INURED OCr n11m STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT YORK, SS. DOCKET NO. CV-12-63
MAINE-L Y BATTERIES, INC. ) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) ) BATTERY WORLD, INC., and ) ) ORDER DAVID E. WILLETTE, and ) ) RICHARD A WILLETTE, ) ) Dedendants. )
L Background
Maine-ly Batteric;~s began supplying batteries and battery supplies to Battery World in late
2000. (Supp. S.M.F. ~ 5.) By late October 2010, Battery World had accrued a significant amount
of debt owed to Maine-ly Batteries. (Supp. S.M.F. ~ 6; Opp. S.M.F. ~ 6.) On October 27, 2010,
Defendants David and Richard Willette executed a Personal Guaranty Agreement guaranteeing
the obligations of Battery World to Maine-ly Batteries. (Supp. S.M.F. ~ 7.) Defendants David
and Richard Willette conveyed their interests in Defendant Battery World, Inc. by Bill of Sale
dated November 10, 2010 to Barabara Davis. (Add. S.M.F. ~~ 29, 30.)
On February 29, 2012, Maine-ly Batteries sent a Demand for Payment via both US. mail and
Certified mail to Battery World, David Willette, and Richard Willette. (Supp. S.M.F. ~ 9.) On
March 16, 2012, Maine-ly Batteries filed the current action to collect $36,606.69 from Battery
World, and David and Richard Willette. (Supp. S.M.F. ~ 10.) Plaintiff, Maine-ly Batteries, filed
motions for emergency injunctive relief and attachment, both of which were granted. (Supp.
S.M.F. ~ 10, 11.)
1 On June 11, 2012 Maine-ly Batteries and Battery World informally mediated and reached a
partial settlement. (Supp. S.M.F. ,-r,-r 12, 13.) The Settlement Agreement provided that "Battery
World agrees that it owes Maine-ly Batteries $30,000 in full settlement of the Action as to
Battery World". (Opp. S.M.F. ,-r 13.) The Willettes did not attend the mediation and were not
included in the Settlement Agreement. (Supp. S.M.F. ,-r,-r 12, 14; Opp. S.M.F. ,-r 12.) Defendants
David Willette and Richard Willette certify that they each terminated the Personal Guaranty
Agreement by letter on April 1, 2012. (Add. S.M.F. ,-r,-r 27, 28.)
Plaintiffs assert that the total balance due from Battery World to Plaintiff as of December
31, 2013 was $18,503.86. (Supp. S.M.F. ,-r 16.) Plaintiffs further assert that of the total balance,
$12,708.69 is the balance owed Battery World under the settlement agreement. (Supp. S.M.F. ,-r
17.)
Plaintiff is now seeking judgment against David and Richard Willette for the debt accrued by
Battery World above the settlement amount. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants David and Richard
Willette are personally liable for $5795.17, costs, and fees as a result of the Personal Guaranty
Agreement they executed.
II. Standard ofReview
Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Beal v. Allstate Ins. Co., 989 A. 2d 733,
738 (Me. 2010); Dyerv. Department ofTransportation, 951 A.2d 821,825 (Me. 2008). When
reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court reviews the parties' statements of material
facts and the cited record evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.
A genuine issue of material fact exists where the fact finder must make a determination
between differing versions of the truth. Reliance National Indemnity v. Knowles Industrial
2 Services Corp., 2005 :ME 29, ,-r7, 868 A.2d 220; citing Univ. of Me. Found. V Fleet Bank of
Me., 2003 :ME 20, ,-r20, 817 A.2d 871. Furthermore, "a fact is material if it could potentially
affect the outcome of the case." Id.
ill. Discussion
Plaintiff moves for a Summary Judgment of $5 795.17, cost, and fees against Defendants
David and Richard Willette. Plaintiff attests that the Personal Guaranty Agreement executed by
the Willettes provides Plaintiff with the right to recover.
The court looks to the terms of the Personal Guaranty Agreement in order to determine as a
matter of law whether Plaintiff has a right to recover the difference between the settlement
amount and the full claim of debt from Defendants David and Richard Willette, as well as costs
and fees. "Since a guarantee is a type of contract ... guaranties are governed by the same rules of
construction as other contracts." Bumila v. Keiser Homes ofMaine, Inc., 1997 :ME 139, ,-r 12,
696 A.2d 1091. "A contract is to be interpreted to effect the parties' intentions as reflected in the
written instrument, construed with regard for the subject matter, motive, and purpose of the
agreement, as well as the object to be accomplished. The interpretation of an unambiguous
contract is a question oflaw." Handy Boat Serv., Inc. v. Profl Servs., Inc., 1998 :ME 134, ,-r 7,
711 A.2d 1306.
The Personal Guaranty Agreement states that:
"The liability of the GUARANTORS shall not be impaired, altered, or otherwise affected by any renewal, modification, compromise or discharge of the INDEBTEDNESS or any part thereof The liability hereunder of the GUARANTORS, shall be direct, immediate and absolute and shall not be conditional or contingent upon the pursuit, exercise or prosecution by OBLIGEE of any other remedy or remedies whatsoever and OBLIGEE shall have and may exercise against the GUARANTORS any and all remedies that it might against a principal debtor upon a past due liquidation obligation.
