Malick-Wimmer v. Wimmer

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedOctober 7, 2021
Docket2:20-cv-00885
StatusUnknown

This text of Malick-Wimmer v. Wimmer (Malick-Wimmer v. Wimmer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Malick-Wimmer v. Wimmer, (M.D. Fla. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION

NICOLE RENELLE MALICK- WIMMER,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 2:20-cv-885-JES-MRM

DEREK PAUL WIMMER, MARY COSMO, STATE OF FLORIDA and TWENTIETH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,

Defendants. / REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION This matter comes before the Undersigned sua sponte upon review of the docket. Plaintiff,1 an attorney proceeding pro se, has failed to comply with or respond to several of this Court’s Orders despite being specifically warned that such failure may result in the dismissal of her action. Thus, upon review of the docket and for the reasons stated herein, the Undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s Petition for

1 Notably, Nicole Renelle Malick-Wimmer refers to herself as Petitioner in her first filing and identifies Derek Paul Wimmer, Mary Cosmo, the State of Florida, and the Twentieth Judicial Circuit as Respondents. (See Doc. 1). However, Derek Paul Wimmer, Mary Cosmo, the State of Florida, and the Twentieth Judicial Circuit have characterized themselves as Defendants and identified Nicole Renelle Malick- Wimmer as Plaintiff. (See Docs. 18, 20, 21). For the sake of clarity and simplicity, and without determining the appropriateness of one designation over another, the Undersigned refers to Nicole Renelle Malick-Wimmer as Plaintiff and Derek Paul Wimmer, Mary Cosmo, the State of Florida, and the Twentieth Judicial Circuit as Defendants. Writ of Mandamus, Prohibition, and Quo Warranto (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED without prejudice.

LEGAL STANDARD The decision to dismiss for want of prosecution is within the Court’s discretion. See McKelvey v. AT & T Techs., Inc., 789 F.2d 1518, 1520 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Martin-Trigona v. Morris, 627 F.2d 680, 682 (5th Cir. 1980)).2 The Eleventh Circuit has held, however, that “the severe sanction of dismissal – with prejudice or

the equivalent thereof – should be imposed ‘only in the face of a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff.’” Id. (citing Martin-Trigona, 627 F.2d at 682). The Eleventh Circuit continued that “such dismissal is a sanction of last resort, applicable only in extreme circumstances, and generally proper only where less drastic sanctions are unavailable.” Id. (citing Searock v. Stripling, 736 F.2d 650, 653

(11th Cir. 1984); E.E.O.C. v. Troy State Univ., 693 F.2d 1353, 1354, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982)). The Court further held that “[a] finding of such extreme circumstances necessary to support the sanction of dismissal must, at a minimum, be based on evidence of willful delay; simple negligence does not warrant dismissal.” Id. (citing Searock, 736 F.2d at 653; Troy State, 693 F.2d at 1354, 1357). Nevertheless, if the

Court dismisses the action without prejudice, the standard is less stringent “because

2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted as binding precedent all the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981. the plaintiff would be able to file [the] suit again.” Brown v. Blackwater River Corr. Facility, 762 F. App’x 982, 985 (11th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Boazman v. Econ. Lab., Inc., 537 F.2d 210, 212-13 (5th Cir. 1976)).

Additionally, Local Rule 3.10 states that “[a] plaintiff’s failure to prosecute diligently can result in dismissal if the plaintiff in response to an order to show cause fails to demonstrate due diligence and just cause for delay.” M.D. Fla. R. 3.10. ANALYSIS

While dismissal for failure to prosecute is a harsh sanction, the Undersigned can only conclude that Plaintiff’s failure to comply timely with this Court’s prior Orders and to heed the Court’s instructions is willful. See McKelvey, 789 F.2d at 1520. Specifically, on June 28, 2021, the Court noticed this action for a Preliminary

Pretrial Conference set for August 17, 2021, before the Undersigned. (Doc. 25). Additionally, the Court ordered the parties to file a joint Case Management Report no later than August 5, 2021. (Id.). In connection with the Case Management Report and Preliminary Pretrial Conference, on July 1, 2021, the Court entered the Order Governing Preliminary Pretrial Conference, which states:

Sanctions for Failing to Comply: Counsel of record and any pro se litigant appearing in the case must comply fully with the requirements and deadlines set forth in the hearing notice (see Doc. 25), the Civil Action Order, and this Order. Any failure to comply—including but not limited to any failure to file a Case Management Report by the deadline specified in the notice or any failure by counsel or by a pro se litigant to appear as directed for the Preliminary Pretrial Conference––may result in the imposition of sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f) or other relevant authority. Unless the Court cancels or reschedules the Preliminary Pretrial Conference in writing and on the docket, the parties should assume that the hearing will occur on the date and at the time specified in the notice.

(Doc. 28 at 1-2 (emphasis added)). Then, on August 4, 2021, following a notice of non-compliance, (see Doc. 32), the Court entered a Text Order permitting the parties to each file unilateral Uniform Case Management Reports and warning Plaintiff that “any further refusal to meet her obligations in this case may result in the imposition of sanctions, including but not limited to the dismissal of the action,” (Doc. 33). Thereafter, on August 16, 2021, the Court entered a Text Order to Show Cause (1) noting that while Defendant Cosmo had appeared in the action as counsel for Defendant Derek Paul Wimmer, Defendant Cosmo had not appeared in her capacity as a Defendant and (2) requiring Plaintiff to show cause why the action should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute as to Defendant Cosmo based on the lack of an appropriate motion seeking a clerk’s default or an extension of time to complete service. (Doc. 38). Plaintiff failed to comply with this Order. On August 17, 2021, the Undersigned convened the duly noticed Preliminary Pretrial Conference. (See Docs. 25, 41, 47). Plaintiff failed to appear at the hearing despite (1) the Court’s attempt to contact her before proceeding, (2) the June 28,

2021 Notice of Hearing mailed to Plaintiff, and (3) the July 1, 2021 Order Governing Preliminary Pretrial Conference warning Plaintiff that failure to appear at the Preliminary Pretrial Conference as ordered may result in sanctions. (See Docs. 28, 41, 47). In fact, before the start of the hearing, when the Courtroom Deputy Clerk called the telephone number provided by Plaintiff in her Petition for Writ of

Mandamus, Prohibition, and Quo Warranto, (Doc. 1 at 1), (832) 995-8889, an individual answered the phone, but then hung up, (Doc. 47). Accordingly, during the hearing, the Undersigned construed Plaintiff’s conduct as a willful refusal to join the hearing as ordered. (Doc. 47). Thus, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause requiring Plaintiff to show

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