RUDMAN, Justice.
[¶ 1] Pursuant to 4 M.R.S.A. § 57 (1989) and M.R. Civ. P. 76B,
the United States District Court for the District of Maine
(Carter, J.)
has certified the following question of state law to this Court:
Does 21-A M.R.S.A. § 301(1)(C) require that a political party which had qualified for official party status in Maine because its candidate for Governor received more than five percent (5%) of the vote in the last gubernatorial election be disqualified if its candidate for President at the next succeeding election fails to receive five percent (5%) of the presidential vote?
[¶2] We first note that there is no dispute as to the material facts at issue, there are no clear controlling precedents, and our answer would, in one alternative, be determinative of this case. Thus, our exercise of jurisdiction in this case is proper.
See League of Women Voters v. Secretary of State,
683 A.2d 769, 771 (Me.1996);
Dasha v. Maine Med. Ctr., 665
A2d 993, 995 (Me.1995).
[¶ 3] In the 1994 election Jonathan Carter, a candidate for Governor of Maine after his nomination by petition, 21-A M.R.S.A. §§ 351-857 (1993 & Supp.1996), received more than five percent of the vote. As a result, during 1995 and 1996, pursuant to 21-A M.R.S.A. § 302 (1993),
the Maine Green
Party formed as a new political party. The Secretary of State recognized the Green Party as an official party in March 1996. It thus became eligible to nominate candidates for state and federal office in the 1996 election. The Green Party nominated Ralph Nader as its presidential candidate in the 1996 election. Nader received less than five percent of the vote in that election.
[¶4] Anticipating that the Secretary of State would disqualify it as a party pursuant to 21-A M.R.S.A. §§ 301, 304 & 305 (1993),
in November 1996 the Green Party filed a complaint in the United States District Court. It sought, among other things, a declaratory judgment favorable to its position with respect to the meaning of 21-A M.R.S.A. § 301(1)(C): that the statute allows it to maintain qualified status because its gubernatorial candidate polled at least five percent of the vote in the last gubernatorial election. In accord with the parties’ agreement, the court enjoined the Secretary of State from disqualifying the Green Party pending resolution of the action and certified the question at issue. We conclude that section 301(1)(C) requires the Green Party to be disqualified as a political party because its candidate polled less than five percent of the vote in the last general election, and aceord-
ingly we answer the certified question in the affirmative.
Statutory Construction
[¶ 5] The Green Party contends that the statute allows a political party to retain qualified status if either its gubernatorial candidate polled at least five percent of the vote in the last gubernatorial election, or its presidential candidate polled at least five percent of the vote in the last presidential election. Conversely, the State contends that the statute allows a political party to maintain qualified status only if that party’s presidential or gubernatorial candidate polled at least five percent of the vote in the last biennial general election. Both parties contend that its position is supported by the plain language of the statute and is consistent with the overall statutory scheme.
[¶ 6] When faced with a question of statutory construction, we seek to discern the intent of the Legislature by examining the plain language contained in the statute and consider the particular language in the context of the whole statutory scheme. See, e.g.,
State v. Butt,
656 A.2d 1225, 1227 (Me.1995);
Jordan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
651 A.2d 358, 360 (Me.1994);
Fraser v. Barton,
628 A.2d 146, 148 (Me.1993);
Stanley v. Tilcon Maine, Inc.,
541 A.2d 951, 952 (Me.1988). In the instant case, however, our review of the statutory language and statutory scheme governing elections, Title 21-A, provides little guidance in resolving the question presented. The statutory language could be construed to support either party’s position. Further, a review of the statutory scheme reveals that either party’s interpretation of the statute could lead to an illogical result.
Legislative History
[¶ 7] We turn next to the legislative history of the statute. Each party contends that the statute’s history supports its respective interpretation. We find the interpretation propounded by the State to be more persuasive.
[¶ 8] The Statement of Fact accompanying a 1976 amendment that later became section 301 provides in pertinent part: “Under this section, a party that was on the ballot in the last general election could qualify again if ... its candidate for Governor or President received at least
2%
of the vote that
year.”
Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 2140, Statement of Fact (107th Legis. 1976). The reference to the last general election in the statement of fact establishes that the Legislature intended that qualified political parties show the requisite support in each biennial general election, whether that election is for Governor or President.
The language adopted in
the 1976 amendment is identical to the present language of section 301(1)(C).
21-A M.R.S.A. § 301(1)(C) (1993); Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 2140, § 321(1)(C) (107th Leg-is.1976). We conclude, therefore, that the legislative intent behind the current statutory language remains as it was expressed in 1976.
[¶ 9] We are also persuaded by the fact that the Legislature has twice rejected proposals that would have amended section 301 in a way consistent with the Green Party’s interpretation. In 1995 the Legislature considered and rejected a proposal that would have allowed a party to qualify to participate in a primary election if its designation was listed on the ballot in either of the last two preceding general elections and if its candidate for Governor or President polled at least five percent of the total vote cast for Governor or President in either of the last two preceding elections.
The Summary of the 1997 bill provides:
This bill increases access to the ballot and other election processes for new parties, ... as follows:
1.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
RUDMAN, Justice.
[¶ 1] Pursuant to 4 M.R.S.A. § 57 (1989) and M.R. Civ. P. 76B,
the United States District Court for the District of Maine
(Carter, J.)
has certified the following question of state law to this Court:
Does 21-A M.R.S.A. § 301(1)(C) require that a political party which had qualified for official party status in Maine because its candidate for Governor received more than five percent (5%) of the vote in the last gubernatorial election be disqualified if its candidate for President at the next succeeding election fails to receive five percent (5%) of the presidential vote?
