Malika Bennett v. The Natori Company, Inc.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: June 12, 2026
• Docket: 2:26-cv-00689
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 MALIKA BENNETT, CASE NO. C26-0689-KKE 8

Plaintiff(s), ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 9 v.

10 THE NATORI COMPANY, INC.,

11 Defendant(s).

12 Plaintiff filed this putative class action in King County Superior Court, complaining that 13 Defendant sent her and other Washington consumers marketing emails with false or deceptive 14 subject lines, in violation of Washington’s Commercial Electronic Mail Act (“CEMA”) and 15 Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”). See Dkt. No. 1-3. Defendant removed the action to this Court. 16 Dkt. No. 1. 17 The courts in this district have questioned whether plaintiffs in similar actions lack Article 18 III standing, and have handled that question differently. See, e.g., Liss v. Skechers USA Inc., No. 19 3:25-cv-05861-DGE, 2026 WL 1392327, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 19, 2026) (finding that plaintiff 20 satisfies the standing requirement); Nuri v. True Religion Apparel, No. 2:25-cv-00690-LK, 2026 21 WL 864886 (W.D. Wash. March 30, 2026) (remanding for lack of standing); Minute Orders, 22 Harrington v. Vineyard Vines, LLC, No. 25-1115 TSZ (W.D. Wash.), Dkt. No. 48 (finding the 23 question of whether plaintiffs lack standing to be “unclear” and ordering supplemental briefing), 24 1 Dkt. No. 64 (staying case pending the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Montes v. SPARC Group, LLC, No. 2 23-35496 (“Montes I”)). 3 To establish Article III standing, “a plaintiff must show (i) that he suffered an injury in fact

4 that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the 5 defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” TransUnion LLC 6 v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021). A court in the Eastern District of Washington has found 7 that a plaintiff in a similar CEMA/CPA action lacked Article III standing because her complaint 8 failed to allege a concrete harm, and that order has been appealed to the Ninth Circuit. See Montes 9 v. Catalyst Brands LLC, No. 2:25-CV-0281-TOR, 2025 WL 3485827, *2–3 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 4, 10 2025) (“Montes II”). Briefing in the appeal is ongoing. See Montes v. Penney OpCo, LLC, No. 11 26-241 (9th Cir. 2026). 12 “It is the duty of federal courts to assure themselves that their jurisdiction is not being

13 exceeded.” HayDay Farms, Inc. v. FeeDx Holdings, Inc., 55 F.4th 1232, 1238 (9th Cir. 14 2022) (quoting In re Ryther, 799 F.2d 1412, 1414 (9th Cir. 1986)). Because the resolution of the 15 Montes II appeal is likely to provide guidance to this Court on the threshold jurisdictional question 16 of standing, a stay of this case may be appropriate while that appeal is pending. See Landis v. N. 17 Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (holding that “the power to stay proceedings is incidental to 18 the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with 19 economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants”); Leyva v. Certified Grocers 20 of Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1979) (“A trial court may, with propriety, find it is 21 efficient for its own docket and the fairest course for the parties to enter a stay of an action before 22 it, pending resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case.”).

23 The parties are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE, no later than July 1, 2026, why this case 24 should not be stayed pending the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in the Montes II appeal. The parties’ 1 responses to this order shall not exceed 1,800 words. Failure to respond to this order will be 2 construed as consent to a stay. 3 Dated this 12th day of June, 2026.

4 A 5 Kymberly K. Evanson 6 United States District Judge

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