IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2004-AN-02160-SCT
CONSOLIDATED WITH
NO. 2002-AN-01805-SCT
IN THE MATTER OF THE EXTENSION AND ENLARGING OF THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CITY OF LAUREL, MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/19/2004 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. FRANKLIN C. MCKENZIE, JR. COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: JONES COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: RICHARD O. BURSON LESLIE PETTIS BARRY NORMAN GENE HORTMAN, JR. NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES & ANNEXATION DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/02/2006 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
RANDOLPH, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
FACTS AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE
¶1. In this annexation case, a petition was jointly filed by the City of Laurel, Mississippi
(“City”), and a private landowner, Randy Chesney (“Chesney”). Chesney subsequently sold the property to Malcolm Carmichael (“Carmichael”). Carmichael was later substituted for
Chesney and is a party to this appeal.
¶2. Chesney, the prior owner of the convenience store/ gas station (“convenience store”),
approached the City requesting that his business, located at 14 Lower Myrick Road, be
annexed by the City. The City, recognizing the opportunity to increase its tax base,
accommodated Chesney’s request, and passed Ordinance 1402-2002, seeking to annex a
portion of the right-of-way of State Highway 15 1 , along with the convenience store. The joint
petition was filed on July 11, 2002. The proposed area of annexation (“PAA”) tract is
adjacent and contiguous to the City. The convenience store subject to annexation is located
approximately four-tenths of a mile from the existing municipal boundary.
¶3. On October 17, 2002, a hearing was held before the Jones County Chancery Court.
Without considering evidence of reasonableness, the Chancellor found the annexation could
not proceed as a matter of law, refusing to allow “the City to use the right-of-way ‘owned by
the State of Mississippi’ to make ‘pockets of territory outside the city limits’ contiguous.”
In the Matter of the Extension and Enlarging of the Boundaries of the City of Laurel,
Miss.: Randy Chesney and the City of Laurel, Miss., 863 So.2d 968, 969 (Miss. 2004). The
City and Chesney appealed to this Court. In a well-reasoned opinion authored by Chief
Justice Smith, this Court held the Chancery Court erred. “Whether this proposed annexation
1 There was no objection to the proposed annexation by the Mississippi Department of Transportation.
2 is reasonable or not is the ultimate question. Thus, the real determinative issue squarely
confronting us is whether the chancellor must conduct a full hearing allowing for evidence
and testimony and utilizing the indicia of reasonableness factors to determine if the proposed
annexation is to be allowed. We conclude that he must do so.” Id. at 971. Accordingly, this
Court reversed the Chancellor and remanded the case “with instructions to proceed on the
merits with a full hearing to determine whether the proposed annexation is reasonable.” Id.
at 973 (citations omitted). Pursuant to the mandate of this Court, on January 15, 2004, the
Chancellor conducted a full evidentiary hearing to determine whether or not the proposed
annexation was reasonable, vel non.
¶4. Three opponents to the proposed annexation appeared at the hearing, as was their right
under Miss. Code Ann. § 21-1-31. In addition to stating their opposition, they answered
questions posed by the petitioners and the court. The opponents were not represented by
counsel at the hearing, nor have they filed a brief.
¶5. The Chancellor heard testimony and received the evidence presented, before issuing
his opinion. The opinion addressed the twelve indicia of reasonableness established by this
Court in In re Enlargement and Extension of the Mun. Boundaries of the City of
Meridian, 662 So.2d 597, 609 (Miss. 1995). The Chancellor found the proposed annexation
was unreasonable. The City and Carmichael timely filed this appeal and present the following
issues for this Court’s consideration: (I) Whether the Chancery Court’s ruling that the
proposed annexation is unreasonable is manifestly wrong and not supported by substantial
3 or credible evidence; (II) Whether the Chancery Court mischaracterized the annexation at
issue; and (III) Whether the Chancery Court’s ruling that the proposed annexation is “not
required by the public convenience and necessity” exceeded the court’s authority.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6. With increasing regularity, municipalities have sought to increase their area of control
and their tax base. Notwithstanding, a significant number of our state’s citizens prefer a rural
lifestyle, and abhor the constraints they believe a municipality will impose upon them, along
with increased taxes. The Legislature has placed the ultimate decision into the hands of the
Chancery Court for ratification, approval, and confirmation. See Miss. Code Ann. § 21-1-29.
