Maida Development Co v. Carolyn C. Hayslett

CourtCourt of Appeals of Virginia
DecidedJuly 25, 1995
Docket1419941
StatusUnpublished

This text of Maida Development Co v. Carolyn C. Hayslett (Maida Development Co v. Carolyn C. Hayslett) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Maida Development Co v. Carolyn C. Hayslett, (Va. Ct. App. 1995).

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Koontz, Elder and Senior Judge Duff

MAIDA DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, ET AL.

v. Record No. 1419-94-1 MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY JUDGE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. CAROLYN COX HAYSLETT JULY 25, 1995

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

Roger S. Mackey (Law Offices of Conrad A. Fontaine, on brief), for appellants.

Raphael C. Conner (Peninsula Legal Aid Center, Inc., on brief), for appellee.

Maida Development Company (employer) and its insurer appeal

an award of benefits by the Virginia Workers' Compensation

Commission (commission) to Carolyn Cox Hayslett (claimant).

Employer contends that the commission, in a divided decision,

erred in finding that claimant's fall was compensable either

because a condition of her employment contributed to her fall or

because her employment placed her in a position of more serious

risk which intensified the effect of her fall. For the following

reasons, we affirm the commission's finding of compensability.

We restate only those facts necessary to explain our

holding. Viewed in the light most favorable to the commission's

ruling, Crisp v. Brown's Tysons Corner Dodge, Inc., 1 Va. App. 503, 504, 339 S.E.2d 916, 916 (1986), the record discloses that

claimant and several other employees were seated during their

lunch break on a series of four steps without a landing or * Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication. railing in front of the double-door entrance to the workplace.

When an employee approached the steps and sought access to the

building, claimant was required to stand up and give way. At

that point she fell off the side of the steps and injured her

right leg.

The deputy commissioner inferred from the record, although

there was no direct evidence as to the vertical width of the

step, that the step offered claimant a limited area on which to

stand and that in allowing the employee to pass, claimant had

insufficient room to stand and, thus, fell off the steps. In

affirming the deputy commissioner's award, a majority of the

commission held that it was permitted to "take judicial notice of

the fact that steps normally present a limited area on which to

stand." The majority further held that even if claimant's fall

was not attributable to conditions of the step, her injury was

nonetheless compensable because the steps, a common gathering

place for employees on break, placed her at an elevated height

which increased the risk of injury. See Southland Corp. v.

Parson, 1 Va. App. 281, 287, 338 S.E.2d 162, 165 (1985).

One commissioner dissented, asserting that the record

supported a finding that the fall was unexplained. While not

directly addressing the assertion that the "limited area" of the

step caused the fall, the commissioner, relying on Memorial

Hospital v. Hairston, 2 Va. App. 677, 682, 347 S.E.2d 527, 529

(1986), asserted that unexplained falls in general are not

-2- compensable. 1

Proof that the employee fell on the employer's premises

"adds nothing and answers nothing, when the inquiry is, did the

injury arise out of the employment. It simply helps prove the

'in the course of' prongs of the compensability test." County of

Chesterfield v. Johnson, 237 Va. 180, 184, 376 S.E.2d 73, 76

(1989). Here, employer concedes that claimant's injury arose in

the course of her employment. To prove the "arising out of"

component, a claimant must show that a condition of the workplace

either caused or contributed to the fall. Id. at 184, 376 S.E.2d

at 75. Furthermore, "the causative danger must be peculiar to

the work and not common to the neighborhood. It must be

incidental to the character of the business and not independent

of the relation of master and servant." Richmond Memorial

Hospital v. Crane, 222 Va. 283, 285, 278 S.E.2d 877, 879 (1981).

We reject the analysis of the dissenting commissioner

because it proceeds from the mistaken belief that claimant's fall

was unexplained and applies standards applicable to such falls.

The legal standards for unexplained falls are inapplicable

because falls associated with steps are de facto "explained falls," that is falls which arise out of a known condition of the

workplace. When an individual falls while traversing a step or 1 This assertion is in error. In Hairston, this Court expressly stated that "[w]e do not here decide whether under different circumstances a presumption [of compensability for unexplained injuries] should be applied in a non-death case." Hairston, 2 Va. App. at 682, 347 S.E.2d at 529.

-3- series of steps in the workplace, the fall, unless idiopathic,

occurs, at least in part, as a result of traversing the step(s).

The presence of the steps explains the fall, obviating the need

to resort to the analysis applicable to unexplained falls.

The mere fact that the presence of steps explains, at least

in part, the fall does not support a finding that the injury

arises from the employment. Where the steps are not unusual and

no other condition of the employment contributes to the fall, the

injury is not compensable. Steps are a risk of everyday life

which may, depending on the specific facts of the case, be

transformed into a risk peculiar to the workplace. We hold that the record supports the commission's principal

position that claimant suffered a fall arising out of a condition

of her workplace and that this condition was not "common to the

neighborhood." Crane, 222 Va. at 285, 278 S.E.2d at 879. To

satisfy the "arising out of" prong of the compensability test,

claimant had to prove that "there is apparent to the rational

mind upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is

required to be performed and the resulting injury." Bradshaw v.

Aronovitch, 170 Va. 329, 335, 196 S.E. 684, 686 (1938) (emphasis

added); see also Marketing Properties, Inc. v. Hill, 17 Va. App.

431, 434, 437 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1993) (en banc). Although

claimant testified that she did not "know how I went off the

steps or anything else," the record as a whole affords an

-4- adequate explanation of how her fall occurred. 2 A review of the

record in the light favorable to the claimant supports a finding

that the steps were unusual because there was no landing,

providing insufficient room upon which an employee might stand in

order to give way. The absence of a railing, also indicated by

the record, to protect against a fall further supports finding a

causative link between a condition of the workplace and

claimant's fall. Moreover, the condition of the workplace which contributed

to claimant's fall was not merely the unusual nature of the steps

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Related

Memorial Hosp. of Martinsville v. Hairston
347 S.E.2d 527 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1986)
Richmond Memorial Hospital v. Crane
278 S.E.2d 877 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1981)
Hercules, Inc. v. Stump
341 S.E.2d 394 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1986)
Crisp v. Brown's Tysons Corner Dodge, Inc.
339 S.E.2d 916 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1986)
County of Chesterfield v. Johnson
376 S.E.2d 73 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1989)
Winegar v. International Telephone & Telegraph
337 S.E.2d 760 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1985)
Bradshaw v. Aronovitch
196 S.E. 684 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1938)
Marketing Profiles, Inc. v. Hill
437 S.E.2d 727 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1993)
Southland Corp. v. Parson
338 S.E.2d 162 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1985)
Reserve Life Insurance v. Hosey
159 S.E.2d 633 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1968)
Kraf Construction Services, Inc. v. Ingram
437 S.E.2d 424 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1993)

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