objections 12 based on lack of foundation, lack of personal knowledge, relevancy, hearsay, and 13 speculation. See ECF Nos. 51-3, 51-4, 54. The Court may only consider admissible 14 evidence when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. A 15 party may object that the material used to “dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form 16 that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). But, if the evidence could 17 be presented in an admissible form at trial, then the contents may be considered on 18 summary judgment even if the evidence itself is hearsay. Burch v. Regents of Univ. of 19 Cal., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119-20 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 20 When the Court cites to evidence that a party has objected to when ruling on the 21 cross-motions for summary judgment, the objection is impliedly overruled. The Court 22 denies as moot objections to any evidence upon which it did not rely. See Mendoza v. 23 City of Los Angeles, 2022 WL 19837951, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2022). 24 C. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 25 Defendant moves for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ breach of express and 26 implied warranty claims brought under the SBA. See Def. MSJ. The SBA “is a remedial 27 statute designed to protect consumers who have purchased products covered by an 28 express warranty.” Martinez v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 193 Cal. App. 4th 187, 191 (2011); 1 see also Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC, 17 Cal.5th 189, 200 (2024). A buyer “who is 2 damaged by a failure to comply with any obligation under [the SBA]...may bring an 3 action for the recovery of damages and other legal and equitable relief.” Cal. Civ. Code 4 § 1794(a). 5 1. Express Warranty Claim 6 As to Plaintiffs’ first cause of action, “[a] consumer may bring a claim for breach of 7 express warranty against a manufacturer if their vehicle is a “new motor vehicle” as 8 defined in the Song-Beverly Act.” Grismore v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2024 WL 9 5001469 (9th Cir. Dec. 6, 2024) (affirming summary judgment for defendant car 10 manufacturer on express and implied warranty claims under the SBA for vehicle leased 11 from a non-party dealership) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(a)). The SBA “defines ‘new 12 motor vehicle’ to include a new vehicle ‘bought or used primarily for personal’ purposes 13 as well as ‘a dealer-owned vehicle and a ‘demonstrator’ or other motor vehicle sold with 14 a manufacturer's new car warranty.’” Rodriguez, 17 Cal.5th at 195; see Cal. Civ. Code 15 § 1793.22(e)(2). The California Supreme Court has made clear that “a motor vehicle 16 purchased with an unexpired manufacturer's new car warranty does not qualify as a 17 ‘motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty’ under [the SBA]'s definition 18 of ‘new motor vehicle’ unless the new car warranty was issued with the sale.” Rodriguez, 19 17 Cal.5th at 196. Plaintiffs also must prove the following elements for their express 20 warranty claim: “(1) the product had a defect or nonconformity covered by the express 21 warranty; (2) the product was presented to an authorized representative of the 22 manufacturer for repair; and (3) the manufacturer or its representative did not repair the 23 defect or nonconformity after a reasonable number of repair attempts.” Robertson v. 24 Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 785, 798–99 (2006). 25 In their summary judgment motion, Defendant argues Plaintiffs lack standing to 26 bring both of their claims because the Subject Vehicle is not a “new motor vehicle” under 27 the SBA and because Plaintiffs did not receive a new car warranty from Defendant in 28 connection with the sale of the Subject Vehicle. Def. MSJ at 1, 3-4. In opposition, 1 Plaintiffs argue the Subject Vehicle qualifies as a “new motor vehicle” under the SBA 2 because it was sold as a “demonstrator” vehicle, did not have prior owners, and came 3 with a full warranty at the time of its lease. Pls. Opp’n at 11 (citing Rodriguez, 17 Cal.5th 4 at 198-200). Plaintiffs’ arguments fail. 5 Like Grismore v. Mercedes-Benz USA, the Subject Vehicle was sold as a pre- 6 owned car without a full new car warranty issued at the time of the sale. See Grismore, 7 710 F. Supp. 3d at 834, aff'd, 2024 WL 5001469; see also Rodriguez, 17 Cal.5th at 195; 8 Edwards v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2022 WL 5176869, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2022). 