[Cite as Maeder v. Hale, 2012-Ohio-2.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF LORAIN )
TINA L. MAEDER C.A. No. 10CA009925
Appellant
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE TYSEN D. HALE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO Defendant CASE No. 08CV158349
and
MARY ANN DAUGHERTY
Appellee
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: January 3, 2012
DICKINSON, Judge.
INTRODUCTION
{¶1} Following a car crash in which a passenger died, the estate of the decedent sued
the titled owner of the car for negligent entrustment. The trial court granted the titled owner
summary judgment, and the estate has appealed. We affirm because there are no genuine issues
of material fact and the titled owner of the car is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
BACKGROUND
{¶2} In September 2007, Kyler Roysdon died from injuries received in a car crash in
Ashland County. At the time of the crash, Mr. Roysdon’s half-brother, Tysen Hale, was driving
a car that was not titled in his name. Although he had primary use of it, the car’s title was issued 2
to Mary Daugherty, Mr. Hale’s girlfriend’s maternal grandmother. Ms. Daugherty testified at
her deposition that, because Mr. Hale was unable to qualify for a loan, even with her as co-
signor, she bought the car for him. According to Ms. Daugherty and Mr. Hale, they agreed that
Mr. Hale would pay her for it and, at some later time, she would transfer the title to him. Just
two days after Ms. Daugherty purchased the car, Mr. Hale wrecked it while Mr. Roysdon was
riding as a passenger.
{¶3} The estate of Kyler Roysdon, acting through his mother, Tina Maeder as
Administratrix, sued Mr. Hale, Ms. Daugherty, and two insurance companies. The estate
claimed that Mr. Hale had negligently operated the car and proximately caused Mr. Roysdon’s
death. It further claimed that Ms. Daugherty, as owner of the car, had negligently entrusted it to
Mr. Hale. Ms. Daugherty moved for summary judgment, arguing that there were no genuine
issues of material fact regarding whether she knew or should have known that Mr. Hale was an
incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless driver. Later, Ms. Daugherty filed a supplemental
motion for summary judgment, arguing that Mr. Hale was the owner of the car because he chose
the car, drove it home, insured it, and gave her the money for the monthly payments. She argued
that she could not be responsible for negligent entrustment because she did not own the car. The
trial court considered both of Ms. Daugherty’s motions and granted her summary judgment. The
estate has appealed that ruling.
NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT
{¶4} The estate’s assignment of error is that the trial court incorrectly granted summary
judgment to Ms. Daugherty because there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether
she owned the car and whether she was negligent in entrusting it to Mr. Hale. In order to prove
negligent entrustment, the plaintiff must show that “that the owner of the automobile had 3
knowledge of the driver’s incompetence, inexperience or reckless tendency as an operator, or
that the owner, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have known thereof from facts and
circumstances with which he was acquainted.” Mt. Nebo Baptist Church v. Cleveland Crafts
Co., 154 Ohio St. 185, paragraph two of the syllabus (1950). In this case, the parties have argued
about whether Ms. Daugherty is the owner of the vehicle, but this Court need not address that
issue. Even assuming that Ms. Daugherty was the owner of the car, there is no genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether she knew or should have known that Mr. Hale was an
incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless driver. See id.
{¶5} The lawyer for the estate cross-examined Mr. Hale at deposition with a copy of
his driving record from the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles. The evidence indicated that, prior to
September 2007, Mr. Hale had accumulated a number of points against his license and had had it
suspended five times. Two of the suspensions occurred while Mr. Hale was a juvenile, one was
a warrant block, one was due to a failure to show proof of insurance when randomly selected to
do so, and one was a court suspension. He had had four speeding tickets in less than five years,
but was cited for only one prior motor vehicle collision. There was some suggestion during Mr.
Hale’s deposition that a notation on the official Bureau of Motor Vehicles record might mean
that Mr. Hale’s license was suspended for a period of time including September 2007 when these
events took place. Mr. Hale testified, however, that if his license was suspended at that time, he
was not aware of it, and he did not receive any citations relating to the fatal crash. Even if his
license was suspended at the time, there is no evidence in the record suggesting that Ms.
Daugherty knew or should have known that before she gave him the car.
{¶6} In support of its argument that Ms. Daugherty should have known that Mr. Hale
was a reckless driver, the estate offered the testimony of Mr. Hale and his girlfriend, Brittany 4
Layton. Ms. Layton, testified that she knows Mr. Hale likes to speed and that, just before her
grandmother helped him get the car, he had received two speeding tickets in rapid succession.
