Maine Municipal Assoc. v. Maine Dep't of Health & Human Services

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: August 19, 2015
• Docket: CUMap-14-39
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERJOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION Docket No. AP-14-39

MAINE ~ICIPAL ASSOCIATION, STATE OF et al., CurnbP.ff~~ ~.. ttk~~ Plaintiffs AUG 1~ 2015

v. RECEIVED ORDER

MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al.,

Defendants

Before the court is a motion by plaintiffs City of Portland and City of Westbrook seeking

the entry of judgment in their favor on counts III and IV of the second amended petition and an

amendment of the court's June 9, 2015 order to provide for reimbursement. Defendants oppose

the motion, which they characterize as a motion for reconsideration, and simultaneously suggest

that injunctive relief should be issued prohibiting Portland and Westbrook from providing

benefits to persons who are ineligible for state and local benefits under 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a). 1

Portland and Westbrook are correct that the court's June 9, 2015 order did not expressly

resolve the claims for reimbursement in counts III and IV. However, the court did rule that

DHHS has no obligation to reimburse Portland and Westbrook for persons ineligible under 8

U.S.C § 1621(a). June 9, 2015 Order at 18-19.

1 Before issuing this order, the court unsuccessfully attempted to convene a conference with counsel to consider recent legislation affecting eligibility that was enacted after the court's June 9, 2015 order. To avoid further delay, the court will proceed to rule on the pending motion. If any of the parties take issue with the court's understanding ofthe status and effect of the recent legislation, they should file the appropriate motion under Rule 59(e). That ruling now needs to be amended to provide that, once a recent amendment to 22

M.R.S. § 4301(3) goes into effect, certain non-citizens who would otherwise have been ineligible

under section 1621(a) have been made eligible under 8 U.S.C. § 162l(d). The amendment in

question is contained in Laws 2015, ch. 324, which is one of the statutes affected by the Law

Court's recent advisory opinion that certain legislation not vetoed within 10 days will become

law pursuant to Me. Const., Art IV, pt. 3, § 2. Opinion of the Justices, 2015 ME 107.

Chapter 324 is now scheduled to go into effect on October 15, 2015 and provides that

effective July 1, 2015 an eligible person for purposes of the General Assistance statute shall

include

in accordance with 8 United States Code, Section 1621(d) ... a person who is lawfully present in the United States or is pursuing a lawful process to apply for immigration relief except that assistance for such a person may not exceed 24 months.

Laws 2015, Ch. 324, amending 22 M.R.S. § 4301(3).

Once it takes effect, chapter 324 will qualify as a state law enacted after the 1996 federal

welfare reform statute which "affirmatively provides" for the eligibility of certain non-citizens

who would otherwise be ineligible for state and local benefits. See 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d).

Accordingly, when chapter 324 takes effect, DHHS will be obliged to reimburse municipalities

for up to 24 months of General Assistance to all non-citizens who are lawfully present or who

are pursuing a lawful process to apply for immigration relief.

In all other respects the motion by Portland and Westbrook is denied. Portland and

Westbrook's motion is primarily based on the argument that under the General Assistance statute

and regulations DHHS cannot begin withholding reimbursement as a penalty for noncompliance

until after municipalities have been notified to file a corrective action plan and that plan has not

been accepted or the municipality remains in violation 60 days after the plan has been filed. See

2 22 M.R.S. § 4323(2); 10-344 C.M.R. ch. 323, §XII. In this case DHHS withheld reimbursement

without waiting for a corrective action plan.

The corrective action protocol on which Portland and Westbrook rely, however, is

applicable when there has been "a violation of this chapter," 22 M.R.S. § 2243(2), referring to

chapter 1161 of Title 22. Similarly, under 10-344 C.M.R. ch. 323 §XII reimbursement may be

withheld only if "a municipality is not complying with the requirements of the General

Assistance statutes, the regulations promulgated thereunder, or the municipality's ordinance."

The court expressly found in its June 9 order that, while Portland and Westbrook may

have been violating 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a), they were not violating any provision of the General

Assistance statutes or regulations. As a result, DHHS is not entitled to invoke the enforcement

and penalty provisions of 22 M.R.S. § 4323(2). June 9, 2015 order at 16-17. It follows that

because the enforcement and penalty provisions are inapplicable, Portland and Westbrook are

not entitled to require that the corrective action protocol be followed by DHHS before any

reimbursement can be withheld.

As the June 9 order makes clear, the court's ruling that DHHS may withhold

reimbursement is not based on the General Assistance statute or regulations but on DHHS's

separate claim for declaratory relief based on federal law as set forth in count I of defendants'

counterclaim. To the extent that Portland and Westbrook have provided General Assistance to

non-citizens who are not eligible for benefits under 8 U.S.C. § 162l(a), the court will not require

DHHS to provide reimbursement. At the same time, the court agrees with the MMA and the

municipal plaintiffs that DHHS has no statutory or inherent authority to enforce 8 U.S.C. §

1621(a) generally and therefore reiterates its ruling that DHHS is not entitled to injunctive or

declaratory relief requiring Portland or Westbrook to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a).

3 Portland and Westbrook point out that in its June 9 order the court found that the DHHS

"Flow Chart" was imperfect and incomplete in some respects and that Portland and Westbrook

are net required to comply with either the Flow Chart or the June 13, 2014 DHHS "Program

Guidance" Memorandum. To the extent that Portland and Westbrook separated their requests for

past reimbursement based on the Flow Chart (Stipulated Record ~~ 12, 17 and Exhibits G and I)

and to the extent that DHHS's reimbursement decisions were based on the Flow Chart (see

Stipulated Record Exhibit J), this would not preclude Westbrook and Portland from seeking

reimbursement for any General Assistance payments made to persons who were in fact eligible

under 8 U.S.C. § 1621 but who were deemed ineligible by DHHS. However, no claim has been

made in this action that DHHS in fact denied reimbursement for GA payments made to non-

citizens who were incorrectly deemed ineligible.