3 Personal Guaranty Agreement,~ 2. The Personal Guaranty Agreement is unambiguous as to
Plaintiff's right to pursue GUARANTORS, David and Richard Willette, for the full amount of
the debt accrued even where Plaintiff has discharged the debt as it pertains to Defendant Battery
World. The Personal Guaranty Agreement is similarly unambiguous pertaining Plaintiff's right
to seek repayment for debt accrued by Battery World from David and Richard Willette whether
or not Plaintiff first seeks repayment from Battery World. There is no question of material fact
concerning whether David and Richard Willette are liable for debt accrued by Battery World
pursuant to the Personal Guaranty Agreement.
David and Richard Willette contend that they are not liable for debt accrued by Battery
World pursuant to the Personal Guaranty Agreement because they terminated the Personal
Guaranty Agreement and because they sold their interest in Battery World. The Personal
Guaranty Agreement does permit unilateral termination of the Personal Guaranty Agreement,
"provided however that this Agreement and the undersigned liability hereunder shall remain in
full force and effect with respect to the portion of the JNDEBTEDNESS created, arising or
existing prior to such termination". Personal Guaranty Agreement, ,-r 1. David and Richard
Willette argue that they terminated the Personal Guaranty Agreement by letters dated April 11,
2012 and therefore Plaintiff is not entitled to judgment against them. The Personal Guaranty
Agreement states that the Guarantors are liable for all debt accrued before the date of
termination. Plaintiff is seeking to recover for debt accrued prior to termination. There is no
question of material fact concerning Defendant David and Richard Willettes' liability.
Defendants David and Richard Willette argue that they are not liable for debt accrued by
Battery World because the Personal Guaranty Agreement was part of the conveyance of
Defendants David and Richard Willette's full interest :ln Battery World by bill of sale to
4 Barabara Davis on November 10, 2010. David and Richard Willette argue that by conveying
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INURED OCr n11m STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT YORK, SS. DOCKET NO. CV-12-63
MAINE-L Y BATTERIES, INC. ) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) ) BATTERY WORLD, INC., and ) ) ORDER DAVID E. WILLETTE, and ) ) RICHARD A WILLETTE, ) ) Dedendants. )
L Background
Maine-ly Batteric;~s began supplying batteries and battery supplies to Battery World in late
2000. (Supp. S.M.F. ~ 5.) By late October 2010, Battery World had accrued a significant amount
of debt owed to Maine-ly Batteries. (Supp. S.M.F. ~ 6; Opp. S.M.F. ~ 6.) On October 27, 2010,
Defendants David and Richard Willette executed a Personal Guaranty Agreement guaranteeing
the obligations of Battery World to Maine-ly Batteries. (Supp. S.M.F. ~ 7.) Defendants David
and Richard Willette conveyed their interests in Defendant Battery World, Inc. by Bill of Sale
dated November 10, 2010 to Barabara Davis. (Add. S.M.F. ~~ 29, 30.)
On February 29, 2012, Maine-ly Batteries sent a Demand for Payment via both US. mail and
Certified mail to Battery World, David Willette, and Richard Willette. (Supp. S.M.F. ~ 9.) On
March 16, 2012, Maine-ly Batteries filed the current action to collect $36,606.69 from Battery
World, and David and Richard Willette. (Supp. S.M.F. ~ 10.) Plaintiff, Maine-ly Batteries, filed
motions for emergency injunctive relief and attachment, both of which were granted. (Supp.
S.M.F. ~ 10, 11.)
1 On June 11, 2012 Maine-ly Batteries and Battery World informally mediated and reached a
partial settlement. (Supp. S.M.F. ,-r,-r 12, 13.) The Settlement Agreement provided that "Battery
World agrees that it owes Maine-ly Batteries $30,000 in full settlement of the Action as to
Battery World". (Opp. S.M.F. ,-r 13.) The Willettes did not attend the mediation and were not
included in the Settlement Agreement. (Supp. S.M.F. ,-r,-r 12, 14; Opp. S.M.F. ,-r 12.) Defendants
David Willette and Richard Willette certify that they each terminated the Personal Guaranty
Agreement by letter on April 1, 2012. (Add. S.M.F. ,-r,-r 27, 28.)