Chancellors throughout the state are required to pass judgment on these competing interests.
In performing this burdensome task, the Chancellor is required to apply the correct law and
weigh the evidence. Only when the lower court fails to consider the applicable law as
established by statute and this Court, or when Chancellors abuse their discretion, should their
decisions be overturned.
[W]here the Chancellor was the trier of facts, his findings of fact on conflicting evidence cannot be disturbed by this Court on appeal unless we can say with reasonable certainty that these findings were manifestly wrong and against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Even if this Court disagreed with the lower court on the finding of fact and might have arrived at a different conclusion, we are still bound by the chancellor’s findings unless manifestly wrong....
Richardson v. Riley, 355 So.2d 667, 668 (Miss. 1978).
4 ¶7. As an appellate court, we are prohibited from disturbing a Chancellor’s findings of
fact unless they are “manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous.” Martin v. Lowery, 912 So.2d
461, 464 (Miss. 2005) (quoting Bowers Window & Door Co. v. Dearman, 549 So.2d 1309,
1312-13 (Miss. 1989)). It is our solemn duty to afford due deference to a Chancellor, who
sits as the fact finder. The Chancellor’s role as fact finder parallels that of a juror. Model Jury
Instruction 1:35 states, “[a]s sole judges of the facts in this case, you determine what weight
and what credibility will be assigned the testimony and supporting evidence of each witness
in this case. You are required to use your good common sense and sound, honest judgment
in considering and weighing the testimony of each witness.” A Chancellor is afforded the
favor of observing the demeanor of witnesses and he is called upon to exercise his discretion,
as we similarly mandate jurors. It is the sole responsibility of jurors to consider and weigh
the evidence presented. Jurors are “permitted to draw such reasonable inferences from the
evidence as seem justified in light of your own experience.” See Mississippi Model Jury
Instructions 1:29; 1:3; 1:351:36; 1:37; 1:38 (West 2005). In Chancery Court, “the Chancellor
is vested with the responsibility to hear the evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses,
and determine ultimately what weight and worth to afford any particular aspect of the proof.”
Rainey v. Rainey, 205 So.2d 514, 515 (Miss. 1967). In Rainey, this Court held, “[t]he
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their testimony, as well as the interpretation of
evidence where it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation, are primarily for the
chancellor as the trier of facts.” Id. Rainey further stated that if the issue is one of fact, the
5 Chancellor’s decision will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly wrong. Id. As with any
finder of fact, he is entitled to consider the interests witnesses may have in the outcome.
Additionally, the Chancellor may consider the absence of proof required of the proponents
of annexation to sustain their petition.
¶8. Parties seeking annexation have the burden of proving to the Chancellor the
reasonableness of their cause. Failure to do so must necessarily defeat their endeavor. The
role of this Court is not to superimpose our opinion over that of the Chancellor, because our
interpretation of facts, disputed and/or agreed, or the lack of facts, might cause us to reach
an entirely different conclusion. “Our standard of review is limited to a single question,
whether the annexation is reasonable.” Chesney and the City of Laurel, Miss., 863 So.2d
at 970 (citations omitted).
¶9. The issue before the trial judge was whether the annexation was reasonable, vel non.
The issue before this Court is limited. Did the trial judge follow applicable law and was there
credible evidence, or the lack thereof, to validate his judgment? In Chesney and City of
Laurel, this Court held that when reviewing the decision of a Chancellor, “[r]eversal is
warranted only when the Chancery Court has employed erroneous legal standards or this
Court has a ‘firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.’” Id. at 971 (quoting
Bassett v. Town of Taylorsville, 542 So.2d 918, 921 (Miss. 1989). We must resist the
temptation to substitute our judgment for that of a Chancellor, even though we may have
found otherwise, had any one of us been the trial judge.
6 ANALYSIS
I. Whether the Chancery Court’s ruling that the proposed annexation is unreasonable is manifestly wrong and not supported by substantial and credible evidence.
