Malia v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America

Maine Superior

Malia v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America

DecidedAugust 18, 2009

DocketCUMcv-08-609

StatusUnpublished

This text of Malia v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America (Malia v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Malia v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, (Me. Super. Ct. 2009).

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Opinion

STATE OF MAINE CUMBERLAND, ss.

KATHLEEN MALIA, Plaintiff DECISION AND ORDER v.

UNUM LIFE INS. CO. OF AMERICA, ET AL., Defendants.

BEFORE THE COURT

This matter comes before the court on a motion to dismiss from defendants

UNUM group and UNUM Life Insurance Company of America (Unum).

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This is a defamation action arising from alleged statements made by defendant,

Unum, to plaintiff Kathleen Malia's (Malia) temporary employment agency, Kelly

Services (Kelly). Malia was a temporary agency employee, assigned to work at Unum

reexamining claims subject to an agreement between Unum and insurance regulators (the

"RSA"). Despite being paid by Kelly, Malia was required to adhere to the same

guidelines as other Unum employees and held to the same or similar standards. Malia

asserts that Unum chose not to inform her of any performance problems, and that her

performance, although not perfect, was comparable to other employees.

In October of 2006, Unum terminated Malia's assignment and informed Kelly of

the termination. Unum contends that the termination was in response to a consumer

complaint, while Malia states that she was fired because of outside pressure from Unum

regulators, which resulted in the decision to make Malia a scapegoat for Unum's unsatisfactory performance of the RSA. Malia alleges that Unum informed Kelly of the

termination and stated that it was due to "several performance issues including, but not

limited to, not following claims through and not responding to claims in a timely

manner." Malia contends that this statement was false and defamatory per se, and that

Unum acted negligently or fraudulently by misstating the real motivation in firing Malia. l

Malia further alleges that since she is required to explain to prospective employers why

she was fired from Unum, this compelled self-publication further damages her reputation,

and has made it impossible to work in the insurance industry? On October 24, 2008,

Malia filed a complaint against the named defendants alleging the above stated facts and

claims. On April 24, 2009, an amended complaint was filed, and the court subsequently

granted Malia's motion for enlargement of time to file proof of service. Unum filed the

present motion to dismiss on May 13, 2009, and Malia filed her opposition on June I,

2009. On June 11,2009, Unum filed a reply in support of their motion to dismiss.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review.

A motion to dismiss "tests the legal sufficiency ofthe complaint." Livonia v.

Town ofRome, 1998 ME 39, ,-r 5, 707 A.2d 83, 85. In determining whether a motion to

dismiss should be granted, the court considers "the allegations in the complaint in relation

to any cause of action that may reasonably be inferred from the complaint." Saunders v.

I Plaintiffs statement that Unum fraudulently made the statement to the temporary agency was

not pled with sufficient particularity for purposes of M.R. Civ. P. 9(b); however, there are other sufficient facts in the complaint that establish a claim for defamation for the purposes of Rule 12(b)(6). 2 Although the parties discuss compelled self-publication to a great extent, compelled self publication is not a separate claim under the Amended Complaint, and the court need not address it here because there are other sufficient facts in the complaint that establish a claim for defamation for the purposes of Rule 12(b)(6). Tisher, 2006 ME 94, ~ 8, 902 A.2d 830, 832. The facts alleged are treated as admitted,

and they are viewed "in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id. The court should

dismiss a claim only "when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff is not entitled to

relief under any set of facts that he [or she] might prove in support of his [or her] claim."

Id. (quoting Johanson v. Dunnington, 2001 ME 169, ~ 5, 785 A.2d 1244, 1246).

II. Defamation.

Unum has moved to dismiss on the basis that Malia failed to establish the

elements of defamation. Defamation requires a false and defamatory statement

concerning another, an unprivileged publication to a third party, fault amounting at least

to negligence on the part of the publisher, and actionability irrespective of special harm

or the existence of special harm caused by the publication. Cole v. Chandler, 2000 ME

104, ~ 5, 752 A.2d 1189, 1193. Specifically, Unum claims that Malia failed to plead

sufficient facts to satisfy the "unprivileged publication to a third party" element. Unum

claims that the statement made to Kelly was protected by both a common law conditional

privilege, as well as statutory immunity. Unum further claims that Malia has not pled

sufficient facts to overcome Unum's asserted privilege, thus mandating a motion to

dismiss.

Whether Unum is entitled to the common law conditional privilege is a question

of law. Cole v. Chandler, 2000 ME 104, ~ 6, 752 A.2d 1189, 1193. A conditional

privilege against liability for defamation arises where society has an interest in promoting

free, but not unfettered, speech. Id. In Cole, the Law Court held that the conditional

privilege applies in numerous situations, including where a claim by an employee arose

due to termination of employment. Id. Thus, Unum correctly asserts the defense of common law conditional privilege against liability for defamation. However, there are

limitations to the privilege. The common law privilege in the context of an employment

termination is limited by a requirement that it not be made with malicious intent, abused

by disclosures outside normal channels, made with knowledge that statements were false,

or with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement. Id.,-r 7, 752 A.2d 1189,

1194. Once the determination is made that the defendant has the privilege, the burden

then shifts to the plaintiff to provide evidence that could go to the jury demonstrating that

it was abused. Id. Whether the defendant abused the privilege is a question of fact. Id.;

see also Rice v. Alley, 2002 ME 43, ,-r 26, 791 A.2d 932,937.

Similarly, employers have statutory immunity when they disclose "information

about a former employee's job performance or work record to a prospective employer."

26 M.R.S.A § 598 (2008). Although the immunity presumes that employers act in good

faith it is not absolute and can be rebutted by a showing of "clear and convincing

evidence of [aJ lack of good faith ... that clearly shows the knowing disclosure, with

malicious intent, of false or deliberately misleading information." Id. Thus, Unum again

correctly asserts immunity as an affirmative defense, but incorrectly states that Malia's

complaint does not contain facts, if taken as true, that could rebut the conditional

privilege and immunity. See e.g., Lavin v. Trezza, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 479,2002 WL

57247, at *16 (D. Me., Jan. 15,2002).

The court accepts as true the factual allegations of Malia's complaint and

concludes that it adequately states a claim upon which relief can be granted because it

sufficiently alleges the elements of defamation. Further, the court notes that both the

conditional privilege and statutory immunity are not absolute, and finds that the facts in the complaint provide a sufficient basis that either privilege may have been abused. See

Cohen v. Bowdoin,

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