Maletta v. Woodle

District Court, M.D. Florida·Decided March 14, 2023·No. 2:20-cv-01004·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION

ANDREW C. MALETTA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:20-cv-1004-JES-KCD

DAVID WOODLE and FREDERICK J. LANGDON,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER This matter comes before the Court on review of plaintiff's Bill of Costs (Doc. #139) filed on February 20, 2023. Defendants filed a Response and Objection (Doc. #140) on March 3, 2023, and plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. #141) on March 9, 2023. The objections are sustained in part and overruled in part as set forth below. I. Plaintiff and his wife filed a Complaint (Doc. #1) against defendants for defamation and defamation per se. An Amended Complaint (Doc. #21) was filed on March 16, 2021. On May 11, 2021, the Court issued an Opinion and Order (Doc. #32) dismissing Counts Three and Four with prejudice, dismissing Count Five without prejudice, and dismissing co-plaintiff Polly Maletta. A Second Amended Complaint (SAC) (Doc. #33) was filed on May 18, 2021 alleging defamation and defamation per se. On July 22, 2021, defendants filed their Answers and Affirmative Defenses. (Docs. ## 45-46.) On July 19, 2022, the Court issued an Order (Doc. #84) denying

cross motions for summary judgment, and the case proceeded to trial on the SAC. Plaintiff asserted that 22 statements in the Letter were defamatory or defamatory per se. The Court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendants as to one statement. The jury found 15 of the remaining 21 statements were both false and defamatory. (Doc. #137.) Compensatory damages were awarded in the amount of $138 against each of the defendants, and punitive damages of $138 were awarded against each defendant. (Id.) The jury annotated the Verdict Form to note that the compensatory damages were computed at $1 for each of the 138 persons who had signed the Letter. (Id.) Judgment (Doc. #138) was entered on February 10, 2023.

The Bill of Costs (Doc. #139) seeks a total of $22,544.82 in taxable costs. Defendants object that plaintiff is not entitled to attorney fees, plaintiff is not a prevailing party under Florida law, and the requested costs are disproportional to the nominal damages recovered. Defendants further argue that the Court has the discretion to deny costs entirely based on the nominal damage award, or to drastically reduce costs. II. Defendants object to an award of attorney fees, asserting that attorney fees are not available under Florida law in a

defamation action. (Doc. #140, pp. 2-3.) While this may be so, the Bill of Costs contains no request for attorney fees. Therefore, the objection to attorney fees is overruled as moot. Defendants also assert that plaintiff is not entitled to an award of costs under Florida law. (Doc. #140, pp. 2-3.) But entitlement to taxable costs in a federal case is controlled by federal law, generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, not state law. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987) (federal courts bound by cost limitations set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1821 and § 1920.) This objection is overruled. Rule 54 provides in relevant part: “Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs--other

than attorney's fees--should be allowed to the prevailing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). This rule “establishes a presumption that costs are to be awarded to a prevailing party, but vests the district court with discretion to decide otherwise.” Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1038 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Absent explicit statutory or contractual authorization, taxable costs are limited to those allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Crawford Fitting Co., 482 U.S. at 445. Defendants assert that the “prevailing party” standard for entitlement to costs is the Florida “significant issues of the entire case” standard. (Doc. #140, p. 3.) Defendants are

incorrect. The definition of “prevailing party” has been succinctly stated: We can thus distill from the Supreme Court's prevailing party jurisprudence that there are two requirements for a party to reach prevailing party status. First, the party must be awarded some relief on the merits of its claim by the court. [] Second, the party must be able to point to a resolution of the dispute which materially altered the legal relationship between the parties. [] Royal Palm Properties, LLC v. Pink Palm Properties, LLC, 38 F.4th 1372, 1376 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal citations omitted). Additionally, while only one side can be the prevailing party for purposes of costs, it is not necessary for there to be a prevailing party at all. When the resolution of the parties’ legal dispute does not result in a material change in their legal relationship, there is, by the Supreme Court's definition, no prevailing party. We therefore now hold that (1) the text of Rule 54(d) does not allow for multiple prevailing parties, and (2) there is not always a prevailing party in every case. Simply put, a district court may find (at most) one prevailing party, but it is not required to do so in every case. Royal Palm Properties, LLC, 38 F.4th at 1380. An enforceable judgment on the merits creates the “material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties” necessary to permit an award of attorney's fees and costs. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dept. of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001). Defendants argue that plaintiff is not a prevailing party because he was awarded de minimis damages. Defendants’ reliance

on Florida law (Doc. #140, pp. 4-6) is misplaced since, as noted above, Florida law does not control the award of costs in a federal case. Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit has already rejected the argument that a party who only recovers nominal damages cannot be a prevailing party. Lipscher v. LRP Publications, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 1321 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, LP, 846 F.3d 1159, 1166 (11th Cir. 2017)(citing Lipscher for proposition that established precedent “provides that shifting costs in favor of the prevailing party is appropriate even in the case of a nominal award, so long as the prevailing party ‘obtains judgment on even a fraction of the claims

advanced.’”); Head v. Medford, 62 F.3d 351, 354–55 (11th Cir. 1995)(“Cases from this and other circuits consistently support shifting costs if the prevailing party obtains judgment on even a fraction of the claims advanced.”) Here, plaintiff obtained judgment in his favor on 15 of 22 statements that were alleged to have been defamatory. Despite the nominal damages awarded, plaintiff is clearly the prevailing party within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 54. III.

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