Maita Angamarca v. Bondi

Opinion

23-7697 Maita Angamarca v. Bondi BIA

Caldas, IJ

A220 282 543/544/545

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 2 Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley 3 Square, in the City of New York, on the 30th day of September, two thousand 4 twenty-five. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 DENNIS JACOBS, 8 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 9 ALISON J. NATHAN, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 JORGE PATRICIO MAITA 13 ANGAMARCA, DELIA YOLANDA 14 GOMEZ CUJI, E.G.M.G., 15 Petitioners, 16 17 v. 23-7697 18 NAC 19 PAMELA BONDI, UNITED STATES 20 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 21 Respondent. * 22

* The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.

1 FOR PETITIONERS: Reuben S. Kerben, Kerben Law Firm, P.C., 2 Kew Gardens, NY. 3 4 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant 5 Attorney General, Civil Division; Leslie 6 McKay, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of 7 Immigration Litigation; Nelle M. Seymour, 8 Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration 9 Litigation, United States Department of 10 Justice, Washington, DC.

11 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of 12 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 13 DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. 14 Petitioners Jorge Patricio Maita Angamarca, Delia Yolanda Gomez Cuji, and 15 their minor daughter, natives and citizens of Ecuador, seek review of an October 16 6, 2023 decision of the BIA that affirmed an April 4, 2022 decision of an 17 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 18 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 1 In re Maita Angamarca, et al., 19 Nos. A 220 282 543/544/545 (B.I.A. Oct. 6, 2023), aff’g Nos. A 220 282 543/544/545 20 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 4, 2022). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

1 Maita Angamarca does not raise his CAT claim here. See Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d Cir. 2023) (“We consider abandoned any claims not adequately presented . . . and an appellant’s failure to make legal or factual arguments constitutes abandonment.” (quotation marks omitted)).

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1 underlying facts and procedural history. 2 We consider the IJ’s decision as modified and supplemented by the BIA. 3 See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005); Yan Chen 4 v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). We review factual findings for 5 substantial evidence and questions of law de novo. See Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 6 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive 7 unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the 8 contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 9 An applicant for asylum and withholding of removal must establish past 10 persecution or a fear of future persecution and that “race, religion, nationality, 11 membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least 12 one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see also 13 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b), 1208.16(b); Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103, 105–06 (2d 14 Cir. 2022) (holding that the “one central reason” standard applies to both asylum 15 and withholding). Applicants seeking relief based on membership in particular 16 social groups must show both that the groups are cognizable and that membership 17 in a group is one central reason for the harm suffered or feared. See Paloka v. 18 Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014).

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1 “[W]here there is more than one motive for mistreatment . . . , an applicant’s 2 status as a member of a particular social group . . . must be at least one of the central 3 reasons, rather than a minor reason, for why that individual is being targeted.” 4 Garcia-Aranda v. Garland, 53 F.4th 752, 757 (2d Cir. 2022). An “applicant must . . . 5 show, through direct or circumstantial evidence, that the persecutor’s motive to 6 persecute arises from the applicant’s” protected characteristic. Yueqing Zhang v. 7 Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Paloka, 762 F.3d at 196–97 8 (“Whether the requisite nexus exists depends on the view and motives of the 9 persecutor.” (quotation marks omitted)). We consider whether the agency’s 10 determination that Maita Angamarca’s membership in his proposed social groups 11 was not a central reason for the harm suffered or feared was supported by 12 substantial evidence. See Edimo-Doualla v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 276, 285 (2d Cir. 13 2006). 14 Maita Angamarca alleged membership in particular social groups of 15 “middle class Ecuadorian mestizos working as taxi drivers who found out that 16 their customers were drug dealers and was unable to stop working for them” and 17 “Ecuadorian citizens who filed a police complaint against a drug dealer.” 18 Certified Administrative Record at 37–38. The agency assumed these groups

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1 were cognizable, but concluded that Maita Angamarca failed to show that his 2 membership in either group was a central reason that he was targeted or harmed. 3 Maita Angamarca’s conclusory statements here are arguably insufficient to 4 challenge the agency’s nexus determination. See Yueqing Zhang, 426 F.3d at 545 5 n.7 (concluding that petitioner abandoned a claim by “devot[ing] only a single 6 conclusory sentence to the argument”). In any event, substantial evidence 7 supports the agency’s conclusion. 8 Maita Angamarca alleged that a repeat passenger in his taxi who was 9 involved in the drug trade sent men to threaten and coerce him into working for 10 the criminal enterprise. These alleged facts reflect that his assailants were 11 principally motivated by the desire to recruit Maita Angamarca to the drug trade, 12 not by animosity towards him as middle-class, mestizo, a taxi driver, or because 13 he filed a police complaint. See Garcia-Aranda, 53 F.4th at 757; Quituizaca, 52 F.4th 14 at 115. The gang’s interest in recruitment does not establish that Maita 15 Angamarca was targeted on account of a protected ground. See Garcia-Aranda, 53 16 F.4th at 758 (explaining that being “targeted for extortion” or the “perceived ability 17 to pay” is not a protected ground for asylum and withholding); Paloka, 762 F.3d at 18 196–97; cf. Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007) (“When the harm

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1 visited upon members of a group is attributable to the incentives presented to 2 ordinary criminals rather than to persecution, the scales are tipped away from 3 considering those people a ‘particular social group’ . . . .”). 4 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending 5 motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

6 FOR THE COURT: 7 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 8 Clerk of Court