Malaga v. Molioo

3 Am. Samoa 518
CourtHigh Court of American Samoa
DecidedMarch 20, 1957
DocketNo. 4-1957
StatusPublished

This text of 3 Am. Samoa 518 (Malaga v. Molioo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering High Court of American Samoa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Malaga v. Molioo, 3 Am. Samoa 518 (amsamoa 1957).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

MORROW, Chief Justice

The Trial Division of the High Court in the case of Ioane of Nuuuli, Mase Molioo of Vaitogi, and Tupua of Vaitogi v. I. Malaga of Iliili decreed that Mase Molioo, subject to his resignation from the title Mase, should be registered as the holder of the matai title Lealaimatafao attached to the village of Iliili. I. Malaga and Tupua appealed separately from the decree. The appeals were argued together.

The statute governing the powers of the Appellate Division on appeal in civil cases reads as follows: “The Appellate Division of the High Court on appeal . . . shall have power to affirm, modify, set aside, or reverse the judgment or order appealed from or reviewed and to remand the case with such directions for a new trial or for the entry of judgment as may be just. The findings of fact of the Trial and Probate Divisions of the High Court in cases tried by them shall not be set aside by the Appellate Division of that court unless clearly erroneous, but in the [520]*520case of appeals from the .district courts the Appellate Division of the High Court may review the facts as well as the law. . .” Section 213 of par. 10 of Amendments, Nos. 11-59, 1952 to the A. S. Code. Under the statute a finding of fact by the Trial Division cannot be set aside by the Appellate Division “unless clearly erroneous.”

Sec. 933 of the Code as amended prescribes the law which the Court must follow in making the determination as to which of the eligible opposing candidates shall be registered as the holder of a matai title. It reads as follows:

“Consideration Given by Court: In the trial of matai name cases, the High Court shall be guided by the following in the priority listed:
(a) The best hereditary right in which the male and female descendants shall be equal in the family where this has been customary, otherwise the male descendant shall prevail;
(b) The wish of the majority or plurality of those members of the family related by blood to the title;
(c) The forcefulness, character, personality, and capacity for leadership of the candidate ;
(d) The value of the holder of the matai name to the government of American Samoa.”

Sec. 926 of ,the Code as amended prescribes the eligibility requirements for succession to a matai title. The trial court found that all of the four original candidates met these requirements. It was not claimed by either of the appellants that Mase did not comply with these requirements. The only provision as respects blood in Sec. 926 as amended requires that a person to be eligible “to succeed to any matai title: (a) must be at least one-half Samoan blood.” All of the candidates in the case met this requirement as to Samoan blood. An examination of Sec. 933 as amended and above quoted will reveal the fact that in the trial of a matai name case the Court must consider “The wish of the majority or plurality of those [521]*521members of the family related by blood (emphasis added) to the title.” This is not a requirement that the person ordered by the Court to be registered as a matai shall be related by blood to the title. It is the wish of blood members and no others that the Court must consider. Neither Sec. 926 nor Sec. 933 requires that a matai shall be a blood member of the family. Of course, the matai is usually a blood member, but this Court judicially knows that there are matais in American Samoa who are not blood members of their respective families. Such is a matter of common and general knowledge in American Samoa. “The rule may be stated broadly that generally courts will take notice , of whatever matters are known, or ought to be generally known, within the limits of their jurisdiction, upon the theory that justice does not require that courts be more ignorant than the rest of mankind.” 20 Am.Jur. 48. Under Samoan customs a family may consist not only of blood members, but also of married persons to the family living in it and rendering service to the matai and in addition persons who have lived in the family for a long time and are rendering such service. It was the wish of these latter two classes of family members that was excluded from consideration by the Court in awarding a matai title when Sec. 933 of the Code was amended in 1952. Prior to that time the .statute provided that the Court should consider “The wish of the majority or plurality of the family.” The amendment obviously did not require that the matai awarded the title be a blood member. Any change in the law to that effect would require the action of the legislative branch of the Government. The Court has no legislative power. It takes the law as it finds it.

It was claimed by both appellants .that the Trial Division made an erroneous finding of fact when it found that Mase was the great grandson of Fao Tuioge and that he, therefore, had 1/sth Fao blood in his veins. The evidence [522]*522was conflicting on this matter. We have reviewed it, but we are unable to say that upon the evidence before the Trial Division its finding that Mase had Vsth Fao blood in his veins was “clearly erroneous.” Despite the conflict, there is ample evidence in the record to support the finding. Under these circumstances we cannot set the finding aside. The admitted fact that Fao Vave, the last holder of the title, celebrated the 50th anniversary of his succession to the title at the fale of Muli, the blood father of Mase, is very strong circumstantial evidence that Muli had Fao blood. If Muli had Fao blood then Mase has it. This was in addition to other evidence in support of Mase’s pedigree which showed him to be the great grandson of Fao Tuioge.

Both appellants claimed upon the appeal that if the Court would grant a new trial, they would be able to introduce additional evidence to support their contention that Mase has no Fao blood in his veins. As far as appears, this evidence was available to the appellants and known to them during the trial before the Trial Division. If they did not introduce it, it was their own fault and due to their own neglect. “To warrant the granting of a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must appear that the evidence is such as will probably change the result if a new trial is granted, that it has been discovered since the trial, that it could not have been discovered before the trial by the exercise of due diligence, that it is material to the issue, and that it is not merely cumulative, or impeaching. The necessity of establishing these essential factors is repeatedly emphasized by the courts in passing upon the propriety of granting or denying new trials upon this ground.” 30 Am. Jur. 165.

Appellant Tupua was in no way prejudiced by the finding that Mase was a blood member of the family because the Court at the same time found that Tupua had the better hereditary right. It found Tupua had ^th Fao [523]*523blood while Mase had Vsth, and that Tupua prevailed over Mase on the issue of hereditary right.

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Bluebook (online)
3 Am. Samoa 518, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/malaga-v-molioo-amsamoa-1957.