Magruder v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.

139 F.2d 751, 31 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1129, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 4120
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 3, 1944
DocketNo. 5162
StatusPublished

This text of 139 F.2d 751 (Magruder v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Magruder v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 139 F.2d 751, 31 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1129, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 4120 (4th Cir. 1944).

Opinion

DOBIE, Circuit Judge.

Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland (an insurance corporation, hereinafter called Fidelity) filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland to recover federal income taxes paid by it for the year 1935. The District Court, sitting without a jury, found for Fidelity and entered judgment in its favor for the full amount claimed. Magruder (United States Collector of Internal Revenue for the District of Maryland) has duly appealed.

In September, 1931 (a time of great economic stress and extreme financial storm), the Baltimore Trust Company was in a most precarious condition. To prevent the probable collapse of this institution, which might have started a run on all the local banks, a guaranty fund of nearly eight million dollars was contributed by various individuals and corporations. Fidelity contributed $200,000 to this fund. Each guarantor received from the Trust Company a [752]*752certificate of indebtedness, bearing annual interest of 2%, but the claims of the guarantors, though superior to the rights of stockholders, were subordinated to the claims'of the Trust, Company’s depositors and other creditors.

On March 31, 1933, at a meeting of Fidelity’s finance committee, composed of responsible executive officers, the claim against the Baltimore Trust Company was discussed and, according to the formal minutes of the meeting: “The Treasurer was authorized to charge off at the rate of $20,-000 p¿r month the $200,000 held in assets, being the amount subscribed to the Baltimore Trust Company guaranty fund. * * *” Apparently, in pursuance of this resolution, the following entries were made in Fidelity’s general ledger.:-

“Baltimore Trust Co., Baltimore, Md. Guaranty Fund
Date Balance
Year Month Day Explanatory Folio Debit Credit Debit Credit
1933 Jan. 3 Transferred from Ledger No. 32 35' $200,000. $200,000.
Mar. 31 Reduction in Book Value as per Finance Committee Resolution
Mar. 31, 1933 C162 $ 20,000. $180,000.
Apr. 29 Mar. 31, 1933 Cl 78 20,000. 160,000.
May 31 Mar. 31, 1933 C193 20,000. 140.000.
June 30 Mar. 31, 1933 C210 20,000. 120.000.
Mar. 31, 1933 C210120,000. 0
$200,000. $200,000.”

It will be noted that after this item had been charged off for three months at the rate of $20,000 a month (according to the resolution of the finance committee), the charge-off was accelerated by writing off the full balance of $140,000 on June 30, 1933. Presumably this acceleration resulted from the fact that, according to the testimony of Roland Benjamin, treasurer of Fidelity, Fidelity “didn’t want to show that in there as a live asset”. Since the resolution, adopted in March, 1933, directed a charge-off at the rate of $20,000 a month, it seems clear that the resolution contemplated a complete charge-off of the entire item of $200,000 during the calendar year 1933. During 1933, Fidelity also transferred this item to its Schedule X, which is a schedule of what are called unlisted assets. Items on this schedule are not included in- Fidelity’s statement of admitted assets and are not considered by Insurance Commissioners in determining the solvency of Fidelity.

In its federal income tax return for the year 1933, Fidelity sought a deduction of $200,000, the entire amount of its claim against the Baltimore Trust Company, as a bad debt that was ascertained to be completely worthless. This was not questioned, but was allowed, by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. But this did not affect the amount payable by Fidelity as income taxes for the year 1933, since Fidelity, apart from this item, still suffered a loss for that year. In its income tax return for the year 1935, which was a profitable year for Fidelity, it again claimed on this same item a deduction for $200,000 as a worthless bad debt. This was not allowed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Fidelity filed the instant civil action for a refund of the amount of its income taxes for 1935 involved in this item.

Under Section 23(j) of the Revenue Act of 1932, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Acts, page 490, a taxpayer is allowed a deduction for “Debts ascertained to be worthless and charged off within the taxable year.” We are thus called on to decide whether Fidelity, in 1933, (1) charged off its claim against the Baltimore Trust Company as a [753]*753bad debt, and (2) ascertained this claim to be worthless, so as to preclude any tax deduction of this item for the year 1935.

We are firmly convinced that Fidelity did charge off its claim against the Baltimore Trust Company in 1933. Seldom, in income tax practice, is a charge-off either manifested by such official action or evidenced by circumstances so definite. Flere we have a formal resolution by the finance committee directing the treasurer, positively and unequivocally, to “charge off” this entire claim at the specified “rate of $20,000 per month,” a definite entry on the ledger of Fidelity in pursuance of the direction of the finance committee and then the claim of deduction thereon in the income tax return for the year 1933. In Commissioner v. McDonald Engineering Co., 7 Cir., 102 F.2d 942, 945, the court aptly said: “Anything which manifests the intent to eliminate an item from assets is sufficient to constitute a charge-off. In the case of an individual it has been held that a mental charge-off serves a purpose. * * * Here we find an entry in the books of the taxpayer showing the debit, with an accompanying explanation which seems to us to satisfy the requirement of eliminating the item from the assets.” See, also, American Cigarette & Cigar Co. v. Bowers, 2 Cir., 92 F.2d 596; Hamlen v. Welch, 1 Cir., 116 F.2d 413; Rubinkam v. Commissioner, 7 Cir., 118 F.2d 148.

We are not impressed by Fidelity’s contention that all this was a mere inadvertent error. Members of the finance committee of an important corporation in a great industrial city, the treasurer of the corporation and those charged with the task of making out its tax returns are not mere clerical employees. Here, too, are three separate steps, the resolution, the ledger entry and the tax return, all fitting into a consistent pattern. Against this background, the transfer of the claim to Schedule X seems rather inconsequential. The expression “charge-off” at least approximates a term of art, and this expression is hardly synonymous here with “transfer to Schedule X”. Apparently the finance committee knew the connotation of this term in accounting practice, and equally must this be true of the treasurer and those who prepared the 1933 tax return.

A more difficult problem is whether Fidelity ascertained this claim to be worthless in the year 1933. An affirmative answer, rather than a negative one, fits much more clearly into the whole picture. The taxpayer can charge off a bad debt only in the year in which the debt is ascertained to be worthless.

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Related

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. MacDonald Eng. Co.
102 F.2d 942 (Seventh Circuit, 1939)
Hamlen v. Welch
116 F.2d 413 (First Circuit, 1940)
Ludlow Valve Mfg. Co. v. Durey
62 F.2d 508 (Second Circuit, 1933)
American Cigarette & Cigar Co. v. Bowers
92 F.2d 596 (Second Circuit, 1937)
Bartlett v. Commissioner
114 F.2d 634 (Fourth Circuit, 1940)
Rubinkam v. Commissioner
118 F.2d 148 (Seventh Circuit, 1941)
Helvering v. Smith
132 F.2d 965 (Fourth Circuit, 1942)

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Bluebook (online)
139 F.2d 751, 31 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1129, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 4120, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/magruder-v-fidelity-deposit-co-ca4-1944.