The entry shall be:

1. In light of subsequent legislation, the court amends paragraph 4 of its June 9, 20 15 order as follows:

On count I of defendants' counterclaim the court finds and declares that DHHS shall not be required to provide reimbursement to Portland or Westbrook for any General Assistance payments that have been made to persons who are ineligible for state and local benefits under 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) except that, when chapter 324 of the statutes enacted in the most recent legislative session becomes effective, DHHS shall be required to provide reimbursement for General Assistance payments made to otherwise ineligible persons who are made eligible pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4301(3), as amended by Laws 2015, ch. 324.

2. Subject to paragraph 1 above, judgment shall be entered for defendants on counts III and IV of the second amended complaint.

3. The clerk is directed to incorporate this order in the docket by reference pursuant to Rule 79(a).

4 Dated: August lq, 2015

'--i'hOIIlaSD. Warren Justice, Superior Court

5 JUSTICE WARREN Date Filed: 07/10/2014 CUMBERLAND Docket No. AP14-0039 COUNTY

Action: 80C Appeal

MAINE MUNICIPA.L ASSOCIATION MAINE DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN CITY OF PORTLAND vs. SERVICES • CITY OF WESTBROOK MARY MAYHEW, COMMISSIONER REHMA REBECCA JUMA(INTERVENOR)

l SUAVIS FURAHA(INTERVENOR)

Plaintiffs Attorney Defendant's Attorney

Peter J Detroy, Esq Clifford H. Ruprecht, Esq r Russell B Pierce, Esq 66 Pearl Street James D Poliquin, Esq Portland, ME 04101 PO Box 4600 Portland, Me 04112

Zachary Heiden, Esq(lntervenors) 121 Middle St., Ste 301 Portland, ME 04101

Jack Comart, Esq(lntervenors) Robyn Merrill, Esq(lntervenors) 126 Sewall St. Augusta, ME 04330-6822 ------------- --------~-

G.

) '-,

'. STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION Docket No. AP-14-39

MAINE MUNICIPAL ASSOCIATION, et al.,

Plaintiffs

V. ORDER

STATE OF~~ MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN Cuatand, ss, \lUll\I SERVICES, et al., JUN 09 2015 Defendants RECEIVED Before the court are cross-motions for judgment upon a stipulated record. The parties

have agreed that the stipulated record constitutes both the administrative record on the Rule SOC

claims brought by plaintiffs Maine Municipal Association, the City of Portland, and the City of

Westbrook (the "Municipal Plaintiffs") and the factual record on all parties' claims_ for

declaratory and injunctive relief. Oral argument was held on May 15, 2015.

This case centers upon a provision of federal law enacted as part of the Personal

Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), P.L. 104-193, the

welfare reform statute enacted during the Clinton Administration. That Act included a number of

provisions applicable to persons who are not U.S. citizens, including S U.S.C. § 1621. That

statute provides that aliens who do not fall within certain specified categories are "not eligible

for any State or local public benefits." S U.S.C. § 1621(a).

In Count I of their Amended Petition the Municipal Plaintiffs are seeking judicial review

under Rule SOC of certain actions by defendants Maine Department of Human Services (DHHS)

and Commissioner Mayhew which the Municipal Plaintiffs contend constitute an unauthorized attempt to enforce 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) against municipalities providing General Assistance (GA)

benefits pursuant to 22 M.R.S. §§ 4301-26. The Municipal Plaintiffs argue that the State cannot

proceed without, at a minimum, engaging in rulemaking under the Maine Administrative

Procedure Act.

In Count II of the Amended Petition Portland and Westbrook seek declaratory and

injunctive relief enjoining the State from any enforcement efforts and preventing the State from

denying reimbursement based on 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a).

Intervenor plaintiffs Rehma Rebecca Juma and Suavis Furaha allege that they were born

in Burundi but fled due to political persecution and have applied for asylum in the United States.

They allege that that the State has promulgated an unauthorized eligibility rule based on 8 U.S.C.

§ 1621(a) that prevents asylum seekers from receiving General Assistance even though asylum

seekers often cannot support themselves because they are required under federal law to wait at

least 180 days before they can obtain authorization to work. The Intervenors join Portland and

Westbrook in seeking declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting the State from enforcing the

eligibility requirement in question.

Defendants have filed a cross-motion for judgment on the stipulated record, arguing that

they were not required to engage in formal rule-making before promulgating statements of policy

and revised reporting forms and before withholding reimbursement for General Assistance to

persons the State contends are ineligible under 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a). In addition, the defendants

seek declaratory and injunctive relief declaring that the State is entitled to withhold

reimbursement from Portland and Westbrook if those cities do not apply the eligibility criteria in

8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) and, in the alternative, enjoining Portland and Westbrook from making

General Assistance payments in violation of8 U.S.C. § 1621(a).

2 At the oral argument on May 15, 2015, counsel for defendants stated that in the interest

of resolving the underlying issues as quickly as possible, defendants were not asserting any

argument that Portland and Westbrook had failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

1. 8 U.S.C. § 1621

As noted above, 8 U.S.C. § 1621 provides that aliens who do not fall within certain

specified categories are "not eligible for any State or local public benefits." 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a).

The statute provides a mechanism by which states can be relieved of this prohibition: a state may

provide that aliens otherwise ineligible for state or local public benefits under§ 1621(a) may be

made eligible through the enactment of a state law after August 22, 1996 "which affirmatively

provides for such eligibility." 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d).

The statutory provisions at issue demonstrate some of the complexities of federal

immigration law. Under section 1621(a) non-citizens who are not excluded from receiving state

and local benefits include (1) "qualified aliens" as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641, (2) aliens who are

defined as "nonimmigrants" under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and (3) aliens who have

been paroled into the United States for less than one year. 8 U.S.C § 1621(a)(1)-(3).

"Qualified alien" is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641 to mean:

( 1) aliens who have been granted permanent resident alien status,

(2) aliens who have been granted asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158,

(3) aliens who have been admitted into the United States as refugees under 8 U.S.C. §

1157,

(4) aliens who have been paroled into the United States for more than one year,

3 (5) aliens whose deportation is being withheld under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) and a

predecessor statute,

(6) aliens who have been granted conditional entry pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 153(a)(7) as in

effect prior to April 1, 1980,

(7) aliens who are Cuban or Haitian entrants as defined in section 501 (e) of the Refugee

Education Assistance Act of 1980,

(8) aliens who themselves or their children have been battered or subjected to extreme

cruelty under certain circumstances.

