Major v. Aldan Borough

58 A. 490, 209 Pa. 247, 1904 Pa. LEXIS 600
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania·Decided May 23, 1904·No. Appeal, No. 304·Published·Cited by 11 cases

Opinion

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Brown,

By ordinance of April 20, 1903, the borough of Aldan resolved to increase its indebtedness, and provision was made for submitting the question of the increase to a popular vote, as the same was in excess of two per centum of the assessed valuation of the property within the municipality. The proposed increase was $17,500 and was for making street improvements. The sum of $15,700 was, as is expressed in the ordinance, to be used as follows:

Grading and telfording Providence Road, from Springfield Road to Oak Lane . . $8,000.00

Grading, telfording and surfacing Oak Lane . 700.00

Grading, telfording and resurfacing Springfield Road from Providence Road to P. B. & W. R. R......... 5,000.00

Grading, telfording and resurfacing Clifton Avenue from Springfield Road to Rively Avenue 2,000.00

The balance, $1,800, was to be used in grading, improving and draining five other streets. At an election held May 26,1903, the borough electors voted in favor of the proposed increase. Subsequently an ordinance was passed authorizing the loan, and the money was appropriated for the purposes set forth in the ordinance of April 20. The borough authorities advertised for bids for doing the work on the four streets for which the sum of $15,700 had been appropriated. The specifications upon which the bids were to be received provided as follows: “ Upon the subgrade as prepared, a telford pavement is to be laid, the foundation course must consist of irregular shaped, hard, tough and durable stone, laid by hand so as to break [250] joints as far as possible ; they must be six inches deep, six to ten inches long, and four to six inches wide, and must be placed on their broadest edges and lengthwise across the roadway. All the irregularities of the upper part of said, foundation must be broken off with napping hammers, and the interstices filled up with stone chips, making this layer when complete a firm, substantial and even pavement six inches deep.”

With the limited amount of money in their hands the borough authorities were unable to enter into a contract in strict conformity to the specifications, and, upon their modification, a contract was made with Patrick Mahoney. This bill was then filed to prevent him from proceeding with the work on the ground that the council, in making the contract with him, had diverted the money from the purposes for which the municipal authorities had been authorized to borrow it.

By section 8, article IX, of our constitution, no municipality can incur any new debt, or increase its indebtedness to an amount exceeding two per centum upon the assessed valuation of the property within it, without the assent of its electors at a public election, in such manner as shall be provided by law. The Act of June 9, 1891, P. L. 252, provides how an election upon a proposed increase of municipal indebtedness shall be held, and directs that the notice of the election shall contain a statement of the amount of the last assessed valuation, the amount of the existing debt, the amount and percentage of the proposed increase, and the purposes for which the proposed indebtedness is to be increased. But all the elector does is to vote “ no increase of debt ” or “ debt may be increased.” Neither in the constitution nor in the act of assembly regulating the election is there any provision that the electors shall pass upon the purpose of the loan. The statutory provision, that the purpose and amount of the increase shall be written or printed on the inside of the ticket, is simply for the information of the voter, that he may vote with intelligence upon the question submitted to the electors. In Barr v. Philadelphia, 191 Pa. 438, in affirming the decree of the court below, we adopted as a correct view of the law upon this subject the following from its opinion: “ It is reasonably clear from the language, both of the constitution and of the act of 1891, that it was not the intention that the electors [251] should determine the purposes to which the moneys are to be applied. The electors are to be given notice of the purposes to which the corporate authorities intend to apply them. If it were the intention of the legislature to have the electors determine the purpose, there would have been a direction not to describe it briefly in their ballots, but clearly, precisely and exactly. The assent of the electors is to be given ‘ to such increase of indebtedness,’ and nowhere is it indicated that they are to assent to or dissent from the purpose or purposes for which the moneys are to be utilized. The ballots are so worded that the electors vote for an increase or no increase of the debt, and the brief description of the purpose is intended for their information, so that they may vote upon this question intelligently.” In the present case the purpose for which the money was to be borrowed was clearly set forth in the notice of the election as being the one named in the ordinance directing the election to be held.

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Major v. Aldan Borough, 58 A. 490, 209 Pa. 247, 1904 Pa. LEXIS 600 (Pa. 1904).

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