STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT ANDROSCOGGIN, ss. CIVIL ACTION \ DOCKET NO. CV-06-219\ !~... '-"r'1:;;""'-,, '_" )c, " , MAINE HUMAN RIGHTS I "t: ,.>'k, 1VF[) " '> n/ ~ ,<. ''l.~t?, Fli... c::u r 'I'
COMMISSION AND (WI, .' ROBERT DUGGAN, JR., --,.. ,)] LJlOB AJ~DRO~C'\('J'G~ r.."~,Jf,l, .S. -IJt)('"f')ln J Plaintiffs \; ,-"'" ,
-.. 1., ",'R·~O"":",i'l ,L Uf?T v. JUDGMENT (AMENDED)
SADDLEBACK, INC, INTEGRITY ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION & SERVICE, INC AND SARGENT & SONS BUILDERS, INC,
Defendants
BEFORE THE COURT
This matter is before the court following a jury trial on June 16, 17 and 18,
2008 for a judicial determination of a remaining claim against Saddleback, Inc.,
brought under the Maine Human Rights Act, 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4553(2) and 4633(2).
The Maine Human Rights Commission and Robert Duggan seek declaratory and
injunctive relief, along with damages, because they allege that Robert Duggan
was illegally fired in violation of the WhistIeblowers' Protection Act and the
Maine Human Rights Act.
Plaintiffs' amended complaint alleged claims against Integrity, Saddleback
and Sargent. Plaintiffs asserted that Duggan's employer, Integrity, discriminated
against Duggan at the behest of Saddleback and Sargent in violation of the Maine
Human Rights Act (MHRA) and the WhistIeblower's Protection Act (WPA) due
to Duggan's complaint to the Maine State Electrician's Examining Board (Board)
that Saddleback employees and others were performing unsafe electrical work
without a license in violation of the Maine State Electrical Code (Code). Plaintiffs alleged that Integrity violated the WPA (Count I) and the MHRA (Count II) by
threatening him with termination, terminating his employment and
subsequently seeking to transfer him to a different job site, all because of his
report to the Board. Integrity was defaulted on Counts I and II and judgment will
be entered against it on both Counts. With respect to Saddleback, the
Commission and Duggan alleged that Saddleback compelled or coerced Integrity
to engage in unlawful NIHRA employment discrimination and interfered with
Duggan's exercise or enjoyment of the rights guaranteed or protected by the
MHRA (Count III). This claim will be addressed below. Duggan also alleged in
Counts IV and V that Saddleback (Count IV) and Sargent (Count V) tortiously
interfered with Duggan's business relationship with Integrity by pressuring
Integrity to fire him. Sargent defaulted on Count V. The jury found for Duggan
on the claims of tortious interference with a business relationship and awarded
him against each Saddleback and Sargent $ 42,000 in compensatory damages.
FACTS
In the summer of 2004, Duggan was employed by Integrity as a
Journeyman Electrician and Foreman and was working at Saddleback Maine Ski
Resort on the snowmaking project and worked for Sargent & Sons, the general
contractor for Saddleback, on the base lodge work. Saddleback also contracted
with Snow Machines Incorporated (SMI), an out-of-state company, to perform
the snowmaking installation. To save money, Saddleback let SMI use Saddleback
laborers when SMI needed additional workers, even though Maine law required
a Maine licensed electrician and SMI workers were not licensed.
Duggan worked through Integrity for both Sargent and Saddleback.
Duggan was a skilled, competent electrician who performed his job well and was
2 regarded by his employer as being a hard, smart worker. Duggan observed
Saddleback employees performing work on the site that was both unlicensed and
unsafe. Duggan also observed Saddleback workers drinking beer on the job and
reported it to his foreman Rick Morin. Duggan had two concerns: (1) electrical
work with high voltage lines was being performed by persons with no electrical
license and in violation of the Electrical Code; and (2) the work being done posed
a serious risk of danger to the general public. Only Integrity had a license;
Saddleback and SMI did not have a license. Duggan was not the only one with
concerns about the illegal work. Many knew that illegal work was going on and
were frustrated that the State had not come in to stop it. Duggan and others l
reported this unlicensed and unsafe work but nothing was done.
