1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Christina M. Madsen, No. CV-19-03182-PHX-GMS
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 City of Phoenix,
13 Defendant. 14 15 16 Before the Court are two motions for reconsideration filed by Plaintiff Christina 17 Madsen. The first is a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Order Granting the City 18 of Phoenix’s Motion for a New Trial (Doc. 345). The second is a Motion for 19 Reconsideration of the Court’s Order Granting the City of Phoenix’s Motions in Limine 20 (Doc. 347). For the following reasons, the motion to reconsider the Order granting a new 21 trial is denied, and the motion to reconsider the motions in limine is granted in part and 22 denied in part. 23 BACKGROUND 24 This case concerns Christina Madsen’s (“Plaintiff”) hostile work environment 25 (“HWE”) claim against the City of Phoenix (“Defendant”). In April 2022, this Court held 26 a four-day jury trial. The jury rendered a verdict for the Plaintiff. After trial, the Court 27 denied Defendant’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and granted its subsequent 28 Motion for a New Trial. 1 DISCUSSION 2 I. Legal Standard 3 Under Local Rule 7.2(g), a motion for reconsideration should ordinarily be denied 4 “absent a showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority that could 5 not have been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” L.R.Civ. 7.2(g); 6 see also School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th 7 Cir. 1993) (holding that granting a motion for reconsideration is appropriate where “the 8 district court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or 9 the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in 10 controlling law”). Moreover, “[n]o motion for reconsideration of an Order may repeat any 11 oral or written argument made by the movant in support of or in opposition to the motion 12 that resulted in the Order.” L.R.Civ. 7.2(g)(1). Thus, “mere disagreement with a previous 13 order is an insufficient basis for reconsideration.” See Adame v. City of Surprise, No. CV- 14 17-03200, 2018 WL 3496955, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 20, 2018). 15 II. Motion to Reconsider New Trial Order 16 The motion to reconsider the order granting a new trial is denied because it does not 17 demonstrate manifest error. While Plaintiff points to several ways she believes the Court 18 mischaracterized or misconstrued the evidence in its Order, she does not demonstrate 19 manifest error because (1) the Court must evaluate the weight of all the evidence, and (2) 20 Plaintiff’s arguments reject the Court’s determination of the relevant time frame in which 21 a reasonable jury could have found that a hostile work environment existed. 22 The Court may not grant a new trial “simply because it would have arrived at a 23 different verdict.” Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 24 819 (9th Cir. 2001). However, to determine whether the verdict was against the clear 25 weight of the evidence, “the district court can weigh the evidence [and] make credibility 26 determinations.” Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com, 762 F.3d 829, 841 27 (9th Cir. 2014). 28 Plaintiff highlights several individual pieces of evidence which she suggests 1 demonstrate that the Court committed manifest error in granting a new trial. However, 2 evaluating the weight of the evidence necessarily requires evaluating all of the evidence, 3 rather than individual pieces. Plaintiff highlights certain discrete pieces of evidence or 4 testimony that suggest a jury could find in her favor. On the Defendant’s Motion for 5 Judgment as a Matter of Law, when the Court was required to “draw all reasonable 6 inferences in favor of the nonmoving party” and “disregard all evidence favorable to the 7 moving party that the jury [was] not required to believe,” it did so. Reeves v. Sanderson 8 Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149, 151 (2000). In the order denying judgment as a 9 matter of law, the Court deferred completely to these isolated pieces of evidence, finding 10 that if the jury completely rejected competing testimony, the evidence Plaintiff highlights 11 was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in her favor. However, when evaluating the 12 weight of the evidence, the Court viewed all of the evidence, including competing 13 evidence. Experience Hendrix, 762 F.3d at 841. Thus, any argument that the Court was 14 required to defer more substantially to Plaintiff’s evidence or reject Defendant’s evidence 15 is not grounds for reconsideration. 