Magruder v. National Metropolitan Bank of Washington

40 A.2d 828, 1945 D.C. App. LEXIS 139
CourtDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 24, 1945
DocketNo. 238
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 40 A.2d 828 (Magruder v. National Metropolitan Bank of Washington) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District of Columbia Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Magruder v. National Metropolitan Bank of Washington, 40 A.2d 828, 1945 D.C. App. LEXIS 139 (D.C. 1945).

Opinion

HOOD, Associate Judge.

Action was brought below against the Bank and its trust officer, Stanley D. Willis, for $1,517, the cash value of certain United States bonds having a face value of $1,850. Due to Mr. Willis’ death prior to entry of judgment, he is no longer a party to the action.

The Bank was appointed executor of the estate of Howe Totten, who died domiciled in the State of Maryland. After its appointment, Mr. Willis, Mr. Gordon, an attorney representing the estate, and a daughter of the decedent, went to a Maryland bank and opened a safe deposit box maintained there by decedent in his individual name and took possession of the contents. Among the contents were the following: Three savings account books showing deposits in Maryland banks of a total of $2,608.78 in the names of decedent and plaintiff as joint owners, subject to their joint order, with balance at the death of either to belong to the survivor. A certificate of title to an automobile truck, registered in the name of plaintiff and bearing an assignment to decedent which assignment was neither acknowledged nor dated. A deed for certain real estate in the District of Columbia executed by plaintiff but not acknowledged by her, and with [829]*829no named grantee. United States Savings bonds of a total face value of $1,850 registered in the names of plaintiff or decedent.

Shortly thereafter there was a conference at Mr. Willis’ office between him, Mr. Gordon and the plaintiff. At this conference plaintiff disclaimed any interest in the automobile and at the request of Mr. Willis acknowledged her signature to the assignment of the certificate of title. Plaintiff also disclaimed any interest in the District of Columbia real estate and upon the request of Mr. Willis acknowledged her signature to the deed thereof.

Likewise at the conference plaintiff endorsed the United States Savings bonds which were thereafter transmitted by Mr. Willis to the Treasury Department for redemption. A few days later plaintiff received from the Treasury Department a draft for $1,517 which she took to the office of Mr. Willis and there endorsed and left it with him. At the same time, Mr. Willis delivered to her the three savings account books and she thereafter withdrew the deposits.

Plaintiff’s claim is that she inadvertently left the endorsed Treasury draft with Mr. Willis, that the proceeds thereof were her property and that the bank wrongfully refused to pay the same to her. The position of the Bank is that as executor it was in doubt as to the respective rights of the estate and the plaintiff in the bonds and savings account deposits and that a settlement agreement was reached between it and the plaintiff by which she paid over to it the proceeds of the bonds and relinquished all rights therein, and it in turn surrendered to her the savings account books and relinquished all its claims and rights in the savings account deposits.

The case below was tried in a rather unusual manner. No testimony was taken, but by agreement the written statements of the plaintiff, Mr. Willis and Mr. Gordon, containing the testimony which they would have given if called upon to testify, were received in evidence. These statements together with a stipulation and certain exhibits constituted the entire evidence in the case.

The accounts of the three individuals as to what took place on the two occasions when the plaintiff was in Mr. Willis’ office are directly conflicting. The plaintiff says that on the first occasion she signed the bonds for redemption at the request of Mr. Willis but that nothing was said concerning any claim of the estate to the bonds or their proceeds; that on the second occasion when she took the Treasury draft to Mr. Willis’ office, he requested that she endorse it and she did so but left it on his desk only by inadvertence; that after receiving the bank books from Mr. Willis and signing a receipt for them she left his office without realizing that she had left the check on his desk; that within a very short time she went back to his office and asked for the check and then for the first time did she learn that the executor made claim to it.

According to Mr. Willis’ statement he discussed with plaintiff at the conference the matter of title to the automobile, the District of Columbia real estate, and the savings accounts as well as the question of the bonds; that she asserted no claim to the automobile, the real estate or the bonds but did claim ownership of the savings accounts; that he told her if she would surrender to the executor the proceeds of the bonds he would deliver to her the savings account passbooks so as to permit her to receive the proceeds thereof; that she thereupon endorsed the bonds for redemption and he told her they would be mailed to the Treasury by him but that the draft would be mailed by the Treasury Department to her and if, upon her receipt of the draft, she would bring it to his office and endorse it he would in turn deliver to her the savings account books; that thereafter she brought the Treasury draft to him, endorsed and delivered it to him and he in turn delivered the savings account books to her; that she left his office and returned some thirty minutes later and asked if she was not also entitled to receive the Treasury draft for $1,517, that he explained to her that the arrangement was that the estate receive the proceeds of the bonds and she receive undisputed possession of the savings account books; that she left his office and he did not hear anything further from her for approximately one year.

According to Mr. Gordon’s statement, the plaintiff at the conference stated that the automobile was the property of Mr. Totten and she made no claim to it, that the real estate belonged to Mr. Totten and she likewise made no claim to it, and she completed the assignment of title and acknowledgment of the deed; that the question of the bank books and the Govern[830]*830ment bonds was then taken up; that she was shown a receipt indicating that she had previously during the lifetime of Mr. Totten received from him Government bonds of a face value of $1,850, and she stated that the bonds remaining in the box belonged to Mr. Totten, but that the bank accounts belonged to her; that he and Mr. Willis informed her that they would surrender the bank books to her if she would co-operate in obtaining redemption of the bonds and surrender of the pro-:ceds to the estate.

It appears undisputed that Mr. Totten had purchased with his own money United States Government bonds of a. face value of $4,200, that all the bonds were registered in the names of himself or plaintiff ; that during his lifetime Mr. Totten had redeemed bonds of the face amount of $500, leaving bonds in the amount of $3,700, and that thereafter one-half of that amount had been delivered by him to the plaintiff, leaving an equal amount in the safe deposit box. It also appears to be undisputed that all deposits in the savings accounts were made by Mr. Totten from his own individual funds.

The trial court found that the accounts ■of the transaction given by Mr. Willis and Mr. Gordon represented the facts and that those facts showed a compromise settlement between the parties, and accordingly finding and judgment were entered in favor of the defendant.

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Bluebook (online)
40 A.2d 828, 1945 D.C. App. LEXIS 139, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/magruder-v-national-metropolitan-bank-of-washington-dc-1945.