On September 21, Duggan spoke about the illegal work to Brian Bunch, a
Saddleback employee hired to oversee installation of snowmaking equipment
and the lifts, whose response was, "We're a small mountain. We do what we
want." Two days later, on September 23, Saddleback gave work to Tripp,
another electrical contractor, and Bunch told Integrity they were happy with
them, they did excellent work, but Bunch wouldn't elaborate beyond that.
Duggan spoke to Mike Carleton, the owner of Integrity, and Rick Morin,
Integrity's general foreman, about the unlicensed and unsafe electrical work. On
September 29, after he witnessed unlicensed workers backfilling boulders and
debris on top of high voltage electrical lines in violation of the Electrical Code
and observed disconnects done by unlicensed workers in the pump house,
Duggan spoke with Morin and warned him he was going to call the State.
I Another employee of Integrity also reported the unlicensed and unsafe work but his employment was not terminated because the defendants did not know that he had also made a report to the State.
3 Duggan asked Morin to contact Carleton. Later that day, Duggan contacted the
Maine State Electrician's Examining Board and reported what he reasonably
believed to be unlawful and unsafe electrical activity on the part of Saddleback
employees. Integrity did not fire Duggan that day for contacting the Board.
When Sargent asked Morin, who had called the State, Morin gave Sargent
Duggan's name. Tom McAlister, General Manager of Saddleback, and Bunch
were upset that Duggan had called the State and wondered "why would he bite
the hand that feeds him." They were angry. Bunch was very upset and because
the snowmaking project was already behind schedule and Bunch knew that the
State had the ability to shut the whole project down.
After Duggan's report, Integrity's work was restricted to a single area at
Saddleback. In addition, Sargent met with Morin and told him that Duggan was
"gone" because he had made the report. He told Morin that this was "the kind
of thing that was going to get Integrity fired from this job." Morin told Sargent
that it would be illegal, but Sargent's response was that he did not care and
Duggan was "gone." During a subsequent meeting with Morin and Carleton,
Sargent again repeated that Duggan was "gone." Sargent initiated this
conversation to relay to Carleton Saddleback's disappointment about why one of
his employees would be calling the State electrical inspector. Bunch also met
with Carleton and ordered Carleton to fire Duggan because of his call to the
Board. Saddleback and Sargent had made clear to Integrity that they wanted
Duggan gone. Carleton was very anxious about not losing the work at
Saddleback. Integrity had a lot to lose if it lost the contract at the mountain? On
2Indeed, Integrity made a lot of money ("obscene amounts of overtime" as described by Carleton) during the months after Duggan was fired.
4 September 3D, Carleton told Duggan that Saddleback wanted him fired and he
asked if he could give Duggan a clean layoff. He then asked Duggan if he would
take a transfer as an alternative to a layoff. Duggan refused. Integrity then
decided to make Duggan take a day off the job site.
The next week Duggan was allowed to return but was told to keep his
head down and not aggravate anybody over the unlicensed work. The work
atmosphere was noticeably more hostile when Duggan returned to work. On
October 7, there was an incident at Sarge's (a bar) when two SMI employees were
staring at Duggan. Duggan approached them and raised the issue of unlicensed
and unsafe work. Sargent complained to Integrity that the persons at Sarge's
who were criticized for doing unlicensed work might harm Duggan. Saddleback
and Sargent workers made other threats to Duggan.
On October 8, Integrity terminated Duggan's employment. Earlier that
day, Carleton called Morin and said "we just lost the rest of the snowmaking
work on the mountain." Morin told Duggan to call Carleton and to get his tools
in case he was fired. When Duggan asked if he was getting fired, Carleton said
"yes", and explained that Bunch of Saddleback was "wound up" because
Duggan had told SMI employees what they were doing was illegal and Bunch
had told him that Duggan had to be fired. Carleton told Duggan he could not
come back to the cite and did not offer any transfer or other work. Subsequently,
Duggan was offered short-term other work, which he refused.
COUNT III
Count III alleges that Saddleback compelled or coerced Integrity to engage
in unlawful Maine Human Rights Act discrimination in violation of 5 M.R.S.A. §
5 4553(l0)(D) and that Saddleback interfered with enjoyment of rights granted or
protected by the MHRA in violation of 5 M.R.S.A. 4633(2).
