Magruder v. Richardson

332 F. Supp. 1363, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12275
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedJuly 27, 1971
DocketNo. 70 C 558(3)
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 332 F. Supp. 1363 (Magruder v. Richardson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Magruder v. Richardson, 332 F. Supp. 1363, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12275 (E.D. Mo. 1971).

Opinion

ORDER

WEBSTER, District Judge.

This is an action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social Security [1364]*1364Act, wherein plaintiff seeks judicial review of the decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare denying her application, filed on August 8, 1968, for disability insurance benefits under 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) and 423. Both parties have moved for summary judgment, have waived oral argument and have submitted memoranda in support of their motions.

In her application, plaintiff has alleged that since March 23, 1963 she has been unable to engage in substantial gainful activity due to a heart condition, an enlarged liver and constant back pain. By letter dated Dec. 16, 1968 from the Area Office of Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social Security Administration, Division of Disability Operations in St. Louis, Missouri her request was denied. Plaintiff protested this ruling. Her application was reconsidered and again denied on July 3, 1969. Plaintiff requested a hearing on Dec. 9, 1969. Such hearing was held March 12, 1970 in St. Louis, Missouri and on April 17, 1970, the Hearing Examiner entered a decision determining that plaintiff was not entitled to disability insurance benefits. The Appeals Council, Bureau of Hearings and Appeals affirmed the Hearing Examiner’s decision on Sept. 14, 1970. Thus, plaintiff has exhausted all administrative remedies on her August 8, 1968 application. Plaintiff had filed applications for disability insurance benefits on July 6, 1964 and June 9, 1967. These applications were administratively denied on Jan. 18, 1965 and Nov. 17, 1967 respectively. Plaintiff did not appeal these denials to higher agencies within the Social Security Administration and they are not before this court.

Plaintiff was born in January of 1921 in the State of Missouri. She completed high school and has since lived in the general metropolitan area of St. Louis, Missouri. She presently lives there with her husband. Their two children are grown. She was 42 years of age in March, 1963, the month and year of the onset of the disability alleged. In 1950, she was hired by the Reynolds Company, a metal producer. In the early years of her employment she inspected aluminum foil labels which would pass in front of her on a conveyor and did some packing and wrapping. Later she performed different services, answering the telephone, operating an addressograph machine and also performing certain supervisory tasks on the factory floor. She worked steadily for almost 13 years and her earnings record shows steady increase into March, 1963, the year she terminated active work. Although she has not worked since this time, she still remains on the company rolls.

About a year prior to March, 1963, she complained of developing tendencies towards episodes of extreme fatigue. She also complained of swelling in her legs and ankles. She became dizzy and nauseous, but never actually fainted or became unconscious. In 1962 she began consulting with physicians and has been consulting them steadily ever since. Her attending physician has been Dr. George D. Wohlsehlaeger, an osteopathic general practitioner. In April, 1963, he had her hospitalized for tests. She was hospitalized again in February, 1965 when she underwent a hysterectomy. Her most recent period in the hospital was in 1969 at which time she complained that her fatigue was worse than in 1963.

Plaintiff has not attempted any gainful employment since March, 1963. She is on numerous types of heart medication and takes pills to reduce low back pain. She states that this back pain is present constantly and is intensified by physical exertion. If she walks more than a block, she testifies as to becoming extremely short of breath. After making a bed at home, she is exhausted for about an hour. She is capable of cooking a meal, but does not attempt to cook for several persons or entertain. She drives her car infrequently. Her appetite is fair and she sleeps reasonably well. She expects Reynolds to put her on “disability” status and pay her monthly benefits if she is found to be [1365]*1365disabled under the Social Security Act. Financial support is presently from her husband’s earnings in full time employment.

The evidence presented to the hearing officer is summarized in the Appendix, which is a part of this Order.

The Eighth Circuit in Celebrezze v. Bolas, 316 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1963), Celebrezze v. Sutton, 338 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1964) and Brasher v. Celebrezze, 340 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1965) has set out the legal standards applicable to appeals under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The claimant has the burden of proving his disability before the Secretary, whose findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.

“Substantial evidence” is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Celebrezze v. Bolas, Celebrezze v. Sutton, Brasher v. Celebrezze, supra. Where there is conflict in the evidence, it is for the Appeals Council on behalf of the Secretary to resolve that conflict and not for a reviewing court. Celebrezze v. Bolas, Celebrezze v. Sutton, Brasher v. Celebrezze, supra.

The statutory definition of “disability” in §§ 416(i) and 423 imposes a threefold requirement: (1) that there be a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months, (2) that there be an inability to engage in substantial gainful activity and (3) that the inability be the result of the impairment.

Plaintiff last met the earnings requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 416(i) (3) (B) and § 423(c) (1) (B) on December 31, 1968. Therefore, it was incumbent on her to establish that she suffered from the disability of which she complains as of or before that date. The Hearing Examiner, in an opinion affirmed by the Appeals Council, found that plaintiff failed to qualify under the second and third requirements, supra. This court must affirm this finding if it is supported by substantial evidence.

None of the doctors who have' examined plaintiff or have studied the records of her case doubt that she is suffering discomfort. There is only disagreement as to what is the cause of her illness and the degree of physical activity she may maintain. Only Dr. Wohlsehlaeger presently believes it has been conclusively demonstrated that plaintiff is suffering from mitral stenosis and is unable to engage in some kind of sedentary employment. Dr. Gardner originally agreed with Dr. Wohlschlaeger’s diagnosis, but has subsequently had doubts. He has classified her under class II of the American Heart Association’s categories, indicating that in his opinion she is capable of sedentary activities.

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Bluebook (online)
332 F. Supp. 1363, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12275, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/magruder-v-richardson-moed-1971.