Mahoney v. Micka

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedJune 3, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-04043
StatusUnknown

This text of Mahoney v. Micka (Mahoney v. Micka) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mahoney v. Micka, (S.D. Ohio 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

PATRICK MAHONEY,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:24-cv-4043 Judge Michael H. Watson Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

JORDAN MICKA, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

The parties’ Stipulated Motion to Seal Filed Documents And/Or Redact (Doc. 16) is before the Court. In it, the parties seek to seal, in its entirety, Exhibit 1 to the Complaint, which is the Membership Interest Purchase Agreement (“Purchase Agreement”) underlying this breach-of- contract action. (Id. at 3). The parties say the Purchase Agreement should be sealed because it contains “confidential business information.” (Id. at 4). More specifically, it includes “information related to LOWGLOW’s assets and liabilities” that “may provide a substantial advantage to competitors and could cause significant and irreparable harm to LOWGLOW.” (Id.). The Court “has an obligation to keep its records open for public inspection [and] that obligation is not conditioned upon the desires of the parties to the case.” Harrison v. Proctor & Gamble Co., No. 1:15-cv-514, 2017 WL 11454396, at *1–2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 11, 2017) (citing Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 2016)). Accordingly, the moving party has a “heavy” burden of overcoming a “‘strong presumption in favor of openness’ as to court records.” Shane Grp., Inc., 825 F.3d at 305 (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1179–80 (6th Cir. 1983)). Parties who move to seal or redact documents must demonstrate: “(1) a compelling interest in sealing the records; (2) that the interest in sealing outweighs the public’s interest in accessing the records; and (3) that the request is narrowly tailored.” Kondash v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 767 F. App’x 635, 637 (6th Cir. 2019). A moving party must also analyze “document-by-document, line-by-line” whether the materials meet this standard for sealing or redaction. Shane Grp., Inc., 825 F.3d at 305–306.

Here, the parties have not made the required “document-by-document, line-by-line” showing. Id. Instead, they merely say that the Purchase Agreement contains information that could put Defendant Jordan Micka’s limited liability corporation, LOWGLOW, at a competitive disadvantage. (Doc. 16 at 4; see also Doc. 1 at ¶ 3). But, as noted, the public has a right to access the Court’s records, and that right is not limited by a party’s conclusory wishes. See, e.g., Grae v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 134 F.4th 927, 932 (6th Cir. 2025) (saying “a party’s mere assertion of its interest in confidentiality” is not enough to warrant sealing court records); Shane Grp., Inc., 825 F.3d at 308 (“[I]n civil litigation, only trade secrets, information covered by a recognized privilege (such as the attorney-client privilege), and information required by statute to be maintained in confidence (such as the name of a minor victim of a sexual assault), is typically enough to overcome the presumption of access.” (quotation omitted)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2 (allowing for very limited redactions in court filings). Instead, “the proponents of secrecy must show that ‘disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury.’” Grae, 134 F.4th at 932 (quoting Shane Grp., Inc., 825 F.3d at 307)). The parties do not identify any specific injury that could be caused by the Purchase Agreement’s disclosure. (Doc. 16 at 3–4). Instead, they offer only “[p]latitudes about competitively sensitive information” and “bald assertions that disclosure” would harm LOWGLOW’s “competitive position.” Grae, 134 F.4th at 932 (internal quotation and quotation marks omitted). Such generalities are not enough to establish a compelling interest in the Purchase Agreement’s non-disclosure. Id. What’s more, the Purchase Agreement was filed with the original Complaint eight months ago and has been on the public docket since that date. (Doc. 1 (filed on October 9, 2024)). The parties do not say Defendants or LOWGLOW have suffered any injury as a result. (Doc. 16 at 3– 4). And at base, the parties do not have a compelling interest in sealing information that is already publicly available. See S.R.X. v. Fleming, No. 3:20-cv-126, 2020 WL 12991127, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 24, 2020) (“The Court finds no compelling interest exists to seal materials that are already publicly available.”); Ecolab, Inc. v. Ridley, No. 1:22-cv-050, 2023 WL 11762683, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. July 13, 2023) (denying a request to seal an attachment that had been “part of the public record of a court hearing” for four months). In sum, the parties have not detailed why the exhibit should be sealed or provided the required analysis under Shane Group and its progeny. Therefore, the Motion (Doc. 16) is DENIED without prejudice. The parties are reminded that they must file a joint status report on their settlement efforts on or before June 9, 2025, unless the case is dismissed before that date. (Doc. 15). IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: June 3, 2025 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson KIMBERLY A. JOLSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Mahoney v. Micka, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mahoney-v-micka-ohsd-2025.