8 U.S.C. §§ 1641(b), (c).

As counsel for the intervenors pointed out at oral argument, the category of permanent

resident alien includes alien spouses and children or permanent resident aliens who are entitled to

conditional permanent resident alien status under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a. The category of

"nonimmigrants" under 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a)(2) includes holders of S, T, and U visas issued to

aliens who have assisted law enforcement agencies or who are victims of human trafficking or

certain crimes including domestic violence.

Aliens who are excluded from receiving state or local benefits under 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a)

are aliens who do not fall into any of the above categories and who entered the U.S. illegally,

who have overstayed their visas, or who have applied for asylum and are awaiting a decision on

their applications. As far as the court can tell, a significant number of aliens in Maine who would

be excluded from receiving any state and local benefits under 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) fall into the

latter category. This is the situation of intervenors Juma and Furaha. Stipulated Record ~ 21.

4 It bears emphasis that, although these individuals are characterized as aliens who are "not

lawfully present" or "illegal" in certain documents in the record, 1 that characterization is not

entirely accurate. In its reply memorandum the State argues that applicants for asylum do not

have a lawful immigration status - although they will get that status if their applications are

approved. But the State agrees that persons who have applied for asylum are at least lawfully

present in the U.S. in that they are not subject to deportation or removal so long as their

applications for asylum are pending? At least one federal statu~e states that "no period of time in

which an alien has a bona fide application for asylum pending ... shall be taken into account in

determining a period of unlawful presence" unless the alien in question was employed without

authorization. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(iii)(II). See also 8 C.F.R. § 103.12(a)(5) (applicants for

asylum who have been granted employment authorization and applicants for asylum under the

age of 14 whose applications have been pending 180 days included as "lawfully present" aliens

for purposes of Title II Social Security benefits).

As a result, attempting to characterize whether applicants for asylum are "lawfully

present" may constitute a debating point between the parties but is not otherwise helpful. For

purposes of this decision, the court will refer only to "eligible" and "non-eligible" aliens under §

1621(a).

2. Maine General AssistarJce Statute

General Assistance is governed by Chapter 1161 of Title 22. It is designed to offer

immediate aid to persons who are unable to provide basic necessities such as food, clothing,

1 See, e.g., Exhibits D and E to the Stipulated Record. 2 Respondents' Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioners' and Intervenors' Motion for Judgment dated March 27, 2015, at 4-5.

5 shelter, and medical care essential to maintain themselves and their families. See 22 M.R.S. §§

4301(1), (3), (5), (10). Each municipality is required to operate a general assistance program

which shall be administered in accordance with a municipal ordinance. 22 M.R.S. § 4305(1). The

governing statute requires that eligibility must be based on need. E.g., 22 M.R.S. § 4308(1). With

minor exceptions, 3 the responsibility for setting all other eligibility standards is placed on

municipalities. 22 M.R.S. § 4305(3):

Municipalities may establish standards of eligibility, in addition to need, as provided in this chapter. Each ordinance shall establish standards which shall: (A) Govern the determination of eligibility of persons applying for relief ....

Each municipal ordinance must also provide that relief shall be furnished or denied to all eligible

applicants within 24 hours of their application. 22 M.R.S. § 4305(3)(C).

Although General Assistance payments are made by municipalities, DHHS is required to

reimburse a municipality for 50% of the general assistance provided up to .0003 of the

municipality's most recent state valuation and for 90% of amounts paid in excess of .0003 of the '

most recent state valuation when the Department finds that the municipality has been "in

compliance with all requirements ofthis chapter." 22 M.R.S. §§ 4311(1), (1-B).

22 M.R.S. § 4323(1) provides that DHHS shall review the administration of general

assistance in each municipality. If DHHS finds "any violation of this chapter after review," it

shall notify the municipality that it has 30 days to file a plan to correct the violation. 22 M.R.S. §

4323(2). Any municipality which fails to file an acceptable plan or which remains "in violation

of this chapter" 60 days after filing its plan is subject to civil penalties and DHHS shall in

3 For example, section 4301(3) provides that fugitives from justice are not eligible for general assistance, and the Commissioner of DHHS is authorized to establish standards of eligibility for general assistance in the unorganized territories. 22 M.R.S. § 4312.

6 addition "withhold reimbursement to any municipality which is in violation of this chapter" until

it achieves compliance. Id.

There is no mention in Chapter 1161 of any federal standards governing eligibility.

Regulations governing DHHS review, the imposition of penalties, and DHHS reimbursement are

contained in 10-144 C.M.R. ch. 323, sections X, XII, and XIII respectively.

3. Maine Administrative Procedure Act

As relevant to the instant case, the Maine Administrative Procedure Act mandates a

formal rule-making process, with notice to the public and to the legislature and a public comment

period, for any "rule," defined as

The whole or part of every regulation, standard, code, statement of policy, or other agency guideline or statement of general applicability ... that is or is intended to be judicially enforceable and implements, interprets or makes specific the law administered by the agency, or describes the procedures or practices of the agency.

5 M.R.S. § 8002(9)(A). The statute further provides that a rule "is not judicially enforceable

unless it is adopted in a manner consistent with this chapter." 5 M.R.S. § 8002(9).

4. DHHS Actions Under Review

In late 2013 and early 2014 DHHS drafted a proposed rule that would have provided that

individuals not eligible for federal or state T ANF or SNAP benefits would not be eligible for

General Assistance. Stipulated Record ~ 1.4 That proposed rule was not approved by the Office

of Attorney General pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 8056(1)(A). Stipulated Record~~ 1-2.

