IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
MAHRIA WILLIAMS, No. 88521-9-I
Petitioner, DIVISION ONE
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION SKAGIT COUNTY, by and through DAVID NEWSOM, Skagit County Prosecutor, and JUDGE PAUL NIELSEN, Skagit County District Court,
Respondents.
SMITH, J. — Mahria Williams appeals the superior court’s order denying
her petition for habeas relief from a district court order requiring her to undergo
competency restoration in her misdemeanor cases. She argues that her restraint
is unlawful because the district court ordered her to undergo competency
restoration without proof of a compelling state interest. We conclude that a
preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that a compelling state interest
exists to order competency restoration. We therefore affirm the superior court’s
denial of Williams’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
FACTS
The State charged Mahria Williams with driving under the influence (DUI)
and domestic violence assault in the fourth degree, both misdemeanors. The
district court ordered Williams to undergo a competency evaluation. On May 5, No. 88521-9-I/2
2025, an evaluator reported that Williams did not have the capacity to understand
the nature of the proceedings or assist in her defense, but a reasonable
likelihood existed that her competency could be restored. On June 4, 2025,
Williams was ordered to undergo inpatient competency restoration in a pending
unrelated felony matter.
At a district court hearing on July 2, 2025, the State asked the court to
order Williams to undergo competency restoration on the misdemeanor charges.
The State argued that her misdemeanor charges “automatic[ally]” constituted a
compelling state interest authorizing competency restoration and that the State
could not refile the charges if dismissed for lack of competency. Williams
opposed restoration and asked the court to dismiss the charges based on lack of
competency. Williams pointed out that the State must prove a compelling state
interest for the court to order competency restoration and that the statutory
default for nonfelony serious offenses is dismissal without prejudice, so the State
could refile the charges if her felony restoration proved unsuccessful.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court referenced the probable
cause declarations and stated, “we have an Assault 4 Domestic Violence and a
DUI” so “I think there is a compelling state interest.” The district court also noted
that the DUI probable cause declaration indicated Williams’s blood alcohol
content (BAC) was measured at “a 144 and a 168 [sic],” which the court
considered “fairly high.” In its written order, the district court expressly found a
compelling state interest by a preponderance of the evidence and ordered
2 No. 88521-9-I/3
Williams to undergo 29 days of inpatient restoration treatment under former
RCW 10.77.088 (2024) (recodified as RCW 10.77.650).1
Williams petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the superior court,
challenging the lawfulness of the inpatient competency restoration order.
Williams argued that the State misstated the law at the district court hearing and
presented no evidence that it had a compelling interest in restoration. Williams
also argued that the district court’s reference to the evidence of probable cause
declarations and the “fairly high” blood alcohol level were insufficient to
demonstrate a compelling state interest for competency restoration. Williams
asked the superior court to vacate the order for inpatient restoration and either
dismiss the charges or remand for a full hearing. In response, the State argued
that the competency restoration order was “legal and valid” because the district
court properly found a compelling state interest based on “the quality and
severity of the pending charges” as described in the probable cause affidavits.
The State also argued that the prosecutor’s “inadvertent misstatement” of the law
at the hearing did not invalidate the district court’s findings.
On July 22, 2025, following a hearing, the superior court denied the
petition and ruled that the district court “made a sufficient finding [of] . . .
compelling state interest for [competency] restoration” and that the competency
order was “legal and valid.”
Williams moved for discretionary review of the superior court’s order
denying her habeas petition. A commissioner of this court ruled that this court
1 LAWS OF 2025, ch. 358, § 2 (effective July 27, 2025).
3 No. 88521-9-I/4
will treat the notice as a notice of appeal and granted Williams’s request for
accelerated review.