¶10. Chancellor McKenzie’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Judgment
(“Opinion”), clearly demonstrate that he prudently considered and weighed the proof
presented, and analyzed it in conjunction with the twelve factors required to determine the
reasonableness vel non of the proposed annexation, as enumerated by this Court in City of
Meridian, 662 So.2d at 609. The Chancellor concluded that the standard of reasonableness
for annexation was not met. The Chancellor’s determination is amply supported in the record
and in his ten page opinion.
¶11. (1) The Municipality’s need to expand: Testimony revealed this alleged need for
expansion arose only after the Mayor was approached by Chesney, who “came and made an
appointment in my office and said that he would like to voluntarily annex his property into
the City of Laurel.”
¶12. Other than conclusory statements by the City’s elected officials and employees, no
evidence was presented by the City that there was a need to expand in the proposed area of
annexation (“PAA”), nor was any evidence presented that the alleged need arose prior to
Chesney’s request. No oral or documentary evidence was offered that from the date of
Chesney’s request until the date of the hearing, any analyses or studies had been undertaken
or reports or surveys prepared to support the City’s need to expand. The City acknowledged
7 there were no previous requests for annexation in this area and that no other property in that
vicinity had been annexed by Laurel.
¶13. Poole v. City of Pearl, 908 So.2d 728 (Miss. 2005) undergirds the Chancellor’s
opinion. Without “developing a litmus test,” Poole sets forth numerous non-exclusive factors
that should be considered by a chancellor in analyzing the need for expansion. Id. at 733-34.
With the exception of testimony by the City that it needed to expand its tax base, there was
no evidence presented by the City or Carmichael satisfying other Poole factors. No evidence
was presented of: (1) spillover development into the PAA by Laurel; (2) Laurel’s population
and internal growth; (3) Laurel’s need for developable land; (4) remaining vacant land within
Laurel; (5) growth in the PAA that would require comprehensive planning; (6) Laurel’s need
to exercise control over the PAA to provide comprehensive planning and growth; (7) traffic
counts; (8) limitations upon Laurel due to geography and surrounding cities; (9) any
environmental influences; and, (10) increased building permit activity. In the absence of
supporting evidence, we cannot say the Chancellor erred when he rejected the unsupported
testimony of the petitioner’s witnesses, all of which had an interest in the outcome.
¶14. The pleadings and lack of proof support the Chancellor’s opinion that the City has no
need to expand into the PAA. The PAA is solely comprised of a highway right-of-way which
crosses a creek and flood plain, directly to a preexisting convenience store. The convenience
store is totally detached from the City, except for the highway right-of-way. Maps illustrating
the PAA, which were attached as exhibits to the Petition, reveal that the store is surrounded
8 on all sides by county property, with the exception of the aforementioned highway right-of-
way.
¶15. Fact finders are not bound by conclusionary statements or opinions which are not
supported by underlying facts, data, reports or surveys. The Chancellor found Carmichael and
the City failed their burden to satisfy factor (1) of the reasonableness test, which does not
favor annexation. We find, based upon the testimony and evidence, the petitioners failed to
satisfy factor (1).
¶16. (2) Whether the area sought to be annexed is in the path of growth: The
Chancellor found that the proponents for annexation failed to satisfy factor (2). A witness for
the City testified that the proposed annexed area was in a path of growth, because it is on
Highway 15 South, a four-lane highway. In contrast, Carmichael, who owns the property,
testified the property is located at 14 Lower Myrick Road, which according to another
witness, is a two lane road. Ordinance 1402-2002 declared the property was located at 14
Lower Myrick Road.
¶17. This Court, in In the Matter of the Enlargement and Extension of the Municipal
Boundaries of the City of D’Iberville v. The City of Biloxi, 867 So.2d 241 (Miss. 2004),
held,
This Court has established factors for consideration when evaluating reasonableness as it relates to the path of growth which may or may not include: (1) spillover development in the annexation area; (2) annexation area immediately adjacent to City; (3) limited area available for expansion; (4) interconnection by transportation corridors; (5) increased urban development in annexation area; (6) geography; and (7) subdivision development.
9 Id. at 253. The testimony presented failed to establish factors (1), (3), (5), (6) and (7).
¶18. Although one witness opined that the PAA was in a path of growth, this opinion was
offered without corroborating evidence. The City conceded that Laurel did not seek to annex
Carmichael’s property or anything in that area in a prior annexation effort by the City. See
City of Laurel v. Sharon Water Works Ass’n, 2005 WL 1906031 (Miss. 2005). The
Chancellor specifically considered the testimony, or lack thereof, and found the testimony
was “doubtful.”