4 In its brief DHHS characterizes the proposed rule as extending GA benefits to certain individuals who otherwise would not be eligible under 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) and denying GA benefits to other individuals made ineligible for benefits under 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a). The full text of the proposed rule is not in the

7 On June 13, 2014 DHHS issued what it described as a "General Assistance Program

Guidance" memorandum. Exhibit D to Stipulated Record. Referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1621, the

DHHS memorandum stated that "[t]o be in compliance with Federal law, the State of Maine

Department of Human Services will no longer provide reimbursement to a municipality for

General Assistance provided to aliens who are not lawfully present in the United States." 5

The "Program Guidance" memorandum further provides that municipalities should now

be asking all clients if they are U.S. citizens and if not, question them on their immigration

status. It stated that since non-citizens must provide DHHS with their immigration status in

connection with applications for TANF and SNAP benefits, municipal GA administrators "will

contact [DHHS] to confirm legal non-citizenship status of GA applicants."

The "Program Guidance" memorandum stated that the DHHS reimbursement form was

being revised to ask municipalities to list the number of non-citizens for which GA

reimbursement was sought and that DHHS will be conducting periodic audits of municipalities

"to review the compliance with this operating memo."

On June 20, 2014 the Governor sent a letter to all municipalities. Exhibit E to Stipulated

Record. That letter outlined the Governor's disagreement with the Office of Attorney General

and stated that after the Attorney General had declined to approve the proposed regulation, state

officials had concluded that "a rulemaking process was not necessary to implement existing

record. As far as the court can tell from the record, any proposed extension of eligibility for GA benefits would have been by implication. The language of the proposed rule contained in the record (Stipulated Record ~ 1) refers only to making certain persons ineligible. 5 In using of the term "no longer," DHHS appears to acknowledge that it had not previously declined to reimburse municipalities for General Assistance payments to persons who would not have been eligible for such assistance pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a). Moreover, it has declined reimbursement for payments to aliens that DHHS deems to be ineligible only since the date of the Guidance Memorandum.

8 federal law." The letter stated that the Governor expected the head of each municipality to certify

in writing compliance with federal law and concluded:

If DHHS finds that a municipality fails to comply with the law, it will cut off all General Assistance reimbursement to that community.

DHHS thereafter sent municipalities a document that is referred to as the "Flow Chart."

Exhibit F to Stipulated Record). The Flow Chart begins with the sentence, "An alien lawfully

admitted ... must submit supporting documentation to establish lawful presence under one of the

following categories." The Flow Chart then lists the documentation which, according to DHHS,

would demonstrate eligibility under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621(a)(l)-(3) and 1641(b) and (c).

The Flow Chart further exemplifies the complexity of federal immigration law.

Moreover, as the Intervenors pointed out at oral argument, the Flow Chart has a number of flaws.

It uses incorrect nomenclature and, perhaps more importantly, omits certain documents that

would also establish eligibility. 6 In addition, for one category- aliens who are eligible under the

provision for persons who have been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty under certain

circumstances, 8 U.S.C. § 1641(c)- Intervenors contend that the Flow Chart's reference to "INS

petition and supporting documentation" is extremely unhelpful because the petition and

supporting documentation often consists of hundreds of pages, many of which are confidential. 7

In October 2014 Portland and Westbrook submitted claims for GA reimbursement for

time periods beginning with the second half of June 2014. Stipulated Record~~ 12, 16. In both

cases the DHHS reimbursement request form required the municipal administrator to certify that

the city was not seeking reimbursement for non-citizens who were not qualified for General

6 These include orders from immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals, approvals of petitions to establish conditional permanent residency of family members, and "S", "T", and "U" visas. 7 The category on the Flow Chart for "battered aliens" also contains a reference to "preceding lists (A & B)" which nowhere appear on the document. See Ex. F to Stipulated Record at 2.

9 Assistance under 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a). See, e.g., page 1 of Exhibit G to Stipulated Record; page 1

of Exhibit I to Stipulated Record.

Westbrook submitted reimbursement claims for non-citizens only with respect to persons

who appeared to be eligible utilizing the DHHS Flow Chart. Exhibit G to Stipulated Record, pp.

2, 5. Westbrook's submission stated that it could not discern with certainty whether persons

subject to the guidance that had been received from DHHS were in fact disqualified from

benefits under 8 U.S.C. § 1621. Westbrook reserved the right to seek reimbursement for GA

payments it had made to persons deemed ineligible by DHHS if its challenge to the legality of

the DHHS Guidance Memorandum was sustained or if any persons had been incorrectly

disqualified for benefits under the Flow Chart. Id.

DHHS found that Westbrook's claims for reimbursement were in compliance and paid all

the claims that Westbrook had submitted for reimbursement. Stipulated Record~~ 14-15.

Portland segregated its claims for reimbursement and submitted two sets of

reimbursement forms, one for persons who appeared to be eligible for benefits utilizing the

DHHS Flow Chart and one for persons who did not appear to be eligible under the DHHS

interpretation. Stipulated Record~ 17; Stipulated Record Ex. 1. 8 Like Westbrook, Portland also

stated that it could not discern with certainty whether persons deemed ineligible by DHHS were

in fact disqualified under 8 U.S.C. § 1621. Ex. I, pp. 2, 4.

In a January 2015 review of Portland's claims for reimbursement, a DHHS Field

Examiner made findings that Portland was out of compliance with the General Assistance statute

and regulations in five respects. Ex. J to Stipulated Record. Four of the alleged violations are not

before the court in this action.

8 On the forms seeking reimbursement for persons who did not appear eligible under the DHHS interpretation, Portland did not sign the certification as to eligibility. Ex. I to Stipulated Record, pp. 5-6.

10 As pertinent to this action, the Field Examiner made a finding that, with respect to the

second set of claims submitted by Portland, Portland was in violation with statutory and

regulatory requirements because it had paid General Assistance benefits to persons whom DHHS

considered to be ineligible under 8 U.S.C. § 1621 and had further requested reimbursement for

those individuals. Ex. J to Stipulated Record at 1, 3, 14. DHHS therefore denied reimbursement

for those persons. Stipulated Record ~ 20. However, the Field Examiner stated that DHHS's

audit found that Portland had correctly segregated individuals who were eligible for

reimbursement under the DHHS interpretation, and DHHS has reimbursed Portland for those

individuals. Ex. J to Stipulated Record at 14; Stipulated Record~ 20. 9

The Field Examiner's report listed a number of remedial steps that DHHS "requires ...

to bring the City of Portland into compliance with the General Assistance statute and

regulations." Ex. J to Stipulated Record at 14. Among those was a requirement to pay General

Assistance only to eligible applicants under 8 U.S.C. § 1621 and not to seek reimbursement for

such individuals. Ex. J at 16.