DISCUSSION
Habeas Corpus Review
“A writ of habeas corpus is a civil action for the enforcement of the right to
personal liberty.” In re Pers. Restraint of Becker, 96 Wn. App. 902, 906, 982
P.2d 639 (1999). Under RCW 7.36.010, “[e]very person restrained of his or her
liberty under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to
inquire into the cause of the restraint, and shall be delivered therefrom when
illegal.” The “purpose of judicial review of restraint,” including habeas review, “is
to protect against governmental oppression and power exercised without law.” In
re Pers. Restraint of Grantham, 168 Wn.2d 204, 214, 227 P.3d 285 (2010). We
review de novo the superior court’s decision whether to grant a writ of habeas
corpus. State v. Dallman, 112 Wn. App. 578, 583, 50 P.3d 274 (2002).
As a preliminary matter, the parties disagree as to the substantive scope
of habeas corpus review. The State contends that Williams is not entitled to
appellate review of the district court’s compelling interest finding via a writ of
habeas corpus, so the only question is whether Williams “proved the district court
did something altogether ‘illegal.’ ” Williams asserts that habeas relief is a proper
mechanism for challenging an unlawful competency order and that this court can
and must consider the district court’s analysis and findings in determining
whether its decision to order restoration was authorized by the evidence before it
and the controlling law.
4 No. 88521-9-I/5
“Traditionally, the writ of habeas corpus could not be used to attack even
an erroneous judgment, unless that judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction.” In
re Pers. Restraint of Runyan, 121 Wn.2d 432, 441, 853 P.2d 424 (1993).
“However, by case law, court rule, and ultimately, by statute, consideration of
collateral challenges expanded.” In re Pers. Restraint of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123,
129, 267 P.3d 324 (2011). Today, RCW 7.36.130(1) permits courts to review a
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
MAHRIA WILLIAMS, No. 88521-9-I
Petitioner, DIVISION ONE
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION SKAGIT COUNTY, by and through DAVID NEWSOM, Skagit County Prosecutor, and JUDGE PAUL NIELSEN, Skagit County District Court,
Respondents.
SMITH, J. — Mahria Williams appeals the superior court’s order denying
her petition for habeas relief from a district court order requiring her to undergo
competency restoration in her misdemeanor cases. She argues that her restraint
is unlawful because the district court ordered her to undergo competency
restoration without proof of a compelling state interest. We conclude that a
preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that a compelling state interest
exists to order competency restoration. We therefore affirm the superior court’s
denial of Williams’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
FACTS
The State charged Mahria Williams with driving under the influence (DUI)
and domestic violence assault in the fourth degree, both misdemeanors. The
district court ordered Williams to undergo a competency evaluation. On May 5, No. 88521-9-I/2
2025, an evaluator reported that Williams did not have the capacity to understand
the nature of the proceedings or assist in her defense, but a reasonable
likelihood existed that her competency could be restored. On June 4, 2025,
Williams was ordered to undergo inpatient competency restoration in a pending
unrelated felony matter.
At a district court hearing on July 2, 2025, the State asked the court to
order Williams to undergo competency restoration on the misdemeanor charges.
The State argued that her misdemeanor charges “automatic[ally]” constituted a
compelling state interest authorizing competency restoration and that the State
could not refile the charges if dismissed for lack of competency. Williams
opposed restoration and asked the court to dismiss the charges based on lack of
competency. Williams pointed out that the State must prove a compelling state
interest for the court to order competency restoration and that the statutory
default for nonfelony serious offenses is dismissal without prejudice, so the State
could refile the charges if her felony restoration proved unsuccessful.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court referenced the probable
cause declarations and stated, “we have an Assault 4 Domestic Violence and a
DUI” so “I think there is a compelling state interest.” The district court also noted
that the DUI probable cause declaration indicated Williams’s blood alcohol
content (BAC) was measured at “a 144 and a 168 [sic],” which the court
considered “fairly high.” In its written order, the district court expressly found a
compelling state interest by a preponderance of the evidence and ordered
2 No. 88521-9-I/3
Williams to undergo 29 days of inpatient restoration treatment under former
RCW 10.77.088 (2024) (recodified as RCW 10.77.650).1
Williams petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the superior court,
challenging the lawfulness of the inpatient competency restoration order.
