Opinion
ROTH, P. J.
On April 25, 1978, respondent filed in Los Angeles Superior Court her application for entry of judgment on sister state judgment
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1710.15
and
judgment was entered thereon by the clerk
on May 3 the same year. Though notice thereof was not served on appellant as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1710.30, subdivision (a),
he nevertheless on October 23, 1978, filed his motion to vacate the judgment thus entered, based on the grounds of such lack of notice and his assertion personal jurisdiction supported the sister state determination. Following the unreported hearing on the motion, it was denied by minute order dated November 9, 1978, as was appellant’s request for findings of fact and conclusions of law.
On his appeal from that order appellant contends:
1. In failing to provide for notice and hearing prior to entry of the sister state judgment by the clerk, chapter 1 of title 11, part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (§§ 1710.10-1710.65) is unconstitutional in that it denies appellant due process of law;
2. Failure by respondent to supply the notice called for by Code of Civil Procedure section 1710.30 results in a similar denial of due process; and
3. The sister state judgment, having been procured without personal jurisdiction obtained over appellant, is void as is the California judgment predicated on it.
In support of the first of these contentions appellant relies upon the recent decisions in
Isbell
v.
County of Sonoma
(1978) 21 Cal. 3d 61 [145 Cal.Rptr. 368, 577 P.2d 188] and
County of Ventura
v.
Castro
(1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 462 [156 Cal.Rptr. 66]. Briefly, those cases, respectively, held unconstitutional the confession of judgment procedure
then set out in Code of Civil Procedure sections 1132-1134 and a similar agreement for entry of judgment as authorized by Welfare and Institutions Code section 11476.1. In both instances, the merits of the underlying matter giving rise to the confession or agreement was determined solely upon the strength of the confession or agreement, without notice to or opportunity by the person so giving permission to be heard at a judicially supervised adjudication wherein the question of the validity of a waiver of constitutional rights could be tested. In the matter at bench, of course, the basic issues of the controversy from which the judgment stemmed and which gave rise to initiation of the procedure contemplated by Code of Civil Procedure section 1710.10 et seq. have already been litigated in proceedings wherein, as we shall later discuss, appellant was accorded notice and an opportunity to be heard and where what remains is enforcement of the judgment, albeit rendered in another jurisdiction.
Assuming, as we do, that this difference does not create a meaningful distinction respecting the question posed, since execution constitutes the ultimate step in deprivation of a party’s property, we are nevertheless of the view due process safeguards sufficient to the purpose of the sort which were lacking in
Isbell
and
Castro
are present here. Thus, while it is true the clerk of the court is required to enter judgment merely upon the filing of an application therefor under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1710.15 and 1710.25 (see fns. 2, 3), no writ of execution generally may issue until the judgment creditor has served upon his debtor a notice of entry of the judgment,
which service itself likewise affords the
debtor an opportunity to move for the judgment’s vacation.
Accordingly, under no circumstances may property of the debtor be taken from him until such time as he has been able to establish, if he can, any of those defenses which remain available to him in the litigation.
In this there is no constitutional infirmity.
Those defenses common against enforcement of a sister state judgment, according to the Law Revision Commission include: . .the judgment is not final and unconditional (where finality means that no further action by the court rendering the judgment is necessary to resolve the matter litigated); the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud; the judgment was rendered in excess of jurisdiction; the judgment was not enforceable in the state of rendition; the plaintiff is guilty of misconduct; the judgment has already been paid; suit on the judgment is barred by the statute of limitations in the state where enforcement is sought.”
Stated another way, we find no valid constitutional objection inherent in the creation of a procedure to enter a California judgment based on that of a sister state, when before the proposed California judgment is effective through execution to divest a judgment debtor of any assets, the judgment debtor is afforded the right to nullify its effect in this state in the same fashion which could be resorted to by him where the judgment creditor files an action in this state upon the sister state judgment to establish it.
Appellant’s second contention, which we understand as suggesting that respondent’s noncompliance with the notice requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 1710.30 invalidates the entry of the California judgment, is likewise without merit and is disposed of by the holding, applicable here, articulated in
Epps
v.
Russell
(1976) 62 Cal. App.3d 201 [133 Cal.Rptr. 30]: “(3) Defendant contends that the order, can be supported on the alternative ground that the notice of entry was ‘not promptly served.’ We reject that contention for two reasons: (1) Subdivision (a) of section 1710.40, quoted above, sets forth the only statutory ground for a motion to vacate. Delay of service is not therein set forth. (2) ... defendant relies only on the period of delay without suggesting any prejudice to him. Defendant’s time to move to vacate ran from the date of service of the notice, not from the date of entry. On the facts before us, any implied finding of undue delay is without support in the evidence.”
(Id.,
at p. 205.)
Finally, appellant contends the sister state judgment herein is void for lack of personal jurisdiction and therefore cannot support the California judgment which relies on it. That assertion, justifiably made by appellant on his motion to vacate (see fns. 6, 7), was nevertheless apparently rejected by the trial court, as evidenced by its order denying the motion. The difficulty is, as also noted above, no findings of fact and conclusions of law, though requested by appellant, were made in aid of that order and it is clear such were required.
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Opinion
ROTH, P. J.
On April 25, 1978, respondent filed in Los Angeles Superior Court her application for entry of judgment on sister state judgment
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1710.15
and
judgment was entered thereon by the clerk
on May 3 the same year. Though notice thereof was not served on appellant as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1710.30, subdivision (a),
he nevertheless on October 23, 1978, filed his motion to vacate the judgment thus entered, based on the grounds of such lack of notice and his assertion personal jurisdiction supported the sister state determination. Following the unreported hearing on the motion, it was denied by minute order dated November 9, 1978, as was appellant’s request for findings of fact and conclusions of law.