Plaintiffs assert that the total balance due from Battery World to Plaintiff as of December
31, 2013 was $18,503.86. (Supp. S.M.F. ,-r 16.) Plaintiffs further assert that of the total balance,
$12,708.69 is the balance owed Battery World under the settlement agreement. (Supp. S.M.F. ,-r
17.)
Plaintiff is now seeking judgment against David and Richard Willette for the debt accrued by
Battery World above the settlement amount. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants David and Richard
Willette are personally liable for $5795.17, costs, and fees as a result of the Personal Guaranty
Agreement they executed.
II. Standard ofReview
Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Beal v. Allstate Ins. Co., 989 A. 2d 733,
738 (Me. 2010); Dyerv. Department ofTransportation, 951 A.2d 821,825 (Me. 2008). When
reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court reviews the parties' statements of material
facts and the cited record evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.
A genuine issue of material fact exists where the fact finder must make a determination
between differing versions of the truth. Reliance National Indemnity v. Knowles Industrial
2 Services Corp., 2005 :ME 29, ,-r7, 868 A.2d 220; citing Univ. of Me. Found. V Fleet Bank of
Me., 2003 :ME 20, ,-r20, 817 A.2d 871. Furthermore, "a fact is material if it could potentially
affect the outcome of the case." Id.
ill. Discussion
Plaintiff moves for a Summary Judgment of $5 795.17, cost, and fees against Defendants
David and Richard Willette. Plaintiff attests that the Personal Guaranty Agreement executed by
the Willettes provides Plaintiff with the right to recover.
The court looks to the terms of the Personal Guaranty Agreement in order to determine as a
matter of law whether Plaintiff has a right to recover the difference between the settlement
amount and the full claim of debt from Defendants David and Richard Willette, as well as costs
and fees. "Since a guarantee is a type of contract ... guaranties are governed by the same rules of
construction as other contracts." Bumila v. Keiser Homes ofMaine, Inc., 1997 :ME 139, ,-r 12,
696 A.2d 1091. "A contract is to be interpreted to effect the parties' intentions as reflected in the
written instrument, construed with regard for the subject matter, motive, and purpose of the
agreement, as well as the object to be accomplished. The interpretation of an unambiguous
contract is a question oflaw." Handy Boat Serv., Inc. v. Profl Servs., Inc., 1998 :ME 134, ,-r 7,
711 A.2d 1306.
The Personal Guaranty Agreement states that:
"The liability of the GUARANTORS shall not be impaired, altered, or otherwise affected by any renewal, modification, compromise or discharge of the INDEBTEDNESS or any part thereof The liability hereunder of the GUARANTORS, shall be direct, immediate and absolute and shall not be conditional or contingent upon the pursuit, exercise or prosecution by OBLIGEE of any other remedy or remedies whatsoever and OBLIGEE shall have and may exercise against the GUARANTORS any and all remedies that it might against a principal debtor upon a past due liquidation obligation.
3 Personal Guaranty Agreement,~ 2. The Personal Guaranty Agreement is unambiguous as to
Plaintiff's right to pursue GUARANTORS, David and Richard Willette, for the full amount of
the debt accrued even where Plaintiff has discharged the debt as it pertains to Defendant Battery
World. The Personal Guaranty Agreement is similarly unambiguous pertaining Plaintiff's right
to seek repayment for debt accrued by Battery World from David and Richard Willette whether
or not Plaintiff first seeks repayment from Battery World. There is no question of material fact
concerning whether David and Richard Willette are liable for debt accrued by Battery World
pursuant to the Personal Guaranty Agreement.
David and Richard Willette contend that they are not liable for debt accrued by Battery
World pursuant to the Personal Guaranty Agreement because they terminated the Personal
Guaranty Agreement and because they sold their interest in Battery World. The Personal
Guaranty Agreement does permit unilateral termination of the Personal Guaranty Agreement,
"provided however that this Agreement and the undersigned liability hereunder shall remain in
full force and effect with respect to the portion of the JNDEBTEDNESS created, arising or
existing prior to such termination". Personal Guaranty Agreement, ,-r 1. David and Richard
Willette argue that they terminated the Personal Guaranty Agreement by letters dated April 11,
2012 and therefore Plaintiff is not entitled to judgment against them. The Personal Guaranty
Agreement states that the Guarantors are liable for all debt accrued before the date of
termination. Plaintiff is seeking to recover for debt accrued prior to termination. There is no
question of material fact concerning Defendant David and Richard Willettes' liability.