¶19. It was within the prerogative of the Chancellor to accept or reject the testimony of any
witness, and consider all facts not in dispute, and make his decision accordingly. We find no
error in the Chancellor’s conclusion that the proponents failed to offer sufficient proof this
factor favored annexation.
¶20. (3) The potential health hazards from sewage and waste disposal in the annexed
areas: The Chancellor found, “[t]he evidence shows that there are no health hazards in the
area which would be solved by annexation. The City approves the wastewater disposal of
Carmichael by private septic system and does not intend to provide sewer services.” No
testimony was presented that sewage and waste disposal would create any health hazards. We
find no error in his finding.
¶21. (4) The municipality’s financial ability to make improvements and furnish
municipal services: We find no error in the Chancellor’s determination that the City was
able to provide municipal services, a factor which supports annexation.
10 ¶22. (5) The need for overall zoning and planning in the area: A witness for the
petitioners testified to the needs and benefits of zoning this area. When asked, “[w]hat
benefits does zoning provide?” the witness related the general benefits of zoning, without
specifically addressing the benefits to be provided to the PAA. The petitioner’s witness
further testified that the area would be zoned as General Commercial or C-2, which would
allow its then present use. Regardless of whether zoning would be implemented, the property
retained its present use, as there was no evidence presented of zoning restrictions in the
county. The Chancellor concluded there is no benefit to the zoning of the PAA. This finding
was supported by Carmichael, who testified that his building already met the City’s standard
building code and that “there is some negative” to being zoned. As the PAA consists of one
business site and the highway right-of-way leading to it, the Chancellor did not err in finding
there is no need for any overall planning in the area. This factor does not favor annexation.
¶23. (6) The need for municipal services in the area sought to be annexed: The City
would not be responsible for providing sewer or water services, as Carmichael did not seek
them. Carmichael asserted that he sought annexation to receive more efficient police service
and round-the-clock fire protection; a cheaper insurance rating; and to have access to garbage
services and pest control. However, the Chancellor found otherwise. Testimony was also
given that Carmichael was already serviced by a private garbage service, and if annexed, he
might considering changing to the garbage service provided by the City. Based on the
11 testimony presented, the Chancellor found the request for municipal services was a pretext
to legalize the sale of beer, in an area where such sales were prohibited.
¶24. Evidence also revealed the City was not going to provide water and sewer to the PAA.
The City would not install a fire hydrant in the PAA, but rather obtain water to fight fires by
ferrying water across the bridge from a fire hydrant four tenths of a mile away.
¶25. Evidence was also presented that Carmichael would not receive any benefit from the
City’s police department, that was not already provided by the Sheriff’s department. Hubert
Welch (“Welch”), a retired school administrator who lives one half of a mile from the
convenience store, stated that deputy sheriffs’ cars are at the store “quite frequently,” as well
as the Constable’s vehicle. Carmichael also testified, “the Deputies do a good job.” Welch
testified that the area was adequately protected by three volunteer fire departments. No
testimony was presented by the petitioners that there was inadequate police or fire protection
in the area, but only generalized opinions that response time would be faster.
¶26. The Chancellor found the area sought to be annexed would not benefit from the
provision of police and fire protection by the City, as Carmichael was already adequately
protected by volunteer fire departments and Sheriff’s patrol. This factor does not favor
annexation.
¶27. This Court recognizes a conflict in fact exists regarding this factor, but as there is
substantial and credible evidence to support the Chancellor’s ruling, we are required to defer
to the Chancellor. Accordingly, we find no error.
12 ¶28. (7) Whether there are natural barriers between the City and the proposed
annexed area: The Tallahala Creek and its flood plain lie between the limits of the City and
the area sought to be annexed. A witness for the petitioners testified that the creek was a
natural barrier, “but...it has a very substantial bridge... so there are no natural barriers that
would prohibit the City from annexing this property....” The chancellor stated, “a large
portion of the highway right-of-way sought to be annexed by the City consists of a bridge
spanning the creek and its flood plain.” The record reflects a bridge spans the creek and flood
plain for approximately four-tenths of a mile. The Chancellor found there is an established
bridge that accommodates the highway right-of-way and bypasses the natural barrier. The
Chancellor analyzed the interaction between this factor and factor (4).