The Field Examiner's report gave Portland 10 days to respond to the DHHS findings and,

if Portland continued to be out of compliance, stated that Portland would have 30 days to submit

a written plan of correction. Ex. J at 16. The Field Examiner's Report stated that pending the

resolution of this lawsuit, DHHS would not assess any civil penalties or withhold reimbursement

more broadly with respect to the payment of GA benefits to persons DHHS considered to be

ineligible under 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a). However, it stated that if the lawsuit was resolved in

DHHS's favor and Portland's non-compliance continued, "DHHS reserves the right to impose

civil penalties or withhold all [GA] reimbursement." Ex. J at 17.

9 This had not occurred at the time the parties submitted their briefs but the court was advised at oral argument that it had occurred as of May 15, 2015.

11 5. Whether Maine Has Enacted Law "Affirmatively Providing" for Eligibility

A threshold issue is whether, since the 1996 enactment ofPRWORA, Maine has enacted

legislation that qualifies, for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d), as furnishing eligibility to aliens

who would otherwise be ineligible under § 1621(a). If so, Portland and Westbrook would not

potentially be in violation of any federal statute by providing benefits to persons such as the

Intervenors.

On this issue the Municipal Plaintiffs and the Intervenors rely on the continued

appropriation of funds for the General Assistance program smce 1996, which they argue

constitutes full funding of eligibility decisions made by municipalities, including payments made

without regard to 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a). They also point to legislative history relating to the

biennial budget enacted in 2013 by the 126th Legislature, in which various changes were made

to the General Assistance Program based in part on recommendations by a General Assistance

Working Group established by the 125th Legislature. 10

The January 29, 2013 Report of the General Assistance Working Group, which was

chaired by defendant Mayhew, demonstrates that DHHS was fully aware that General Assistance

was being provided to asylum seekers. 11 Moreover, the January 29, 2013 Report was sent to the

Legislature with a cover letter from Commissioner Mayhew, demonstrating- if there was any 10 Laws 2011, ch. 655, § R-4. 11 The General Assistance Working Group Report, sent to the Legislature with a cover letter signed by Commissioner Mayhew, may be found at http://www.maine.gov/dhhs/reports/general-assistance-work- group-report.pdf. One of its recommendations was "to streamline the asylum, seekers application process." Another recommendation was to modify the TANF and SNAP hardship criteria for asylum seekers and lawful permanent residents in order to reduce the burden on General Assistance. A third recommendation to reduce the burden on GA assistance was to restore certain budget cuts for "asylum seekers, lawful permanent residents, and other lawful immigrants." Report at 10-11. The Working Group Report also notes that the problem of asylum seekers is particularly acute because, while asylum applications are required to be adjudicated within 180 days, "in reality it often takes several years to obtain a final decision."

12 doubt - that the Legislature was also made aware that General Assistance was being provided to

asylum seekers. During the budget debate the Senate Chair of the Appropriations Committee

expressly thanked the General Assistance Working Group and noted that the Appropriations

Committee had adopted a number of its recommendations. See Legislative Record - Senate,

126th Legislature, 1st Session, June 13, 2013 (remarks of Sen. Cain). In her floor remarks

Senator Cain stated that that the budget bill had eliminated General Assistance for those who

should not be receiving it while at the same time protecting those most vulnerable including

"people fleeing unsafe conditions in their country of origin." Id.

However, under 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d), a State can overcome the prohibition on eligibility

set forth in § 1621 (a) "only through the enactment of a State law after the date of the enactment

of this Act [August 22, 1996] which affirmatively provides for such eligibility." The court is

constrained to conclude that, notwithstanding prior legislative and DHHS acquiescence and

notwithstanding the legislative history cited above, section 1621(d) requires statutory language

conveying a positive expression of legislative intent to extend GA benefits to aliens who would

otherwise be ineligible under§ 1621(a). See Martinez v. Regents ofthe University of California,

241 P.3d 855, 868 (Cal. 2010); Kaider v. Hamos, 975 N.E. 2d 667, 674 (Ill. App. 2012). 12

As defendants point out, the Maine Legislature enacted such language in connection with

food assistance and in connection with TANF and Medicaid. Laws 1997, ch. 731, § 1, enacting

22 M.R.S § 3104-A(4) (since repealed); Laws 1997 ch. 530 § A-16, enacting 22 M.R.S. §

12 The court agrees with the California Supreme Court in Martinez and the Illinois Appeals Court in Kaider v. Ramos that§ 162l(d) does not require an express reference to 8 U.S.C. § 162l(a) or an express reference to "ineligible aliens," "illegal aliens," or "aliens not lawfully present." See 241 P.3d at 867; 975 N.E. 2d at 673. What is required and what is missing here is language in a legislative enactment expressing an intent to extend GA benefits to a category of non-citizens that would include asylum seekers, such as the legislative language that was found to be sufficient in Martinez, 241 P.3d at 366 (statutory reference to "persons without lawful immigration status") and Kaider, 975 N.E. 2d at 675-66 (statute expressly referring to "non-citizens").

13 3762(3)(8)(2). Both of those statutes expressly extended benefits to households or non-citizens

who "would be eligible ... but for [PRWORA]." No comparable language has been enacted

with respect to General Assistance.

As a result, although the Municipal Plaintiffs and Intervenors are correct that DHHS's

current reliance on 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) represents a change in DHHS policy, one that is not called

for by any enactment of the Maine Legislature, and one that is in fact inconsistent with the prior

funding decisions by the Maine Legislature, the court does not find that Maine has enacted any

legislation that has affirmatively provided for General Assistance eligibility of otherwise

ineligible non-citizens under section 1621 (d).