9 In Grismore, the plaintiff was the first consumer to purchase the vehicle, which had been 10 used by the dealership as a service vehicle. The plaintiff presented the vehicle to the 11 dealership to repair various issues and after the problems continued, subsequently 12 brought a lawsuit against the car manufacturer2 raising express and implied warranty 13 claims under the SBA. The district court granted summary judgment for the car 14 manufacturer where the lease agreement was entered into with the dealership, the 15 manufacturer was not involved in the lease, and the manufacturer did not provide a new 16 warranty for the used car at the time of the lease.3 710 F. Supp. 3d at 834-35. The 17 Grismore court explained: 18 As part of the evidence in support of its Motion, MBUSA provides a copy of Grismore's lease with MBO, which 19 indicates that the Subject Vehicle was “pre-owned” and that it was not covered by a new or pre-owned warranty. That 20 portion of the contract—which Grismore signed—states that “[i]f the vehicle is pre-owned, it is not covered by a warranty 21 unless indicated by a check in the corresponding block below.” None of the following three boxes was checked on 22 the lease: (1) “Remainder of a standard new vehicle warranty from manufacturer; (2) Pre-owned vehicle warranty from 23 manufacturer; or (3) Pre-owned warranty from third-party provider.” 24 Id. The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed and expressly rejected the buyer’s argument that 25

26 2 Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC was also the defendant car manufacturer in Grismore. 27 3 Defendant cited to Grismore for the first time in its Reply. See Def. Reply at 3-4. At the hearing, Plaintiffs responded to Grismore and arguments raised in Defendant’s 28 Reply. 1 “pre-owned vehicles sold with a balance remaining on a manufacturer's new-car 2 warranty” qualified as a “new motor vehicle” under the SBA, reasoning that this 3 argument was rejected by the California Supreme Court in Rodriguez. 2024 WL 5001469 4 at *1. 5 Like Grismore, it is undisputed that Defendant manufacturer was not involved in 6 the non-party dealership’s sale of the Subject Vehicle to Plaintiff. The Subject Vehicle’s 7 lease agreement with the non-party dealership also had a check box marking the 8 Subject Vehicle as “pre-owned.” Def. MSJ, Exh. B at 2 (ECF No. 47-4). For the section 9 on the Subject Vehicle’s “New and Preowned Vehicle Warranty,” the lease agreement 10 does not indicate the Subject Vehicle is covered by a warranty. Id. at 4. Section 15 of the 11 lease agreement provides: 12 New and Pre-Owned Vehicle Warranty. If the vehicle is new, it is covered by a standard new vehicle warranty from 13 the manufacturer. If the vehicle is pre-owned, it is not covered by a warranty unless indicated by a check in the 14 corresponding box below[.] 15 Id. Like Grismore, none of the check boxes are marked in this section of the lease, which 16 includes whether a remainder of a standard new vehicle warranty from the manufacturer 17 is provided; whether the pre-owned vehicle warranty from the manufacturer is provided; 18 or whether a pre-owned warranty from another third-party provider is provided. Id. The 19 lease agreement, signed by Plaintiffs, clearly identifies that the Subject Vehicle was “pre- 20 owned” and was not “sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty” at the time of the 21 sale. Rodriguez, 17 Cal.5th at 195 (quoting California Civil Code § 1793.22(e)(2)); see 22 also Grismore, 710 F. Supp. 3d at 834-35. 23 Furthermore, even if the Subject Vehicle had a balance remaining on the 24 manufacturer’s new car warranty,4 this is not a material fact and insufficient to establish

25 4 See Pls. Opp’n, Exh. 1 at 7-8 (ECF No. 51-2) (Deposition of Defendant’s Rule 26 30(b)(6) expert, Heather Gurocak, testifying the Subject Vehicle was “leased preowned, but it did—so it would have come with the remainder of the new-vehicle limited warranty, 27 which is for four years or 50,000 miles, whichever occurs first[.]”); Def. Response to Request for Admission No. 4 (“Admit the vehicle was leased with the remainder of a new 28 vehicle limited warranty, the terms of which speak for themselves.”) (ECF No. 51-2 at 1 the SBA’s “new motor vehicle” requirements because the warranty was not issued at the 2 time of the sale of the Subject Vehicle to Plaintiffs. The California Supreme Court has 3 made clear that an unexpired manufacturer’s new car warranty does not qualify as a new 4 car warranty under the SBA unless it was issued at the time of the sale of the Subject 5 Vehicle. See Rodriguez, 17 Cal.5th at 195-96; Grismore, 