Maki v. State of New York

Second Circuit

Maki v. State of New York

597 F. App'x 36

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit

DecidedMarch 12, 2015

Docket14-897

StatusUnpublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 597 F. App'x 36 (Maki v. State of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Maki v. State of New York, 597 F. App'x 36 (2d Cir. 2015).

Pincite

Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Frank D. Maki, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his complaint on the recommendation of the assigned magistrate judge. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint. Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir.2013). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Pro se complaints are to “be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir.2006) *37 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).

Maki correctly observes that before the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss his complaint, he' was entitled to de novo review of those portions of the magistrate judge’s report to which he objected. See 28 U.S.C. § 686(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). Although the phrasing of the district court’s order suggests that it may have reviewed the report and recommendation only for clear error, even assuming the court applied the incorrect standard of review, that error was harmless because our independent and de novo review of the entire record reveals that the magistrate judge’s recommendations were correct and Maki’s objections were without merit. See Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 n. 7 (2d Cir.2009). We therefore affirm for substantially the. same reasons stated by the magistrate judge in his thorough December 5, 2013 report and recommendation.

We have considered all of Maki’s re-, maining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Frank D. Maki, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his complaint on the recommendation of the assigned magistrate judge. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint. Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir.2013). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Pro se complaints are to “be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir.2006) *37 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).

Maki correctly observes that before the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss his complaint, he' was entitled to de novo review of those portions of the magistrate judge’s report to which he objected. See 28 U.S.C. § 686(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). Although the phrasing of the district court’s order suggests that it may have reviewed the report and recommendation only for clear error, even assuming the court applied the incorrect standard of review, that error was harmless because our independent and de novo review of the entire record reveals that the magistrate judge’s recommendations were correct and Maki’s objections were without merit. See Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 n. 7 (2d Cir.2009). We therefore affirm for substantially the. same reasons stated by the magistrate judge in his thorough December 5, 2013 report and recommendation.

We have considered all of Maki’s re-, maining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

597 F. App'x 36, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/maki-v-state-of-new-york-ca2-2015.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack