Maez v. Thunderbird Market
Opinion
This case involves a claim for unemployment insurance benefits under the Idaho Employment Security Law. The claimant-appellant, Dennis Maez, appeals from a decision by the Industrial Commission denying his claim for unemployment benefits.
Maez began working for employer-respondent Thunderbird Market in September, 1977. He was hired as a journeyman clerk, and his duties included checking, handling freight, and making displays. He was absent from work on November 10 and 12, 1977, due to an illness and returned to work on November 14, 1977.
On November 15, 1977, Maez began work by bagging groceries for customers. His manager then told him to start working on freight that was at the back of the store. Maez did so, but was called back a number of times by other clerks to bag groceries. Each time the manager saw him bagging groceries, he would send him back to work on the freight. Apparently, Maez and his manager were quite upset with each other at this point. After ordering Maez to work on the freight for about the third time, the manager followed him to the back of the store and asked him if he had brought a doctor’s statement for the days he had been absent. The two men started arguing over whether a doctor’s statement was required. During the course of this argument, the manager told Maez, “if you’re not gonna get a doctor’s excuse and you’re gettin’ tired of this job anyway, you know where the time clock’s at.” Maez interpreted that statement to mean that he was fired. He immediately clocked out and left the store.
Maez filed for unemployment insurance benefits in December, 1977. The Department of Employment, an Appeals Examiner, and the Industrial Commission all denied his claim. Maez appeals that denial.
On an appeal from the Industrial Commission, we are constitutionally limited to a review of questions of law. Idaho Constitution, Art. 5, § 9. We will, therefore, not disturb the findings of the Commission that are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Guillard v. Department of Employment, 100 Idaho 647, 603 P.2d 981 (1979); Hoyt v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., 100 Idaho 659, 603 P.2d 993 (1979). Our review of the record, however, shows that the Commission’s decision to deny benefits to Maez was based on a finding not supported by substantial and competent evidence.
*130 The Appeals Examiner found that “when the claimant refused to get one [doctor’s statement], the manager told him that if he did not supply a doctor’s statement, he could not work.” The Appeals Examiner further found that “the manager needed the doctor’s statement requested to determine if the claimant was entitled to sick-pay. Therefore, the request for the doctor’s statement is determined to be a reasonable request.” The Appeals Examiner then concluded that Maez’s leaving work after refusing to comply with the reasonable request constituted a voluntary quit without good cause. The Industrial Commission affirmed that decision on the single ground enunciated by the Appeals Examiner; that Maez voluntarily quit work without good cause by failing to comply with a reasonable request.
It is clear from the record and findings of the tribunals below that Maez was not required to bring in a doctor’s excuse. The Commission found that Maez had only been absent from work for two days due to illness. The union contract governing the employees at Thunderbird Market stated that a doctor’s statement would be required before sick-pay would be granted, but that no sick-pay would be allowed for the first two days of any illness. 1 Maez was only absent for two days and, therefore, could not have drawn sick-pay even with a doctor’s statement. Moreover, there was no evidence that the manager was enforcing one of his own rules in requiring the doctor’s statement; indeed, the manager’s testimony indicated that he demanded the doctor’s statement because he felt it was required by the union contract. 2
Thus, the record reveals no employment rule requiring Maez to produce a doctor’s statement to his manager. By forcing Maez to make a choice between giving up his job or bringing a doctor’s statement, the manager was certainly not making a rea *131 sonable request. The Industrial Commission, in affirming the Appeals Examiner, based its decision solely on the ground that the manager had made a reasonable request which was not complied with. Thus, the Industrial Commission’s finding is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. We find that a reasonable person would consider the circumstances resulting in Maez’s unemployment to be real, substantial, and compelling. See, e. g., Meyer v. Skyline Mobile Homes, 99 Idaho 754, 589 P.2d 89 (1979); Flynn v. Amfac Foods, Inc., 97 Idaho 768, 554 P.2d 946 (1976). Therefore, Maez did not voluntarily quit work without good cause, and the Industrial Commission’s decision is reversed. Costs and attorney fees to appellant.
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609 P.2d 660 (Maez v. Thunderbird Market) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.