16 Moreover, most of Plaintiff’s argument rests on a rejection of the Court’s conclusion 17 that the clear weight of the evidence shows a hostile work environment did not begin until 18 late March 2018 and the City took remedial action by May 1, 2018, when it removed Mr. 19 Graci from Ms. Madsen’s supervision. As explained in the New Trial Order, Defendant’s 20 obligation to remedy or prevent a hostile work environment necessarily cannot arise until 21 a hostile work environment exists. (Doc. 340 at 4-5.) Plaintiff does not present facts or 22 evidence to show the conclusion that the hostile work environment did not arise until late 23 March 2018 constitutes manifest error. She highlights incidents that occurred between Mr. 24 Graci and Plaintiff or other women in the workplace before March 2018. However, as the 25 Court has previously stated, “[a]lthough Plaintiff may have rendered complaints to her 26 supervisor, Ms. Reynolds, about Mr. Graci prior to March 2018, those complaints 27 addressed insubordinate behavior by an employee, and did not indicate that Plaintiff felt 28 fearful or harassed by Mr. Graci.” (Doc. 340 at 4.) Those incidents and complaints thus 1 remain insufficient to support the existence of a hostile work environment, and thus the 2 City’s obligation to respond, prior to late March 2018. 3 Plaintiff also does not present facts or evidence indicating that the hostile work 4 environment was not remedied by Mr. Graci’s removal from her supervision on May 1, 5 2018. While she states that on May 7, 2018, Ms. Benton reported that Mr. Graci “was 6 treating her with unprofessionalism or flat disrespect,” there is no evidence that this 7 interaction with Ms. Benton affected or harmed Ms. Madsen. In light of the remaining 8 evidence that no further incidents occurred after May 1, 2018, this is insufficient to 9 demonstrate an ongoing hostile work environment that the City failed to remedy. 10 The relevant time frame created by the evidence from trial continues to be late 11 March 2018 to May 1, 2018. When addressing the evidence within that time frame, 12 Plaintiff’s motion essentially raises the same arguments she made in response to the Rule 13 59 motion. Though Plaintiff may disagree with the conclusion reached, disagreement is an 14 insufficient basis for reconsideration and does not demonstrate manifest error. 15 Therefore, the Court will not reconsider its order granting a new trial. Moreover, 16 because the Court does not reconsider its grant of a new trial on liability grounds, it also 17 does not reconsider its ruling on excessive damages as a reason for granting a new trial. 18 And because the verdict on liability was against the clear weight of the evidence, a trial on 19 only damages or remittitur would be inappropriate. 20 III. Motion to Reconsider Motions in Limine 21 Plaintiff has also moved for reconsideration of the Court’s previous order granting 22 the City’s motions in limine.
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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Christina M. Madsen, No. CV-19-03182-PHX-GMS
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 City of Phoenix,
13 Defendant. 14 15 16 Before the Court are two motions for reconsideration filed by Plaintiff Christina 17 Madsen. The first is a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Order Granting the City 18 of Phoenix’s Motion for a New Trial (Doc. 345). The second is a Motion for 19 Reconsideration of the Court’s Order Granting the City of Phoenix’s Motions in Limine 20 (Doc. 347). For the following reasons, the motion to reconsider the Order granting a new 21 trial is denied, and the motion to reconsider the motions in limine is granted in part and 22 denied in part. 23 BACKGROUND 24 This case concerns Christina Madsen’s (“Plaintiff”) hostile work environment 25 (“HWE”) claim against the City of Phoenix (“Defendant”). In April 2022, this Court held 26 a four-day jury trial. The jury rendered a verdict for the Plaintiff. After trial, the Court 27 denied Defendant’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and granted its subsequent 28 Motion for a New Trial. 