Mahopac Isle, Inc. v. Agar

39 Misc. 2d 1, 239 N.Y.S.2d 614, 1963 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2098
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedApril 26, 1963
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 39 Misc. 2d 1 (Mahopac Isle, Inc. v. Agar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mahopac Isle, Inc. v. Agar, 39 Misc. 2d 1, 239 N.Y.S.2d 614, 1963 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2098 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1963).

Opinion

Joseph F. Gagliardi, J.

This is an article 78 proceeding to review a determination of the Planning Board of the Town of Carmel in Putnam County, disapproving a subdivision proposed for Canopus Island in Lake Mahopac which is located in the town. On the initial hearing, the court determined that the board’s return did not comply either with the second paragraph of section 282 of the Town Law or the provisions of the order to show cause and, consequently, directed that body to file an amended return in accordance with the mandate of section 1291 of the Civil Practice Act. Those directions have been complied with and also the court has received additional affidavits on behalf of the parties which are hereby made a part of the record in this matter.

The record discloses that in September of 1961, petitioner obtained title to this 44-acre island which is zoned for residential use, and in December, 1961, submitted what it refers to as a proposed subdivision map” to the Planning Board for approval. The board rejected this application on January 9, 1962, stating “ existing laws and regulations are not sufficiently comprehensive to afford consideration of your application at this time.” Following several conferences, discussions and exchanges of letters, this refusal was vacated, in effect, by the acceptance of petitioner’s application which thereafter was placed before the Planning Board and considered at a regular meeting on July 11, 1962. While there was some uncertainty at the outset of this article 78 proceeding concerning the date of the board’s determination disapproving the application (see initial return and prior decision), the board chairman in a supplemental affidavit concedes that “ under date of August 27, 1962, the Board made findings which stated reasons for rejection of the application.”

Respondents urge that this proceeding is not timely. Section 282 of the Town Law requires that “ [a]ny person * * * aggrieved by any decision of the planning board concerning such plat * * * may present to * * * the supreme court a petition * * * within thirty days after the filing of the decision in the office of the board.” A petition dated September 26, 1962, was presented to the Supreme Court and an order to show cause commencing this proceeding issued on that date. Clearly, this proceeding has been instituted within the required [3]*3time period. However, there is a more serious question — a period of 47 days elapsed from the time of the hearing, July 11, to the date of determination, August 27. Section 276 of the Town Law reads, in part, as follows: “ For the purpose of providing for the future growth and development of the town and affording adequate facilities for the housing, transportation, distribution, comfort, convenience, safety, health and welfare of its population, such town board may by resolution authorize and empower the planning board to approve plats showing lots, blocks or sites, with or without streets or highways, within that part of the town outside the limits of any incorporated city or village. For the same purposes and under the same conditions, the town board may, by resolution, authorize and empower the planning board to pass and approve the development of plats already filed in the office of the clerk of the county in which such plat is located if such plats are entirely or partially undeveloped. A public hearing shall be held by the planning board within thirty days after the time of submission of such plat for approval, which hearing shall be advertised in a newspaper of general circulation in such town of at least five days before such hearing. The planning board may thereupon approve, modify and approve, or disapprove such plat. The approval required by this section, or the refusal to approve, shall take place within forty-five days from and after the time of the hearing for the approval or disapproval of the plat. In the event that such hearing shall not be held, or that such plat shall not have been disapproved after such hearing, within the time prescribed therefor, such plat shall be deemed to have been approved, and the certificate of the clerk of such town as to the date of submission or hearing for the approval or disapproval of the plat, as the case may be, and the failure to take action thereon within such time, shall be issued on demand and shall be sufficient in lieu of the written endorsement or other evidence of approval herein required. The ground of refusal of any plat submitted shall be stated upon the records of such planning board.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner urges that this “ proposed subdivision plat ” must be deemed approved due to the failure of the board to observe the time requirements of section 276. The board contends that the 45-day limitation period is not involved since the ‘ ‘ submission ” here was for “ preliminary ” approval, rather than for any final action in accordance with the Land Subdivision Regulations for the Town of Carmel, adopted by the Planning Board and approved by the Town Board pursuant to the authority of section 272 of the Town Law.

[4]*4Section 276 of the Town Law is, in one aspect, a default statute since it grants approval to a plat subdivision by virtue of official inaction (Matter of Levin v. Thornbury, 2 A D 2d 774 [2d Dept.]). While this procedure is utilized to prevent Planning Boards from denying individual rights simply by refusing to reach a decision, “ [n]o court should construe a default statute in such a manner as to penalize the future and orderly growth of a community unless there is no other construction open.” (Matter of A. E. Ottaviano, Inc., v. Zerello, 33 Misc 2d 263, 266.) Moreover, it is well settled that the rules and regulations which have been adopted to implement the application of the standards set forth, inter alia, in sections 273 and 277 of the Town Law may not conflict with the basic requirements already established by statute (cf. Matter of Gruner v. Haefeli, 12 A D 2d 838 [3d Dept.]; Lunmor Homes v. Johnson, 122 N. Y. S. 2d 149 [Supreme Ct., Westchester County]).

The Regulations of the Planning Board of the Town of Carmel provide that the subdividing owner * * * shall apply for and secure approval of such proposed subdivision in accordance with the following procedure, which includes, basically, two steps: (1) Preliminary Layout (2) Subdivision Plat.” The Preliminary Layout ” consists of a map showing the location of the entire property under consideration in relation to surrounding property and streets. All pertinent features, such as existing structures, streets, railroads, water bodies and other physical characteristics which would influence the subdivision design and a topographical description at a contour interval of not more than five feet are to be included on the “ Preliminary Layout. ’ ’ Further, it shall show the location, width and approximate grade of all proposed streets; the approximate location, dimensions and area of all proposed or existing lots; all property proposed to be set aside for playground or park use and the proposed provision of water supply, fire protection, disposal of sanitary waste, storm water drainage, street trees, street lighting fixtures, street signs and sidewalks, data on which must be available for consideration at this stage. (Regulations of Planning Bd., Town of Carmel, art. IV, § 1, subds.

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Bluebook (online)
39 Misc. 2d 1, 239 N.Y.S.2d 614, 1963 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2098, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mahopac-isle-inc-v-agar-nysupct-1963.