Williams argued that the State misstated the law at the district court hearing and
presented no evidence that it had a compelling interest in restoration. Williams
also argued that the district court’s reference to the evidence of probable cause
declarations and the “fairly high” blood alcohol level were insufficient to
demonstrate a compelling state interest for competency restoration. Williams
asked the superior court to vacate the order for inpatient restoration and either
dismiss the charges or remand for a full hearing. In response, the State argued
that the competency restoration order was “legal and valid” because the district
court properly found a compelling state interest based on “the quality and
severity of the pending charges” as described in the probable cause affidavits.
The State also argued that the prosecutor’s “inadvertent misstatement” of the law
at the hearing did not invalidate the district court’s findings.
On July 22, 2025, following a hearing, the superior court denied the
petition and ruled that the district court “made a sufficient finding [of] . . .
compelling state interest for [competency] restoration” and that the competency
order was “legal and valid.”
Williams moved for discretionary review of the superior court’s order
denying her habeas petition. A commissioner of this court ruled that this court
1 LAWS OF 2025, ch. 358, § 2 (effective July 27, 2025).
3 No. 88521-9-I/4
will treat the notice as a notice of appeal and granted Williams’s request for
accelerated review.
DISCUSSION
Habeas Corpus Review
“A writ of habeas corpus is a civil action for the enforcement of the right to
personal liberty.” In re Pers. Restraint of Becker, 96 Wn. App. 902, 906, 982
P.2d 639 (1999). Under RCW 7.36.010, “[e]very person restrained of his or her
liberty under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to
inquire into the cause of the restraint, and shall be delivered therefrom when
illegal.” The “purpose of judicial review of restraint,” including habeas review, “is
to protect against governmental oppression and power exercised without law.” In
re Pers. Restraint of Grantham, 168 Wn.2d 204, 214, 227 P.3d 285 (2010). We
review de novo the superior court’s decision whether to grant a writ of habeas
corpus. State v. Dallman, 112 Wn. App. 578, 583, 50 P.3d 274 (2002).
As a preliminary matter, the parties disagree as to the substantive scope
of habeas corpus review. The State contends that Williams is not entitled to
appellate review of the district court’s compelling interest finding via a writ of
habeas corpus, so the only question is whether Williams “proved the district court
did something altogether ‘illegal.’ ” Williams asserts that habeas relief is a proper
mechanism for challenging an unlawful competency order and that this court can
and must consider the district court’s analysis and findings in determining
whether its decision to order restoration was authorized by the evidence before it
and the controlling law.
4 No. 88521-9-I/5
“Traditionally, the writ of habeas corpus could not be used to attack even
an erroneous judgment, unless that judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction.” In
re Pers. Restraint of Runyan, 121 Wn.2d 432, 441, 853 P.2d 424 (1993).
“However, by case law, court rule, and ultimately, by statute, consideration of
collateral challenges expanded.” In re Pers. Restraint of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123,
129, 267 P.3d 324 (2011). Today, RCW 7.36.130(1) permits courts to review a
writ of habeas corpus alleging “that rights guaranteed the petitioner by the
Constitution of the state of Washington or of the United States have been
violated.” See Woods v. Burton, 8 Wn. App. 13, 15, 503 P.2d 1079 (1972)
(noting that a writ of habeas corpus “may be utilized to secure relief from any
restraint which violates basic and fundamental freedoms” and “should not be
restricted to a determination of the legality of detention.”); Holt v. Morris, 84
Wn.2d 841, 843, 529 P.2d 1081 (1974) (“the ambit of habeas corpus procedure”
has been “enhance[d]” “substantially beyond the pre-existent traditional
limitations.”) (overruled on other grounds by Wright v. Morris, 85 Wn.2d 899, 540
P.2d 893 (1975)).