1 DISCUSSION 2 I. Legal Standard 3 Under Local Rule 7.2(g), a motion for reconsideration should ordinarily be denied 4 “absent a showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority that could 5 not have been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” L.R.Civ. 7.2(g); 6 see also School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th 7 Cir. 1993) (holding that granting a motion for reconsideration is appropriate where “the 8 district court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or 9 the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in 10 controlling law”). Moreover, “[n]o motion for reconsideration of an Order may repeat any 11 oral or written argument made by the movant in support of or in opposition to the motion 12 that resulted in the Order.” L.R.Civ. 7.2(g)(1). Thus, “mere disagreement with a previous 13 order is an insufficient basis for reconsideration.” See Adame v. City of Surprise, No. CV- 14 17-03200, 2018 WL 3496955, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 20, 2018). 15 II. Motion to Reconsider New Trial Order 16 The motion to reconsider the order granting a new trial is denied because it does not 17 demonstrate manifest error. While Plaintiff points to several ways she believes the Court 18 mischaracterized or misconstrued the evidence in its Order, she does not demonstrate 19 manifest error because (1) the Court must evaluate the weight of all the evidence, and (2) 20 Plaintiff’s arguments reject the Court’s determination of the relevant time frame in which 21 a reasonable jury could have found that a hostile work environment existed. 22 The Court may not grant a new trial “simply because it would have arrived at a 23 different verdict.” Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 24 819 (9th Cir. 2001). However, to determine whether the verdict was against the clear 25 weight of the evidence, “the district court can weigh the evidence [and] make credibility 26 determinations.” Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com, 762 F.3d 829, 841 27 (9th Cir. 2014). 28 Plaintiff highlights several individual pieces of evidence which she suggests 1 demonstrate that the Court committed manifest error in granting a new trial. However, 2 evaluating the weight of the evidence necessarily requires evaluating all of the evidence, 3 rather than individual pieces. Plaintiff highlights certain discrete pieces of evidence or 4 testimony that suggest a jury could find in her favor. On the Defendant’s Motion for 5 Judgment as a Matter of Law, when the Court was required to “draw all reasonable 6 inferences in favor of the nonmoving party” and “disregard all evidence favorable to the 7 moving party that the jury [was] not required to believe,” it did so. Reeves v. Sanderson 8 Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149, 151 (2000). In the order denying judgment as a 9 matter of law, the Court deferred completely to these isolated pieces of evidence, finding 10 that if the jury completely rejected competing testimony, the evidence Plaintiff highlights 11 was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in her favor. However, when evaluating the 12 weight of the evidence, the Court viewed all of the evidence, including competing 13 evidence. Experience Hendrix, 762 F.3d at 841. Thus, any argument that the Court was 14 required to defer more substantially to Plaintiff’s evidence or reject Defendant’s evidence 15 is not grounds for reconsideration. 16 Moreover, most of Plaintiff’s argument rests on a rejection of the Court’s conclusion 17 that the clear weight of the evidence shows a hostile work environment did not begin until 18 late March 2018 and the City took remedial action by May 1, 2018, when it removed Mr. 19 Graci from Ms. Madsen’s supervision. As explained in the New Trial Order, Defendant’s 20 obligation to remedy or prevent a hostile work environment necessarily cannot arise until 21 a hostile work environment exists. (Doc. 340 at 4-5.) Plaintiff does not present facts or 22 evidence to show the conclusion that the hostile work environment did not arise until late 23 March 2018 constitutes manifest error. She highlights incidents that occurred between Mr. 24 Graci and Plaintiff or other women in the workplace before March 2018. However, as the 25 Court has previously stated, “[a]lthough Plaintiff may have rendered complaints to her 26 supervisor, Ms. Reynolds, about Mr. Graci prior to March 2018, those complaints 27 addressed insubordinate behavior by an employee, and did not indicate that Plaintiff felt 28 fearful or harassed by Mr. Graci.” (Doc. 340 at 4.) Those incidents and complaints thus 1 remain insufficient to support the existence of a hostile work environment, and thus the 2 City’s obligation to respond, prior to late March 2018. 