At that time, Mr. Hale was living with Ms. Layton and her mother, Janet Seabold, within a mile
of Ms. Daugherty’s home. Mr. Hale testified that his poor driving record was a topic of
conversation among his girlfriend’s family members, especially at holiday gatherings. He said
that Ms. Daugherty was present at those events so she must have known about his record. He
explained that it was common knowledge in Ms. Daugherty’s family that “[his driving] record
wasn’t that great.” He also said, however, that, before he reviewed it at his deposition, even he
was unaware of how bad his driving record was.
{¶7} Both Mr. Hale and Ms. Layton testified that, in the beginning of their relationship,
Ms. Layton did all the driving for Mr. Hale because his license was suspended at that time. They
both testified that Ms. Daugherty would have seen Ms. Layton driving him around, but
acknowledged that they did not know whether Ms. Daugherty realized that Mr. Hale did not
drive at all or understood why he did not drive during that time. Mr. Hale testified that he never
told Ms. Daugherty about his tickets or suspensions, and she never asked him. Ms. Layton also
said that she never told her grandmother about her boyfriend’s poor driving record, but said that
“[she] could almost guarantee[,]” based on “how [her] mom is[,]” that her mother would have
told her own mother, Ms. Daugherty, about Mr. Hale getting two speeding tickets within a week.
She did not, however, offer any evidence that Ms. Daugherty actually knew about the two recent
speeding tickets.
{¶8} Ms. Daugherty denied having any knowledge of Mr. Hale’s driving record before
hearing about it at her deposition. She also testified that she did not know that her granddaughter
used to drive Mr. Hale everywhere due to a license suspension. She testified that, prior to getting 5
the car for him, she asked him whether he had a license and proof of insurance, but she never
asked about moving violations or suspensions. She said that, by September 2007, she had known
Mr.
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[Cite as Maeder v. Hale, 2012-Ohio-2.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF LORAIN )
TINA L. MAEDER C.A. No. 10CA009925
Appellant
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE TYSEN D. HALE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO Defendant CASE No. 08CV158349
and
MARY ANN DAUGHERTY
Appellee
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: January 3, 2012
DICKINSON, Judge.
INTRODUCTION
{¶1} Following a car crash in which a passenger died, the estate of the decedent sued
the titled owner of the car for negligent entrustment. The trial court granted the titled owner
summary judgment, and the estate has appealed. We affirm because there are no genuine issues
of material fact and the titled owner of the car is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
BACKGROUND
{¶2} In September 2007, Kyler Roysdon died from injuries received in a car crash in
Ashland County. At the time of the crash, Mr. Roysdon’s half-brother, Tysen Hale, was driving
a car that was not titled in his name. Although he had primary use of it, the car’s title was issued 2
to Mary Daugherty, Mr. Hale’s girlfriend’s maternal grandmother. Ms. Daugherty testified at
her deposition that, because Mr. Hale was unable to qualify for a loan, even with her as co-
signor, she bought the car for him. According to Ms. Daugherty and Mr. Hale, they agreed that
Mr. Hale would pay her for it and, at some later time, she would transfer the title to him. Just
two days after Ms. Daugherty purchased the car, Mr. Hale wrecked it while Mr. Roysdon was
riding as a passenger.
{¶3} The estate of Kyler Roysdon, acting through his mother, Tina Maeder as
Administratrix, sued Mr. Hale, Ms. Daugherty, and two insurance companies. The estate
claimed that Mr. Hale had negligently operated the car and proximately caused Mr. Roysdon’s
death. It further claimed that Ms. Daugherty, as owner of the car, had negligently entrusted it to
Mr. Hale. Ms. Daugherty moved for summary judgment, arguing that there were no genuine
issues of material fact regarding whether she knew or should have known that Mr. Hale was an
incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless driver. Later, Ms. Daugherty filed a supplemental
motion for summary judgment, arguing that Mr. Hale was the owner of the car because he chose
the car, drove it home, insured it, and gave her the money for the monthly payments. She argued
that she could not be responsible for negligent entrustment because she did not own the car. The
trial court considered both of Ms. Daugherty’s motions and granted her summary judgment. The
estate has appealed that ruling.
NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT
{¶4} The estate’s assignment of error is that the trial court incorrectly granted summary
judgment to Ms. Daugherty because there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether
she owned the car and whether she was negligent in entrusting it to Mr. Hale. In order to prove
negligent entrustment, the plaintiff must show that “that the owner of the automobile had 3
knowledge of the driver’s incompetence, inexperience or reckless tendency as an operator, or
that the owner, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have known thereof from facts and
circumstances with which he was acquainted.” Mt. Nebo Baptist Church v. Cleveland Crafts
Co., 154 Ohio St. 185, paragraph two of the syllabus (1950). In this case, the parties have argued
about whether Ms. Daugherty is the owner of the vehicle, but this Court need not address that
issue. Even assuming that Ms. Daugherty was the owner of the car, there is no genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether she knew or should have known that Mr. Hale was an
incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless driver. See id.
{¶5} The lawyer for the estate cross-examined Mr. Hale at deposition with a copy of
his driving record from the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles. The evidence indicated that, prior to
September 2007, Mr. Hale had accumulated a number of points against his license and had had it
suspended five times. Two of the suspensions occurred while Mr. Hale was a juvenile, one was
a warrant block, one was due to a failure to show proof of insurance when randomly selected to
do so, and one was a court suspension. He had had four speeding tickets in less than five years,
but was cited for only one prior motor vehicle collision. There was some suggestion during Mr.
Hale’s deposition that a notation on the official Bureau of Motor Vehicles record might mean
that Mr. Hale’s license was suspended for a period of time including September 2007 when these
events took place. Mr. Hale testified, however, that if his license was suspended at that time, he
was not aware of it, and he did not receive any citations relating to the fatal crash. Even if his
license was suspended at the time, there is no evidence in the record suggesting that Ms.
Daugherty knew or should have known that before she gave him the car.
{¶6} In support of its argument that Ms. Daugherty should have known that Mr. Hale
was a reckless driver, the estate offered the testimony of Mr. Hale and his girlfriend, Brittany 4
Layton. Ms. Layton, testified that she knows Mr. Hale likes to speed and that, just before her
grandmother helped him get the car, he had received two speeding tickets in rapid succession.
At that time, Mr. Hale was living with Ms. Layton and her mother, Janet Seabold, within a mile
of Ms. Daugherty’s home. Mr. Hale testified that his poor driving record was a topic of
conversation among his girlfriend’s family members, especially at holiday gatherings. He said
that Ms. Daugherty was present at those events so she must have known about his record. He
explained that it was common knowledge in Ms. Daugherty’s family that “[his driving] record
wasn’t that great.” He also said, however, that, before he reviewed it at his deposition, even he
was unaware of how bad his driving record was.
{¶7} Both Mr. Hale and Ms. Layton testified that, in the beginning of their relationship,
Ms. Layton did all the driving for Mr. Hale because his license was suspended at that time. They
both testified that Ms. Daugherty would have seen Ms. Layton driving him around, but
acknowledged that they did not know whether Ms. Daugherty realized that Mr. Hale did not
drive at all or understood why he did not drive during that time. Mr. Hale testified that he never
told Ms. Daugherty about his tickets or suspensions, and she never asked him. Ms. Layton also
said that she never told her grandmother about her boyfriend’s poor driving record, but said that
“[she] could almost guarantee[,]” based on “how [her] mom is[,]” that her mother would have
told her own mother, Ms. Daugherty, about Mr. Hale getting two speeding tickets within a week.
She did not, however, offer any evidence that Ms. Daugherty actually knew about the two recent
speeding tickets.
{¶8} Ms. Daugherty denied having any knowledge of Mr. Hale’s driving record before
hearing about it at her deposition. She also testified that she did not know that her granddaughter
used to drive Mr. Hale everywhere due to a license suspension. She testified that, prior to getting 5
the car for him, she asked him whether he had a license and proof of insurance, but she never
asked about moving violations or suspensions. She said that, by September 2007, she had known
Mr. Hale for several years and, having seen his current driver’s license, believed he must be an
experienced driver.
{¶9} The best evidence the estate presented regarding Ms. Daugherty’s knowledge of
Mr. Hale’s driving record came from Ms. Layton. She testified that, sometime before her
grandmother helped Mr. Hale get the car, she heard her mother tell her grandmother that Mr.
Hale’s license had been suspended at some time in the past “over [his] insurance” and that “it
wasn’t [his] fault.” There was no indication that the suspension they discussed was a recent
problem. In any event, a suspension for failure to show proof of insurance may indicate
someone is willing to break the financial responsibility law, but it does not implicate his
technical skill in operating a motor vehicle. Even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the estate, as is required at this stage, it does not create a genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether Ms. Daugherty knew or should have known that Mr. Hale was an
incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless driver. See Mt. Nebo Baptist Church v. Cleveland Crafts
Co., 154 Ohio St. 185, paragraph two of the syllabus (1950). Ms. Daugherty is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
{¶10} There is no genuine issue of material fact, and Ms. Daugherty is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. The judgment of the Lorain County Common Pleas Court is
affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. 6
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
CLAIR E. DICKINSON FOR THE COURT
WHITMORE, P. J. MOORE, J. CONCUR
APPEARANCES:
MICHAEL J. DUFF, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
TERRENCE J. KENNEALLY, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.