2024 WL 5001469 at *1. The 6 FAC is unverified and cannot be considered as evidence at summary judgment. See 7 Moran, 447 F.3d at 759-60. In addition, Plaintiffs submitted a declaration from Plaintiff 8 Ohayan, stating that Plaintiffs were told the Subject Vehicle was “new,” Plaintiffs did not 9 “notice that the lease agreement provided that the [Subject] Vehicle was pre-owned,” 10 and instead, Plaintiffs were told that the Subject Vehicle came with a new car warranty 11 issued by Defendant. Decl. Karin Ohayan ¶¶ 6-11 (ECF No. 51-1). These statements, 12 however, do not create a genuine issue of material fact because they are self-serving 13 and lack supporting, admissible evidence. See F.T.C. v. Publ'g Clearing House, Inc., 104 14 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 1997) (“A conclusory, self-serving affidavit, lacking detailed 15 facts and any supporting evidence, is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material 16 fact.”); Grismore, 710 F. Supp. 3d at 835-37 (rejecting buyer’s self-serving declaration 17 from counsel and buyer’s statements that the dealership told the buyer the vehicle was 18 accompanied by a new and full warranty from the manufacturer). Plaintiffs’ other 19 arguments and evidence submitted do not create a genuine dispute of material fact. See 20 Grismore, 710 F. Supp. 3d at 835-37 (also rejecting buyer’s arguments based on Carfax 21 vehicle history report and Vehicle Master Inquiry). Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot recover 22 against Defendant manufacturer on their express warranty claim because the Subject 23 Vehicle is not a “new motor vehicle.” 24 2. Implied Warranty Claim 25 Plaintiffs’ second cause of action is for breach of implied warranty under the SBA. 26 FAC ¶¶ 49-60. Under the SBA, “every sale of consumer goods that are sold at retail in 27

28 86). 1 this state shall be accompanied by the manufacturer's and the retail seller's implied 2 warranty that the goods are merchantable.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1792. Implied warranties 3 apply to both new and used goods because “‘[c]onsumer goods’ means any new product 4 or part thereof that is used, bought, or leased for use primarily for personal, family, or 5 household purposes.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1791(a). Plaintiffs argue that the Subject Vehicle 6 was a new motor vehicle that was accompanied by an implied warranty of 7 merchantability. As described above, this argument fails because the Subject Vehicle 8 was not a new motor vehicle under the SBA. 9 As a used vehicle, Plaintiffs’ implied warranty claim still fails because the SBA 10 “does not create implied warranties against manufacturers for the sale of used consumer 11 goods.” Grismore, 2024 WL 5001469 at *2 (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1795.5; Nunez v. 12 FCA US LLC, 61 Cal. App. 5th 385, 275 Cal. Rptr. 3d 618, 628 (2021)). California Civil 13 Code § 1795.5 assumes “that the manufacturer and the distributor/retailer are distinct 14 entities.” Nunez, 61 Cal. App. 5th at 399. Here, Plaintiffs elected not to bring claims 15 against the distributor retailer (the dealership) who sold the Subject Vehicle to Plaintiffs 16 and entered into the lease agreement with Plaintiffs, and there is no evidence that 17 Defendant manufacturer acted as the retailer or distributor or was involved in the lease 18 agreement with Plaintiffs. Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot recover against Defendant 19 manufacturer on their implied warranty claim. 20 IV. CONCLUSION 21 In conclusion, Plaintiffs’ breach of express warranty claim fails because the 22 Subject Vehicle is not a new motor vehicle under the SBA. See Grismore, 2024 WL 23 5001469 at *1-2; Rodriguez, 17 Cal.5th at 195-96. Plaintiffs’ implied warranty claim fails 24 because the Subject Vehicle is not a new motor vehicle and an implied warranty claim 25 cannot be brought against a manufacturer for the sale of a used vehicle. See Grismore, 26 2024 WL 5001469 at *2. Defendant is therefore entitled to summary judgment on 27 Plaintiffs’ claims and the Court declines to address the parties’ remaining arguments. 28 / / / 1 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 2 1. Defendant's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 51) is GRANTED; 3 2. Judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendant; and 4 3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case. 5 6 | Dated: July 30, 2025 C □□ $ \U CHI SOO KIM 8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Q || 4, malk1877.23 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12