Although Integrity has been defaulted, the court will discuss Integrity's
violations because they provide a foundation to understanding how it is that
Saddleback also violated Duggan's rights under the MHRA. Integrity violated
the MHRA, which provides in relevant part, that it is "unlawful employment
discrimination for any employer ... to discharge an employee or discriminate
with respect to transfer ... terms [or] conditions" because of previous actions
taken by the employee that are protected by the WPA. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(l)(A).
The WPA provides that no employer may discharge, threaten or otherwise
discriminate against an employee regarding the employee's compensation,
terms, conditions, location or privileges of employment because the employee,
acting in good faith ... reports orally or in writing to a public body what the
employee has reasonable cause to believe is a violation of a law or rule ... [or] a
condition or practice that would put at risk the health or safety of that employee
or any other individual." 26 M.R.S.A. § 833(l)(A)(B).
There are three elements to a claim of unlawful retaliation: "(I) the
employee engaged in activity protected by the statute; (2) the employee was the
subject of an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between
the protected activity and the adverse employment action." Costain v. Subury
Primary Care, P.A., 2008 ME 142, <][ 6. The first element was met by Duggan's
complaint to the Board about Saddleback's unlicensed and unsafe electrical
installation work. There is no question that this activity is the type of action
afforded protection from discrimination by 26 M.R.S.A. § 833(1)(A). As to the
remaining elements, Duggan's employment was terminated within one week of
6 his report to the Board. Temporal proximity, as here, between an employee's
report and the subsequent discharge or transfer is "sufficient to raise an inference
of causation" and establish plaintiff's prima facie case. Currie v. Indus. Sec., Inc.,
2007 ME 12, 9I 23, 915 A. 2d 400, 406. And, in addition, there are the statements
that Duggan must be gone.
Once plaintiff makes his prima facie case of discrimination, a rebuttable
presumption arises that the defendant Integrity retaliated against Duggan for
engaging in WPA protected activi ty, which the court finds by a preponderance of
the evidence that he did and Integrity has failed to produce any probative
evidence to demonstrate nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment
action. Thus, judgment will be entered on Counts I and II against Integrity.
The evidence shows that Duggan engaged in protected activity by
contacting the Board and reporting unlicensed and unsafe work. He experienced
an adverse employment action in that he was first threatened with termination,
then terminated and then offered an unsatisfactory transfer. The causal
connection is established by the timing of Duggan's reporting activity in relation
to the adverse job actions and statements by all of defendants, including
Saddleback made in the same time period.
Section 4553(10) of the MHRA provides, in relevant part, that "unlawful
discrimination includes Unlawful employment discrimination as defined and
limited by subchapter III [and] compelling and coercing another to do any of
such types of unlawful discrimination...." 5 M.R.S.A. § 4553(l0)(D). As
discussed above, it is unlawful employment discrimination for an employer to
discharge an employee because of actions taken by an employee that are
protected by the WPA. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(1)(A). And, as discussed above, the
7 WPA protects an employee's good faith reports of violation of a law or rule or a
condition that creates a health or safety risk. 26 M.R.S.A. § 833(1)(A, B). Thus, it
is a violation of Section 4553(l0)(D) for a person to compel or coerce an employer
to fire its employee because the employee reported to a public body, such as the
Electrical Board in this case, what Duggan reasonably believed to be a violation
of a rule or law or a safety risk.
With regard to Section 4633(2), the MHRA gave Duggan the right not to
be fired by Integrity because of his activity protected by the WPA. By making it
clear to Integrity that it would lose work for Saddleback unless Integrity fired
Duggan for his reporting, Saddleback interfered with Duggan's rights under the
MHRA and thereby violated section 4633(2). See Currie v. Industrial Sec., Inc.,
2007 ME 12, <[ 31, 915 A. 2d 400, 408.
CONCLUSION
The court concludes that Plaintiffs have proven that it is more likely than
not that Saddleback and Sargent coerced or compelled Integrity to fire Duggan
because of his previous activity protected by the Whistleblower Protection Act in
violation of 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4553(l0)(D) and 4633(2) and that Integrity did in fact
fire Duggan as a result of this coercion.