3 Plaintiff also does not present facts or evidence indicating that the hostile work 4 environment was not remedied by Mr. Graci’s removal from her supervision on May 1, 5 2018. While she states that on May 7, 2018, Ms. Benton reported that Mr. Graci “was 6 treating her with unprofessionalism or flat disrespect,” there is no evidence that this 7 interaction with Ms. Benton affected or harmed Ms. Madsen. In light of the remaining 8 evidence that no further incidents occurred after May 1, 2018, this is insufficient to 9 demonstrate an ongoing hostile work environment that the City failed to remedy. 10 The relevant time frame created by the evidence from trial continues to be late 11 March 2018 to May 1, 2018. When addressing the evidence within that time frame, 12 Plaintiff’s motion essentially raises the same arguments she made in response to the Rule 13 59 motion. Though Plaintiff may disagree with the conclusion reached, disagreement is an 14 insufficient basis for reconsideration and does not demonstrate manifest error. 15 Therefore, the Court will not reconsider its order granting a new trial. Moreover, 16 because the Court does not reconsider its grant of a new trial on liability grounds, it also 17 does not reconsider its ruling on excessive damages as a reason for granting a new trial. 18 And because the verdict on liability was against the clear weight of the evidence, a trial on 19 only damages or remittitur would be inappropriate. 20 III. Motion to Reconsider Motions in Limine 21 Plaintiff has also moved for reconsideration of the Court’s previous order granting 22 the City’s motions in limine. Specifically, in the first Order Setting Trial (Doc. 251), the 23 Court granted Defendants’ Motion in Limine #2 (Doc. 233) as to Exhibits 27 and 51 and 24 granted Defendants’ Motion in Limine #4 (Doc. 235). 25 A. Motion in Limine #2 26 At the final pretrial conference, the Court recognized that the Motion in Limine 27 seeking to exclude all evidence related to Ms. Benton’s alleged claim that Mr. Graci treated 28 her differently because she is a woman was likely overbroad. However, it also recognized 1 that Exhibit 27 and Exhibit 51 related to events that happened after Mr. Graci was removed 2 from Ms. Madsen’s supervision. At that time, Plaintiff’s counsel stated that she could not 3 think of any evidence in their possession that demonstrated a hostile work environment 4 remained after Ms. Madsen no longer supervised Mr. Graci. In relation to the voicemail 5 constituting Exhibit 27, the Court said, “you’re not going to be able to get that one in, 6 unless you can demonstrate for me that there was some sort of harassment – harassing 7 environment that endured after Mr. Graci was no longer supervised by Ms. Madsen.” (Doc. 8 252 at 26:3-7.) 9 Some confusion ensued in the conversation that followed. Defendants raised the 10 fact that Exhibit 51 presented the same concerns because it encompasses events that 11 occurred after Mr. Graci was removed from Ms. Madsen’s supervision. The Court then 12 said “if, in fact, Exhibit 27 and 51 are the voicemail and the transmission of that voicemail, 13 the motion is granted.” (Doc. 252 at 26: 20-22.) Subsequently, at trial, the Court admitted 14 Exhibit 51 over Defendants’ objection. Throughout trial, several instances demonstrated a 15 lack of clarity around the scope of the order granting the Motion in Limine. (See Trial 16 Transcript at 239:9-241:13.) The uncertainty appeared to stem from differing 17 understandings about whether the Court’s ruling applied to a subset of Beth Benton’s 18 complaints that occurred after Ms. Madsen was no longer supervising Mr. Graci or whether 19 it applied more generally to Ms. Benton’s complaints about disparate treatment. 20 As the post-trial motions and orders demonstrate, the timeline of events in this case 21 is particularly important to determining whether a given piece of evidence is relevant to 22 the hostile work environment claim. Plaintiff apparently seeks to use these documents, at 23 the very least, to demonstrate that the City was on notice that Mr. Graci was creating a sex- 24 based hostile work environment. Defendants assert that the documents are not relevant to 25 that point because “there is no evidence Plaintiff continued to endure a harassing 26 environment after Mr. Graci was no longer supervised by Plaintiff after May 1, 2018.” 