On his appeal from that order appellant contends:
1. In failing to provide for notice and hearing prior to entry of the sister state judgment by the clerk, chapter 1 of title 11, part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (§§ 1710.10-1710.65) is unconstitutional in that it denies appellant due process of law;
2. Failure by respondent to supply the notice called for by Code of Civil Procedure section 1710.30 results in a similar denial of due process; and
3. The sister state judgment, having been procured without personal jurisdiction obtained over appellant, is void as is the California judgment predicated on it.
In support of the first of these contentions appellant relies upon the recent decisions in
Isbell
v.
County of Sonoma
(1978) 21 Cal. 3d 61 [145 Cal.Rptr. 368, 577 P.2d 188] and
County of Ventura
v.
Castro
(1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 462 [156 Cal.Rptr. 66]. Briefly, those cases, respectively, held unconstitutional the confession of judgment procedure
then set out in Code of Civil Procedure sections 1132-1134 and a similar agreement for entry of judgment as authorized by Welfare and Institutions Code section 11476.1. In both instances, the merits of the underlying matter giving rise to the confession or agreement was determined solely upon the strength of the confession or agreement, without notice to or opportunity by the person so giving permission to be heard at a judicially supervised adjudication wherein the question of the validity of a waiver of constitutional rights could be tested. In the matter at bench, of course, the basic issues of the controversy from which the judgment stemmed and which gave rise to initiation of the procedure contemplated by Code of Civil Procedure section 1710.10 et seq. have already been litigated in proceedings wherein, as we shall later discuss, appellant was accorded notice and an opportunity to be heard and where what remains is enforcement of the judgment, albeit rendered in another jurisdiction.
Assuming, as we do, that this difference does not create a meaningful distinction respecting the question posed, since execution constitutes the ultimate step in deprivation of a party’s property, we are nevertheless of the view due process safeguards sufficient to the purpose of the sort which were lacking in
Isbell
and
Castro
are present here. Thus, while it is true the clerk of the court is required to enter judgment merely upon the filing of an application therefor under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1710.15 and 1710.25 (see fns. 2, 3), no writ of execution generally may issue until the judgment creditor has served upon his debtor a notice of entry of the judgment,
which service itself likewise affords the
debtor an opportunity to move for the judgment’s vacation.
Accordingly, under no circumstances may property of the debtor be taken from him until such time as he has been able to establish, if he can, any of those defenses which remain available to him in the litigation.
In this there is no constitutional infirmity.
Those defenses common against enforcement of a sister state judgment, according to the Law Revision Commission include: . .the judgment is not final and unconditional (where finality means that no further action by the court rendering the judgment is necessary to resolve the matter litigated); the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud; the judgment was rendered in excess of jurisdiction; the judgment was not enforceable in the state of rendition; the plaintiff is guilty of misconduct; the judgment has already been paid; suit on the judgment is barred by the statute of limitations in the state where enforcement is sought.”
Stated another way, we find no valid constitutional objection inherent in the creation of a procedure to enter a California judgment based on that of a sister state, when before the proposed California judgment is effective through execution to divest a judgment debtor of any assets, the judgment debtor is afforded the right to nullify its effect in this state in the same fashion which could be resorted to by him where the judgment creditor files an action in this state upon the sister state judgment to establish it.
Appellant’s second contention, which we understand as suggesting that respondent’s noncompliance with the notice requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 1710.30 invalidates the entry of the California judgment, is likewise without merit and is disposed of by the holding, applicable here, articulated in
Epps
v.
Russell
(1976) 62 Cal. App.3d 201 [133 Cal.Rptr. 30]: “(3) Defendant contends that the order, can be supported on the alternative ground that the notice of entry was ‘not promptly served.’ We reject that contention for two reasons: (1) Subdivision (a) of section 1710.40, quoted above, sets forth the only statutory ground for a motion to vacate. Delay of service is not therein set forth. (2) ... defendant relies only on the period of delay without suggesting any prejudice to him. Defendant’s time to move to vacate ran from the date of service of the notice, not from the date of entry. On the facts before us, any implied finding of undue delay is without support in the evidence.”
(Id.,
at p. 205.)
Finally, appellant contends the sister state judgment herein is void for lack of personal jurisdiction and therefore cannot support the California judgment which relies on it. That assertion, justifiably made by appellant on his motion to vacate (see fns. 6, 7), was nevertheless apparently rejected by the trial court, as evidenced by its order denying the motion. The difficulty is, as also noted above, no findings of fact and conclusions of law, though requested by appellant, were made in aid of that order and it is clear such were required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1710.40; see
Kinder
v.
Superior Court
(1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 574, 581 [144 Cal.Rptr. 291].) Ordinarily, the trial court’s omission in this regard requires reversal. (See
Covina-Azusa Fire Fighters Union
v.
City of Azusa
(1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 48, 57 [146 Cal.Rptr. 155];
Ma
tanky
v.
Board of Medical Examiners
(1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 293, 301 [144 Cal.Rptr. 826].) Here, however, having taken judicial notice upon respondent’s request and agreeably with the requirements of Evidence Code section 459, 455
of the proceedings conducted in the sister state action which occasioned that which is the subject of this appeal, and being persuaded that they demonstrate conclusively appellant’s voluntary appearance and participation therein,
we conclude based upon the entire record and the reasoning set out hereinbefore, the trial court’s erroneous omission to make findings and conclusions was without prejudice to appellant, since under no circumstances could such findings and conclusions have been favorable to him.
(Newby
v.
Alto Riviera Apartments
(1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 288, 305 [131 Cal.Rptr. 547].)
The order appealed from is affirmed.
Fleming, J., and Beach, J.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied January 8, 1980.