The entry is:
1. Pursuant to the jury's answers to written interrogatories submitted to them and their resulting verdict, the Clerk is hereby ordered to enter the following Judgment for the plaintiff, Robert Duggan, on Counts IV and V in the amount of $42,000 together with interests and costs on each count;
2. Pursuant to a default entered on Counts I and II against Integrity and for the Plaintiffs, the Clerk is hereby Ordered to enter the following Judgment for Plaintiffs on Counts I and II;
8 3. Judgment is hereby entered against Saddleback in favor of the Maine Human Rights Commission and Robert Duggan on Count III;
4. A declaratory judgment that Integrity and Saddleback's practices were unlawful and violations of the Maine Human Rights Act; Integrity and Saddleback, and all persons acting in concert with them, or at their direction, are enjoined from engaging in any policy or practice that retaliates against Robert Duggan for exercising his rights under the WPA or the MHRA; and back pay be awarded as an alternative to reinstatement given that the job is no longer available and Integrity has ceased operations;
5. Backpay of $1,907. 36 together with interest against Integrity and Saddleback on Counts I, II and III;
6. Civil penal damages against Integrity on Counts I and II and Saddleback on Count III in the amount of $7,500 on each Count; and
7. Reasonable attorney's fees and costs against Integrity and Saddleback.
Date: October 31, 2008
9 STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT ANDROSCOGGIN, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. CV-06-2~ . ~~ - ~!IJ.D - Id-./f-} .;Jof)~' MAINE HUMAN RIGHTS Rf-CE1VED & f Iu:.: iJ o',;'
COMMISSION AND ROBERT DUGGAN, JR.,
Plaintiffs AN rL)O()c,COGC31.f\J j". '""' C l \r' f r' EL)PERIOR -,U ,H" . v. ORDER REGARDING ATTORNEYS FEES SADDLEBACK, INC, INTEGRITY ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION & SERVICE, INC AND SARGENT & SONS BUILDERS, INC,
This matter is before the court for consideration of a request for plaintiff's
attorney's fees and litigation expenses following a successful jury trial on June
16, 17 and 18, 2008 and a successful judicial determination of non-jury issues. In
the court's order of October 2008, the court made findings of fact on which it
relies in the analysis of the claim for attorney's fees and expenses.
The evidence at trial was essentially the same for both the Maine Human
Rights Act (MHRA) claims and the tort claims. 1 Although the tort claims
required proof of intimidation, the MHRA claims required proof of compelling
or coercing another to violate the MHRA, 5 M.R.S.A. § 4553(1O)(D) and proof of
interference, coercion or intimidation, 5 M.R.S.A. § 4633. Thus, the evidence for
proof of the tortious interference claims and the claims under the MHRA was
much the same for all claims.
I The court relies on its factual statement in the October 31, 2008 Order. Contrary to defendant's argument, the claims in this case are so
interrelated2 that "attempts to allocate hours between claims may be
unwarranted where an action involves related legal theories applied to a
common core of facts." Phetosomphone v. Allison Reed Group, Inc., 984 F. 2d 4,7 (lst
Cir. 1983). There is in this case a single core of facts applicable to either theory:
Duggan's employer, Integrity, discriminated against Duggan at the behest of
Saddleback and Sargent in violation of MHRA and the Whistleblower's
Protection Act (WPA) due to Duggan's complaint to the Maine State Electrician's
Examining Board (Board) that Saddleback employees and others were
performing unsafe electrical work without a license in violation of the Maine
State Electrical Code (Code), that Integrity violated the WPA and the MHRA by
threatening him with termination, terminating his employment and
subsequently seeking to transfer him to a different job site, all because of his
report to the Board, and that Saddleback and Sargent compelled or coerced
Integrity to engage in unlawful MHRA employment discrimination and also
tortiously interfered with Duggan's business relationship with Integrity by
pressuring Integrity to fire him. Duggan was successful on all of these claims that
involved a common set of facts.
Pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 4614 and M.R.Civ.P. 54(b), Attorney Rebecca
Webber filed a detailed request for $79,777.07 in attorney's fees and expenses,
after subtracting $11,204.00 for tort-related work and a reduction of $4,180 for the
no-charged work.
2And, the conduct of the defendants is also so interrelated and produced "an indivisible injury", that the court concludes that the defendants are jointly and severally liable for the fees and expenses as outlined in this decision. Koster v. Perales, 903 F. 2d 131, 140 (2 nd Cir. 1990).
