Magnus v. U.S. Attorney General

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: September 2, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-1558
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SZETH ASLAN MAGNUS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civ. No. 25-cv-1558 (UNA) ) ) U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on its initial review of Plaintiff’s application for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2), pro se complaint (ECF No. 1, “Compl.”) and motion for

declaratory judgment (ECF No. 7).1 The Court will grant the application, dismiss the complaint,

and deny the motion.

Szeth Aslan Magnus, a veteran of the United States Navy, currently is incarcerated in

Washington State at the Coyote Ridge Correction Center. See Compl. at 7, 14 (page numbers

designated by CM/ECF). Because of “both service and non-service connected disabilities, [he]

is entitled to . . . monetary benefits from the Veterans Administration.” Id. at 7. Pursuant to 38

U.S.C. § 5313, the Veterans Administration reduces plaintiff’s benefit payments during his

incarceration. See id. at 7-8.

In Plaintiff’s view, this reduction in benefits “imposes a punitive consequence (the

deprivation of earned compensation benefits) based solely on a prior judicial conviction, without

1 The Court treats plaintiff’s submission (ECF No. 1) as a civil complaint, notwithstanding the headings and sections plaintiff designates, and plaintiff’s representation that “[t]his action is brought as a Constitutional Challenge pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 702 and is NOT a Civil Suit, nor a Habeas Action.” Compl. at 1 (emphasis in original). 1 any subsequent adjudicative process.” Id. at 3. As such, he deems § 5313 an unlawful bill of

attainder, see id.; see also id. at 9, and an unlawful exercise of power by Congress, see id. at 5,

which “lacks authority to alter or enhance punishment post hoc,” id. In addition, Plaintiff claims

that § 5313 “creates a discriminatory subclass of veterans: those incarcerated for felony

convictions,” id. at 3, and absent “a rational basis,” id. at 4, it runs afoul of the Equal Protection

Clause, see id. at 3. Plaintiff also considers his benefits “property,” and “[t]he automatic

reduction in benefits under § 5313 . . . without a hearing, notice, or opportunity to be heard,

constitute[es] a deprivation of property without procedural due process” in violation of the Fifth

Amendment. Id. at 4. Plaintiff also considers the withholding of veterans benefits a breach of a

contractual agreement with the government. See id. at 8.

Plaintiff’s challenges to 38 U.S.C. § 5313 are neither new nor successful. See Hutchison

v. United States, No. 3:15-cv-890-J-34-MCR, 2016 WL 7173886, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 12,

2016) (noting that “courts have uniformly and consistently upheld the nonpayment of benefits to

prison inmates against various constitutional challenges”), report and recommendation adopted,

No. 3:15-cv-890-J-34-MCR, 2016 WL 7157561 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2016), appeal dismissed, No.

17-10110-G, 2018 WL 3545905, at *1 (11th Cir. Feb. 5, 2018); Latham v. Brown, 4 Vet. App.

265, 268 (Vet. App. Ct. Feb. 12, 1993) (noting that several courts have upheld the

constitutionality of 38 U.S.C. § 5313 and that no court has held it unconstitutional). It is neither

a bill of attainder, see Sorrow v. United States, No. 2:20-cv-0169, 2020 WL 13280677, at *6

(S.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2020) (concluding that § 5313 “cannot be considered to be illegal bills of

attainder, ex post facto laws, double jeopardy, or excessive fines” because “the suspension or

reduction of noncontractual disability benefits does not constitute punishment” ), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 2:20-cv-0169, 2021 WL 8441967 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2021), nor

2 punishment of any kind, see Hall v. West, 217 F.3d 860, 860 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (per curiam)

(“Since withdrawing VA benefits does not constitute punishment, the instant statute and its

implementing regulation are not illegal bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, cruel and unusual

punishment, double jeopardy or excessive fines.”). And because the government “is not

contractually obligated to furnish VA benefits, [it] does not impair an obligation of contract in

suspending or reducing them.” Hall, 217 F.3d at 860.

Plaintiff’s equal protection argument fares no better. See Brown v. Dep’t of Veterans

Affairs, 451 F. Supp. 2d 273, 281 (D. Mass. 2006) (dismissing constitutional challenge to §

5313(a)(2) construed as equal protection claim under Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).

“Prisoners are not a suspect class,” Moss v. Clark, 886 F.2d 686, 690 (4th Cir. 1989), as “[t]he

status of incarceration is neither an immutable characteristic . . . nor an invidious basis of

classification,” id. (citations omitted), and there is a rational basis for treating veterans who are

prisoners differently than veterans who are not, see Hall, 217 F.3d at 860 (“The purpose of VA

benefits is to help disabled veterans maintain a standard of living compromised by a service-

connected disability. These benefits cannot serve their intended purpose when the veteran

recipient is incarcerated because a minimum standard of living is provided, free, to prisoners.”);

McDermott v. McDonald, Case No. 12-29999, 2014 WL 4435899 at *2 (Vet. App. Ct. Sept. 10,

2014) (“[T]he Court has held that prisoners are not a suspect class and that the suspension of the

payment of pension benefits while a veteran is in prison is rationally related to and furthers

nonpunitive legislative goals of preventing duplication of subsistence payments and contraband

purchases within prisons.”).

An Order is issued separately.

DATE: September 2, 2025 /s/ JIA M. COBB

3 United States District Judge