¶29. Chesney chose not to seek water or sewer services, although Ordinance 1402-2002
stated the City would provide the same municipal services to the PAA that were available to
all its residents. The Chancellor recognized water or sewer services had not been requested
by Carmichael; however, the Chancellor astutely observed that if this area were to be
annexed, Carmichael or a subsequent owner may seek water or sewer services from the City.
A consulting engineer hired by the City testified the City had not performed a cost analysis
for providing water or sewer services to the area. The Chancellor opined that if an owner of
this property were to request water and sewer services from the City, the costs of providing
water and sewer across or under a creek would be “so high that it would not be economically
feasible in order to serve one customer operating a convenience store.” We cannot say the
13 Chancellor erred in opining that if a subsequent owner demanded water and sewer service
from the City, it would not be economically feasible for the City to provide these services
given the natural barriers between the City and the PAA. This factor does not favor
¶30. (8) The past performance and time element involved in the City’s provision of
services to its present residents: The Chancellor found that the City had done a good job
of providing services to its residents in the past, a factor which favors annexation, and is a
finding without error.
¶31. (9) The impact (economic or otherwise) of the annexation upon those who live in
the area: The Chancellor found that only Carmichael and the State Highway Department
were in the PAA.
¶32. The residents of the community who live near Carmichael’s store testified that
annexation would adversely affect their property. The evidence is clear that the only
individual to benefit from the proposed annexation would be Carmichael. Carmichael
testified he would benefit from annexation for the following reasons: (1) he could increase
revenues by being allowed to sell beer from his convenience store, which would allow him
to compete with a convenience store four-tenths of a mile away located in the City.
Carmichael testified, “I’m in this to make money;” (2) he believed police and fire protection
would be improved; (3) he would save money on insurance; and (4) he would have access
to City pest control. The Chancellor found that Carmichael’s request for annexation was
14 motivated by his desire to sell beer to increase his profits, and the request for municipal
services was a mere pretext to accomplish this goal.
¶33. No evidence was presented that annexation favorably impacts any other persons who
live in the area, a factor against annexation. We conclude no error was committed by the
Chancellor regarding factor (9).
¶34. (10) The impact of annexation upon the voting strength of protected minority
groups: There are no voters residing in the area sought to be annexed; therefore, this factor
is neutral, and was so treated by the Chancellor.
¶35. (11) Whether the property owners and other inhabitants of the area sought to be
annexed have in the past, and will in the future unless annexed, will because of their
reasonable proximity to the corporate limits of the municipality, enjoy economic and
social benefits of the municipality without paying their fair share of taxes: No proof
regarding this factor was introduced. This factor is also neutral.
¶36. (12) Any other factors that may suggest reasonableness: The Chancery Court
found, “[t]his court is convinced that if Malcolm Carmichael now had the right to sell
alcoholic beverages at his convenience store, this annexation case would not exist.” The
Chancellor opined, “[t]he annexation would make legal what is now illegal in the area.”
¶37. The Chancellor relied not only on the testimony of opponents regarding the sale of
beer, but also recognized that the citizens of the area surrounding the PAA expressed their
will through the ballot box, and voted to prohibit beer sales in the county, including the PAA.
15 Rarely is the will of our citizens determined by direct vote. However, here the citizens voted
to keep beer out of the PAA, and this Court accords deference to their expression, and finds
no fault in the Chancellor’s consideration of same. It is not and should not be a conclusive
test of reasonableness, but rather a factor in determining reasonableness by examining the
totality of the circumstances.
¶38. The lower court also received evidence from Leroy Hamilton, a Public Accountant
and a Jones County School System, District Four Board member, that the present line of
demarcation between the City and County, the bridge that spans the Tallahala Creek and
flood plain, would be lost. Hamilton testified he and other residents love the City, but have
chosen to live in the County and do not want the City to cross the bridge into the County.
