Malever v. Kay Jewelry Co.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Malever v. Kay Jewelry Co.

25 S.E.2d 436, 223 N.C. 148, 1943 N.C. LEXIS 225

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedMay 5, 1943

StatusPublished

Cited by35 cases

This text of 25 S.E.2d 436 (Malever v. Kay Jewelry Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Malever v. Kay Jewelry Co., 25 S.E.2d 436, 223 N.C. 148, 1943 N.C. LEXIS 225 (N.C. 1943).

Pincite

Opinion

Stacy, C. J.

Tbe question for decision is whether tbe agreement to give tbe plaintiff “a regular permanent job” in tbe defendant’s new store means any more tban an indefinite general hiring terminable in good faith at tbe will of either party. 35 Am. Jur., 460; 39 C. J., 41.

While it is suggested in plaintiff’s testimony tbat tbe inducement to give up bis job in Fayetteville was sufficient consideration to support tbe agreement for permanent employment, still tbe agreement itself is for no definite time, and there is no business usage or other circumstance appearing on tbe record which would tend to give it any fixed duration. Anno. 35 A. L. R., 1432; 62 A. L. R., 234. Conversely, it is suggested tbe moving cause of plaintiff’s acceptance was bis desire to be in Charlotte with bis family, which more tban outweighed tbe difference in pay. He was employed until tbe defendant closed bis store. 35 Am. Jur., 461.

Tbe case of Jones v. Light Co., 206 N. C., 862, 175 S. E., 167, cited and relied upon by tbe plaintiff, is not in point. There, tbe promise in consideration of exceptional efforts on tbe part of tbe plaintiff, was to give him “permanent employment for tbe term of at least ten years.” Nor are tbe cases of Fisher v. Lumber Co., 183 N. C., 485, 111 S. E., 857, Stevens v. R. R., 187 N. C., 528, 122 S. E., 295, and Dotson v. Guano Co., 207 N. C., 635, 178 S. E., 100, where there were agreements to give employment for life in settlement of personal injury claims, controlling on tbe facts of tbe instant record.

Tbe general rule is, tbat “permanent employment” means steady employment, a steady job, a position of some permanence, as contrasted with a temporary employment or a temporary job. Ordinarily, where there is no additional expression as to duration, a contract for permanent employment implies an indefinite general hiring, terminable at will. McKelvy v. Oil Co., 52 Okla., 81, 152 P., 414. Here, tbe plaintiff shows a promise of permanent employment, simpliciter, and no more. Anno., 135 A. L. R., 646.

We find nothing on tbe record to take tbe case out of tbe general rule.

Affirmed.

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Stacy, C. J.

Tbe question for decision is whether tbe agreement to give tbe plaintiff “a regular permanent job” in tbe defendant’s new store means any more tban an indefinite general hiring terminable in good faith at tbe will of either party. 35 Am. Jur., 460; 39 C. J., 41.

While it is suggested in plaintiff’s testimony tbat tbe inducement to give up bis job in Fayetteville was sufficient consideration to support tbe agreement for permanent employment, still tbe agreement itself is for no definite time, and there is no business usage or other circumstance appearing on tbe record which would tend to give it any fixed duration. Anno. 35 A. L. R., 1432; 62 A. L. R., 234. Conversely, it is suggested tbe moving cause of plaintiff’s acceptance was bis desire to be in Charlotte with bis family, which more tban outweighed tbe difference in pay. He was employed until tbe defendant closed bis store. 35 Am. Jur., 461.

Tbe case of Jones v. Light Co., 206 N. C., 862, 175 S. E., 167, cited and relied upon by tbe plaintiff, is not in point. There, tbe promise in consideration of exceptional efforts on tbe part of tbe plaintiff, was to give him “permanent employment for tbe term of at least ten years.” Nor are tbe cases of Fisher v. Lumber Co., 183 N. C., 485, 111 S. E., 857, Stevens v. R. R., 187 N. C., 528, 122 S. E., 295, and Dotson v. Guano Co., 207 N. C., 635, 178 S. E., 100, where there were agreements to give employment for life in settlement of personal injury claims, controlling on tbe facts of tbe instant record.

Tbe general rule is, tbat “permanent employment” means steady employment, a steady job, a position of some permanence, as contrasted with a temporary employment or a temporary job. Ordinarily, where there is no additional expression as to duration, a contract for permanent employment implies an indefinite general hiring, terminable at will. McKelvy v. Oil Co., 52 Okla., 81, 152 P., 414. Here, tbe plaintiff shows a promise of permanent employment, simpliciter, and no more. Anno., 135 A. L. R., 646.

We find nothing on tbe record to take tbe case out of tbe general rule.

Affirmed.

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25 S.E.2d 436, 223 N.C. 148, 1943 N.C. LEXIS 225, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/malever-v-kay-jewelry-co-nc-1943.

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