The Municipal Plaintiffs and Intervenors also note that the federal government has never

sought to enforce § 1621(a) against Maine. However, there is no provision in federal law for

enforcement of § 162l(a) in cases where no federal funding is provided. As a result, federal

silence does not constitute federal agreement that Maine has removed itself from the prohibition

in § 1621(a). Nor does the court perceive any Tenth Amendment problem given the federal

government's constitutional authority over immigration policy. U.S. Canst. Art I, § 8, cl. 4. See

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,225 (1982).

6. Rulemaking and Statutory Authority

DHHS argues that it did not have to engage in formal rulemaking because its June 20 14

"Program Guidance" memorandum comes within the statutory exception to rulemaking for "an

explanatory statement of policy that is itself not judicially enforceable, and that is intended

solely as advice to assist persons in determining, exercising, or complying with their legal rights,

duties, or privileges." See 5 M.R.S. § 8002(9)(8)(4).

14 The problem with this argument is that the DHHS "Program Guidance" memorandum

does not simply advise municipalities of DHHS's interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) and its

intent not to provide GA reimbursement for aliens DHHS deems ineligible. Instead, it directs

municipalities to make inquiries as to the citizenship status of all applicants and the immigration

status of all non-citizens. The "Program Guidance" memorandum further states that DHHS will

be conducting audits "to review compliance with this operating memo" (emphasis added).

As promised in the "Program Guidance" memorandum, DHHS then amended its

reimbursement form to - require municipalities to certify that they were not seeking

reimbursement for aliens not eligible under 8 U.S.C. § 1621. The DHHS Flow Chart instructs

municipalities to require that non-citizen GA applicants submit specified "supporting

documentation" establishing their immigration status. Finally, both the Governor's letter and the

Field Examiner's Report provided to Portland, Stipulated Record Exs. E and J, demonstrate that

depending on the outcome of this lawsuit, DHHS intends to withhold all General Assistance

reimbursement to any municipality that does not comply with DHHS's directives with respect to

non-citizens.

DHHS' s "Program Guidance" memorandum and the other directives it has issued in

furtherance of that memorandum are part of an undisguised effort to enforce the federal

PRWORA eligibility statute. Together they constitute "a statement of policy or other agency

guideline ... that is or is intended to be judicially enforceable and implements, interprets or

makes specific the law administered by the agency or describes the procedure or practices of the

agency." 5 M.R.S. § 8002(9)(A). The "Program Guidance" memorandum and the other DHHS

directives therefore constitute a "rule" for which rule-making was required.

15 DHHS relies on the Law Court's decision in Roderick v. State, 2013 ME 34, 79 A.3d

368, in arguing that its "Program Guidance" memorandum and its other directives are

explanatory statements of policy that are not intended to be judicially enforceable. In Roderick,

the Law Court ruled that a statement of policy is not intended to be judicially enforceable

"because the Department would never have occasion to ask a court to order anyone to comply

with it." 2013 ME 14 ~ 11. However, as the Municipal Plaintiffs and Intervenors point out,

DHHS is seeking judicial enforcement of its "Program Guidance" memorandum in this action. In

addition, DHHS is requiring municipalities to comply with various directives - to inquire as to

citizenship and immigration status, to require non-citizens to submit specified immigration

documentation, to ascertain the correct immigration status of non-citizens, 13 and to certify that

non-citizen GA recipients are eligible under 8 U.S.C.§ 162l(a).

DHHS is also proposing to enforce compliance with its directives by potentially

employing the sanctions of civil penalties and withholding all GA reimbursement under 22

M.R.S. 4323(2). Unlike the Department of Corrections in Roderick, DHHS is not merely issuing

a policy setting forth its interpretation of a statute. Instead, it is mandating compliance with

PRWORA and threatening to punish non-compliance with penalties. Accordingly, DHHS cannot

undertake enforcement action unless it undertakes rulemaking pursuant to 5 M.R.S. §§ 8051-74.

Further support for this conclusion is found in 5 M.R.S. § 8074, which contemplates that

rulemaking shall be undertaken with respect to "substantive rules that are required by federal

13 In many cases this will not be an easy task given the complexity of federal immigration law, the imperfect and incomplete guidance given by DHHS in its Flow Chart, and the 24-hour rule.

16 law." Finally, the fact that DHHS originally sought to proceed by rulemaking 1s a telling

acknowledgment that rulemaking is required. 14

DHHS's attempt to enforce compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) is flawed for a second

reason. Its authority to invoke any of the compliance enforcement and penalty provisions is

limited to municipalities which are "in violation of this chapter." 22 M.R.S. § 4323(2). There is

nothing in Chapter 1161 of Title 22 which conditions eligibility for General Assistance upon

immigration status or that incorporates any federal eligibility standard. As a result, municipalities

which provide General Assistance to asylum seekers may be violating 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a), but

they are not violating Maine's General Assistance statute. DHHS cannot invoke the enforcement

and penalty provisions of 22 M.R.S. § 4323(2) because it lacks both the regulatory authority and

the statutory authority to do so.

This problem is not limited to the imposition of penalties or the threat to withhold all

reimbursement. All of DHHS's statutory and regulatory authority with respect to General

Assistance is derived from chapter 1161 of Title 22. See, e.g., 22 M.R.S. § 4311(1) and (1-B)

(providing for state reimbursement "if the department finds that the municipality has been in

compliance with all requirements of this chapter"); 22 M.R.S. § 4323(1) (DHHS shall review the

administration of general assistance in each municipality "for compliance with this chapter").

While the issue of pre-emption is discussed below, defendants have cited no authority - and the

court is aware of none - for the proposition that actions that contravene federal law automatically

14 DHHS's initial attempt to proceed through rulemaking failed because its proposed rule was not approved by the Office of Attorney General as required by 5 M.R.S. § 8056(1)(A). However, DHHS has not argued that this excuses its failure to proceed through rulemaking. At an initial hearing in this case, counsel for defendants stated that defendants were not making any legal challenge to the statutory requirement of submission of proposed rules to the Attorney General. In this connection, the Executive Branch is not necessarily left without any avenue of relief if it believes that the Attorney General has wrongly failed to approve a necessary rule. The court sees no reason why a state agency could not seek Rule 80C review from a decision of the Office of Attorney General that a proposed rule should not be approved. See Opinion of the Justices, 2015 ME 27.