Defendants David and Richard Willette argue that they are not liable for debt accrued by
Battery World because the Personal Guaranty Agreement was part of the conveyance of
Defendants David and Richard Willette's full interest :ln Battery World by bill of sale to
4 Barabara Davis on November 10, 2010. David and Richard Willette argue that by conveying
their "full interest" in Battery World they conveyed their personal guaranty and were no longer
liable for any debt accrued by the company. According to Black's Law Dictionary, a Guaranty is
"A promise to answer for the payment of some debt, or the performance of some duty, in case of
the failure of another who is liable in the first instance." Guaranty, Black's Law Dictionary (9th
ed. 2009), guaranty. The Personal Guaranty Agreement was a promise by Defendants David and
Richard Willette to personally answer for the payment of Battery World's debt in case of Battery
World's failure to do so. Battery World could not have been both the primary obligor and the
guarantor. The Personal Guaranty Agreement was a personal asset of the Willettes', not an asset
of the company. Therefore, the Personal Guaranty Agreement was not conveyed as part of the
November 10,2010 bill of sale.
Defendants David and Richard Willette also argue that Plaintiff did not properly retain the
right to pursue the W"illettes for the debt at the time of the Settlement Agreement between
Plaintiff and Battery World. Defendants David and Richard Willette argue that because Plaintiff
did not properly retain the right to pursue the debt, the Willettes are no longer liable for any debt
accrued by Battery World.
To the extent that the obligee releases the principal obligor from its duties pursuant to the underlying obligation: (a) the principal obligor is also discharged from any corresponding duties of performance and reimbursement owed to the secondary obligor unless the terms of the release effect a preservation of the secondary obligor's recourse(§ 38); (b) the secondary obligor is discharged from any unperformed duties pursuant to the secondary obligation unless: (i) the terms of the release effect a preservation ofthe secondary obligor's recourse(§ 38); or (ii) the language or circumstances of the release otherwise show the obligee's intent to retain its claim against the secondary obligor
5 Restatement (Third) of Suretyship & Guaranty§ 39 (1996). The terms of the agreement and the
Amended Consent Judgment entered by the court on May 1, 2013, show the obligee's intent to
retain its claim against David and Richard Willette. 1 There is no question of material fact
concerning Defendant David and Richard Willettes' liability.
Next the court must determine the extent of Defendant David and Richard Willettes' liability.
According to the Personal Guaranty Agreement:
"The records of OBLIGEE shall be conclusive with respect to the amounts, times and places of delivery of any and all merchandise and the balance due and owing to OBLIGEE by said COMPANY. Any evidence admissible in an action against the COMPANY shall be admissible in an action against the GUARANTORS on this Guaranty."
Personal Guaranty Agreement, ~ 2. The OBLIGEE, Plaintiff, has presented its records with
respect to the balance owing. The Personal Guaranty Agreement states unambiguously that the
Plaintiffs records are to be conclusive on the matter of the amount due by David and Richard
Willette. Plaintiff seeks the amount due according to the records less the amount Battery World
has agreed to pay. According to Plaintiffs records, that amount it $5795.17. After review of
Plaintiffs records, the court finds that there is no question of material fact concerning the
balance of the debt after Plaintiff's Settlement Agreement with Battery World.
Finally, the court must determine whether David and Richard Willette must compensate
Plaintiff for reasonable costs and attorneys fees accrued in this action. Once again, the court
1 Section 39 continues: (c) if the secondary obligor is not discharged from its unperformed duties pursuant to the secondary obligation by operation of paragraph (b), the secondary obligor is discharged from those duties to the extent: (i) of the value of the consideration for the release; (ii) that the release of a duty to pay money pursuant to the underlying obligation would otherwise cause the secondary obligor a loss; and (iii) that the release discharges a duty of the principal obligor other than the payment of money; Restatement (Third) of Suretyship & Guaranty § 39 (1996). While Defendants David and Richard Willette are not discharged of the entire debt, they are discharged of the duty to answer for the value of the consideration for the release. Plaintiff may only seek the amount due over and above the amount of the Settlement Agreement at this time.
6 looks to the language of the Personal Guaranty Agreement: "The GUARANTORS hereby agree
to pay OBLIGEE all costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys fees, which it may incur
in attempting to collect from CO:rvfi> ANY or the GUARANTORS in the enforcement of this
guaranty." Personal Guaranty Agreement,~ 4. David and Richard Willette unambiguously
promised to pay all reasonable costs and fees associated with collecting on the debt accrued by
Battery World. Therefore, the court finds as a matter of law that David and Richard Willette are
liable for reasonable costs and fees accrued by Plaintiff Plaintiff may submit to the court an
itemized record of costs and fees for review within 60 days of entry of this order.
IV. Conclusion
Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a), the Clerk is directed to incorporate this order into the docket
by reference and the entry is
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted.
DATE: John~ Justice, Superior Court