It is well established that habeas corpus is not a substitute for an appeal
from a criminal conviction. See In re Pers. Restraint of Hagler, 97 Wn.2d 818,
824, 650 P.2d 1103 (1982) (“ ‘The reasons for narrowly limiting the grounds for
collateral attack on final judgments are well known and basic to our adversary
system of justice’ ” (quoting United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184, 99 S.
Ct. 2235, 60 L. Ed. 2d 805 (1979)). Issuance of a writ of habeas corpus cannot
result in dismissal of the charges. Weiss v. Thompson, 120 Wn. App. 402, 407,
5 No. 88521-9-I/6
85 P.3d 944 (2004). But this case involves a petition for habeas relief from a
pretrial competency restoration order, not a postconviction collateral attack on a
judgment and sentence.
Our Supreme Court’s decision in Born v. Thompson is instructive. Born
was charged with a misdemeanor and found incompetent to stand trial. 154
Wn.2d 749, 751-52, 117 P.3d 1098 (2005). The district court determined that the
charge involved a violent act and ordered competency restoration. Born, 154
Wn.2d at 752. Born filed a habeas corpus petition in superior court, arguing that
the State had not proved that the facts in the police report supported the district
court’s determination that the crime involved a violent act. Id. at 753. The
superior court denied the petition and Born appealed. Id. at 753. Our Supreme
Court held that the facts in the police incident report did not provide clear and
convincing evidence that Born's actions constituted a violent act, as required for
competency restoration. Id. at 767-68. Consequently, the court remanded to the
superior court to grant the petition for habeas corpus to the extent of vacating its
finding of a violent act. Id. at 769.
This court followed a similar approach in Butler v. Kato, 137 Wn. App. 515,
154 P.3d 259, 261 (2007). Butler was charged with DUI and the district court
imposed pretrial release conditions. Butler, 137 Wn. App. at 520. Butler
challenged two of the conditions by writ of habeas corpus, arguing that they were
not authorized by court rules and violated his constitutional rights. Id. at 520.
The superior court denied the writ and Butler appealed. Id. at 520. This court
recognized that “the writ of habeas corpus is an original action” wherein “[t]he
6 No. 88521-9-I/7
petitioner does not seek review of another court's decision, but rather sets forth
allegations detailing the unlawfulness of detention.” Id. at 520-21. It reviewed
the case de novo, identifying and considering the evidence and analysis “[t]he
district court appear[ed] to have based its decision [on],” including Butler’s arrest
record and the accompanying police reports. Id. at 521, 522-23, 528. After
concluding that “nothing in Butler's record, other than the facts surrounding his
arrest” supported the State's assertions” and that “[t]he State's arguments do not
outweigh the risk of erroneous deprivation of Butler's constitutional rights,” this
court reversed and remanded the superior court’s denial of habeas corpus relief.
Id. at 528-29, 532.
Here, Williams is restrained under the district court’s competency
restoration order. See Weiss v. Thompson, 120 Wn. App. 402, 407, 85 P.3d 944
(2004) (“Incapacitated criminal defendants have liberty interests in freedom.”);
Born, 154 Wn.2d at 766 (a person ordered to undergo competency restoration is
“sufficiently under present restraint to seek habeas relief” from the restoration
order by a higher court). Her petition for writ of habeas corpus alleged that the
district court unlawfully ordered her to 29 days of inpatient restoration in violation
of former RCW 10.77.088. In determining whether the superior court erred in
denying habeas relief, we will not conduct a review for errors in the district court’s
reasoning. Instead, we review de novo whether the evidence presented by the
State supports a compelling state interest to order competency restoration.
7 No. 88521-9-I/8
Compelling State Interest
Williams contends the district court erroneously ordered her to undergo
competency restoration for misdemeanors without requiring the prosecutor to
prove a compelling state interest and that the superior court erred in refusing to
deliver her from this unlawful restraint. We disagree.