17 violate state law as well or that all federal laws are implicitly and automatically incorporated into

state law. As a result, DHHS has no statutory authority to require compliance with 8 U.S.C. §

7. Preemption

The foregoing discussion does not fully resolve this case because DHHS is alternatively

seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to avoid a situation where it is required to reimburse

municipalities for General Assistance payments that are in violation ofPRWORA. Moreover, the

court is not prepared to issue a ruling that has the effect of ignoring the dictates of federal law.

Regardless of any opinion that the court may have as to the wisdom of the federal law at issue,

the court is bound to apply federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,

U.S. Canst. Art VI, cl. 2, and municipalities are bound to follow federal law as well.

That leaves the court with what might appear to be an irreconcilable conflict between a

state agency that has failed to adopt a rule as required by law and whose actions are in excess of

statutory authority, 5 M.R.S. §§ 8058(1), 11007(4)(C)(2), and municipalities which are not

adhering to a federal statute relating to the eligibility of certain non-citizens for state and local

benefits. However, this conflict can be reconciled on the basis of standing. For the reasons stated

above, DHHS does not have standing or statutory authority to enforce 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) or to

require compliance with that statute. However, DHHS would be subjected to injury in fact 15 if it

were required to provide reimbursement for any General Assistance payments that have been

made to persons who are ineligible for state and local benefits under federal law. DHHS

15 See Fitzgerald v. Baxter State Park Authority, 385 A.2d 189, 196 (Me. 1978).

18 therefore has standing to obtain an order relieving it of any obligation to provide GA

reimbursement to Portland or Westbrook for persons ineligible under 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a). 16

8. Relief

While all parties have sought injunctive relief, the proceedings before the court have not

demonstrated any unwillingness on the part of any party to accept a judicial determination in the

form of declaratory relief. See Littlefield v. Town of Lyman, 447 A.2d 1231, 1235 (Me. 1982).

See also 14 M.R.S. § 5960 (if necessary, further relief may be granted to supplement declaratory

relief).

Accordingly, the court will deny all parties injunctive relief and award only declaratory

relief.

1. On Count I of the second amended petition, the court finds pursuant to Rule 80C and 5 M.R.S. § 8058(1) that defendant DHHS lacks authority to require compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) or to impose any penalties for non-compliance until it engages in rulemaking.

2. On Count I of the secon4 amended petition, the court finds in the alternative pursuant to Rule 80C and 5 M.R.S. § 11007(4)(C)(2) that the actions of defendant DHHS to enforce 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) are in excess of statutory authority.

3. On Count II of the second amended petition, the court finds and declares that plaintiffs City of Portland and City of Westbrook are not required to comply with the "Program Guidance" Memorandum, the Flow Chart, and the certification requirements as to non-citizens in the revised reimbursement form and that DHHS has no statutory or regulatory authority to penalize

16 According to the "Program Guidance" memorandum attached as Exhibit D to the Stipulated Record, DHHS requires all GA recipients to also apply for food supplement, T ANF, and/or MaineCare assistance and requires the submission of immigration status documents as part of those applications. While there may be individual cases where immigration status is difficult to discern, DHHS appears to have the necessary information to consider immigration status in connection with GA reimbursement. Both municipalities and DHHS retain all administrative and judicial remedies in the event of disputes as to the eligibility of specific individuals or categories of individuals.

19 municipalities for non-compliance with DHHS instructions or directives relating to persons who DHHS deems to be ineligible for General Assistance pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 162l(a).

4. On Count I of defendants' counterclaim, the court finds and declares that DHHS shall not be required to provide reimbursement to Portland or Westbrook for any General Assistance payments that have been made to persons who are ineligible for state and local benefits under 8 U.S.C. § 162l(a).

5. As noted above, the court declines at this time to enter any injunctive relief and therefore denies the request for injunctive relief in count II of the second amended petition and dismisses Count II of defendants' counterclaim.

6. The clerk is directed to incorporate this order in the docket by reference pursuant to Rule 79(a).

Dated: June _3_, 2015

~~ Thomas D. Warren Justice, Superior Court

20 CLERK OF COURTS Cumberland County 205 Newbury Street, Ground Floor Portland, ME 041 01

ZACHARY HEIDEN ESQ ~t\~ \ ~ "::::""'Te( venor:.f 121 MIDDLE STREET SUITE 301 PORTLAND ME 04101

----~-- --- - - -

_,.· CLERK OF COURTS ,._.,, Cumberland County 205 Newbury Street, Ground Floor Portland, ME 041 01

RUSSELL PIERCE ESQ NORMAN HANSON & DETROY (c,uC\SQ\ ~ M. M Pt .J C.\-\- y , f PO BOX 4600 PORTLAND ME 04112-4600 l'c:> ;t-\ G.r\d / \A)e.s"~-brcoK'. CLERK OF COURTS Cumberland County 205 Newbury Street, Ground Floor Portland, ME 041 01

JACK COMART ESQ ~un~e. \ ~ 'J:"v"tecver.or.S 126 SEWALL STREET AUGUSTA ME 04330-6822

CLERK OF COURTS Cumberland County 205 Newbury Street, Ground Floor .. " Portland, ME 041 01

CLIFFORD RUPRECHT ESQ 66 PEARL STREET Cvunsa I ~ fA-a~"<. Dr\ H~ PORTLAND ME 04101 ·J NJ IRE :0 _DEC .. 3 (}_ Z0.11 • I ,_. !' '

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION Docket No. AP-14-39

MAINE MUNICIPAL ASSOCIATION, IDW-CUW1- 1~-"M-JLf et al,

MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN ~.C:.~~ SERVICES, DEC ~2 2014 Defendant RECEIVED Based on the conference with counsel held on the record on December 18, 2014, the

court issues the following order on the municipal plaintiffs' order to specify the course of future

proceedings:

1. The municipal plaintiffs' motion to file a supplemental pleading adding Counts III and

IV to the First Amended Petition for Review is granted without objection. This is without

prejudice to the position of defendant DHHS that Counts III and IV are not ripe for adjudication

at the present time.