2 Defendant Saddleback opposes Webber's application for attorney's fees
on several grounds, including that most of her time was spent on the tort claims
for which no attorney's fees are authorized while "the Maine Human Rights
Commission litigated most of the case." Def's Opp, p.l. Saddleback also claims
that Webber's fees include excessive, redundant or unnecessary hours accruing
fees, and includes generic descriptions of time not capable of being properly
assessed.
The court is indeed charged with examining an attorney's fee request to
determine whether counsel exercised sound billing judgment. Wilcox v. Stratton
Lumber, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 837, 848 (D. Me. 1996). Webber and counsel of the
Commission exercised extraordinary care to ensure that all matters critical to the
case were covered by one of them and that they did not duplicate each other's
actions. Webber has demonstrated the reasonableness of her rates and hours
submitted in her application for fees. The court has scrutinized her billing
records and her explanation of how she and counsel for the Commission divided
up the work to be accomplished and finds that she acted responsibly and the
resulting fees are reasonable.
Saddleback points to what it describes as unnecessary conferences with
Attorney Gause of the Commission, but the court rejects the argument that this
could only result in duplication of effort by attorneys. These conferences led to a
division of work so as to avoid duplication and wasted resources. Webber and
Gause divided responsibility for taking depositions, saving defendant
depositions costs for which the Commission paid. Webber and Gause also split
up witnesses during discovery and at trial. Gause was the only attorney to
interview the State Electrical Inspector and to obtain an affidavit for Integrity
3 Foreman Rick Morin. Morin's affidavit was used to both defeat Saddleback's
Motion for Summary Judgment and at trial. None of this shows up in Webber's
fee petition precisely because it was delegated to the Commission during a
conference between Gause and Webber. They also divided up the work
responding to Saddleback's motion for summary judgment. Attorney Webber
prepared the detailed factual section and the supporting statement of facts, work
that was later used again for the trial brief and in the brief to the law court.
Although both Gause and Webber signed the trial brief, they divided up
responsibility for certain portions of the brief, just as they divided up
responsibility for opening and closing statements, all to avoid duplication.
Attorneys Gause and Webber should be commended for the lengths to which
they went to avoid duplication and to ensure that their clients' cases went to the
court in an expeditious manner.
Saddleback also argues that it was only one defendant and it should not
shoulder all of the fees that Duggan incurred in litigating against the other
defendants. However, this ignores the fact that only Saddleback vigorously
defended itself against Duggan's claims. Integrity and Sargent defaulted early in
the litigation. Moreover, joint and several fee liability is a proper exercise of the
court's discretion. See Webb v. Dyer County Bd. of Ed., 471 U.s. 234, 244 n. 20, 105
S. Ct. 1923, 1929 n. 20, 85 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1985). See also Anrst v. Estes, 8 A. 2d 201,
203 (Me. 1939). According to Wyman v Secretary of State, 625 A. 2d 307, 312 (Me.
1993), lithe awards are to be guided by substantive liability rules, and should
reflect the defendant's degree of responsibility for the injury suffered by the
plaintiff. II Id. at 312-13 (citations and quotations omitted). Here, not only was
Saddleback engaging in the illegal and dangerous electrical work to save money,
4 but Saddleback was also pressuring Sargent and Integrity to have Duggan fired.
Saddleback was the entity most responsible for Duggan's termination;
accordingly, it is appropriate that the responsibility for the fees not be divided up
and instead be awarded jointly and severally.
Saddleback further argues that Webber's services were unnecessary and
redundant because the Commission was pursuing Duggan's MHRA claims. The
Commission could not adequately represent Duggan in her individual claims.
The Commission represents the interests of the State of Maine. Its actions were
taken for the State of Maine and for the use of Duggan. Duggan has a right to
counsel to represent him individually. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4613(1).
Saddleback criticizes Webber's attempt to recover for fees spent pursuing
the tortious interference claim. Saddleback dismisses what it calls Webber's
arbitrary determination that $11,204 were expended on tort claims and
discounting her fees by this number. Yet, Saddleback does not identify any fees
that should be excluded, but simply argues that the fees should be reduced by
$15,995 for each of the two tort claim counts. The court considers the claims so
interrelated that it would not be fruitful to attempt further segregation of
Duggan's claims. As stated before, the elements of the IvIHRA claim and the tort
claim are virtually identical, and Duggan was successful on all claims so there is
no need to separate out the successful from the unsuccessful claims or to separate
out the defendants because the witnesses were the same regardless of the claim
or the defendant.
