Mae Hendrix v. Lautrec Ltd
This text of 924 N.W.2d 243 (Mae Hendrix v. Lautrec Ltd) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinions
On November 19, 2018, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the October 27, 2016 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
I concur in the Court's order denying leave to appeal. I agree that, under
Allison v. AEW Capital Mgt., LLP
,
Plaintiff Mae Hendrix
MCL 554.139 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(1) In every lease or license of residential premises, the lessor or licensor covenants:
(a) That the premises and all common areas are fit for the use intended by the parties.
(b) To keep the premises in reasonable repair during the term of the lease or license, and to comply with the applicable health and safety laws of the state and of the local unit of government where the premises are located, except when the disrepair or violation of the applicable health or safety laws has been caused by the tenant[']s wilful or irresponsible conduct or lack of conduct.
This statute was enacted in 1968 to codify the common-law implied warranty of habitability.
Our primary goal in interpreting a statute "is to ascertain the legislative intent that may be reasonably inferred from the words expressed in the statute."
I concur in the majority's denial order because, under Allison , which interpreted the covenant created by MCL 554.139(1)(a) as an ongoing obligation, I agree that there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant violated that covenant by failing to keep the driveway "fit for the use intended by the parties." As the Court of Appeals explained, photographs taken from the day of plaintiff's fall show that a "substantial portion" of the driveway was covered in ice formed when water from a downspout pooled in broken and depressed concrete. But, for the reasons above, I believe this Court should reconsider in an appropriate future case whether Allison 's interpretation of MCL 554.139(1)(a) as creating an ongoing obligation is consistent with the plain language of the statute.
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924 N.W.2d 243, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mae-hendrix-v-lautrec-ltd-mich-2019.