2. The court has considered the pleadings, the positions taken by counsel at the December

18 conference, and the statutes and portions of the General Assistance Manual cited in the

pleadings and in the December 19 letter from counsel for DHHS. It concludes that the municipal

plaintiffs are entitled to proceed on a motion for a preliminary injunction on the claim set forth in

Count II of the First Amended position and on the claims set forth in Counts III and IV that,

without having issued any notice of noncompliance after program review, DHHS has failed or refused to process Portland's claims for reimbursement on a monthly basis and has failed or

refused to process Westbrook's claims for reimbursement on a quarterly basis. 1

3. Accordingly, the municipal plaintiffs shall proceed with their motion for a preliminary

injunction, which they have proposed to file on or before December 31, 2014.

4. If the municipal plaintiffs file their motion by December 31, 2014, DHHS shall have

until January 15, 2015 to file opposing papers to the motion for a preliminary injunction and may

seek an extension of that deadline depending on the papers filed by the municipal plaintiffs.

5. The court shall schedule a hearing on the motion as promptly as possible and in any

event before the end of January, and the parties shall advise the court as soon as practicable

whether they anticipate an evidentiary hearing.

6. The court reserves decision at this time whether a trial on the merits should be

consolidated with the hearing on the motion for the preliminary injunction. M.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(2).

This may depend in part on whether there are claims in this case that will not be the subject of

the preliminary injunction hearing. 2

7. At this time, based on counsel's assertion that DHHS is not contending that the

constitutionality of 5 M.R.S. § 8058(1)(A) and (B) is being drawn into question, the court does

not see a need to notify the Attorney General to allow intervention pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 24(d).

8. As discussed on December 19, plaintiffs City of Portland and City of Westbrook have

not yet filed replies to the counterclaims asserted by DHHS. At the December 18 conference

counsel for the municipal plaintiffs proposed that those be filed by December 22, 2014. Because

1 The latter claims may be subject to a ripeness defense as noted above. 2 In this connection there is currently an equal protection claim brought by intervenors Rehma Rebecca J uma and Suavis Furaha that the court concludes should be asserted in a separate action. See ~~ 10-12 below.

2 counsel may not receive this order until after December 22, replies to the counterclaims shall be

served and filed on or before December 26, 2014.

9. While the case was pending in federal court, the court (Nivison, Magistrate Judge)

issued an order pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 granting the motion to intervene by Rehma Rebecca

Juma and Suavis Furaha. At the December 19, 2014 conference counsel for the municipal

plaintiffs and for DHHS agreed that Juma and Furaha should be allowed to intervene, and the

court sees no reason to revisit Magistrate Judge Nivison's order.

10. However, there is an issue as to the scope of their intervention. Juma and Furaha, in

addition to joining the municipal plaintiffs in count I of their Intervenor Complaint, have asserted

an entirely new cause of action, a claim under the equal protection clause of the Maine

Constitution, in count II of the Intervenor Complaint. The normal rule is that intervenors are

entitled to be heard on all the issues in the pending action but may not change the action by

introducing their own additional claims. 2 C. Harvey, Maine Civil Practice§ 24:1, citing Morris

v. Resolution Trust Corp., 622 A.2d 708, 714-15 (Me. 1993).

11. On December 19 both counsel for the municipal plaintiffs and counsel for DHHS

expressed reservations about including the equal protection claim asserted by Juma and Furaha

in this action because of the potential that the equal protection claim could delay entry of final

judgment. 3 The court shares these concerns given that it expects that is highly likely that either

the municipal plaintiffs or DHHS will want to seek prompt appellate review by the Law Court.

12. Accordingly, while the motion to intervene has been granted and Juma and Furaha

shall be heard on all the issues raised by the other parties, Juma and Furaha shall not be entitled

to assert an additional cause of action. This order is without prejudice to their right to commence

3 Counsel for DHHS also expressed concerns that went to other issues, including standing.

3 a separate action to assert an equal protection claim and to seek to have that action heard jointly

with this action pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 42.

13. An issue that was not addressed at the December 18 conference was the municipal

plaintiffs' Rule 80C claim and the preparation of the administrative record on that cause of

action. Once the preliminary injunction motion has been filed, the court will schedule another

conference to address that issue and to set a firm date for the preliminary injunction hearing.

The municipal plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading is granted. The motion to intervene by Rehma Rebecca Juma and Suavis Furaha has previously been granted by the federal court, but intervention shall be limited to the claims raised by the municipal plaintiffs in this action. Procedural order entered. The clerk is directed to incorporate this order in the docket by reference pursuant to Rule 79(a).

Dated: December 2-2,2014

Thomas D. Warren Justice, Superior Court

4 ~·-7--<11""'-:-=:;:.!

CLERK OF COURTS Cumberland County 205 Newbury Street, Ground Floor Portland, ME 041 01

CLIFFORD RUPRECHT ESQ ROACH RUPRECHT SANCHEZ BISCHOFF PC 66 PEARL STREET SUITE 200 u"t2r\ ~Q. ~l- ~ ( ou nS<2-' PORTLAND ME 04101

..,,_ .. ,,.

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CLERK OF COURTS Cumberland County 205 Newbury Street, Ground Floor Portland, ME 04101

RUSSELL PIERCE ESQ r\~~ n-1 ;w"'.) Co~("lse_) NORMAN HANSON & DETROY PO BOX 4600 PORTLAND ME 04112-4600 ~·v

CLERK OF COURTS Cumberland County 205 Newbury Street, Ground Floor Portland, ME 04101

ZACHARY HEIDEN ESQ r"tervenor~ Coun~~\ ACLU OF MAINE FOUNDATION 1Z1 MIDDLE STREET SUITE 301 PORTLAND ME 04101

,,_·,,

......

CLERK OF COURTS Cumberland County 205 Newbury Street, Ground Floor Portland, ME04101

JACK COMART ESQ MAINE EQUAL JUSTICE PARTNERS If\-Te....rV~ \S Counse \ 126 SEWALL STREET AUGUSTA ME 04330-6822