Finally, Saddleback argues against what it describes as "block billing"
practice of Webber so as to evade meaningful judicial review. The court is very
able to read and understand the billing entries. Each entry is about a particular
5 event, whether it was a discovery conference with the court, drafting a subpoena
and deposition notice, and so forth. No further specificity is required.
Finally, Saddleback argues that if the court is not willing to significantly
reduce Webber's fees, the court should grant it a evidentiary hearing with
discovery to determine if Webber is entitled to the fees and costs she seeks and to
resolve the factual issues in dispute. Yet, Saddleback has not identified what
factual issues are in dispute and how an evidentiary hearing would advance the
court's inquiry. And, the court is mindful that it should avoid a second major
litigation over the fee petition. See Koster v. Perales, 903 F. 2d 131, 140 (2d Cir.
1990); Webb v. Dyer County Bd. of Ed., 471 U.s. 234,244 n. 20, 105 S. Ct. 1923, 1929
n. 20, 85 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1985).
The court considered most, if not all of the factors relevant to how many
hours were reasonably spent on this case. The court considered the factors
identified in Colony Cadillac & Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Yerdon, 558 A. 2d 364, 368 (Me.
1989); Mancini v. Scott, 2000 ME 19, «n 10, 744 A. 2d 1057, 1061 (citing Poussard v.
Commercial Credit Plan, Inc. of Lewiston, 479 A. 2d 881, 883 (Me. 1984)). The court
finds that the time spent by the lawyers and paralegal is reasonable considering
the time and labor spent on the case from summary judgment, through trial and
than an appeal filed by Saddleback. This case involved novel issues, including
the extent of coverage and the interpretation of 5 M.R.S.A. § 4553(10)(D) and 5
M.R.S.A. § 4633. Employment law expertise was vital to this case and required,
from time to time, preclusion of other employment. The hourly fee of Attorney
Webber and her associate are comparable, if not lower than, the customary rates
charged by other Maine attorneys with similar experience in employment
litigation in Maine. Attorney Webber took a substantial risk in taking this case
6 on a contingent fee basis. The circumstances under which Attorney Webber
came into this case required her to get up to speed quickly and to promptly
prepare an amended complaint. This priority work inevitably delayed other legal
work at that time. Success in this case for Duggan was complete. Attorney
Webber's experience, reputation and ability were apparent in her handling of
this case. Because the lost back pay wages in this case were small, and the
MHRA damages were limited due to the size of Integrity, and the fact that
Saddleback was not a direct employer, this case was not desirable when
compared to cases with larger potential MHRA damages. Attorney Webber did
not know Duggan before this case, thus this case required additional time for
trial preparation with Mr. Duggan. After considering all of the factors, the court
concludes that Duggan's attorney's fees are reasonable. Accordingly, Duggan is
awarded the attorney's fees and expenses requested.
1. Saddleback is Ordered to pay forthwith the Bill of Costs approved in July 2008; 2. Saddleback is Ordered to pay the Bill of Costs submitted subsequent to the appeal in the amount of $476.50 within 30 days of this Order; 3. Saddleback is Ordered to pay pre-judgment interest pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 1602-B(3) on the amount of the judgment against it, which includes the award by the jury of $42,000, plus $7,500 of MHRA penalties, plus $1,907.36 of lost pay, plus this award of attorney's fees. The total amount on which interest is due is: $131,184.43. The interest rate to be applied is: 7.36%. The amount due in pre-judgment interest is therefore: $9,655.17. 4. Saddleback is Ordered to pay Duggan post-judgment interest pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 1602-C on the amount of the judgment against it, which includes the award by the jury of $42,000, plus $7,500 of MHRA penalties, plus $1,907.36 of lost back pay, plus this award of attorney's fees. The total amount on which interest is due is: $131,184.43. The interest rate to be applied is: 9.42%. The total amount due in post-judgment interest is therefore: $12,357.57.
7 5. Saddleback is Ordered to pay the following attorney's fees and litigation expenses to Duggan's counsel within 30 days of this order: Attorney's fees for Attorney Webber $ 76,300.00 Attorney's fees for Attorney Buck $ 714.00 Paralegal fees of Anne Leblanc $ 2,264.00 Expenses $ 499.07
TOTAL: $ 79,777.07
Date: December 16, 2009