Malavenda v. White Oak Corporation, No. Cv93-0532394 (Apr. 18, 1994)
This text of 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 4125 (Malavenda v. White Oak Corporation, No. Cv93-0532394 (Apr. 18, 1994)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Defendant, Commissioner of Transportation moves to strike the Third Count directed to him on the ground that the notice required under General Statutes
The Third Count in the complaint which was served on September 16, 1993 describes an accident in which a truck operated by the plaintiff "burst through the barriers" in the highway and caused "the plaintiff's injuries and losses," which are more fully described in certain paragraphs of the First count, incorporated by reference into the Third Count.
Plaintiff sent the Commissioner written notice of the accident, dated November 4, 1991, which states the accident occurred on September 16, 1991 at 2:30 a.m. in the southbound lane of Interstate 91 at exit 42 in Windsor Locks, Connecticut. The three-page notice includes a detailed description of alleged "construction deficiencies" at the accident site. In addition, the notice states:
I write to formally place on notice the State of Connecticut, pursuant to General CT Page 4126 Statutes,
13a-144 , that I intend to bring an action on behalf of Matlack and Philip Malavenda against the State of Connecticut for any and all claims which might arise from this collision.Our investigation indicates that lighting and construction deficiencies and failure to warn as well as design defects at the above site were all directly responsible for any and all of the losses and damages resulting from the collision.
General Statutes
No such action shall be brought except within two years from the date of such injury, nor unless notice of such injury and a general description of the same and of the cause thereof and of the time and place of its occurrence has been given in writing within ninety days thereafter to the commissioner.
Our Appellate Court has ruled that the failure to give any description of the damage sustained beyond the mere assertion that the injury or damage occurred, makes the notice insufficient to meet the statutory requirements of
While plaintiff's original complaint, filed on September 23, 1993, and the plaintiff's revised CT Page 4127 complaint, filed on November 15, 1993, each describe the plaintiff's alleged injuries in some detail, these complaints were each filed well beyond ninety days from the date of the accident and, cannot serve to satisfy the notice requirements of the statute.
The notice required by the statute is a condition precedent to maintaining a cause of action under the statute and if this requirement is not met, no cause of action exists. Bresnan v. Frankel,
Motion to Strike Third Count granted.
Wagner, J.
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