Magnusen v. Pine Belt Inv. Corp.
This text of 963 So. 2d 1279 (Magnusen v. Pine Belt Inv. Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Brandy MAGNUSEN, Appellant
v.
PINE BELT INVESTMENT CORPORATION, Appellee.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
*1280 Catouche Judge Body, attorney for appellant.
L. Clark Hicks, Hattiesburg, attorney for appellee.
Before KING, C.J., GRIFFIS, BARNES, and ROBERTS, JJ.
ROBERTS, J., for the Court.
SUMMARY OF THE CASE
¶ 1. In this premises liability case, Brandy Magnusen sued Pine Belt Investment Corporation after she was attacked at a Burger King franchise owned and operated by Pine Belt. Magnusen alleged that Pine Belt had actual or constructive knowledge that an atmosphere of violence existed at the Burger King. Pine Belt denied liability.
¶ 2. Pine Belt filed a motion for summary judgment and alleged that there was no evidence to support a theory that a pattern of criminal activity existed in the vicinity of the Burger King. The circuit court agreed and granted Pine Belt's motion for summary judgment. Magnusen appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
*1281 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 3. Around 8:00 p.m. on August 22, 2003, Magnusen intended to use the drive-through line at Burger King in Poplarville, Mississippi. Magnusen felt as though the line was too long, so she never ordered. As she approached the parking lot exit, a truck moved and blocked her exit. Another truck blocked her in from behind. According to Magnusen, when she got out of her truck, six men "started beating on [her]."[1] After the six men stopped hitting Magnusen, a Burger King employee went outside and told Magnusen that employees called an ambulance and the authorities. The employee invited Magnusen inside so Magnusen could rinse out her mouth.
¶ 4. An ambulance arrived shortly before Magnusen's mother. Magnusen's mother drove Magnusen, nineteen years old at the time, to Gulfport Medical Regional Hospital. There, x-rays revealed that Magnusen's jaw was broken on both sides. An oral surgeon repaired Magnusen's jaw with plates and screws on both sides. Additionally, Magnusen's jaw was wired shut for six months.
¶ 5. On August 30, 2004, Magnusen filed a complaint in the Pearl River County Circuit Court. Magnusen sued Pine Belt Investment Corporation, the owner of the particular Burger King franchise, and alleged that Pine Belt was liable for her injuries because Pine Belt failed to provide adequate security for her. Magnusen also alleged that a pattern of criminal activity existed in the general vicinity of the premises.
¶ 6. On October 24, 2005, Pine Belt filed a motion for summary judgment. Pine Belt claimed that summary judgment was appropriate because there was no atmosphere of violence on the premises. Pine Belt also submitted that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to causation.
¶ 7. On May 8, 2006, the circuit court granted Pine Belt's motion for summary judgment. The circuit court found no genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was an atmosphere of violence on the Burger King premises. The circuit court also found no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Pine Belt proximately caused Magnusen's injuries. Magnusen appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 8. This Court conducts a de novo review of orders granting or denying summary judgment. Mantachie Natural Gas v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 594 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Miss.1992). According to Rule 56 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, a circuit court may grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." "A fact is material if it `tends to resolve any of the issues, properly raised by the parties.'" Webb v. Jackson, 583 So.2d 946, 949 (Miss.1991) (quoting Mink v. Andrew Jackson Cas. Ins. Co., 537 So.2d 431, 433 (Miss.1988)).
*1282 ¶ 9. The moving party bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Tucker v. Hinds County, 558 So.2d 869, 872 (Miss.1990). Additionally, the circuit court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Russell v. Orr, 700 So.2d 619, 622 (Miss.1997). Furthermore, the circuit court must consider motions for summary judgment with a skeptical eye. Ratliff v. Ratliff, 500 So.2d 981, 981 (Miss. 1986). It is better for the circuit court to err on the side of denying the motion. Id.
ANALYSIS
¶ 10. "A claim of negligence has four elements: duty, breach, causation, and damages." Price v. Park Management, Inc., 831 So.2d 550(¶ 5) (Miss.Ct. App.2002). To prove that the circuit court should not have granted Pine Belt's motion for summary judgment, Magnusen had to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the fact that: (a) Pine Belt owed her a duty, (b) Pine Belt breached that duty, (c) damages, and (d) "a causal connection between the breach and the damages, such that the breach is the proximate cause of [her] injuries." Crain v. Cleveland Lodge 1532, Order of the Moose, Inc., 641 So.2d 1186, 1189 (Miss.1994) (citing Lyle v. Mladinich, 584 So.2d 397, 398 (Miss.1991)).
¶ 11. The duty Pine Belt owed to Magnusen depends on whether Magnusen was a licensee, an invitee, or a trespasser. This question of status can be a jury question, but where the facts are not in dispute, the question of status becomes a question of law. Little v. Bell, 719 So.2d 757(¶ 17) (Miss.1998). Here, there is no factual dispute that Magnusen was on the premises of Burger King as a drive-through customer. A person who goes upon the premises of another as a result of an express or implied invitation of the owner or occupant for their mutual advantage is classified as an invitee. Id. at (¶ 15). As such, Magnusen was an invitee and Pine Belt was duty bound to "keep the premises reasonably safe and when not reasonably safe to warn only where there is hidden danger or peril that is not [in] plain and open view." Id. at (¶ 16). Said differently, a premises owner owes an invitee a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect an invitee from reasonably foreseeable injury at the hands of another. Crain, 641 So.2d at 1189. That being so, we must determine whether Magnusen's injury, caused by a third party, was "reasonably foreseeable."
¶ 12. An act may be considered reasonably foreseeable if the premises owner had cause to anticipate the third party act. Id. "Cause to anticipate" a third party act may arise from (1) actual or constructive knowledge of the third party's violent nature, or (2) actual or constructive knowledge that an atmosphere of violence existed on the premises. Id. When determining whether a defendant had actual or constructive knowledge that an atmosphere of violence existed, pertinent factors for consideration are: (1) "the overall pattern of criminal activity prior to the event in question that occurred in the general vicinity of the defendant's business premises," and (2) "the frequency of criminal activity on the premises." Id. at 1189-90.
¶ 13. According to the affidavit of Bashir Shams, the owner of Pine Belt, "[t]here was no pattern of violent criminal activity or other similar activity on the Burger King premises prior to the time that . . . Magnusen was involved in the incident. There was no frequency of similar *1283
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