[¶2] We first note that there is no dispute as to the material facts at issue, there are no clear controlling precedents, and our answer would, in one alternative, be determinative of this case. Thus, our exercise of jurisdiction in this case is proper.
See League of Women Voters v. Secretary of State,
683 A.2d 769, 771 (Me.1996);
Dasha v. Maine Med. Ctr., 665
A2d 993, 995 (Me.1995).
[¶ 3] In the 1994 election Jonathan Carter, a candidate for Governor of Maine after his nomination by petition, 21-A M.R.S.A. §§ 351-857 (1993 & Supp.1996), received more than five percent of the vote. As a result, during 1995 and 1996, pursuant to 21-A M.R.S.A. § 302 (1993),
the Maine Green
Party formed as a new political party. The Secretary of State recognized the Green Party as an official party in March 1996. It thus became eligible to nominate candidates for state and federal office in the 1996 election. The Green Party nominated Ralph Nader as its presidential candidate in the 1996 election. Nader received less than five percent of the vote in that election.
[¶4] Anticipating that the Secretary of State would disqualify it as a party pursuant to 21-A M.R.S.A. §§ 301, 304 & 305 (1993),
in November 1996 the Green Party filed a complaint in the United States District Court. It sought, among other things, a declaratory judgment favorable to its position with respect to the meaning of 21-A M.R.S.A. § 301(1)(C): that the statute allows it to maintain qualified status because its gubernatorial candidate polled at least five percent of the vote in the last gubernatorial election. In accord with the parties’ agreement, the court enjoined the Secretary of State from disqualifying the Green Party pending resolution of the action and certified the question at issue. We conclude that section 301(1)(C) requires the Green Party to be disqualified as a political party because its candidate polled less than five percent of the vote in the last general election, and aceord-
ingly we answer the certified question in the affirmative.
Statutory Construction
[¶ 5] The Green Party contends that the statute allows a political party to retain qualified status if either its gubernatorial candidate polled at least five percent of the vote in the last gubernatorial election, or its presidential candidate polled at least five percent of the vote in the last presidential election. Conversely, the State contends that the statute allows a political party to maintain qualified status only if that party’s presidential or gubernatorial candidate polled at least five percent of the vote in the last biennial general election. Both parties contend that its position is supported by the plain language of the statute and is consistent with the overall statutory scheme.
[¶ 6] When faced with a question of statutory construction, we seek to discern the intent of the Legislature by examining the plain language contained in the statute and consider the particular language in the context of the whole statutory scheme. See, e.g.,
State v. Butt,
656 A.2d 1225, 1227 (Me.1995);
Jordan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
651 A.2d 358, 360 (Me.1994);
Fraser v. Barton,
628 A.2d 146, 148 (Me.1993);
Stanley v. Tilcon Maine, Inc.,
541 A.2d 951, 952 (Me.1988). In the instant case, however, our review of the statutory language and statutory scheme governing elections, Title 21-A, provides little guidance in resolving the question presented. The statutory language could be construed to support either party’s position. Further, a review of the statutory scheme reveals that either party’s interpretation of the statute could lead to an illogical result.
Legislative History
[¶ 7] We turn next to the legislative history of the statute. Each party contends that the statute’s history supports its respective interpretation. We find the interpretation propounded by the State to be more persuasive.
[¶ 8] The Statement of Fact accompanying a 1976 amendment that later became section 301 provides in pertinent part: “Under this section, a party that was on the ballot in the last general election could qualify again if ... its candidate for Governor or President received at least
2%
of the vote that
year.”
Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 2140, Statement of Fact (107th Legis. 1976). The reference to the last general election in the statement of fact establishes that the Legislature intended that qualified political parties show the requisite support in each biennial general election, whether that election is for Governor or President.
The language adopted in
the 1976 amendment is identical to the present language of section 301(1)(C).
21-A M.R.S.A. § 301(1)(C) (1993); Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 2140, § 321(1)(C) (107th Leg-is.1976). We conclude, therefore, that the legislative intent behind the current statutory language remains as it was expressed in 1976.
[¶ 9] We are also persuaded by the fact that the Legislature has twice rejected proposals that would have amended section 301 in a way consistent with the Green Party’s interpretation. In 1995 the Legislature considered and rejected a proposal that would have allowed a party to qualify to participate in a primary election if its designation was listed on the ballot in either of the last two preceding general elections and if its candidate for Governor or President polled at least five percent of the total vote cast for Governor or President in either of the last two preceding elections.
The Summary of the 1997 bill provides:
This bill increases access to the ballot and other election processes for new parties, ... as follows:
1. Modifies the frequency of the 5% vote requirement from the current 2-year cycle to a 4-year cycle_
L.D. 1376, Summary (118th Legis.1997) (emphasis added). The defeat of the 1995 and 1997 bills provides strong support for the State’s interpretation of section 301.
See Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,
478 U.S. 833, 846, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 3254, 92 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986), (quoting
N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aerospace Co.,
416 U.S. 267, 274-75, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 1762, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974) (footnotes omitted)) (“It is well established that when Congress revisits a statute giving rise to a longstanding administrative interpretation without pertinent change, the ‘congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency’s interpretation is persuasive evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress.’ ”);
Strickland v. Commissioner, Maine Dept. of Human Serv.,
96 F.3d 542, 547 (1st Cir.1996) (“This combination congressional awareness of an existing administrative praxis coupled with a concomitant unwillingness to revise that praxis-strongly implies legislative approval.”). In light of the clear statement of legislative intent and the subsequent actions of the Legislature, we conclude that section 301(1)(C) requires that a political party’s candidate must poll five percent of the vote in the last biennial general election in order for the party to maintain qualified status.
[¶ 10] We answer the certified question in the affirmative.