“Chapter 10.77 RCW governs the procedures and standards trial courts
use to judge the competency of defendants to stand trial.” State v. Coley, 180
Wn.2d 543, 551, 326 P.3d 702 (2014). Where a defendant facing a nonfelony
charge defined as a “serious” offense under former RCW 10.77.092 (recodified
as RCW 10.77.665) is found to be incompetent, then the court “shall dismiss” the
proceedings without prejudice unless the prosecutor objects to dismissal and
moves for an order for competency restoration treatment. Former RCW
10.77.088 (recodified as RCW 10.77.650). At the hearing, the prosecutor must
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a compelling state interest
exists to order competency restoration treatment. Former RCW 10.77.088(1)(b)
(recodified as RCW 10.77.650(1)(b)).
That Williams is incompetent to stand trial and that her pending
misdemeanor charges are serious nonfelony offenses is not disputed. The
question is whether the State proved by a preponderance that the evidence
supports a “compelling state interest” to order competency restoration.
In determining whether the prosecutor proved that the asserted state
interest in ordering restoration is compelling, the court “may consider prior
criminal history, prior history in treatment, prior history of violence, the quality and
8 No. 88521-9-I/9
severity of the pending charges, [and] any history that suggests whether
competency restoration treatment is likely to be successful, in addition to the
factors listed under RCW 10.77.665.” RCW 10.77.650(1)(b). The additional
factors include: (i) The charge includes an allegation that the defendant actually inflicted bodily or emotional harm on another person or that the defendant created a reasonable apprehension of bodily or emotional harm to another; (ii) The extent of the impact of the alleged offense on the basic human need for security of the citizens within the jurisdiction; (iii) The number and nature of related charges pending against the defendant; (iv) The length of potential confinement if the defendant is convicted; and (v) The number of potential and actual victims or persons impacted by the defendant's alleged acts.
RCW 10.77.665(3)(b).
Chapter 10.77 RCW does not define “compelling state interest.” Williams
points out that the statute makes dismissal the default and limits restoration to
cases where a compelling state interest requires departure from it. She contends
that the State needs to make this showing by presenting evidence, beyond the
identity of the charges, that a special need exists in ordering restoration of a
particular defendant. She further contends that the prosecutor at the district
court hearing presented no evidence relevant to the analysis and that the district
court and superior court erred by ordering restoration based solely on a cursory
description of the charges.
But the district court found a compelling state interest to order competency
restoration treatment by a preponderance of the evidence after consulting two
9 No. 88521-9-I/10
probable cause affidavits submitted by the State. RCW 10.77.650(1)(b)
authorizes district courts to order competency restoration treatment for
defendants facing a serious nonfelony charge based on “the quality and severity
of the pending charges.” And under RCW 10.77.665(3)(b)(i), (ii), and (v), courts
may consider whether the defendant “actually inflicted bodily or emotional harm
on another person,” the “extent of the impact of the alleged offense on the basic
human need for security of the citizens within the jurisdiction,” and “[t]he number
of potential and actual victims or persons impacted by the defendant’s alleged
acts.”
We conclude that the State proved by a preponderance of evidence that
the record supports a compelling state interest to order competency restoration.
The probable cause affidavit for the DUI indicates that Williams reported that she
drove her car into a guardrail after drinking whiskey for several hours before
getting behind the wheel. According to the affidavit, an initial infrared analysis of
her breath revealed a blood alcohol concentration of at least 0.144 percent.
Testing of a second sample revealed a higher reading of up to 0.168 percent,
more than twice the legal limit. And in the probable cause affidavit for the
assault, Williams’s niece alleged that Williams tripped her, pushed her into a
dresser and tried to punch her. Deputies stated that Williams “appeared to be
heavily intoxicated” and Williams’s mother said “this is the most violent she has
ever been.” “Public safety is clearly a compelling interest.” Robinson v. City of
Seattle, 102 Wn. App. 795, 823, 10 P.3d 452 (2000).
10 No. 88521-9-I/11
We do not find error in the determination that there was a compelling state
interest to order competency restoration. Because “legal cause” exists for
Williams’s restraint, the superior court did not err in denying her habeas petition.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: