1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 MARCIAZ MALDONADO, Case No. 23-cv-02394-HSG
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 9 v.
10 STEVEN POSSON, 11 Defendant.
12 13 Plaintiff, an inmate at California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (“CSATF”), has filed 14 a pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging lack of medical treatment while housed at 15 Correctional Training Facility (“CTF”). His complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is now before the Court for 16 review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in 17 a separate order. 18 DISCUSSION 19 A. Standard of Review 20 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 21 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 23 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 24 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 25 (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See United States v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 26 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2020). 27 // 1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 2 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not 3 necessary; the statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 4 grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). 5 While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than an unadorned, 6 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). 7 A pleading that offers only labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 8 cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement does not suffice. Id. 9 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 10 right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged 11 violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 12 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 13 B. Complaint 14 Plaintiff names as defendants CTF Chief Medical Executive Steve Posson and CTF 15 healthcare providers John Does 1-3. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. 16 The complaint makes the following allegations. Defendants Posson and John Doe Nos 1-3 17 were in charge of Plaintiff’s medical care while he was housed at CTF. On June 27, 2022, due to 18 water on the floor, Plaintiff slipped and broke his hand and fractured his knee. Plaintiff’s hand 19 had to be treated with a splint. As of this day, Plaintiff continues to suffer pain, but no medical 20 care or medications have been provided. Dkt. No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ 21 inactions violate the Eighth Amendment and the Tort Claims Act, and constitute general 22 negligence, intentional infliction of emotional and physical pain. Id. 23 The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend for the following reasons. 24 First, the complaint fails to link any defendant, whether CTF CME Posson or the 25 unidentified Doe defendants, to a specific action or failure to act that violated federal or state laws 26 or the federal or state constitutions. It is unclear how each defendant caused, or is linked to, the 27 alleged constitutional violation. In addition, the use of “John Doe” to identify a defendant is not 1 because it is effectively impossible for the United States Marshal to serve an anonymous 2 defendant. The Court’s general practice is to dismiss Doe defendants without prejudice and, if the 3 plaintiff is able to identify the unknown defendant through discovery, allow the plaintiff leave to 4 amend the complaint to name the intended defendant. See Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642. In 5 preparing an amended complaint, Plaintiff should identify how each named prison official violated 6 the Eighth Amendment or state law, i.e., what each defendant did or did not do that violated 7 Plaintiff’s rights, and Plaintiff should not name Doe defendants. Plaintiff may seek to determine 8 the identity of Doe defendants through discovery and then, after he has determined the Doe 9 defendants’ identities, request leave to amend the complaint to add these Doe defendants. 10 Second, to the extent that Plaintiff has named CME Posson as a defendant because he 11 supervises John Does 1 – 3 or because CME Posson generally oversees the medical care provided 12 at CTF, this fails to state a cognizable Section 1983 claim. There is no supervisory liability under 13 Section 1983. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Knowledge and 14 acquiescence of a subordinate’s misconduct is insufficient to establish liability; each government 15 official is only responsible for his or her own misconduct. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 16 677 (2009). To state a claim for relief under Section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory 17 liability, Plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim that (1) the supervisor(s) 18 proximately caused the deprivation of rights of which Plaintiff complains, see Harris v. City of 19 Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981); or (2) the supervisor(s) failed to properly train or 20 supervise personnel resulting in the alleged deprivation, Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile 21 Home Village, 723 F. 2d 675, 680 (9th Cir. 1984); (3) the alleged deprivation resulted from a 22 custom or policy for which each of the supervisor(s) was or were responsible, see id.; or (4) the 23 supervisor(s) knew of the alleged misconduct and failed to act to prevent future misconduct, 24 Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. A formulaic recitation of the elements of supervisory liability fails to 25 state a claim under Section 1983. 26 Third, the complaint fails to state a cognizable federal claim. Although Plaintiff need not 27 provide specific facts, his allegations are insufficient to give Defendants fair notice of his Eight 1 Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 2 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). A determination of “deliberate indifference” involves an examination of 3 two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s 4 response to that need. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled in 5 part on other grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 MARCIAZ MALDONADO, Case No. 23-cv-02394-HSG
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 9 v.
10 STEVEN POSSON, 11 Defendant.
12 13 Plaintiff, an inmate at California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (“CSATF”), has filed 14 a pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging lack of medical treatment while housed at 15 Correctional Training Facility (“CTF”). His complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is now before the Court for 16 review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in 17 a separate order. 18 DISCUSSION 19 A. Standard of Review 20 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 21 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 23 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 24 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 25 (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See United States v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 26 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2020). 27 // 1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 2 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not 3 necessary; the statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 4 grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). 5 While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than an unadorned, 6 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). 7 A pleading that offers only labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 8 cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement does not suffice. Id. 9 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 10 right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged 11 violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 12 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 13 B. Complaint 14 Plaintiff names as defendants CTF Chief Medical Executive Steve Posson and CTF 15 healthcare providers John Does 1-3. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. 16 The complaint makes the following allegations. Defendants Posson and John Doe Nos 1-3 17 were in charge of Plaintiff’s medical care while he was housed at CTF. On June 27, 2022, due to 18 water on the floor, Plaintiff slipped and broke his hand and fractured his knee. Plaintiff’s hand 19 had to be treated with a splint. As of this day, Plaintiff continues to suffer pain, but no medical 20 care or medications have been provided. Dkt. No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ 21 inactions violate the Eighth Amendment and the Tort Claims Act, and constitute general 22 negligence, intentional infliction of emotional and physical pain. Id. 23 The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend for the following reasons. 24 First, the complaint fails to link any defendant, whether CTF CME Posson or the 25 unidentified Doe defendants, to a specific action or failure to act that violated federal or state laws 26 or the federal or state constitutions. It is unclear how each defendant caused, or is linked to, the 27 alleged constitutional violation. In addition, the use of “John Doe” to identify a defendant is not 1 because it is effectively impossible for the United States Marshal to serve an anonymous 2 defendant. The Court’s general practice is to dismiss Doe defendants without prejudice and, if the 3 plaintiff is able to identify the unknown defendant through discovery, allow the plaintiff leave to 4 amend the complaint to name the intended defendant. See Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642. In 5 preparing an amended complaint, Plaintiff should identify how each named prison official violated 6 the Eighth Amendment or state law, i.e., what each defendant did or did not do that violated 7 Plaintiff’s rights, and Plaintiff should not name Doe defendants. Plaintiff may seek to determine 8 the identity of Doe defendants through discovery and then, after he has determined the Doe 9 defendants’ identities, request leave to amend the complaint to add these Doe defendants. 10 Second, to the extent that Plaintiff has named CME Posson as a defendant because he 11 supervises John Does 1 – 3 or because CME Posson generally oversees the medical care provided 12 at CTF, this fails to state a cognizable Section 1983 claim. There is no supervisory liability under 13 Section 1983. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Knowledge and 14 acquiescence of a subordinate’s misconduct is insufficient to establish liability; each government 15 official is only responsible for his or her own misconduct. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 16 677 (2009). To state a claim for relief under Section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory 17 liability, Plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim that (1) the supervisor(s) 18 proximately caused the deprivation of rights of which Plaintiff complains, see Harris v. City of 19 Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981); or (2) the supervisor(s) failed to properly train or 20 supervise personnel resulting in the alleged deprivation, Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile 21 Home Village, 723 F. 2d 675, 680 (9th Cir. 1984); (3) the alleged deprivation resulted from a 22 custom or policy for which each of the supervisor(s) was or were responsible, see id.; or (4) the 23 supervisor(s) knew of the alleged misconduct and failed to act to prevent future misconduct, 24 Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. A formulaic recitation of the elements of supervisory liability fails to 25 state a claim under Section 1983. 26 Third, the complaint fails to state a cognizable federal claim. Although Plaintiff need not 27 provide specific facts, his allegations are insufficient to give Defendants fair notice of his Eight 1 Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 2 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). A determination of “deliberate indifference” involves an examination of 3 two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s 4 response to that need. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled in 5 part on other grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) 6 (en banc). A “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result 7 in further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin, 974 8 F.2d at 1059 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he 9 knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to 10 take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “A difference of 11 opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding treatment does not 12 give rise to a § 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). Similarly, 13 a showing of nothing more than a difference of medical opinion as to the need to pursue one 14 course of treatment over another is insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish deliberate 15 indifference. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058-60 (9th Cir. 2004). A claim of medical 16 malpractice or negligence is insufficient to make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 17 1060-61. 18 Here, it is unclear what Plaintiff’s serious medical need was and how Defendants failed to 19 take reasonable steps to address the medical need. Plaintiff references a broken hand and fractured 20 knee, but Plaintiff acknowledges that he received a splint for the broken hand. It is unclear what 21 further medical care Plaintiff claims is needed beyond a splint. Moreover, both the complaint and 22 the attachments to the complaint contradict Plaintiff’s claim that he was not provided medical care 23 for his hand and knee between June 27, 2022, the date he suffered the injury, and December 7, 24 2022, the date he was transferred away from CTF to CSATF. Plaintiff acknowledges in the body 25 of the complaint, and prison records confirm, that he was provided a splint for his broken hand. 26 Dkt. No. 1 at 3, 11. According to prison records, Plaintiff received other medical treatment 27 immediately following the fall. Plaintiff was sent to an outside hospital for urgent x-rays 1 had the splint removed; hand exercises were prescribed; and a physical therapy follow-up 2 scheduled. Dkt. No. 1 at 11. It also appears that Plaintiff has been prescribed pain medication. 3 Dkt. No. 1 at 9. In filing an amended complaint, Plaintiff should identify how defendant Posson 4 and/or other prison officials denied him medical care and explain why their actions or failures to 5 act were unreasonable within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. 6 The Court declines to screen Plaintiff’s remaining claims at this time as they appear to be 7 state-law claims.1 Pursuant to Section 1367(c)(3) of the United States Code, title 28, a district 8 court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it dismisses all claims over which it has 9 original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). “The decision whether to continue to exercise 10 supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after all federal claims have been dismissed lies 11 within the district court’s discretion.” Foster v. Wilson, 504 F.3d 1046, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2007) 12 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). Because there is currently no operative complaint, the Court 13 cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction and it is therefore premature to screen the state-law 14 claims. 15 CONCLUSION 16 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES the complaint with leave to amend. 17 Within twenty-eight (28) days of the date of this order, Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint 18 that addresses the identified deficiencies. The amended complaint must include the caption and 19 civil case number used in this order, Case No. C 23-02394 HSG (PR) and the words “AMENDED 20 COMPLAINT” on the first page. If using the court form complaint, Plaintiff must answer all the 21 questions on the form in order for the action to proceed. An amended complaint completely 22 replaces the previous complaint. See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 925 (9th Cir. 2012). 23 Accordingly, Plaintiff must include in his amended complaint all the claims he wishes to present 24 and all of the defendants he wishes to sue, and may not incorporate material from the prior 25 complaint by reference. Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order in the 26
27 1 Plaintiff alleges a violation of the “Tort Claims Act.” Dkt. No. 1 at 1, 3. The Court presumes 1 time provided will result in dismissal of this action without further notice to Plaintiff. The Clerk 2 || shall include two copies of the court’s complaint form with a copy of this order to Plaintiff. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 || Dated: 11/9/2023 □ | ° HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12
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