27 (Doc. 349 at 3.) 28 As soon as the City took adequate remedial steps to remedy a potential hostile work 1 environment, Mr. Graci’s conduct toward other women—and the City’s notice of such 2 conduct—becomes largely irrelevant. However, this inquiry relies, at least to some degree, 3 on the specific timeframe in which Plaintiff seeks to prove that the City (1) had notice and 4 (2) failed to take remedial measures. While the Court apparently based its initial ruling on 5 the Motion in Limine on the fact that no further harassment occurred after the removal of 6 Mr. Graci from Plaintiff’s supervision, it ultimately admitted other evidence pertaining to 7 events after the May 1, 2018, removal of Mr. Graci to show notice. 8 In light of the parties’ varied understandings of the bases for these rulings and the 9 fact that the relevance of testimony pertaining to how Mr. Graci treated Ms. Benton is 10 dependent on other facts and evidence that may or may not be presented to the jury, the 11 Court grants the Motion for Reconsideration. It remains doubtful that these pieces of 12 evidence are relevant to show notice if no further harassment occurred after Mr. Graci was 13 not supervised by Ms. Madsen. And depending on the way in which this evidence is used, 14 Plaintiff risks running afoul Rule 403 by confusing the jury and addressing claims already 15 dismissed on summary judgment. Nevertheless, to avoid premature or conflicting rulings 16 on evidence relevant to this Motion in Limine, it is denied without prejudice. 17 B. Motion in Limine #4 18 The Court previously granted Defendants’ Motion in Limine #4, excluding evidence 19 “relating to TX 16, TX 43, TX 44, asking Janice Pitts about Mr. Graci’s complaint and her 20 handling of it, or any evidence relating to the City’s handling of Mr. Graci’s complaint.” 21 (Doc. 235 at 3.) Plaintiff apparently argues that the Court should reconsider this motion 22 because of new, unforeseen facts that could not have been considered at the time of the 23 motion. Specifically, she asserts that she could not have foreseen testimony that Janice 24 Pitts had a practice of referring employees who had concerns about harassment or 25 discrimination to the City’s Equal Opportunity Division. 26 Even if such testimony could be characterized as unforeseeable, Plaintiff remains 27 free to challenge that Ms. Pitts did not follow this practice when addressing Plaintiff’s 28 complaints. However, Plaintiff’s assertion that “evidence of Pitts’ handling of Graci’s 1 || complaint is admissible to demonstrate that on that particular occasion, Pitts acted in 2|| accordance with her/the City’s patterns and practices” is a repackaging of the disparate || treatment claim that has already been dismissed. (Doc. 347 at 10.) Underpinning that 4|| assertion is that Pitts acted in accordance with her practices for Mr. Graci, but did not for 5 || Ms. Madsen. Such a comparison is not relevant to the hostile work environment claim and 6 || does not become relevant based on Ms. Pitts’ testimony. And, in any event, it continues to || present significant concerns under Rule 403. Any probative value that this evidence may || have is significantly outweighed by the likelihood that it will confuse the jury and raise 9|| previously dismissed claims. As such, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied as to || Motion in Limine #4, and that Motion in Limine remains granted. 11 CONCLUSION 12 Accordingly, 13 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting the City of Phoenix’s Motion for a New Trial (Doc. 345) is DENIED. 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 347) of Order Granting the City of Phoenix’s Motions in Limine is GRANTED in part and 17 || DENIED in part. It is granted as to the City of Phoenix’s Motion in Limine #2, which is |} denied without prejudice. It is denied as to the City of Phoenix’s Motion in Limine #4, || which remains granted. An Amended Order Setting Trial that includes the rulings on the 20 || motions in limine will be issued. 21 Dated this 16th day of August, 2023. 22 Wi, 23 A Whacrsay Sooo) 4 Chief United States District Judge 25 26 27 28
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