Maliner v. United States

362 F.2d 281, 176 Ct. Cl. 144
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJune 10, 1966
DocketNo. 8-61
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 362 F.2d 281 (Maliner v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Maliner v. United States, 362 F.2d 281, 176 Ct. Cl. 144 (cc 1966).

Opinion

Cowen, Chief Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an action for the recovery of income taxes paid by the taxpayers for the tax years 1951 and 1958. During those years, each plaintiff (or his or her spouse) was a stockholder of Wemberly Gardens Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Wemberly Gardens), a New York corporation.

The sole issue presented in this suit is whether Wemberly Gardens was a “collapsible corporation” as defined in Section 117 (m) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 (26 U.S.C. § 117(m) (1952 ed.)), so as to render gains realized by each plaintiff-stockholder from corporate distributions made in 1951 and 1953 taxable as ordinary income.

The distributions at issue were made out of surplus mortgage funds obtained for the construction of an apartment house project. On November 16, 1951, an aliquot distribution of $1,745 per share was made to the common stockholders of Wemberly Gardens, and on January 30, 1953, a further distribution of $260 per share was made in the same manner. Plaintiffs reported the income as long-term capital gains. [147]*147The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed deficiencies, treating the gains as ordinary income on the ground that the corporation was “collapsible” within the meaning of Section 117 (m). Plaintiffs paid the deficiencies, plus interest, and sue here for refunds.

The origin of the tax avoidance device known as the “collapsible corporation” and the considerations which induced Congress to enact Section 117 (m) of the 1939 Code have been discussed in Todd Tibbals and Helen A. Tibbals v. United States, decided this day, post, p. 196, and need not be repeated here.1

Section 117 (m) provides in substance that gain from the sale or exchange of stock in a collapsible corporation is to be treated as ordinary income if, in the absence of the Section, the gain would be considered a gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 6 months. To the extent here relevant, a collapsible corporation is defined as one formed or availed of principally for the construction of property with a view to a distribution to its shareholders before the corporation realizes a substantial part of the net income to be derived from the property and such shareholders realize a gain attributable to the property.

The applicable Treasury Regulation, Section 29.117-11 (b), provides that the statutory requirements for imposition of its provisions are satisfied where the view to a distribution is contemplated “unconditionally, conditionally, or as a recognized possibility” by those persons in a position to determine the policies of the corporation. The regulation also provides that if the distribution is attributable to circumstances present at the time of construction, the corporation shall, in the absence of compelling facts to the contrary, be considered to have been formed or availed of with a view to the action described in the statute.

The question involved here has been litigated extensively. It has been held that the term “collapsible” applies to distributions from corporations which are not simply temporary [148]*148devices that are liquidated witliiu a short time of their organization, Glickman v. Commissioner, 256 F. 2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958) ; Burge v. Commissioner, 253 F. 2d 765 (4th Cir. 1958) ; that the word “principally” does not modify the phrase “with a view to” so as to restrict the operation of the statute to situations in which the proscribed objective was uppermost in the shareholder’s mind, Weil v. Commissioner, 252 F. 2d 805 (2d Cir. 1958) ; that the view which brings the statute into operation may exist ,at any time prior to the completion of the construction, Jacobson v. Commissioner, 281 F. 2d 703 (3d Cir. 1960), and that the requisite view is met where one of the collapsible events specified in Section 117(m) derives from circumstances which are present or which could reasonably be anticipated during the construction period, Mintz v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 723, aff’d 284 F. 2d 554 (2d Cir. 1960). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has determined that the statute applies when the requisite factors coalesce despite an absence of tax avoidance purposes. In Braunstein v. Commissioner, 374 U.S. 65 (1963) the Supreme Court stated at page 71:

It is our understanding, in other words, that Congress intended to define what it believed to be a tax avoidance device rather than to leave the presence or absence of tax avoidance elements for decision on ,a case-to-case basis.

After a full trial in this court, Commissioner William E. Day found the following facts relative to the application of Section 117 (m):

39. Wemberly Gardens was availed of for the construction of an apartment house with a view towards making a distribution to the plaintiffs, prior to the realization by Wemberly of a substantial part of the net income to be derived from the apartment house.
40. This view mentioned in finding 39 existed at a time prior to the completion of the construction of the project.

Since the plaintiffs have failed to make the showing required to overcome the presumption of correctness accorded the trial commissioner’s findings by our Rule 66, we have adopted his findings. After a study of the record, we have concluded that the adopted findings are amply supported by the evi-[149]*149deuce and effectively preclude recovery by plaintiffs in this action.

The plaintiffs are children (or spouses of children) of the Eosenberg brothers, Isaac and Fisher. Fisher Eosenberg died in 1957. The brothers had been active in various real estate enterprises since 1920 and were engaged primarily in the business of constructing, renting and operating apartment houses. In 1946 or 1947 they, along with a business associate, acquired 30 lots in Jackson Heights, Queens County, New York. Initially, it had been the intention of the parties to construct an apartment house on the land to be financed by a conventional mortgage loan. Upon enactment of Section 608 of the National Housing Act of 1948, the brothers considered the desirability of obtaining a mortgage loan insured by the Federal Housing Administration. They felt that the insured loan would be preferable to a conventional loan because the interest rate would be lower, the repayment period longer, and the amount of the loan greater. Their associate parted company with them over fears that FHA control would adversely affect the profitable operation of the project. On April 13, 1949, the brothers filed with the FHA an “Application for Mortgage Insurance.”

The plans called for a six-story brick apartment building containing 210 family units. The estimated requirements for construction set forth in the application were prepared by the brothers and their architect. The estimated construction cost for the buildings and garages, plus builder’s and architectural fees as stated, was $1,931,562. The total estimated requirements listed by the Eosenbergs, including carrying charges, legal and organization expenses, and the cost of the land, amounted to $2,280,000. This sum was, as subsequently revealed at trial, inflated in several respects.

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