Hamilton stated he and other residents did not want the City to cross over the bridge because,
“they are afraid if you ever get there, you will continue.” It is this concern that if the City
established a beachhead by annexing a “string on a balloon,” (see infra), the City may later
seek to annex other parcels in the area where people have chosen to build and live outside
of the City. Hamilton and other residents “are fearing the City more than the alcohol sales.”
¶39. The lower court found annexation for the purpose of Carmichael increasing his profits
by selling beer was unreasonable.
¶40. The Chancellor properly considered the twelve indicia of reasonableness. We are
satisfied that the trial court applied the correct legal standard, and there exists a sufficient
combination of (1) undisputed facts; (2) contested facts; and (3) the absence of documented
16 data, facts, analysis, or studies for the Chancellor to deny annexation. Concluding such, the
Chancellor’s judgment cannot be said to be manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, we affirm.
II. Whether the Chancery Court mischaracterized the annexation at issue
¶41. The appellant charges the Chancery Court mischaracterized the annexation at issue
by including in his opinion: “This case presents a joint request for annexation. One by the
City of Laurel which seeks annexation of 4/10 of a mile of the right-of-way of Mississippi
Highway 15 South of Laurel. And the other by property owner Malcolm Carmichael which
seeks annexation of his property once the City’s annexation is able to extend the City
boundaries so it touches his property.”
¶42. There is no evidence the Chancery Court failed to follow this Court’s mandate and
treat the annexation as one tract. It is obvious that the ultimate decision of the Chancellor did
not turn on the language quoted by the appellants, as it is clear the Chancellor considered the
twelve reasonableness factors as required by the Court in Chesney, as addressed in our
analysis of Issue I.
¶43. Courts throughout this land have been troubled by the adjacency issue about which
this Court made a clear pronouncement in Chesney. Other courts refer to this type of
annexation as “shoestring,” “balloon on a stick,” “corridor” or “long lasso” annexation,
which rely solely on a highway right-of-way or a narrow corridor to connect the municipality
to an otherwise noncontiguous area in order “to capture a prize parcel.” Town of Baraboo
17 v. Village of West Baraboo, 699 N.W.2d 610 (Wisc. App. 2005). See also City of Rapid City
v. Anderson, 612 N.W.2d 289 (SD 2000); Hughes v. Town of Oak Island, 580 S.E.2d 704
(NC App. 2003).
¶44. This Court has wisely determined that no single factor should be used to defeat or
sustain annexations; but has sufficiently developed a body of law for chancellors to follow
to determine reasonableness vel non. Single issue concerns such as “balloon on a stick” or
“corridor” annexations are subsumed into the overall broader analysis of the totality of the
circumstances, and can be considered within the twelve factor framework.
¶45. Appellants ask this Court to parse the Chancellor’s words, when the record is clear
that the Chancellor did treat the PAA as one tract of land for annexation consideration.
Appellants concede in their brief the purported error is “probably not reversible error.” The
Court agrees with the appellant and finds no reversible error as to Issue II.
III. Whether the Chancery Court’s ruling that the proposed annexation is “not required by the public convenience and necessity” exceeded the Court’s authority.
¶46. As the Chancellor considered the twelve reasonableness factors required by this Court
in a clear and concise manner and justifiably determined the annexation to be unreasonable,
it was harmless error for him to consider public convenience and necessity.
¶47. The language in the Chancellor’s opinion regarding “public convenience and
necessity” is, at worst, mere surplusage. The Chancellor made a clear analysis of the twelve
reasonableness factors; therefore, his consideration of “public convenience and necessity”
18 is of no consequence in the ultimate determination of this case. In an otherwise exceptional
opinion on the reasonableness vel non of the attempted annexation, the Chancellor properly
considered the twelve reasonableness factors required by this Court. Therefore, Issue III is
without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶48. It is the duty of this Court to defer to the Chancellor unless we are convinced his
findings are manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous. In this case, the Chancellor properly
considered all factors required for annexation cases, as previously enumerated by this Court.
The determination by the Chancellor was neither manifestly wrong, nor clearly erroneous.
Therefore, we affirm his decision.
¶49. AFFIRMED.
SMITH, C.J., WALLER AND COBB, P.JJ., EASLEY, CARLSON AND DICKINSON, JJ., CONCUR. GRAVES, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. DIAZ, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.