Mairena-Zeledon v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: July 10, 2025
• Docket: 24-98
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 10 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE RAMON MAIRENA- No. 24-98 ZELEDON; NUBIA DEL CARMEN Agency Nos. BLANDON-MEZA; JAKELINE SELENA A220-239-568 MAIRENA-BLANDON; JULIESKI A220-239-569 RAMON MAIRENA-BLANDON, A220-239-570 A220-239-571 Petitioners,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 7, 2025**

Before: OWENS, LEE, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Jose Ramon Mairena-Zeledon, his wife Nubia Del Carmen Blandon-Meza,

and their children Jakeline Selena Mairena-Blandon and Julieski Ramon Mairena-

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Blandon—natives and citizens of Nicaragua—petition for review of the Board of

Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision dismissing their appeal of an immigration

judge’s (IJ) denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and

protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under

8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

We consider only the grounds relied upon by the BIA. Santiago-Rodriguez v.

Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011). “[E]xcept to the extent the IJ’s opinion

is expressly adopted,” our “review is limited to the BIA’s decision.” Guerra v. Barr,

974 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2020). We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo

and its factual findings for substantial evidence. Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850

F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (citations omitted).

1. Asylum and withholding of removal. Mairena-Zeledon’s applications for

asylum and withholding of removal each require him to demonstrate “a likelihood

of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution.” Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th

1052, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). This burden can be satisfied by showing

past persecution—which creates a rebuttable presumption of future persecution—or

an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution. Id. at 1060, 1065.

The BIA did not err in finding that any past harm suffered by Mairena-

Zeledon does not rise to the level of persecution, which is an “extreme concept.” Gu

v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Paramilitaries

2 24-98 apparently threatened Mairena-Zeledon multiple times, but “unfulfilled threats”

without actual harm “very rarely [] rise to the level of persecution.” Hussain v.

Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 646 (9th Cir. 2021).

True, Mairena-Zeledon also suffered an alleged physical beating in which he

was thrown to the ground and kicked in the ribs. But a single instance of offensive

contact does not “compel” a finding of persecution. See Gu, 454 F.3d at 1020–21.

As in Gu, Mairena-Zeledon was beaten one time and did not require medical

attention. Id. And there is no evidence that the paramilitaries took a continuing

interest in Mairena-Zeledon after the beating. Cf. Prasad v. I.N.S., 47 F.3d 336, 339

(9th Cir. 1995); Hoxha v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003). Finally,

although Petitioners moved to a rural part of Nicaragua after the beating, they stayed

in Nicaragua three more years without facing harassment by the government. See

Gu, 454 F.3d at 1022.

Mairena-Zeledon does not dispute the BIA’s determination that he did not

challenge the IJ’s finding that he failed to establish a well-founded fear of future

persecution. We do not consider arguments not exhausted before the BIA. Umana-

Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023). Therefore, Mairena-Zeledon

fails to show the requisite persecution for Petitioners’ applications for asylum and

withholding of removal, and we deny these parts of the petition.

2. CAT claim. To qualify for relief under the Convention Against Torture,

3 24-98 Mairena-Zeledon must establish that “it is more likely than not that he . . . would be

tortured if removed to [Nicaragua].” Hamoui v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 821, 826 (9th

Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination

that he failed to make such a showing. Although Mairena-Zeledon points to the

Nicaraguan government’s history of violence against dissidents, history or country

conditions in the abstract will not suffice. See Gutierrez-Alm v. Garland, 62 F.4th

1186, 1201 (9th Cir. 2023). Mairena-Zeledon’s assertions about conditions in

Nicaragua fail to “demonstrate that he would be subject to a particularized threat of

torture” there. Dhital v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation

omitted). Moreover, torture is “more severe than persecution.” Davila v. Barr, 968

F.3d 1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). So the threats and beating of

Mairena-Zeledon that could not establish past persecution also cannot establish a

particularized fear of future torture. We thus deny this part of the petition as well.

PETITION DENIED.

4 24-98